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Thesis Abstract 
This thesis provides a theoretical and empirical examination of the contentious 
“sovereignty” dispute between Taiwan and China, especially following the signing of 
the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010. 
Distinctive from many contemporary studies of cross-Strait relations, this research 
analyzes Beijing’s and Taipei’s political agendas regarding sovereignty in the broader 
context of East Asian economic integration, as the ECFA is in fact the byproduct of 
their regional strategies. Commercial diplomacy and interdependence theory 
constitute the theoretical framework of this thesis. Moreover, this thesis employs 
various definitions of sovereignty in order to evaluate the extent to which China has 
impacted upon Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of economic integration. 
 
By employing document analysis and elite interview methodologies, this thesis 
finds that Taipei has a limited ability to protect its sovereignty from China’s 
commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era. This outcome can be explained by 
Beijing’s efforts to marginalize Taiwan during the construction of East Asian 
regionalism, which has driven Taipei to shift its strategy from confrontation to 
cooperation with Beijing so as to secure its economic and sovereignty interests. To 
date, economic integration features centrally in Taiwan’s new Mainland policy. This 
has increased the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, which gives 
greater scope for Beijing to wield commercial diplomacy to infringe upon Taiwan’s 
domestic, functional, and de jure sovereignty. 
 
This thesis makes two overall contributions. The most significant contribution 
of this thesis is its pioneering research approach, which analyzes how China and 
Taiwan reconcile their economic interests and sovereignty concerns through the lens 
of commercial diplomacy. Furthermore, by categorizing sovereignty according to its 
different aspects, this thesis also contributes to the understanding of the effectiveness 
of China’s commercial diplomacy in furthering its sovereignty interests with regards 
to Taiwan. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Cross-Strait Relations in the Post-ECFA Era: Arguments and Questions 
Economic integration has become the main impetus for the rapprochement of 
the relationship between China and Taiwan since the 1990s.1 This dynamic became 
much more salient in China’s Taiwan policy when both sides signed the Cross-Strait 
Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2010 based on the 
ambiguous “one-China principle”the 1992 Consensus.2 This thesis argues that the 
ongoing process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region has helped China 
to convince Taiwan of the benefits of cross-Strait economic integration. This has 
allowed Beijing to infringe on Taiwan’s sovereignty by utilizing commercial 
diplomacy in the process of cross-Strait economic integration, which is in turn 
favorable for China’s goal of achieving peaceful reunification. This thesis employs 
document analysis and elite interviewing to evaluate the effectiveness of China’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan, particularly from the decision to commence 
negotiation over the ECFA in 2008 to the emergence of the Sunflower Movement in 
2014, which resulted in the stagnation of cross-Strait economic integration. However, 
this thesis will also tackle a number of further questions. To what extent has China 
infringed on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of economic integration? How 
effective is China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan? Under what conditions 
can China enhance its influence over Taiwan by utilizing commercial diplomacy? 
																																																								
1 China refers to the People’s Republic of China, PRC, Mainland China, the Chinese mainland, the 
Mainland, and Beijing, whereas Taiwan refers to the Republic of China, the ROC in abbreviation, 
Chinese Taipei, and Taipei. Notably, these titles in this thesis are for academic research only; I have no 
intention to define either side’s political status in reality. 
2 Pasha L. Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law”, Journal of 
International Economic Law 14, no. 1 (2011): 121-22. 
	 2 
These research questions are very important for three reasons, which stem from 
debates over the current development of cross-Strait relationsespecially with 
respect to impacts of cross-Strait economic integration on Taiwan’s sovereignty
while the effectiveness of China’s Taiwan strategy has often been exaggerated. 
 
Firstly, contemporary literature on cross-Strait relations has the propensity to 
discuss the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty in the context of economic integration 
across the Taiwan Strait, yet the definition of sovereignty remains unclear. Indeed, 
scholars who contend that Taiwan’s sovereignty has been eroded in the process of 
economic integration pay close attention to the guiding principle of China’s Taiwan 
policy “using economics to push for reunification”. 3  Furthermore, Taiwan’s 
reacceptance of the 1992 Consensus is important evidence in support of these 
arguments. However, asserting that cross-Strait economic integration would 
automatically result in cross-Strait peaceful reunification based on the 1992 
Consensus is equal to hypothesizing that the ECFA can directly alter the status quo 
across the Taiwan Strait, which is not in accordance with reality. 
 
As will be discussed in chapter 2, the 1992 Consensus is, in essence, a flexible 
version of the “one-China principle”.4 In brief, the 1992 Consensus emphasizes that 
both the mainland and Taiwan belong to “the only one-China in the world”, but it 
allows Beijing and Taipei to have different definitions of which side represents 
																																																								
3 For more examples, please see: Tsai-Lung Hong and Chih-hai Yang, “The Economic Cooperation 
Framework Agreement between China and Taiwan: Understanding Its Economics and Politics”, Asian 
Economic Papers 10, no. 3 (2011): 79-96; Joe Thomas Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook for 
Relationship across the Taiwan Strait”, Issues & Studies 48, no. 4 (2012): 113-43.  
4 Dennis V. Hickey, “Wake Up to Reality: Taiwan, the Chinese Mainland and Peace across the Taiwan 
Strait”, Journal of Chinese Political Science 18, no.1 (2013): 4-7; Chi Su, Taiwan’s Relations with 
Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (New York: Routledge, 2010), 46-47. 
	 3 
“China”.5 Therefore, rather than resolving the disputed sovereignty issue between 
both sides, the key function of the 1992 Consensus is to shelve this controversy 
whilst promoting cross-Strait economic integration. In order to support the argument 
that China has infringed on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of economic 
integration, a detailed analysis of what impact the 1992 Consensus has had on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty is essential. As such, this thesis divides sovereignty into 
Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, 
interdependence sovereignty, and functional sovereignty according to the works of 
Stephen Krasner and Sigrid Winkler so as to examine the effectiveness of China’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan.6 
 
Furthermore, given the increasing degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on 
China facilitated by the ECFA, scholars have pointed out that Beijing has the 
potential to either coerce or lure Taipei to comply with its political agendas.7 
Nonetheless, this argument needs further careful evaluation. In fact, despite the fact 
that the ECFA aims to fully liberalize cross-Strait trade relations based upon 
regulations of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as will be discussed in more 
detail in the third section, most of the sub-agreements of the ECFA have been 
pending as a result of the emergence of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan on 
March 18th, 2014.8 This movement suggests that Taiwan’s domestic politics could 
easily constrain the progress of cross-Strait economic integration. Most importantly, 																																																								
5 Ibid. 
6 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: University Press of Princeton, 
1999), 3-4; Sigrid Winkler, “Can Trade Make a Sovereign? Taiwan-China-EU Relations in the WTO”, 
Asia Europe Journal 6, no. 3 (2008): 467-85.  
7 Chen-Yuan Tung, “Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China’s Leverage and Taiwan’s Vulnerability”, 
Issues & Studies 39, no.3 (2003): 137-75; Murray S. Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against 
Taiwan: A Tricky Weapon to Use (Pittsburgh: RAND, 2007), 1-9.  
8 Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan ECFA”, 124-31; Chen-Yuan Tung and Jason Yeh, “Development of a 
Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement: Strategy, Review, and Outlook”, The 
Chinese Economy 47, no. 3 (2014): 40-44. 
	 4 
it also indicates that trade barriers between Taiwan and China have still not been 
entirely removed. The most prominent example is the pending Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Trade in Services (CSSTA), which affects bilateral economic 
exchanges between service industries. Since service industries contributed nearly 
70% of Taiwan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2014, the argument that 
Taiwan’s economy is heavily dependent on the Chinese market is questionable.9 
Therefore, this thesis will carefully analyze the effectiveness of China’s commercial 
diplomacy towards Taiwan in the context of asymmetric economic interdependence 
across the Taiwan Strait. 
 
Finally, when skeptics argue that the ECFA magnifies former Taiwanese 
President Ma Ying-jeou’s “China-leaning policy”, putting sovereignty in danger, 
Taiwan’s strategic concern over the ECFA seems to be left out.10 In fact, any issue of 
cross-Strait relations has never been a purely bilateral affair, and issues surrounding 
economic integration across the Taiwan Strait are no exception. According to former 
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s strategic concern behind the EFCA is 
to avoid “economic isolation” by participating in the ongoing process of regional 
economic integration, especially the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).11 To achieve this strategic 
goal, Taipei must improve cross-Strait relations so as to remove obstacles to 
																																																								
9 Ian Rowen, “Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a Student-Occupied 
Parliament, and the Future of the Region”, The Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 1 (2015): 6.  
10 Stephane Corcuff, “Ma Ying-jeou’s China-leaning Policy and the 1683 Fall of the Zheng in Taiwan: 
A Cross-centuries Geopolitical Comparison”, in National Identity and Economic Interest: Taiwan’s 
Competing Options and Their Implications for Regional Stability, ed. Peter C. Y. Chow (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 93-124. 
11 Peng Li, “The Nature of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement and Its Implication for 
the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations”, in New Dynamics in Cross-Taiwan Straits 
Relations: How Far can the Rapprochement Go?, ed. Weixing Hu (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
47-48. 
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Taiwan’s international space created by Beijing.12 As such, the ECFA is crucial for 
Taiwan’s regional strategy. 
 
Since signing the ECFA with Beijing, Taipei has signed several free trade 
agreements (FTA) with its trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region, and the issue 
of its participation in regional economic integration also seems negotiable.13 In this 
light, there is a possibility for Taipei to decrease the degree of economic dependence 
on the Chinese market.14 Moreover, following the expansion of its international 
space, Taipei could further consolidate its international legal sovereignty, which may 
influence the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. As 
such, this thesis explores cross-Strait economic integration in the context of regional 
economic integration. Chapter 3 of this thesis will introduce both China’s and 
Taiwan’s roles in recent waves of East Asian regionalism and regionalization. The 
impact of regional economic integration on both Beijing’s and Taipei’s strategies for 
tackling cross-Strait relations will be discussed in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
 
This thesis starts by introducing commercial diplomacy together with the grand 
strategy of contemporary China’s Taiwan policy. The third section of this chapter 
introduces the ECFA and its key features. The fourth section brings in the approaches 
adopted by scholars to analyze cross-Strait relations in the context of regional 
economic integration and discusses their limitations. Finally, in addition to 
introducing the structure of this thesis, the methodology of document analysis and 
																																																								
12 Jie Huang, “TPP Versus ECFA: Similarities, Differences, and China’s Strategies”, The China 
Review 12, no. 2 (2012): 86-88. 
13 Michael I. Magcamit and Alexander C. Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon: Understanding 
Taiwan’s Sovereignty and Trade Linkages in the Twenty-first Century”, International Relations of the 
Asia-Pacific 15, no. 1 (2015): 92-99. 
14 Jie Huang, “TPP Versus ECFA”, 86-88. 
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elite interviewing will also be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 	
1.2 China’s Commercial Diplomacy and the ECFA 
1.2.1 Why Commercial Diplomacy and not Economic Statecraft? 
Applying commercial diplomacy to study contemporary PRC-Taiwan relations 
in the context of bilateral and regional economic integration is a key original 
contribution of this thesis. Most work on cross-Strait relations still revolves — either 
explicitly or implicitly — around the theory of economic statecraft, stressing China’s 
ability to pursue economic coercion or even impose economic sanctions on Taiwan. 
This thesis is the first academic work what departs from this dominant position and 
explores cross-Strait relations in the post-ECFA era through the lens of commercial 
diplomacy. The justification for the use of commercial diplomacy in this research is 
rooted in Beijing’s intention to further its political agenda of peaceful reunification in 
the process of cross-Strait economic integration; particularly following the signing of 
the ECFA with Taiwan in 2010.15 Before exploring the manner in which commercial 
diplomacy represents Beijing’s core strategy for tackling “the Taiwan issue”, it is 
first essential to define what commercial diplomacy is.  
 
According to Ellen Frost’s work, published in 2007, commercial diplomacy is: 
“the use of commercial power such as market access or technology transfer to 
influence noncommercial decisions in the political or even the security realm”.16 
																																																								
15 Scott L. Kastner, “Buying Influence? Assessing the Political Effects of China’s International Trade”, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 60, no. 6 (2016): 984. 
16 Ellen L. Frost, “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or Threat?” in China’s Rise and 
the Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (Pittsburgh: 
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Notably, the concept of commercial diplomacy has not yet been widely used to 
explain Beijing’s regional strategy. Neither has this been a major theoretical principle 
applied to Taiwan’s regional and global position and role. The key reason for this 
lacuna is the narrow definition of commercial diplomacy that was employed before 
the 2000s. 
 
Prior to the publication of Frost’s work, most literature narrowly defined 
commercial diplomacy as a state’s diplomatic strategy for influencing other nations’ 
decisions, particularly with respect to “liberalizing trade and investment”.17 As such, 
the conventional wisdom in “commercial diplomacy” seldom touches upon issues 
beyond the economic realm. However, apart from economic interests, strategic 
concerns over the distribution of power, influence, and even sovereignty can also be 
salient motivating factors underlying commercial diplomacy.18 For example, as will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter 3, under the strategic guideline of “pivoting to 
Asia”, promoting the TPP was a key strategy in Washington’s attempt to solidify its 
regional leadership during Barack Obama’s presidency. 19  By the same token, 
Beijing’s RCEP and “One Belt One Road” initiatives furthered its political agendas 
of acquiring greater regional clout under the guideline of “peaceful influence”.20 
 
																																																																																																																																																													
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 96-97. 
17 G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 210-24; 
Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
and Its Impact on National Commercial Policies and Techniques (London: Michael Joseph Limited, 
1965), 1-9.  
18 Frost, “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia”, 96-97. 
19 Tun-Jen Cheng and Peter C. Y. Chow, “The TPP and the Pivot: Economic and Security Nexus”, in 
The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations: Economic and Security Dynamics. ed. 
Peter C. Y. Chow (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 114-18. 
20 Jagannath P. Panda, “Factoring the RCEP and TPP: China, India and the Politics of Regional 
Integration”, Strategic Analysis 38, no.1 (2014): 49-50; Peter Ferdinand, “Westward Ho-the China 
Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping”, International Affairs 92, 
no. 4 (2016): 948-55. 
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In response to these phenomena, instead of expanding the definition of 
commercial diplomacy, scholars have preferred to adopt the theory of economic 
statecraft for studying how states use economic power to furthering their political 
interests.21 According to David A. Baldwin, economic statecraft can be broadly 
understood as “influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a 
reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money”.22 By comparing this 
broad definition with Frost’s definition of commercial diplomacy, it is clear that both 
concepts aim to understand how state actors utilize “economic resources” to enhance 
the degree of their “influence” vis-à-vis their counterparts so as to further their 
agendas.23 In addition, both economic statecraft and commercial diplomacy contend 
that establishing economic interdependencies with “target states” is a prerequisite for 
acquiring influence.24 However, the subsequent focal points of these two types of 
research are very different. 
 
First of all, as discussed in chapter 2.5, commercial diplomacy emphasizes the 
importance of furthering political agendas by providing “positive-sum economic 
incentives” to “target states”. 25  The economic statecraft literature pays close 
attention to studying how state actors benefit economically and otherwise when 
employing coercive measures in an interdependent relationship, especially with 
																																																								
21 For more works about Chinese economic statecraft, please see: Adam Segal, “Chinese Economic 
Statecraft and the Political Economy of Asian Security”, in China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence 
in Asia, ed. William W. Keller and Thomas G. Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2007), 146-61; William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, 
and State Control (New York: Cornell University Press, 2016).  
22 David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985), 13-14. 
23 Ibid., see also: Frost, “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia”, 96-97.  
24 Deborah Brautigam and Xiaoyang Tang, “Economic Statecraft in China’s New Overseas Special 
Economic Zones: Soft Power, Business or Resource Security”, International Affairs 88, no. 4 (2012): 
802-3; Frost, “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia”, 96-99; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. 
Ripsman, Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State 
Conclusions (New York: Routledge, 2013), 6. 
25 Frost, “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia”, 96-99. 
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regard to economic sanctions.26 In the case of cross-Strait economic integration, as 
shown in the section 1.4.2.1 of this chapter, Beijing’s ability to impose economic 
sanctions on Taiwan is a focal point of economic statecraft.27 But this on its own 
does not tell the full story. Under the Chinese guideline of “peaceful reunification”, 
economic sanctions have rarely been a pragmatic option for Beijing.28 Rather, in an 
attempt to shape Taiwanese attitudes towards “peaceful reunification”, Chinese 
leaders often emphasize the spirit of “win-win” and the principles of “mutual 
benefits”. 29  This necessitates scholars adopting the theoretical apparatus of 
commercial diplomacy to re-conceptualize China’s Taiwan policy. 
 
Furthermore, the focus of economic statecraft narrows the scope of analysis. 
Indeed, while the effectiveness of state coercion is the main theme of the literature on 
economic statecraft, the discussion seemingly focuses on the comparison of 
economic power between state actors in an interdependent relationship at the 
bilateral level so as to discern which party is more vulnerable to sanctions.30 
According by this approach, China should possess great influence over Taiwan by 
manipulating economic statecraft, owing to the asymmetric economic 
interdependencies and economic power across the Taiwan Strait. Contrary to this 
argument, as discussed in chapters 3, 4, and 6, Taiwanese manufacturers have also 
																																																								
26 Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, Economic Statecraft and Foreign Policy: 
Sanctions, Incentives, and Target State Conclusions (New York: Routledge, 2013), 6. 
27 Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft, 15-21; Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 
1-5. 
28 Chong-Pin Lin, “Goodwill and Proactive Exchange Policy: How Taipei Manages the Cross-Strait 
Relations”, Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 29 (2001): 712-14. 
29 Li, “The Nature of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 50-57. 
30 Daniel W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics”, 
International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 11-18; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, and 
Norrin M. Ripsman, “The Political Economy of National Security: Economic Statecraft, 
Interdependence, and International Conflict”, in Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, 
Interdependence and National Security, ed. Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, and 
Norrin M. Ripsman (New York: Frank Cass, 2000), 3-5. 
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played important roles in the process of China’s economic modernization since the 
1990s.31 In this case, China may also suffer considerable economic losses by 
displaying coercive behavior towards Taiwan, and thus Chinese economic statecraft 
towards Taiwan is not as strong or aggressive as is assumed in this theory. Thus, 
analyses based on economic statecraft cannot explain how both sides “influence” one 
another in the process of cross-Strait economic integration. 
 
In addition, neither can the theory of economic statecraft sufficiently explain 
Taiwan’s strategy for consolidating its de jure sovereignty under Ma Ying-jeou’s 
presidency. As discussed in chapters 5 and 6, asymmetric economic interdependence 
across the Taiwan Strait did assist Beijing in convincing Taiwan to sign the ECFA. 
However, in contradiction to Beijing’s unification strategy towards Taiwan, after 
improving cross-Strait relations, Taipei then “seesawed” between Beijing and 
Washington in an attempt to expand its international space by participating in the 
TPP and RCEP.32 In this context, to study both China’s and Taiwan’s strategies for 
managing cross-Strait relations, it is essential to extend our analysis from the 
bilateral to the regional level; or more correctly, to study both the bilateral and 
regional dimensions at the same time, and the way that these two levels interact. 
Through the lens of commercial diplomacy, this thesis provides a more 
comprehensive analysis of both Beijing’s and Taipei’s sovereignty agendas and their 
strategies towards each other by studying contemporary relations across the Taiwan 
Strait in the broader context of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. 	
																																																								
31 Scott L. Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and 
Beyond (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 86-99. 
32 Li, “The Nature of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 47-48. 
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1.2.2 Contemporary Strategy of China’s Taiwan Policy: Commercial Diplomacy 
Since the late 1980s, despite the fact cross-Strait economic exchanges have 
provided Taiwan with greater opportunities to boost its economic performance,  
challenges to sovereignty also captured the attention of Taiwanese leaders, especially 
when China aims to fulfill its national goal of peaceful reunification by facilitating 
cross-Strait economic integration.33 What makes commercial diplomacy salient in 
China’s Taiwan policy actually stems from Beijing’s intention to incorporate 
economic interests with political agendas of peaceful reunification since 
administration of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Following the implementation of 
China’s “reform and opening up” policy in 1978, pursuing economic development in 
a peaceful environment became China’s priority. 34  Chinese leaders adopted 
“peaceful reunification” as the guideline for their Taiwan policy, so long as Taiwan 
did not show signs of unilaterally announcing independence, which would force 
Beijing to adopt a military response.35 Under this guideline, artillery engagements 
between China and Taiwan that had lasted for thirty years ceased. 36  Most 
significantly, from 1978 onwards, as shown in every PRC White Paper regarding the 
Taiwan issue, Chinese leaders adopted the strategy of facilitating economic exchange 
across the Taiwan Strait as the first step for leading Taiwan towards peaceful 
reunification.37 However, economic incentives provided by China have never been 																																																								
33 Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (TAO), “The Taiwan 
Question and Reunification of China”, 1993, accessed January 13, 2015 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103 /t20110316_1789216.htm. 
34 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 1-5. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, 2005), 15. 
37 The National People’s Congress of the PRC (NPC), “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, 1979, 
accessed January 13, 2015, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/OneChinaPrinciple/201103/t20110317_1790061.htm; TAO, “The 
Taiwan Question and Reunification of China” ; TAO, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan 
Issue”, 2000, accessed January 13, 2015,  
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/WhitePapers/201103/t20110316_ 1789217.htm . 
	 12 
unconditional. The “one-China principle” defining Taiwan as “an inalienable part of 
China” has also been a precondition for cross-Strait negotiations and even bilateral 
economic cooperation.38  Nevertheless, the effectiveness of China’s commercial 
diplomacy towards Taiwan was not prominent before 2008. 
 
As will be detailed in chapter 4, Beijing’s proposals regarding cross-Strait trade 
liberalization received strong opposition from Taipei during President Lee Teng-hui 
and President Chen Shui-bian’s presidencies, due to their concern over the erosion of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty.39 Despite the fact that low-cost production factors in the 
mainland market have allowed Taiwanese entrepreneurs to pursue high profits 
following China’s economic ascendance in the 1980s, Taipei was still reluctant to 
remove barriers to bilateral trade and investment.40 President Lee’s “No Haste, Be 
Patient” policy and President Chen’s policy of “Effective Opening, Active 
Management” were the clearest evidence of this.41 
 
In general, by reviewing literature on cross-Strait relations, it is clear that 
Taipei’s conservative policy for opening cross-Strait economic exchanges is rooted in 
three main strategic considerations. Firstly, trade liberalization across the Taiwan 
Strait was not favorable for Taiwanese leaders to promote de jure independence. As 
Beijing had aimed to convince Taiwanese people of peaceful reunification by 
providing economic incentives, Taiwanese leaders were worried about the emergence 
of a “fifth column” that would press the government to renounce the 
																																																								
38 Ibid. 
39 Bush, Untying the Knot, 27-28. 
40 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 38-71. 
41 Douglas B. Fuller, “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship’s Impact on Development in Taiwan 
and China: Adversaries and Partners”, Asian Survey 48, no. 2 (2008): 240-45. 
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pro-independence route.42 Secondly, China became Taiwan’s largest trading partner 
in 2002, and some analysts further assert that Taiwan would be inevitably integrated 
into the Chinese economy.43 Taiwanese policymakers were therefore worried about 
the “hollowing-out” effect, whereby Taiwan would become vulnerable to China’s 
economic statecraft, and thus they decided to restrict the pace of cross-Strait 
economic exchanges.44 Finally, Taiwanese leaders also used trade liberalization as 
an important bargaining chip to negotiate with Beijing about ruling out the use of 
force to reunify Taiwan.45 Nevertheless, Taipei’s oppositional attitude towards the 
issue of cross-Strait trade liberalization did not affect the determination of Chinese 
leaders to cultivate economic ties with Taiwan; Beijing has seemingly enjoyed 
remarkable success in terms of promoting cross-Strait economic integration since 
2008. 
 
Indeed, following Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration in May 
2008, Taipei shifted its attitude from confrontation to cooperation with Beijing, with 
respect to the issue of cross-Strait economic integration. In an attempt to commence 
negotiations with Beijing, President Ma departed from his predecessors’ strategies 
for tackling cross-Strait relations and endorsed the 1992 Consensus.46 Based upon 
this consensus, both sides soon reached agreement in resuming the “three direct links” 
of “air transport”, “sea transport”, and “postal services” across the Taiwan Strait in 
																																																								
42 Tung, “Cross-Strait Economic Relations”, 152-53; Miles Kahler and Scott L. Kastner, “Strategic 
Uses of Economic Interdependence: Engagement Policies on the Korean Peninsula and Across the 
Taiwan Strait”, Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 5 (2006): 536.   
43 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing 
in East Asia”, in China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. William W. Keller and Thomas 
G. Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 130-31. 
44 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 1-9; Bush, Untying the Knot, 27-28. 
45 Bush, Untying the Knot, 45-47. 
46 Hickey, “Wake Up to Reality”, 3-4. 
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November 2008.47 Most significantly, at an unprecedented pace in negotiating an 
FTA, Taiwan signed the ECFA with China in 2010, which ensures the framework of 
cross-Strait economic integration. 48  From thereon, Taipei further signed four 
important sub-agreements of the ECFA listed in Appendix I. As mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, whereas some scholars perceive the ECFA as a milestone 
of cross-Strait relations, 49  others contend that Taiwan’s sovereignty has been 
endangered by the comprehensive economic integration with China.50 Since China’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan stem from the intensive progress of 
cross-Strait economic integration embodied in the ECFA, in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy, it is necessary to explain what the 
ECFA is. 
 
1.3 What Is The ECFA? 
1.3.1 ECFA as an FTA between China and Taiwan 
The ECFA is probably the most ambiguous case of economic cooperation 
because its function is equivalent to an FTA under a title of “framework agreement”. 
																																																								
47 Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), “Chronology of Meetings”, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015, 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300&nowPage=1&p
agesize=30 ; David W. F. Huang, “On the Spillover Effect of the Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement: Perspective from the European Model of Functional Integration” in New Dynamics in 
Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations: How Far can the Rapprochement Go?, ed. Weixing Hu (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 13-14. 
48 Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan ECFA”, 121-22. 
49 Gang Lin, “Beijing’s Evolving Policy and Strategic Thinking on Taiwan”, in New Dynamics in 
Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations: How Far can the Rapprochement Go?, ed. Weixing Hu (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 63-77; Jing Huang, “Hu Jintao’s Pro-Status Quo Approach in Cross-Strait Relations: 
Building Up an One China Framework for Eventual Reunification”, in The Changing Dynamics of the 
Relations among China, Taiwan, and the United States, ed. Cal Clark (Newcastle Upon Tyne: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 96-154.   
50 For more examples, please see: Hong and Yang, “The Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement between China and Taiwan”, 79-96; Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking 
Dragon”, 81-112. 
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In other words, although the title of ECFA defines it as a “framework agreement”, it 
is essentially an FTA between China and Taiwan in essence. According to the WTO, 
the “GATT: Article XXIV5” defines a framework agreement as an “interim 
agreement leading to the formation of a custom union or a free trade area”.51 In 
clause 8(2) of the same Article, the WTO defines an FTA as an agreement aiming to 
establish a “free trade area”, which is “a group of two or more customs territories in 
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce…are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating 
in such territories”.52 
 
What makes the ECFA qualify as an FTA in function is that it stipulates a wide 
range of economic cooperation between China and Taiwan. In addition to the Early 
Harvest List in Goods and Services shown in Articles 7 and 8, the ECFA regulates 
negotiation principles of trade in goods and services in Articles 3 and 4 
respectively.53 As to the issues of bilateral investment, the ECFA also states that both 
sides should make an agreement “within six months” after its implementation.54 
Moreover, the ECFA covers several new issues beyond the traditional FTA format, 
which only focuses on eliminating trade barriers.55 According to Article 6 of the 
ECFA, these new issues include “intellectual property rights protection and 
cooperation”, “financial cooperation”, “customs cooperation”, “e-commerce 
																																																								
51 GATT, “GATT: Article XXIV”, 1994, accessed April 17, 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm; Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan ECFA”, 140; 
Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook”, 136-38. 
52 Ibid. 
53 For full text of the ECFA, please see: Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
Republic of China (MOEA, ROC), “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 2010, 
accessed April 17, 2015, http://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=1072. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Linda Low, “Multilateralism, Regionalism, Bilateral and Crossregional Free Trade Arrangements: 
All Paved with Good Intentions for ASEAN?”, Asian Economic Journal 17, no. 1 (2003): 81. 
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cooperation”, and so on.56 
 
Most significantly, Article 13 in the ECFA clearly explains: “All annexes to this 
Agreement and subsequent agreements signed in accordance with this Agreement 
shall be parts of this Agreement”. 57  Therefore, as listed in Appendix I, the 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Cooperation, 
the Cross-Strait Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (BIPPA), 
the Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement, and the CSSTA should all be 
understood as part of the ECFA. In this regard, Article 13 manifests Beijing’s and 
Taipei’s intention to make the ECFA play the role of a fully functioning FTA across 
the Taiwan Strait. The main reason why the ECFA cannot be directly called an FTA 
is the disputed sovereignty issue between Beijing and Taipei, as both sides perceive 
the signing of an FTA as the privilege of a sovereign state.58 Additionally, as the 
result of severe controversy over sovereignty, the mechanism of “dispute settlement” 
is different from the WTO regulations.59 Article 10 of ECFA requires that Taipei and 
Beijing establish the “Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Committee” (CSECC) to 
resolve trade disputes amongst themselves rather than through the “WTO Dispute 
Settlement System”.60 Nonetheless, the ECFA is still equipped with the function of 
integrating all the agreements relevant to cross-Strait economic cooperation, and thus 
it is an FTA in essence. 
 
																																																								
56 MOEA, ROC “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan ECFA”, 138-41; Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook”, 136-38. 
59 Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook”, 124-25. 
60 MOEA, ROC “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”; Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan 
ECFA” 152-54. 
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1.3.2 Economic Contributions and Impacts of the ECFA 
As will be explored in chapters 5 and 6, the economic contribution of the ECFA 
to both China’s and Taiwan’s economies is still not clear because several important 
sub-agreements are pending in effect, such as the CSSTA (please see Appendix I). 
Without these sub-agreements, cross-Strait trade liberalization is limited by the early 
harvest list contained in Annex I in the ECFA.61 It is clear from the ECFA’s early 
harvest list that Taiwan has received more benefits than China, which contradicts the 
prevalent argument that the ECFA is harmful for Taiwan’s economic development.62 
First of all, in terms of the ECFA’s contribution to both sides’ GDP growth rate, this 
agreement was estimated to boost Taiwan’s GDP performance by 1.72% annually 
since 2010, whereas China only saw a 0.17% annual growth in GDP.63 
 
Furthermore, according to Annex I of the ECFA, Taiwan had to impose zero 
tariffs on 267 products imported from China in 2013, which constituted 10.5% of 
China’s total export to Taiwan in 2009. 64 Meanwhile, China must reduce its tariffs 
to zero on 539 imported goods — containing 18 agricultural products — from 
Taiwan by 2013, which accounted for 16.1% of Taiwan’s total exports to China in 
2009.65 It is notable that among the zero tariff preference products Taiwan released 
(with the exception of several textile and petrochemical products), most of their 
import tariffs had already been reduced to 5% or even lower when Taiwan joined the 
WTO in 2002.66 As for China, the import tariffs on almost all the items listed in the 																																																								
61 Ibid. 
62 MOEA, ROC, “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”. 
63 Ibid.; see also Hong and Yang, “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between China 
and Taiwan”, 90-92. 
64 MOEA, ROC, “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”.; Tung and Yeh, 
“Development of a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 42. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan ECFA”, 141-44; Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook”, 116-18. 
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early harvest list were still higher than 10% before 2010, and the taxes on several 
household appliances had even reached 35%.67 By this reasoning, economically, the 
ECFA should be more beneficial for Taiwan’s exports. Nonetheless, before 
concluding that Taiwan has benefited from the ECFA, the huge outflow of Taiwan’s 
capital towards the Chinese market must be examined. 
 
Indeed, despite the suspended sub-agreements for the liberalization trade in 
goods and services, Taiwanese investment in the mainland had peaked at US$14.6 
billion in 2010, accounting for 83.81% of Taiwan’s total outward investment that 
year.68 The fact that Chinese enterprises only invested US$94.3 million into the 
Taiwanese market in 2010 magnifies the considerable degree of asymmetric 
economic interdependence between China and Taiwan.69 Moreover, despite tense 
debates in Taiwan, an important sub-agreement of ECFAthe BIPPA which aims to 
not only facilitate but also protect bilateral investment was reached between China 
and Taiwan in 2012.70 
 
So far, owing to the pending CSSTA, the BIPPA is only applicable to 
investments from Taiwan’s manufacturing industries, as well as several finance 
institutions contained in the early harvest list of ECFA. In spite of its limited scope of 
application, the capital account deficit in Taiwan peaked at US$15 billion in 2014 
after signed the BIPPA with China in 2012.71 The huge amount of capital outflow 
from Taiwan seems to support scholars’ arguments that cross-Strait economic 
																																																								
67 MOEA, ROC, “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”. 
68 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”, 2016, accessed April 
17, 2016, http://www.moeaic.gov.tw. 
69 Ibid. 
70 SEF, “Chronology of Meetings”. 
71 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”.  
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integration may cause Taiwan’s economy to be “hollowed out” by China. 72 
Consequently, without a convincing explanation as to why this “hollowing-out” 
effect is not a real threat, the Taiwanese government has faced difficulties in 
promoting ECFA sub-agreements.73 
 
The most prominent obstacle to the government’s initiative was the Sunflower 
Movement that began on March 18th, 2014. Organized by Taiwanese university 
students, the protest consisted of the occupation of the Legislative Yuan to 
demonstrate against the intensive economic ties with China and to safeguard 
Taiwan’s sovereignty.74 These students alleged that the negotiation process of the 
CSSTA as casual and opaque, despite the fact that the service industry makes up 
nearly 70% of Taiwan’s GDP.75 Thus students called on legislators re-review this 
agreement by adopting the “item-by-item” review process.76 Most significantly, 
protestors also connected the issues of cross-Strait economic integration with 
Taiwan’s democracy and sovereignty. 77  By comparing the case of cross-Strait 
economic integration with the cases of asymmetric economic interdependence 
between Germany and Eastern European countries before World War II, several 
scholars who participated in this protest appealed to the government to take China’s 
reunification strategy seriously.78  Eventually, all bilateral negotiations over the 
sub-agreements of the ECFA signed between 2013 and 2014 (see Appendix I) were 
suspended in the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement, and therefore the analyses 
of China’s commercial diplomacy in the subsequent chapters of this thesis finish in 																																																								
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2014.79 
 
1.3.3 The Connection between the ECFA and Regional Economic Integration   
As briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, any issue regarding 
cross-Strait relations is seldom a purely bilateral affair, and this is also true of the 
ECFA. Even though the ECFA is an agreement managing bilateral economic 
integration between China and Taiwan only, it indicates that both sides’ strategic 
concerns have been extended from the bilateral to the regional level. In fact, both 
Chinese and Taiwanese leaders have bridged the ECFA with the ongoing process of 
regional economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
1.3.3.1 Taiwan’s Regional Strategic Concern over the ECFA 
For Taiwan, the ECFA is crucial to tackling the negative consequences of its 
marginalization in the process of regional economic integration. Initially, Taiwan was 
not overly concerned about the impacts bred by regional economic integration. 
According to the evaluation conducted by the Executive Yuan (the highest 
administrative institution in Taiwan) in 2004, economic integration between China 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was estimated to 
negatively impact upon Taiwan’s textile and petrochemical industries, and Taiwan 
would only suffer a 0.05% decrease of GDP by losing US$149 million.80 In addition, 
this report also questioned whether the project of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) could 																																																								
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really be put into practice considering that Washington had the propensity to deter 
China-centered regionalism in East Asia.81 However, when South Korea took the 
initiative to launch FTA negotiations with the U.S., China, and ASEAN, Taiwanese 
policymakers began to pay closer attention to the “substitution effect”.82 
 
As will be discussed in chapter 3, the “substitution effect” is generated by the 
practice of “rules of origins” (ROO) in a free trade area, which provides price 
advantages to local manufacturers, thus allowing their products “substitute for” the 
same goods imported from economies outside the area. 83  South Korean and 
Taiwanese exports are highly overlapping, especially with respect to manufacturing 
products of the machinery industry and the information and communications 
technology (ICT) industries.84 While South Korea is sparing no effort in expanding 
its FTA coverage rate, Taiwanese enterprises are facing the risk of losing their 
competitive advantages vis-à-vis South Korea.85 As such, Taiwan’s decision to sign 
the ECFA with China is a contingency planand perhaps the only feasible 
scenarioto ameliorate its economic marginalization before participating in regional 
economic integration. 
 
Thus far, although the ECFA has not yet been fully implemented, all the items 
on the early harvest list have enjoyed tariff exemption since 2013.86 Among 539 
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items on the early harvest list that China promised to liberalize, 331 of them are 
products of machinery, textile, and petrochemical industries, which may confront 
loss following the introduction of the APT or the China- South Korea FTA.87 In this 
light, it is clear that the ECFA has assisted Taiwan — to a certain degree — in 
avoiding the “substitution effect”. 
 
In addition to economic interests, the ECFA also has profound implications for 
Taiwan’s regional strategy. Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou said: 
 
“It [the ECFA] will help us [Taiwan] catch up the pace of economic 
integration in the region [of Asia-Pacific]. There are 58 FTAs in Asia but 
Taiwan has none. We have FTAs with our diplomatic allies in Central 
America, but we must remove the obstacles and sign more with other 
countries. The solution is to sign an ECFA with Beijing”.88 
 
Accordingly, tackling the problem of economic marginalization in the Asia-Pacific 
region is a core strategic concern that drove Ma’s administration to enact the ECFA 
with China. At the surface-level, as many scholars have noticed, Taiwan’s regional 
strategy is to improve cross-Strait relations first and then sign FTAs with its major 
trading partners and regional institutions.89 Some scholars further point out that after 
improving its isolated position in the Asia-Pacific region, Taipei could consolidate its 
statehood in the international community following the expansion of its 
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“international space”, which contradicts Beijing’s agenda of peaceful reunification.90 
In this regard, commercial diplomacy has featured centrally in Taiwan’s strategy for 
consolidating its sovereignty as well. The question of the extent to which Taiwan 
could obtain its sovereignty goals by utilizing commercial diplomacy will be 
explored in chapter 6. 
 
Beyond the above surface-level analyses, the transformation of Taiwan’s 
regional strategy manifests the shift of Taiwan’s strategic logic. After signing the 
ECFA with China, the Taiwan-US alliance may no longer be Taiwan’s only regional 
strategy to counter-balance China. In the past, the expansion of Taiwan’s 
international space relied heavily on US support, as is clear from Taiwan’s accession 
to the WTO and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).91 However, the 
decline of US regional influence in East Asia since the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
has meant that Taiwan has received less support from Washington in terms of joining 
in the process of regional economic integration.92 From the late 1990s onwards, 
China’s economic rise has made it an indispensable player in the process of regional 
economic integration; henceforth, Taipei has had to deal with the “China factor” 
before launching any FTA negotiation with regional economies or institutions.93 
Following the improvement in cross-Strait relations, China has been serving as 
another bandwagon for Taiwan to jump on in order to obtain its regional interests, 
and it further implies that Taiwan has shifted its strategic logic from balance of 
power to seesawing between the U.S. and China. As Taipei’s new strategic logic 																																																								
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could also have a negative impact on the effectiveness of China’s commercial 
diplomacy, this thesis will discuss this issue in more detail in chapter 6. 
 
1.3.3.2 China: Regionalizing the Taiwan Policy? 
Taiwan is not the only side considering cross-Strait relations at the regional 
level. On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, scholars also point out that China’s 
Taiwan policy has seemingly been embedded into its strategy for managing regional 
economic integration.94 The most direct evidence of this is Chinese President Hu 
Jintao’s speech at the forum celebrating “the 30th anniversary of the issuance of the 
Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” in 2008. 95  At this forum, President Hu 
mentioned that: “Cross-Straits economic cooperation is …conducive to exploring 
feasible approaches to the dovetailing of the common development of both 
economies with the economic cooperation mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region”.96 
According to President Hu’s speech, cross-Strait economic integration is crucial for 
China to promote its political agenda of peaceful reunification. Moreover, his speech 
reflects that Beijing also aims to connect mechanisms of cross-Strait economic 
integration with the ongoing process of regional economic integration. However, as 
opposed to Taiwan’s strategic concern, Beijing’s political concerns seemingly 
outweigh their economic interests in this respect. 
 
In fact, Beijing’s effort to promote the ECFA is not in line with its economic 
interests. First of all, in respect of ECFA’s contribution to China’s economy, it is 																																																								
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fairly limited because China only saw a 0.17% increase in its annual GDP growth 
rate after signing this agreement with Taiwan.97 In addition, given the asymmetric 
market openness between China and Taiwan shown in the early harvest list of the 
ECFA, some Chinese scholars even describe this agreement as “an unfair treaty” for 
China.98 China’s motivation behind its economic concessions has therefore caught 
scholars’ attention, and most scholars ascribe China’s benign attitude towards 
cross-Strait economic integration to its grand strategy of peaceful reunification.99 
Most importantly, beyond the bilateral analyses, China’s success in isolating Taiwan 
in the process of regional economic integration must also be taken into 
consideration.100 
 
Indeed, scholars perceive Taiwan’s decision to sign the ECFA with China to be a 
consequence of its economic marginalization in the process of regional economic 
integration.101 Although it is difficult to discern whether marginalizing Taiwan was 
an initial intention or an accidental outcome of Beijing’s strategy for regional 
economic integration, it is certain that China did not successfully squeeze Taiwan’s 
regional space before the 1997 Asian financial crisis. As detailed in chapter 3, 
Beijing’s regional strategy has taken the form of commercial diplomacy to increase 
its degree of regional influence, and China’s economic development is key to the 
effectiveness of its commercial diplomacy.102 Prior to the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific was 
constrained for two reasons. 																																																								
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As will be discussed in chapter 3, economically, China was not an important 
trading partner for East Asian countries before 1997. For example, an indicator of 
trade between China and ASEAN conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
shows that, by 1997, China only shared 3.35% of ASEAN’s total trade value, 
whereas the US and Japan accounted for 33.70% in total.103 While the US and Japan 
played significant roles in boosting the economic performance of East Asian 
countries, China’s regional influence trailed far behind these great powers. 
Furthermore, before the financial crisis in 1997, East Asian countries still preferred 
global trade liberalization so as to support their exports to the US and EU markets.104 
Hence most leaders of East Asian countries advocated an “open regionalism” in 
which the U.S. and Japan were the major drivers promoting economic integration in 
the Asia-Pacific region.105 In this context, as the US and Japan took the lead in the 
process of regional economic integration, Taiwan was able to become involved in the 
U.S.-centered multilateral mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific regardless of Beijing’s 
opposition.106 Beijing’s incapability to disrupt Taiwan’s position in several regional 
institutions, such as the ADB and APEC, were the clearest evidence of this.107 
 
Not until the onset of the Asian financial crisis between 1997 and 1998 was 
China able to effectively exert influence by utilizing commercial diplomacy.108 
Indeed, as will be discussed in chapter 3, this crisis provided Beijing with a strategic 																																																								
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opportunity to rival Washington for regional leadership. Chinese leaders grasped this 
chance to exclude the US from the process of regional economic integration. On the 
one hand, contrary to the initiatives with stringent conditions proposed by the US-led 
multilateral institutions, Beijing’s unconditional promise that it would not devaluate 
the Chinese currency during the crisis helped China to impress a positive image on 
East Asian countries.109 On the other hand, the financial crisis had a limited impact 
on China’s economic performance. Since China’s economic rise occurred at a 
stunningly rapid pace, the importance of China as a trading partner has been more 
prominent for regional economies to revive their own economic performances after 
the financial crisis.110 As a result, most East Asian countries turned to Beijing to 
lobby the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) as well as 
the APT, and Beijing also displayed a positive attitude towards these issues.111 From 
thereon, the ASEAN-centered APT, which then evolved into the current RCEP, has 
featured heavily in East Asian regionalism.112 US leadership in East Asia has been 
shaken in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. 
 
Taiwan has received less diplomatic support from the U.S. at the regional level 
since the ebbing of US regional influence.113 The first and most important result of 
this has been the prevalence of the one-China principle in East Asia. Notably, in 1999, 
Beijing convinced ASEAN of the one-China principle in exchange for a smooth 
progress of economic integration.114 As a consequence of Washington’s reluctance to 																																																								
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promote “open regionalism” due to its focus on the War on Terror, the APT became 
the only feasible economic integration framework in East Asia.115 It has further led 
to the deterioration of Taiwan’s already isolated position in the process of regional 
economic integration. Although the US is now trying to regain its regional influence 
by launching the TPP under the grand strategy of “pivot to Asia”, whether Taiwan 
can join the TPP remains uncertain.116 
 
Furthermore, while Beijing has blocked Taiwan’s path towards regional 
economic integration, scholars point out that Taiwanese entrepreneurs have begun to 
move manufacturing facilities and even business headquarters to China in an attempt 
to take advantage of China’s connection with the regional market within the CAFTA 
and APT frameworks.117 Consequently, this has resulted in Taiwan’s economic 
overdependence on China allowing Beijing to exert its influence over the island.118 
The most prominent evidence of this is Taiwan’s capital outflow to the mainland. 
Regardless of the fact that Taipei’s policies restrict cross-Strait economic exchanges, 
immediately, following Beijing’s pronouncement of support for the APT in 1997, 
Taiwan’s investment in China increased threefold, reaching US$4.33 billion.119 Most 
significantly, from 1997 onwards, Taiwan’s investment in the mainland shared more 
than 50% of its total outward investment, and this ratio increased to 70.53% in 2008, 
two years before signing the ECFA with China.120 
 
Eventually, given its isolated position in the process of regional economic 
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integration, as well as the deepening economic ties with China, Taipei decided to 
negotiate economic integration with Beijing. As mentioned before, Taipei’s key 
concern is to improve its economically marginalized position.121 Furthermore, Taipei 
also aims to protect its economic interests in the mainland and regional market.122 In 
this regard, Beijing’s effort to marginalize Taiwan in East Asian economic integration 
is not only conducive to forcing Taiwan to discard its policy of restricting bilateral 
economic exchanges, but it also helpful in bringing Taipei back to the negotiation 
table. These achievements further raise the question of whether the effectiveness of 
China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan is contingent on the effectiveness of 
its commercial diplomacy at the regional level. As such, to study the effectiveness of 
China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan, chapter 3 explores both sides’ 
economic and strategic interests in the context of East Asian regionalism and 
regionalization. Chapter 4 studies the impact of regional economic integration on 
cross-Strait economic integration before 2008, which influenced both Beijing’s and 
Taipei’s policies for managing their bilateral relations. Chapter 5 and 6 then discuss 
the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy and Taiwan’s strategy to counter 
China’s commercial diplomacy respectively. 
 
1.4 Literature on Cross-Strait Relations 
1.4.1 Literature Deficit 
There is only a small amount of literature on the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty 
in the context of economic integration. The main reason for this is that Taiwan 																																																								
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studies have been in decline. Given this literature deficit, Murray Rubinstein even 
proposed the question “Is Taiwan studies dead?” at the “Sixth Annual Conference of 
the European Association of Taiwan Studies” in 2009.123 Perhaps the main cause of 
this is that “Taiwan studies” is not widely recognized as an independent academic 
field of international politics, while all the key issues regarding Taiwan can be easily 
connected with China. Neither is there any academic journal focusing solely on 
Taiwan studies. Even though academic journals which focus on China studies serve 
as ideal platforms on which most articles of Taiwan studies are published, as Shelly 
Rigger indicates, “Taiwan studies occupies a marginal position in the China studies 
field.”124 The most prominent evidence of this is found in Jonathan Sullivan’s survey. 
Between 2004 and 2008, there were 225 articles in academic journals discussing 
Taiwan, but just 86 of them were on either international politics or international 
political economy.125 
 
Currently, in spite of the fact that in 2010 Taiwan and China signed the ECFA, 
which was marked as a significant breakthrough of cross-Strait relations, there is still 
very little literature on this topic. Therefore, the pre-existing research approaches to 
study the Taiwan issue in the context of economic integration introduced in the next 
subsection have not yet been paradigms for Taiwan studies due to the literature 
deficit. Generally speaking, among a small number of these studies discussing 
Taiwan’s sovereignty and cross-Strait economic integration, they revolve around 
three dimensions to explore the question of whether facilitating cross-Strait 
economic integration is favorable for China’s national goal of peaceful reunification. 																																																								
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These dimensions are: China’s economic statecraft vis-à-vis Taiwan, the identity 
issue across the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan’s strategic importance for the U.S. in the 
Asia-Pacific region. Although none of these studies provides comprehensive 
explanations for the questions of how, and to what extent, China has infringed on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of economic integration, as this thesis does, they 
still contribute to this thesis’ theoretical framework and discussion of the background 
of the ECFA in the context of regional economic integration in chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
 
1.4.2 Pre-existing Research Approaches and Their Limitations 
1.4.2.1 China’s Economic Statecraft 
Following the strengthening of cross-Strait economic ties with China in the 
1990s, the foremost theoretical approach within the literature on cross-Strait 
economic integration has been the theory of economic statecraft. As will be further 
discussed in the next chapter, the theory of economic statecraft focuses on a state’s 
ability to protect its national interests by threatening or even punishing others 
through economic means.126 In the case of cross-Strait economic integration, while 
the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Chinese market has increased, it 
has raised the question of whether Taiwan is vulnerable to China’s economic 
coercion.127 Moreover, given the asymmetric economic power between China and 
Taiwan, Murray Tanner and Tung Chen-yuan further studied Taiwan’s vulnerability 
to Beijing’s economic sanctions.128 
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Chapter 2 details the research findings of Tanner and Tung’s studies. In brief, 
both of them concluded that economic sanctions are not a feasible strategy for 
Chinese leaders to punish Taiwan’s stubborn attitude towards China’s agendas.129 
Firstly, most of Taiwan’s manufacturing industries, especially the ICT industries, are 
highly integrated into the regional production networks.130 As a result, Beijing’s 
strategy of imposing economic sanctions on Taiwan would inevitably affect other 
countries’ economic performances, which could generate discontent among East 
Asian countries with China, to the detriment of Beijing’s agenda for peaceful 
development.131 Secondly, Taiwan’s manufacturing industries on the mainland have 
been major sources of China’s inward foreign direct investment (FDI) since the 
1990s.132 In this regard, cutting cross-Strait economic ties would seriously endanger 
China’s economic performance.133 By and large, threatening Taiwan by imposing 
economic sanctions is the very last option in Beijing’s Taiwan policy arsenal, other 
than using military force, but Tanner and Tung pointed out that China’s political 
leverage over Taiwan is still considerable.134 
 
In fact, Beijing’s inability to impose economic sanctions on Taiwan at the state 
level did not affect its ability to coerce Taiwanese entrepreneurs to support Beijing’s 
political agenda, as has been the case for the Chi Mei Corporation and Acer 
Corporation, which are the leading ICT manufacturers in Taiwan. 135 As detailed in 
chapter 2, the chairmen of these enterprises renounced their pro-independence stance 																																																								
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during Taiwan’s presidential campaigns in 2000 and 2004. 136  Additionally, as 
discussed in chapter 4, since there has been a tendency towards “mainland fever” 
among Taiwanese businessmen, Beijing is also supposed to have many more 
advantages to organize these entrepreneurs to lobby or even pressure Taipei to 
comply with China’s interests in Taiwan.137 In this light, China’s influence on 
Taiwan’s policy-making procedures may be greater following the intensive progress 
of cross-Strait economic integration. 
 
In general, the economic statecraft approach confirms that China’s political 
leverage over Taiwan in the process of economic integration is substantial, but that 
China is not powerful enough to impose economic sanctions on Taiwan. However, 
this theoretical approach is not applicable to cross-Strait relations in the post-ECFA 
era. As mentioned before, Taipei re-endorsed the 1992 Consensus after signing the 
ECFA with Beijing in 2010. In this context, a coercive strategy to counter Taiwan’s 
pro-independence movements in the international community is not in China’s 
interest. In contrast, in attempting to gain Taiwanese support for peaceful 
reunification, the spirit of “equality, dignity, and mutual benefit” has guided Beijing’s 
current Taiwan policy, and the ECFA is evidence of this.138 Therefore, rather than 
focusing on the question of whether China possesses more resources to intimidate 
Taiwan by threatening economic sanctions in the post-ECFA era, this research 
employs the theory of commercial diplomacy to study how China furthers its 
interests towards Taiwan in the process of cross-Strait economic integration. 
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1.4.2.2 The Identity Issue 
In addition to the theoretical approach of economic statecraft, studying 
Taiwanese identity in the context of cross-Strait economic integration is another 
common approach to examine China’s political leverage over Taiwan. Notably, this 
thesis seldom touches on the identity issue unless it directly impinges on either 
China’s or Taiwan’s strategic concern over sovereignty, such as the discussion of 
different perspectives on sovereignty between the Chinese and Taiwanese in chapter 
2. However, literature on Taiwanese identity still contributes to knowledge of the 
effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan because the 
Taiwanese government has provided a database for scholars to explore the growth of 
Taiwanese identity since the strengthening of economic ties across the Taiwan Strait 
in the 1990s. 
 
Since 1992, the Taiwanese government has entrusted the Election Study Center 
at the National Chengchi University (NCCU) with investigating annual fluctuations 
in Taiwanese national identity. Based on this survey, Wu Yu-shan, Keng Shu, and 
Gunter Schubert indicate that promoting cross-Strait economic integration is 
ineffective in convincing Taiwanese people of the benefits of reunification.139 As 
shown in chapter 5 (see Figures 5.4.1 and 5.4.2), following the intensive progress of 
cross-Strait economic integration, the percentages of Taiwanese who identify 
themselves as “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese” soared from 17.6% in 1992 to 
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60.6% in 2014.140 Simultaneously, the ratios of those who advocated reunification 
with China also decreased from 15.6% in 1992 to 7.9% in 2014.141 Accordingly, 
instead of promoting Taiwanese recognition of China, cross-Strait economic 
integration has seemingly consolidated Taiwanese preferences against eventual 
reunification, which is entirely opposed to Beijing’s expectation.142 Although the 
survey conducted by the NCCU can be taken as the most direct evidence of the 
effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan, it reflects only the 
degree of China’s influence in the realm of Taiwan’s domestic politics. With respect 
to the impact of China’s commercial diplomacy on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the 
post-ECFA era, this issue requires more evaluation. 
 
1.4.2.3 The Triangular Relations between China, Taiwan, and the U.S. at the 
Regional Level 
The previous section introduced China’s and Taiwan’s strategic concerns behind 
the ECFA, and it confirmed that both sides’ leaders have contemplated bilateral 
affairs in the context of regional economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Despite the fact that both China and Taiwan’s strategies at the regional level have 
become important variables that influence the development of cross-Strait relations, 
a limited number of scholars have taken these variables into account. Even though 
some scholars study the Taiwan issue at the regional level, their analyses are 
seemingly confined to a triangular framework that focuses on either Taiwan’s 
strategic concerns or its strategic value in the context of Sino-US relations in the 																																																								
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Asia-Pacific region.143 As to the issues of Taiwan’s contribution to the establishment 
of regional production networks (RPNs) and Taipei’s FTA strategy in East Asia, there 
are only a few studies on these topics, even though these factors influence the 
effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. Notwithstanding 
the limits of triangular analyses of Taiwan, China, and the U.S., these academic 
works enable this thesis to analyze Taiwan’s seesawing tactics for countering China’s 
commercial diplomacy, which will be detailed in chapter 6. 
 
Initially, analyses of the “strategic triangle” between China, Taiwan, and the US 
were derived from the analytical framework used to study the relations between the 
Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. during the Cold War, in which geopolitical 
calculations were central.144 Through the lens of geopolitics, Taiwan’s strategic 
value from Washington’s perspective consist of its geographic prominence in the US 
“first island chain”, which balance the rise of China.145 Amid the backdrop of the 
US “pivot to Asia”, scholars believed that Taiwan could take advantage of this 
strategic opportunity to persuade the U.S. to support its participation in the TPP.146 
With US support, it seemed that Taiwan could bypass China to improve its isolated 
regional position.147 Moreover, several scholars also contended that joining the TPP 																																																								
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would be conducive to reducing the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on the 
Chinese market.148 By this reasoning, Washington’s strategy of “pivoting to Asia” 
provides Taiwan with a source to counter China in the process of cross-Strait 
economic integration. 
 
However, this realist theory of the balance of power cannot explain 
contemporary cross-Strait relations because economic integration is by no means a 
zero-sum game. First of all, in terms of Taiwan’s participation in regional economic 
integration, strategies that risk Taiwan’s economic ties with either China or the US 
have never been in Taiwan’s interests, as these countries are Taiwan’s top two largest 
trading partners. Although the US and China are absent from either the RCEP or the 
TPP, like most East Asian countries, Taiwan expects to be involved in both of these 
regional economic integration frameworks to maximize its economic interests.149 
 
With respect to Taiwan’s political interests, following the improvement of 
relations with China and the US, both of them are now serving as bandwagons that 
Taiwan may be able to jump on to further the expansion of its international space. 
Moreover, obtaining endorsement from either Beijing or Washington could also 
increase Taipei’s bargaining chips with which to negotiate with the other side to 
support Taiwan’s proposal of joining regional economic integration. In this light, 
instead of balancing China, Taiwan’s key tactic to pursue its economic and political 
interests is to seesaw between Beijing and Washington. Chapter 6 explores the 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s seesawing tactic in more detail in order to assess whether 
this strategy has influenced the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy 																																																								
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towards Taiwan, especially in terms of achieving the national goal of peaceful 
reunification. 	
1.4.2.4 Taiwan’s Destiny in the Context of “Offensive Realism” 
So far, this section has briefly introduced several important works on 
cross-Strait economic integration. With the exception of research on Taiwanese 
identity, it appears that neo-realism has largely dominated the Taiwan studies 
literature. This is especially true with regards to studies of China’s economic 
statecraft towards Taiwan and the triangular relations between China, Taiwan, and 
the US in the context of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. Notably, 
most of these works contend that China possesses immense resources for the purpose 
of furthering its political agendas towards Taiwan, yet they all question if Beijing 
could really coerce Taiwan to endorse its reunification agenda.150 However, analyses 
of cross-Strait relations purely centered on “offensive realism” have provided fairly 
pessimistic conclusions with regards to Taiwanese sovereignty.151 
 
The most significant and timely example of this school has been John 
Mearsheimer’s work: “Say Goodbye to Taiwan”. 152  According to his work, 
observers will likely witness the eventual reunification across the Taiwan Strait, 
either by  peaceful means or through a destructive war between China and Taiwan, 
and even the US.153 As will be discussed below, analyses of “offensive realism” are 																																																								
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arbitrary if they do not consider China’s long-standing guideline of “peaceful 
reunification” and most importantly, both sides’ roles in the process of regional 
economic integration. 
 
Generally speaking, the arguments made by “offensive realists” are based upon 
two core assumptions. Firstly, China’s economic power growing continuously.154 As 
such, Taipei may confront greater difficulties in countering China’s political agendas 
in the future, since China’s military power should be covariant with its rapid 
economic growth.155 It is true that asymmetric military power has been a growing 
concern for Taiwan, which has motivated Taipei to consolidate its military ties with 
the US.156 There is also a great possibility that Beijing would be able to invest much 
more capital in developing military technology following its economic rise. However, 
it is questionable whether Beijing would be willing to generate a war that risks 
regional stability. 
 
As constantly emphasized in this thesis, the asymmetric yet economically 
interdependent relationship between China and Taiwan means that Taiwan is an 
important contributor to China’s economic growth.157 For example, Taiwan has 
always been amongst China’s top five investors since the 1990s and was even in 
China’s the top three in 2015.158 To date, pursuing economic development remains 
China’s core interest. This mission will likely be more important for Beijing when 
China’s economic growth slows down; for example, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 																																																								
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announced in 2017 that Beijing will aim to maintain a GDP growth rate of 6.5%, 
which is the lowest prediction since the 2000s.159 In this context, given Taiwan’s 
contribution to China’s economic performance, it is unlikely that Beijing will go to 
war with Taiwan by risking its economic interests. As such, it appears probable that 
“peaceful reunification” will continue to guide Beijing’s Taiwan policy. 
 
Secondly, based on the theory of “offensive realism”, a hegemon will seek to 
challenge the pre-existing hegemonic power so as to ensure its “monopoly in 
dominating and controlling” order within its sphere of power.160 By applying this 
theory to study Sino-US relations in the context of the balance of power in the 
Asia-Pacific region, Beijing’s regional strategy should be expected to be more 
“assertive” following the progress of its economic and military modernization.161 
Regardless of Beijing’s emphasis on “peaceful development”, China’s “assertive” 
attitude towards the contentious sovereignty issue in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and 
South China Sea are widely considered to be strong evidence in support of the 
arguments of “offensive realists”.162 In general, China is a powerful challenger to 
US hegemony in the region. It seems inevitable that there will be a conflict between 
China and the US, unless Washington voluntarily withdraws from the Asia-Pacific 
region.163 
 
Nonetheless, through the lens of Chinese commercial diplomacy, Beijing indeed 																																																								
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expects to expand its influence in the Asia-Pacific region in the process of 
constructing East Asian regionalism.164 However, China has no intention of fully 
pushing Washington out of the region. Rather, by integrating itself into the 
framework of East Asian economic integration, Beijing hopes to impress regional 
state actors by fulfilling the promise of “peaceful development”.165 Notably, China 
still holds a seat in the US-led APEC. Even in the case of TPP — another US-led 
regionalism strategy that has been perceived by analysts as a mean to counterbalance 
the China-driven RCEP — both Beijing and Washington kept an open attitude 
towards China’s enrolment.166 In sum, by employing Frost’s work on commercial 
diplomacy, chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this thesis provide an alternative approach for 
conceptualizing China’s grand strategy for managing challenges at the bilateral level 
across the Taiwan Strait and the regional level in the Asia-Pacific. This focus on 
commercial diplomacy allows analysts to critically engage with “offensive realism”. 	
1.5 Research Design 
1.5.1 Methodology: Document Analysis and Elite Interviewing 
This thesis employs document analysis and elite interviewing to study whether 
cross-Strait economic integration helps China to infringe on Taiwan’s sovereignty by 
wielding commercial diplomacy in the context of economic integration in the 
Asia-Pacific region. As discussed in the previous section, the volume of new 
																																																								
164 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 113-121. 
165 Ibid., 116. 
166 Shintaro Hamanaka, “TPP Versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting”, Journal of 
East Asian Economic Integration 18, no. 2 (2014): 163-65.  
	 42 
literature on Taiwan studies has diminished.167 Furthermore, the Taiwan issue does 
not occupy a significant proportion of the literature on China studies.168 As such, an 
important goal of this thesis is to fill the huge gap in the literature on Taiwan studies 
by collecting and analyzing credible documents published by the authorities and 
media. In addition, by interviewing both Chinese and Taiwanese elites and 
senior-level policymakers, this thesis also provides valuable insights on 
contemporary cross-Strait relations and both China’s and Taiwan’s strategic concerns 
over the issue of sovereignty. 
 
1.5.1.1 Methodology of Document Analysis 
Document analysis is widely used to supplement a literature base, support 
research findings, illustrate the “change and development” of research objects or 
issues, expand arguments, and uncover questions that have not yet been addressed.169 
This approach is particularly important for this thesis because the ECFA is a timely 
and fairly new issue across the Taiwan Strait, which has not been sufficiently 
analyzed in the academic realm. However, collecting data is not an easy task, and it 
could be difficult to discern credibility when there is an immense volume of 
documents. While policy documents constitute the main evidence used to support 
analyses of China’s and Taiwan’s strategies for managing cross-Strait relations and 
regional economic integration affairs, this thesis uses those policy documents 
published by either the Chinese or the Taiwanese government as references. 
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Specifically, the archives of China’s Taiwan policy are mainly available from 
the official website of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China (TAO), which is the highest official institute responsible for 
carrying out Beijing’s Taiwan policy. The other source is the Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), which is the semi-official institute 
responsible for carrying out negotiations with Taiwan on behalf of the PRC. With 
respect to China’s foreign policy documents adopted by this thesis, they are all from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (MOFA, PRC). By 
the same token, this thesis adopts the archives of Taiwan’s China policy published by 
either the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Republic of China (MOEA), or the 
Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan of the Republic of China (MAC), 
which is the highest official institute charge with coordinating Taiwan’s Mainland 
policy. Additionally, documents released by the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) 
in Taiwan are also analyzed, as this institution is the counterpart of the ARATS, 
managing Taiwan’s negotiation with the Mainland. Finally, all of Taiwan’s foreign 
policy documents come from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
China (MOFA, ROC). 
 
Furthermore, speeches made by either Chinese or Taiwanese leaders are also 
valuable in helping this research understand both sides’ strategic concerns behind the 
ECFA. Official proclamations or news releases by the government are important 
sources; mass media also provides abundant news articles containing remarks from 
the leaders of both sides. Nonetheless, incomplete information contained in news 
articles or bias in news reporting could be misleading.170 Therefore, to avoid 
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misinterpretation, this thesis has chosen only those news articles with original 
quotations from interviewees as references. 
 
Apart from the policy documents and remarks from both sides’ leaders, this 
thesis also requires statistical data on various economic indicators (e.g. investment, 
GDP growth rate, etc.) to study the ECFA and economic integration in the 
Asia-Pacific region. All of the statistics concerning cross-Strait economic exchanges 
are available on the MOEA website, and the Taiwanese government also updates this 
data once a month to ensure their accuracy.171 Given the convenient accession and 
timely updates, the statistics of trade and investment across the Taiwan Strait shown 
in this thesis are mainly based on the MOEA database. In addition, statistics on 
China’s and Taiwan’s economic performance conducted by the WTO and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are also used in this thesis. 
 
As for economic statistics at the regional level, the “UN Comtrade Database”, 
which provides statistics on commodity trading, enables this research to investigate 
East Asian regionalization by illustrating the total value of parts and components 
trade among East Asian economies.172 Meanwhile, the database of “Integration 
Indicators” created by the ADB also covers a wide range of economic indicators, 
such as the total volume of intraregional trade and investment, which generally 
satisfies the needs of this research.173 Yet statistics on Taiwan’s contribution to 
regional trade and investment have been omitted in both the UN and ADB databases. 
In order to compensate for the shortage of data regarding Taiwan’s economic 																																																								
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performance in the Asia-Pacific region, this thesis provides official documents 
comparing the FTA coverage rate between Taiwan and its major competitors in the 
region obtained from senior officers in the MOEA and the Executive Yuan in Taiwan. 
Moreover, thanks to the MOEA’s effort in collecting statistics on bilateral trade and 
investment in East Asian countries on a year-by-year base,174 this research is still 
able to examine Taiwan’s role in the process of regional economic integration by 
reviewing these statistics together with UN and ADB data. By referring to the above 
statistical data, this thesis examines not only the degree of asymmetric economic 
interdependence between China and Taiwan but also both sides’ contributions to 
economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region, which are crucial for evaluating 
China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. 
 
1.5.1.2 Methodology of Elite Interviewing 
In addition to various forms of documents and statistical data concerning both 
countries’ strategies through the lens of commercial diplomacy, elite interviewing is 
also used to explore the strategic concerns over the issues of economic integration. 
Interviews with Chinese and Taiwanese elites were semi-structured, which is a 
popular approach to “in-depth interviews” in qualitative methodology. 175  As 
interviewees shown on this thesis include entrepreneurs, scholars and senior level 
politicians or policymakers, the design of interview guides is also contingent on 
specific expertise and the backgrounds of interviewees.176 By asking open-ended 
questions, I have made every effort to ensure that interviewees had “leeway” to 
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answer the questions based on their practical experience or academic knowledge.177 
I interviewed 32 Chinese and Taiwanese elites in total during fieldwork in China and 
Taiwan from September 2013 to April 2014, and again in December 2014. The 
duration of every interview was over one hour, with the exception of the interview 
with former Taiwanese Premier, Professor Liu Chao-Shiuan, which lasted for 45 
minutes. However, there is an accessibility gap regarding elite interviewees from 
Taiwan and China. 
 
During the period of fieldwork in Taiwan, I successfully collected valuable 
information and perspectives from twenty Taiwanese elites, as shown on Appendix II. 
The list of interviewees includes one former premier, one former General Secretary 
of the National Security Council, one former Minister of the MAC, and five deputy 
minister level officers from either the MOEA or the MAC. Moreover, a former 
chairmen of the Committee of Research and Design Planning of the MOFA (ROC) 
and several senior policymakers of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) also 
accepted interviews. While their terms of office stretch from Lee Teng-hui’s 
presidency to Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, this research not only illustrates Taiwan’s 
strategic concern over the ECFA but also tracks the evolution of Taiwan’s strategic 
interests with regards to cross-Strait economic integration. 
 
Aside from interviews with Taiwanese policymakers, this thesis also includes 
interviews with five Taiwanese entrepreneurs in order to explore the roles of 
Taiwan’s manufacturing industries in the process of regionalization, as well as the 
motivations that drive them to invest in the mainland. Among these five interviewees, 
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three are from Taiwan’s most important multinational corporations (MNCs). 
Specifically, Kent S. Chien is a General Manager of ASUS, heading the Graphic 
Card Business Unit; Dora W. Chang and Jacky B. Chen are the CEO and Manager, 
respectively, of the Yageo Corporation, which is the largest manufacturer of passive 
components in the world. Through interviews with these business people, I gained 
insights into the business operation strategies of ASUS and Yageo, which serve as 
important case studies to illustrate not only the contribution of Taiwan’s MNCs in the 
process of regionalization in the Asia-Pacific region but also the impacts of the 
ECFA, the RCEP and the TPP on Taiwan’s manufacturing industries. 
 
As to the fieldwork in China, I was unable to interview any Chinese politicians 
or policymakers due to the difficulty of obtaining their contacts. Instead, all 13 
Chinese elite interviewees were scholars from Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen (see 
Appendix II); however, their perspectives remain valuable in depicting China’s 
political agendas behind economic integration. First of all, as David Shambaugh has 
noted, some Chinese scholars do participate in the process of Beijing’s policymaking 
procedures, and their opinions could also sometimes influence Chinese leaders’ 
decisions.178 Although it is difficult to identify exactly who plays what role in which 
department of the Chinese government, thanks to assistance from Taiwanese 
interviewees, I successfully conducted interviews with a number of Chinese scholars 
who are also researchers hired by the TAO. 
 
Furthermore, academic debate among Chinese scholars also reflects Beijing’s 
policy tendencies, since the voice of Chinese scholars should always be in line with 																																																								
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the government.179  As a result, I target Chinese scholars in distinct academic 
institutions of Taiwan studies or international relations, such as Peking University, 
Renmin University, China Foreign Affairs University, Fudan University, and most 
importantlythe Taiwan Research Institute at Xiamen University. Despite the high 
academic prestige of these Chinese interviewees in China’s Taiwan studies, I do not 
solely rely on these interviews to analyze China’s commercial diplomacy. In contrast, 
academic literature and official documents are always key evidence supporting 
arguments of this thesis; interviews act to supplement explanations of China’s policy 
and academic studies. 
 
1.5.2 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 2 constructs a theoretical 
framework to analyze China’s commercial diplomacy and Taipei’s strategy for 
countering China’s commercial diplomacy. In order to evaluate the extent to which 
China is able to encroach on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of cross-Strait 
economic integration, this chapter first splits the concept of sovereignty into de jure 
and de facto. Based on Stephen Krasner’s work, this chapter then divides de jure 
sovereignty into Westphalian and domestic sovereignty; in the same vein, de facto 
sovereignty is also split into international legal and interdependence sovereignty.180 
Most importantly, by reviewing Sigrid Winkler’s work, this chapter argues that 
functional sovereignty is a bridge connecting de jure and de facto sovereignty, upon 
which Taiwan expects to legitimize its statehood in the international community.181 
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Additionally, as both Beijing and Taipei implement their strategies for tackling the 
contentious issue of sovereignty in the process of economic integration, this chapter 
also explores Ellen Frost’s theory of commercial diplomacy in the context of 
interdependence theory by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.182 This chapter then 
proposes that asymmetric economic interdependence between China and Taiwan 
allows Beijing to wield commercial diplomacy to achieve its national goal of 
peaceful reunification, especially when Taiwan is marginalized in the process of 
economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses China’s and Taiwan’s strategic concerns over cross-Strait 
economic integration from the bilateral level to the regional level. By studying their 
roles in the process of East Asian regionalization, this chapter demonstrates that, 
before signing the ECFA with Taipei, Beijing had already created regional conditions 
that entail Taiwan strengthening economic ties with China to secure its economic 
interests, as well as to improve its marginalized position in the process of regional 
economic integration. The main reason for this is that China’s economic rise has 
overshadowed Taiwan’s economic contributions to East Asian economic integration. 
Specifically, by investigating components trade between East Asian economies, this 
chapter finds that, while China has played a pivotal role in regional production 
networks, there have been asymmetric economic interdependencies between China 
and East Asian economies. Taiwan is no exception. This has impinged on the 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy in securing its regional position. As 
Beijing began to take the initiative to shape East Asian regionalism, this further 
resulted in the exclusion of Taiwan from East Asian economic integration 																																																								
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mechanisms, endangering Taiwan’s economic and sovereignty interests. In this case, 
seesawing between China and the US appears to be the new regional strategy of Ma’s 
administration, and the ECFA may in fact be the byproduct of such a strategy. 
 
After providing the general background information about the ECFA in the 
context of East Asian economic integration, chapter 4 first explores how the 
dynamics of regional economic integration have impinged upon cross-Strait 
economic relations. This chapter then studies the question of how China and Taiwan 
reconcile their sovereignty agendas with cross-Strait economic integration. By 
reviewing both sides’ policy documents, this research finds that whereas Chinese 
leaders consistently furthered the agenda of peaceful reunification by promoting 
cross-Strait economic liberalization since the 1980s, Taiwanese leaders spared no 
effort in constraining bilateral economic exchanges before 2008. Additionally, the 
“go south” policy was Taiwan’s concrete strategy of commercial diplomacy in order 
to secure its sovereignty interests. By strengthening economic ties with ASEAN 
members, Taipei expected to decrease the degree of its economic dependence on the 
Chinese market so as to counter Beijing’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. 
Nonetheless, the rapid progress of China’s economic modernization and Taiwan’s 
industrial development policies reduced the effectiveness of Taiwan’s “go south” 
strategy. The cases of ASUS and Yageo demonstrate that the large economies of scale 
and low-cost production factors in China are crucial for Taiwanese manufacturing 
industries to enhance their performance. Following the implementation of Beijing’s 
unilateral preferential trade policies targeting Taiwan, China became the main 
destination for Taiwanese investments. As a result, the degree of Taiwan’s economic 
dependence on China increased steadily, which strengthened Beijing’s political 
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leverage over Taiwan in the process of cross-Strait economic integration. Most 
importantly, this also laid the foundations of contemporary cross-Strait economic 
integration. 
 
In chapter 5, this thesis analyzes the effectiveness of China’s commercial 
diplomacy towards Taiwan after 2008. This chapter illustrates China’s strategic 
concern over the ECFA and its concrete measures for tackling the contentious Taiwan 
issue in the post-ECFA era. First of all, this research finds that the ECFA is 
conducive for Beijing to constrain Taiwanese leaders from promoting de jure 
independence movements. The key reason for this is that the ECFA has 
institutionalized not only cross-Strait economic integration but also the 1992 
Consensus across the Taiwan Strait. Notably, in order to convince Taiwan of the 
ambiguous “one-China principle”, Beijing has also made concessions with regards to 
Taiwan’s international space. However, instead of worrying about the consolidation 
of Taiwan’s de jure sovereignty, Chinese leaders are seemingly confident with this 
political concession because they believe that the 1992 Consensus has legitimized 
China’s international legal sovereignty over Taiwan. Moreover, following the 
intensive progress of cross-Strait economic integration, the importance of the 
Chinese market for Taiwan’s enterprises has increased, and Chinese investments 
have also been allowed access to the Taiwanese market. Chinese leaders, then, expect 
to enhance their political leverage over Taiwan in the process of economic 
integration, which is beneficial for Beijing to achieve its national goal of peaceful 
reunification. 
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In order to examine whether China’s commercial diplomacy has been as 
effective as expected, chapter 6 focuses on the impact of the ECFA on Taiwan’s 
economic performance and the effectiveness of Taipei’s strategies for consolidating 
its statehood. This chapter argues that the institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus 
has hampered the effectiveness of Taiwan’s FTA strategy to acquire de jure 
sovereignty based on its solid de facto and functional sovereignty. Moreover, in 
terms of Taiwan’s international space, as most of Taiwan’s achievements have been 
accomplished with Beijing’s consent, Taiwan’s accession to international 
organizations or regional economic integration mechanisms is thus contingent on the 
development of cross-Strait relations. From an economic perspective, the ECFA has 
made a limited contribution to Taiwan’s economic performance, and it has indeed 
increased the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Chinese market, as is 
clear from the tremendous flows of capital from Taiwan to China. However, this 
chapter finds that Taiwan’s economic overdependence on China is restricted to 
manufacturing industries, as Taiwanese investments in the Chinese market were 
mainly made by manufacturers, which accounted for less than 30% of Taiwan’s GDP 
in 2014.183 Moreover, while the ECFA has generated concerns in Taiwan over the 
hollowing-out effect, it further generated the Sunflower Movement in 2014, which 
make those ECFA’s sub-agreements signed in 2013 and 2014 pending in practice. In 
this light, the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy should not be 
exaggerated. 
 
The final chapter of this thesis concludes that China has been able to encroach 
on Taiwan’s international legal and interdependence sovereignty by wielding 																																																								
183 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”, last modified September 
27, 2016, http://www.moea.gov.tw/Mns/dos_e/content/ContentLink.aspx?menu_id=6748. 
	 53 
commercial diplomacy in the process of cross-Strait economic integration. There is 
also a possibility for Beijing to infringe on Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty, as some 
policymakers in the Ma administration aim to connect the 1992 Consensus with the 
Constitution of the Republic of China, which could further impact Taiwan’s 
functional sovereignty. However, even though the 1992 Consensus was 
institutionalized following the implementation of the ECFA, Taiwan can still firmly 
secure its Westphalian sovereignty, as the ambiguous one-China principle cannot 
alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. As a result, Beijing can wield 
commercial diplomacy to create conditions favorable for its national goal of peaceful 
reunification, but commercial diplomacy cannot be Beijing’s final strategy to take 
over Taiwan. Additionally, there are also several variables that may influence the 
effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan that are worthy of 
future research. Firstly, as the DPP won Taiwan’s presidential campaign in January 
2016, the new pro-independence Taiwanese government attitude towards the 1992 
Consensus remains ambivalent. Secondly, contrary to scholars’ predictions, 
negotiations over the TPP between the US and the other 11 members were concluded 
in 2015.184 Whether Taiwan can participate in this regional economic integration 
framework is a question that requires further research. Finally, China’s economic 
growth has always been stunning, regardless of global financial crises. However, 
comparing its double digit economic growth rate in the 2000s with the estimated 7% 
in 2015,185 the question of whether China can maintain a high economic growth rate 
in the future must also be examined. 																																																								
184 William Mauldin, “U.S. Reaches Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deals with 11 Pacific Nations”, 
The Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2015, accessed October 17, 2015, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-reaches-trade-deal-with-11-pacific-nations-1444046867 
185 Mark Magnier, “China Economic Growth Falls Below 7% for First Time Since 2009”, The Wall 
Street Journal, October 18, 2015, accessed October 19, 2015, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-economic-growth-falls-below-7-for-first-time-since-2009-144522
1368 
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Chapter 2 Understanding Sovereignty and Commercial Diplomacy:  
A Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
    The previous chapter briefly introduced economic integration between China 
and Taiwan in the context of cross-Strait relations, and it was noted that sovereignty 
remains the most contentious issue affecting the progress of bilateral economic 
integration. The Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 
signed in 2010 is a milestone in PRC-Taiwan relations which symbolizes that both 
sides have entered into the phrase of “peaceful development”.1 The pursuit of 
economic prosperity has become the common interest of China and Taiwan, and it 
has driven both sides to cooperate with each other under the principles of “putting 
aside disputes” and “equality, dignity, and mutual benefit” based upon the 1992 
Consensus.2 Nonetheless, against the anticipated progress of cross-Strait economic 
integration, bilateral negotiations over sub-agreements of the ECFA have been 
pending following the onset of the Sunflower Movement in 2014. 3  Intensive 
economic integration between Taiwan and China has raised the question of whether 
asymmetric economic interdependence has provided many more resources for 
Beijing to carry out its grand strategy of peaceful reunification4. Moreover, the ECFA 
has also generated Taiwanese concerns over the erosion of sovereignty. 
 																																																								
1 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 102-105; Prashant Kumar Singh, “Can 
Taiwan Talk ‘Political’ with the Mainland?”, Strategic Analysis 39, no. 3 (2015): 264-66. 
2  Li “The Nature of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 52. 
3 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 102-105; Singh, “Can Taiwan Talk 
‘Political’ with the Mainland?”, 264-66. 
4 Scott L. Kastner, “Drinking Poison to Quench a Thirst? The Security Consequences of 
China-Taiwan Economic Integration” in The Economic-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia, ed. T. J. 
Pempel (New York: Routledge, 2013), 25-27. 
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    To study the question of whether Beijing has infringed on Taiwan’s sovereignty 
in the process of cross-Strait economic integration, this chapter aims to construct the 
theoretical framework of this thesis to evaluate the effectiveness of Beijing’s strategy. 
The first mission of this chapter is to define sovereignty. In general, sovereignty can 
be understood as “the right to rule, involving an inherent independence from external 
authority and implying the legitimate authority to govern.”5 Under this general 
definition, sovereignty is indivisible; a state has either “all or nothing.”6 However, 
this definition is not useful for studying cross-Strait relations. Although China has 
not achieved the national of peaceful reunification, it has become the legitimate 
owner of the island under the prevalent “one–China principle” in the international 
community. By the same token, despite the fact that the “one–China principle” is an 
obstacle to Taiwan’s international space, it does not affect Taiwan acting as a 
sovereign state in many aspects, for instance, military procurements from the United 
States. As a result, contrary to indivisible nature of sovereignty, this research splits 
sovereignty into several different categories in order to resolve the puzzle of 
sovereignty in cross-Strait relations.   
 
    Specifically, this research utilizes the works of Stephen Krasner and Sigrid 
Winkler to catalogue five different definitions of sovereignty. The second section 
first discuss the advantages and disadvantages of Krasner’s approach for defining 
sovereignty. Furthermore, most literature on cross-Strait relations adopts a 
dichotomous approach to split sovereignty into de facto and de jure sovereignty. 
Based on this approach, the third section of this chapter divides de facto sovereignty 																																																								
5 Joel R. Campbell, et al., “Bargaining Sovereignty: State Power and Networked Governance in a 
Globalized World”, International Social Science Review 85, no. 3/4 (2010): 108. 
6 Zhongqi Pan, “Managing the Conceptual Gap on Sovereignty in China-EU Relations”, Asia Europe 
Journal 8:2 (2010): 229. 
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into Westphalian and domestic sovereignty according to Krasner’s definition.7 By 
the same token, de jure sovereignty is also split into international legal and 
interdependence sovereignty in the fourth section of this chapter.8 Additionally, in 
the fifth section, this chapter employs Winkler’s definition of functional sovereignty 
to fill the gap between literature and Realpolitik in explaining how Taiwan 
consolidates its international legal sovereignty by participating in the international 
community without widely recognized statehood.9      
 
    After providing definitions of sovereignty, this chapter aims to study the 
disputed issue of sovereignty in the context of economic interdependence. It seeks to 
address three key questions: what is the connection between sovereignty and 
economic interdependence? How do Beijing and Taipei achieve their political goals 
in the process of economic integration? How can one evaluate the effectiveness of 
Beijing’s grand strategy of peaceful reunification in the context of cross-Strait 
economic integration? To address these questions, in the sixth section, this chapter 
constructs a theoretical framework based on Ellen Frost’s theory of commercial 
diplomacy as well as the interdependence theory proposed by Robert Keohane and 
Joseph Nye. Finally, by considering the asymmetric economic interdependence 
between both sides, this chapter suggests that commercial diplomacy is an effective 
instrument for Beijing to achieve its national goal of peaceful reunification in the 
process of cross-Strait economic integration; and Taiwan is supposed to be 
vulnerable due to its asymmetric economic interdependent relations with China. 
																																																								
7 Krasner, Sovereignty, 9-25. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Sigrid Winkler, “A Question of Sovereignty? The EU’s Policy on Taiwan’s Participation in 
International Organizations”, Asia Europe Journal 11, no. 1 (2013): 1-3. 
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2.2 Approach for Defining “Sovereignty”: Strengths and Flaws 
    As scholars have pointed out, there is an abundance of literature on sovereignty, 
but none of these works provide a universally satisfactory theoretical approach to 
study this issue.10 Some scholars prefer to define sovereignty according to its 
“juridical” nature by studying the constitution of a sovereign state or international 
law, but this approach overlooks the argument that power asymmetry among 
sovereign states is the main cause of the violation of “equality”.11 Others define 
sovereignty by stressing the “absolute authority” of the state,12 but they ignore the 
role that non-state actors have played in weakening states’ “ability to control” in the 
era of globalization. 13  Historical background is a crucial factor in defining 
sovereignty; however, there has been intense debates amongst scholars over the issue 
of whether “Westphalian sovereignty”, the concept originating in Europe in the 17th 
century, is adaptable to world politics today.14  
 
    Since none of the above approaches is sufficient for conceptualizing state 
sovereignty, political theorists have spared no effort in articulating innovative 
alternative explanations. The neo-realist school pays close attention to the question 																																																								
10 R. B. J. Walker, “State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time”, European 
Journal of Political Research 20, no. 3 (1991): 445-47. 
11 For more examples of “juridical sovereignty”, please see: Alan James, “The Practice of Sovereign 
Statehood in Contemporary International Society”, Political Studies 47, no. 3 (1999): 457-73; Michael 
Barnett, “The New United Nations Politics of Peace: From Juridical Sovereignty to Empirical 
Sovereignty”, Global Governance 1, no 1 (1995): 79-97.  
12 Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between 
Theory and Empirical Research”, International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 215-19.   
13 John Agnew, “Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World 
Politics”, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95, no. 2 (2005): 437-39; Joseph S. Nye 
and Robert O. Keohane, “Tansnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction”, International 
Organization 25, no. 3 (1971): 332-36; Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of 
Globalization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 23-32.   
14 Andrew Coleman and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, “‘Westphalian’ Meets ‘Eastphalian’ 
Sovereignty: China in a Globalized World”, Asian Journal of International Law 3 (2013): 258-68; 
Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”, International 
Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 264-66; Luke Glanville, “The Myth of Traditional Sovereignty”, 
International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 1 (2013): 87-88. 
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of how the distribution of power impinges on state actors’ sovereign claims in the 
international system.15 Liberal-institutionalism proposes “pooled sovereignty” to 
illustrate the impact of international integration on “state authority” in the era of 
globalization. 16  Constructivists further magnify the issue of identities as they 
contend that sovereignty is a essentially “socially-constructed” concept. 17 
Regardless of these efforts, the definition of sovereignty is still ambiguous due to its 
complex historical backdrop, as well as ambivalent logical connection among the 
concepts of “state”, “government”, “authority” and “power”.18   
 
    It is important to emphasize that this chapter does not intend to provide a 
definition of sovereignty that resolves all the controversies surrounding state 
sovereignty. Rather, the core mission is to find an approach that can effectively study 
the contentious sovereignty issue between Taiwan and China in the context of 
economic integration. Therefore, discussions of sovereignty in relation to political 
philosophy and human rights are not taken into consideration. Exploring identity 
issues is helpful to understand the divergent discourses on sovereignty across the 
Taiwan Strait. However, both Chinese and Taiwanese leaders’ policies for managing 
cross-Strait relations, and the interactions between China and Taiwan in the 
international system, are more critical. In this context, Stephen Krasner’s work on 																																																								
15 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc., 
2010), 93-97; Stephen Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 182-83. 
16 Robert O. Keohane, “Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 746-49.   
17 Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, “The Social Construction of State Sovereignty”, in State 
Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 11-14. 
18 Alexander B. Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as Political-territorial Ideal: Historical and 
Contemporary Considerations”, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker 
and Cynthia Weber (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 107-12; Giovanni Arrighi, 
“Globalization, State Sovereignty, and the ‘endless’ assumption of capital”, in States and Sovereignty 
in the Global Economy, ed. David A. Smith et. al. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 58-65; Joseph A. 
Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty: The Politics of Shrinking and Fragmenting World 
(Hants: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1992), 15-24.  
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articulating different aspects of sovereignty represents an ideal approach to the study 
of the contentious sovereignty issues across the Taiwan Strait.19 Nevertheless, as 
shown in the succinct discussion above, despite many scholars’ efforts, there is no 
widely accepted definition of sovereignty, and neither can Krasner’s work fulfil this 
mission. As such, it is important to illustrate both the advantages and disadvantages 
of defining sovereignty according to Krasner’s approach. 
     
    First of all, Krasner categorizes the definition of sovereignty into “Westphalian”, 
“domestic”, “international legal” and “interdependence sovereignty” in accordance 
with its different dimensions, and he stresses that each should be taken as an 
independent concept.20 This demarcation approach enables scholars to analyze a 
regime’s specific sovereign interests in the process of interactions with other 
sovereign states. However, due to the lack of connection between each type of 
sovereignty, scholars may confront difficulties in exploring how a “problematic 
regime” utilizes one form of sovereignty to acquire another form of sovereignty. To 
recitify this shortcoming, as will be specified in the fifth section, Winkler’s 
“functional sovereignty” will be used to connect the four independent categories of 
sovereignty proposed by Krasner.21  
 
    Furthermore, as David Lake indicates, although analysts can capture “deviance” 
between different types of sovereignty, Krasner does not propose a method to 
amalgamate all aspects of sovereignty into a single whole.22 The core reason for this 
																																																								
19 Krasner, Sovereignty, 9-25. 
20 Ibid.; see also: Stephen Krasner, “Foreword: Varieties of Sovereignty”, in The Future of the United 
States, China, and Taiwan Relations, ed. Cheng-Yi Lin and Denny Roy (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), xii-ix. 
21 Winkler, “Can Trade Make a Sovereign?”, 469-71. 
22 David A. Lake, “The New Sovereignty in International Relations”, International Studies Review 5, 
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lies in Krasner’s argument that not all sovereign states are equipped with every form 
of sovereignty in practice.23 Thus, there is no standard that clearly defines how many 
kinds of sovereignty a state must acquire for being a fully-fledged sovereign state. 
Owing to this lack of a unitary standard, when applying Krasner’s approach to study 
sovereignty issues in the international system, analysts may be concerned into 
arguing that a regime cannot be a fully-fledged sovereign state unless it possesses all 
four aspects of sovereignty. This assumption unwittingly asserts that state actors’ 
strategies for pursuing their sovereign interests are beneficial for “state-building”.24  
 
    In the case of Taiwan, the crux of its sovereignty dispute is mainly rooted in its 
problematic international legal sovereignty.25 As such, it is correct to assert that 
Taiwan would be a fully-fledged sovereign state upon obtaining broad international 
recognitions. However, this may not be the case for Tropical African countries. 
Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg point out that the principles of “self-determination” 
and “non-interference” allowed African regimes to rapidly obtain international 
recognitions in the wave of decolonization after World War II.26 Despite their 
success in acquiring international legal sovereignty, some Tropical African states had 
limited ability for “self-government”.27 The subsequent results were dictatorship, 
juntas, civil war, poverty and so on, but African leaders’ insistence in the convention 
of “indigenization” under the norms of “self-determination” and “non-interference” 
prevented their regimes from external interventions.28 Consequently, there was the 																																																																																																																																																													
no. 3 (2003): 310. 
23 Krasner, Sovereignty, 4. 
24 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 1-12.  
25 Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations”, 220. 
26 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, “Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood 
in the African Crisis”, The Journal of Modern African Studies 24, no. 1 (1986): 9-14. 
27 Ibid., 19-20. 
28 Ibid., see also: Jackson, Quasi-States, 21-26. 
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emergence of “quasi states” that possess sufficient international recognitions but with 
limited domestic governing ability.29 In this light, the applicability of Krasner’s 
approach is limited because it is entirely contingent on the empirical case selection. 
   
    Last but not least, Krasner’s analysis of state sovereignty is conducted through 
the “actor-oriented approach”, as he contends that rulers are real actors who drive 
“statecraft”.30 By employing this approach, scholars can further explore how rulers’ 
“policies”, “power”, and sovereign interests impinge on a regime’s sovereignty 
claims.31 This approach is especially important for the study of cross-Strait relations. 
For example, Beijing’s “one-China principle” is ostensibly unchanged in the 
international system, as Taiwan is still forbidden from accessing many important 
international institutions. Nonetheless, as will be detailed in chapters 4 and 5, by 
taking China’s official speeches and policy documents into consideration, it is clear 
that Chinese leaders have subtly recalibrated their discourse on the “one-China 
principle” since the 1990s, and this principle has in fact become adjustable at the 
bilateral and regional level.32  
 
    Krasner’s “actor-oriented approach” extends discussion from interactions 
between sovereign states to rulers’ concerns over state sovereignty, but his focal 
point remains at the state level, owing to the connection between “sovereign state” 
and “ruler” implied by the terminology of “state actor”.33 Specifically, Krasner’s 
analyses mainly center on state actors’ internal and external power in the context of 																																																								
29 Ibid. 
30 Krasner, Sovereignty, 43-44; see also: Stephen Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays 
on International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2009), 182-83. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Sow Keat Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 129-31. 
33 Krasner, Sovereignty, 43-44; see also: Stephen Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays 
on International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2009), 182-83. 
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Westphalian and international legal sovereignty.34 This then implores scholars to pay 
additional attention to other two important factors —globalization and identity — 
which have a profound impact on state sovereignty.  
 
    Firstly, the dynamic of globalization is a determining factor in relation to 
interdependence sovereignty.35 Although most of the contemporary literature points 
out that multilateral institutions may “absorb” a portion of sovereign states’ 
policymaking authority, these mechanisms also contribute to the consolidation of a 
regime’s claim on its “statehood”.36 This chapter will discuss this issue in more 
detail in the fourth section. Secondly, as constructivists have noted, sovereignty can 
be deemed to be a “socially constructed identity”, which is the outcome of 
interactions between both “states or agents” in international society and individuals 
within a specific community.37 Although this thesis does not examine the identity 
issue in depth, this factor is key to the legitimacy of the Taiwanese government, as 
well as both sides’ perception of the “one-China principle”.38 The next section of 
this chapter will explore this issue in association with Westphalian and domestic 
sovereignty. 
 
2.3 De Facto Sovereignty in Cross-Strait Relations 
    Literature on cross-Strait relations always divides the definition of sovereignty 																																																								
34 Ibid. 
35 Krasner, Sovereignty, 12-14. 
36 Kal Raustiala, “Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law”, Journal of 
International Economic Law 6:4 (2003):844-46; Saskia Sassen, “Embedding the Global in the 
National: Implications for the Role of the State”, in States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, ed. 
David A. Smith et. al. (New York: Routledge, 1999), 158-60.  
37 Biersteker and Weber, “The Social Construction of State Sovereignty”, 11-14.  
38 Murphy, “The Sovereign State System as Political-territorial Ideal”, 110-12. 
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into de facto and de jure sovereignty. De facto sovereignty means “the right of 
governance,” whereas de jure sovereignty usually refers to the statehood of a regime 
that enables it to act as a sovereign state in the international community.39 However, 
by employing this dichotomous approach, the contribution of this literature is 
seemingly limited to the realm of de jure sovereignty. Indeed, there are abundant 
studies discussing Taiwan’s international status or the evolution of China’s Taiwan 
policy in the post-ECFA era, but in terms of de facto sovereignty, only a few pieces 
of literature discuss the impacts of cross-Strait economic integration on this realm.  
 
    The main reason for this is that de facto sovereignty is always connected with 
the status quo, which is assumed to be static.40 Following this logic, the impact on 
this realm is not measurable unless there are physical challenges to the status quo 
across the Taiwan Strait, such as a war. However, cross-Strait economic integration 
has entailed both China and Taiwan recalibrating their domestic policies based on the 
ECFA and the 1992 Consensus, which have apparently impinged on de facto 
sovereignty. Obviously, analyses based on this assumption are no longer sufficient to 
explain cross-Strait relations in the post-ECFA era. Therefore, this research adopts 
Krasner’s definitions of sovereignty to further divide de facto sovereignty into 
Westphalian and domestic sovereignty by considering their similar features that 
emphasize the “control”, “autonomy”, and “authority” of a sovereign state.41  
 
																																																								
39 Sow Keat Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong Kong and Taiwan (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013), 68-71. 
40 Jianwei Wang, “ Hu Jintao’s ‘New Thinking’ on Cross-Strait Relations”, American Foreign Policy 
Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy 29, no. 1 (2007): 25-28; 
Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty, 129-31. 
41 Krasner, Sovereignty, 3-4. 
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2.3.1 Defining Westphalian Sovereignty 
2.3.1.1 Westphalian Sovereignty: Contents in Discontents 
    This chapter argues that de facto sovereignty is composed of Westphalian 
sovereignty and domestic sovereignty, and that Westphalian sovereignty is the most 
important ingredient. The core reason is that Westphalian sovereignty stresses the 
“exclusionary” and absolutely “supreme” of an “authority within the territory,” 
which are prerequisites of the “right of governance.”42 Krasner defines Westphalian 
sovereignty as “political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from 
authority structures within a given territory”, such that “territoriality” and 
“noninterference” are important principles. 43  Externally, Westphalian principles 
guarantee that the “domestic authority structures” of a regime are autonomous and 
“independent of the others”, which qualifies it as a sovereign state that should not be 
invaded by others.44 Internally, Westphalian principles endow a regime with the 
monopoly to govern within a defined territory, and any intervention in its domestic 
affairs is therefore forbidden. 45  While these Westphalian principles should be 
“honored” in the international community, theoretically, Westphalian sovereignty 
also implies that sovereign states are equal regardless of their powers or regime 
modalities.46 However, Westphalian principles have become the topic of fierce 
debates amongst scholars, especially with regards to their implementation.  
 																																																								
42 Chengxin Pan, “Normative Convergence and Cross-Strait Divergence: Westphalian sovereignty as 
an ideational source of Taiwan Conflict”, in New Thinking about the Taiwan Issue: Theoretical Insight 
into Its Origins, Dynamics, and Prospects, ed. D. V. Hickey and J.M.F. Blanchard (New York: 
Routledge, 2012): 30. 
43 Krasner, Sovereignty, 3-4. 
44 Ibid., 20-21   
45 Takashi Inoguchi and Paul Bacon, “Sovereignties: Westphalian, Liberal and Anti-Utopian”, 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 1, no. 2 (2001): 285-87. 
46 C. Pan, “Managing the Conceptual Gap on Sovereignty”, 228-29; Z. Pan, “Normative Convergence 
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    Debates over applying Westphalian sovereignty in studying international 
relations revolve around challenges from great power politics, waves of globalization, 
and human rights advocacy.47 First of all, the Westphalian principle of equality is 
always violated because of asymmetric power amongst sovereign states in 
Realpolitik. For realists, power remains a crucial factor that decides the extent to 
which a sovereign entity can protect its Westphalian sovereignty from being 
invaded.48 In this case, weaker powers always make concession on their Westphalian 
sovereignty in exchange for peace, economic aid, or security guarantees. Unequal 
treaties that forced China to concede its territory to great powers in the nineteenth 
century were most evident of this.49 Thus, Krasner argues that “asymmetries of 
power” serve as the main reason for why the practice of Westphalian sovereignty 
always contradicts its doctrine.50  
 
    Furthermore, liberals also question whether a state can adhere closely to 
Westphalian sovereignty since achieving absolute self-governance has become much 
more difficult in the era of globalization. Numerous “globalized” problems (e.g. 
financial crises, epidemic diseases, etc.) have driven sovereign states to cooperate 
with one another.51 Consequently, multilateral institutions have been springing up 
around the world. Although not necessarily compulsory, multilateral institutions have 
the potential to require governing rights from sovereign states (e.g. tariff policy in the 
case of economic integration) so as to consolidate the legitimacy of collective 																																																								
47 April Morgan, “Sovereignty’s New Story”, The Monist 90, no. 1 (2007): 31-37; Kal Raustiala, 
“Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law”, Journal of Economic Law 6:4 
(2003): 841-44.  
48 Krasner, Sovereignty, 8-9. 
49 Randall Peerenboom, “China Stands Up: 100 Years of Humiliation, Sovereignty Concerns, and 
Resistance to Foreign Pressure on PRC Courts”, Emory International Law Review 24, no. 2 (2010): 
654-56. 
50 Krasner, Sovereignty, 20-21. 
51 Joel R. Campbell, et al., “Bargaining Sovereignty”, 117-19; Inoguchi and Bacon, “Sovereignties: 
Westphalian, Liberal and Anti-Utopian”, 299-302. 
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action.52 In this case, conceding Westphalian sovereignty is inevitable in order to 
avoid isolation from the international community. Thus, scholars cast doubt on the 
application of Westphalian principles.  
 
    Finally, the increasing awareness of human rights concerns has become the most 
significant challenge to the Westphalian principle of noninterference. Traditional 
definitions of Westphalian sovereignty do not stipulate states’ obligation to protect 
their citizens. By contrast, the principle of noninterference legitimizes all decisions 
made by the supreme authority within its own territory, including the use of force to 
repress dissent.53 To date, noninterference remains the core principle of sovereignty 
in the modern international community, as the Charter of the United Nations 2(4) 
stipulates that:  
 
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independency of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
UN.”54 
 
However, this principle is no longer a sacred doctrine without regulating obligations 
of states. It is noteworthy that the “responsibility to protect” has been listed in the 
UN “Secretary-General's 2009 Report (A/63/677) on Implementing the 
																																																								
52 Saskia Sassen, “The Places and Spaces of the Global: An Expanded Analytic Terrain”, in 
Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 80-82. 
53 Morgan, “Sovereignty’s New Story”, 29-31. 
54 UN, “Charter of the United Nations”, 1945, accessed January 20, 2013, 
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Responsibility to Protect”.55 According to this document, a sovereign state is liable 
“to protect its populations, whether nationals or not, from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement”, and it 
further legitimizes “collective actions” adopted by the UN once a sovereign state 
fails to carry out this duty.56 In this light, the principle of noninterference has been 
redefined. 
 
2.3.1.2 Westphalian Sovereignty in the Context of Cross-Strait Relations 
    Despite the fact that the controversies over Westphalian sovereignty have not 
been resolved, what justifies the application of Westphalian sovereignty in studying 
cross-Strait relations is actually derived from these debates. Several scholars argue 
that Westphalian sovereignty is the consensus on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and 
China has a “fundamentalist” attitude towards Westphalian sovereignty due to the 
memory of the “century of humiliation” in the colonial era.57 Chinese people have 
bitter memories of the violation of their Westphalian sovereignty and thereby the 
PRC has adhered tightly to Westphalian principles ever since its establishment in 
1949.58 Sow Keat Tok points out that the Preamble of the Constitution of the PRC is 
most evidence of this, as it lists the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”,59 
which are: 
  
“mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual 																																																								
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non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence in developing diplomatic 
relations and economic and cultural exchanges with other countries.”60  
 
    Based on these principles, the PRC welcomes no external intervention in its 
domestic affairs, especially with regard to the disputed issues of territory and human 
rights.61 Moreover, China also promotes this principle in the process of East Asian 
economic integration and as such issues relevant to Taiwan have been put aside in 
the regional institutions under the “one-China principle.”62 So far, Westphalian 
principles are guiding not only China’s foreign policy but also its Taiwan policy; any 
external intervention in the Taiwan issue is therefore not tolerable.63 
 
    On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the history of colonialism has also been 
indelibly imprinted in Taiwan’s collective conscience. As part of China’s “century of 
humiliation”, Taiwan was conceded to Japan in the aftermath of the First 
Sino-Japanese War between 1894 and 1895.64 After reverting to the nationalist 
government in 1945, the Taiwanese government held tightly to Westphalian 
principles. The most significant case in this regard is Taiwan’s firm attitude toward 
remnant sovereignty disputes over the Senkaku/Duaoyutai Islands with Japan, with 
the KMT government condemning the resurgence of the right-wing militarism in 
Japan.65 By this reasoning, the history of resistance colonialism is the core factor 																																																								
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that drives both sides to insist on the adherence to Westphalian principles, but their 
interpretations of Westphalian sovereignty are different due to the civil war between 
the KMT and CCP. 
     
    The foremost controversy regarding Westphalian sovereignty between China 
and Taiwan is territoriality.66 For Beijing, the Taiwan issue is an unresolved problem 
from the Chinese Civil War. The Constitution of the PRC clearly claims: “Taiwan is 
part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty 
of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great 
task of reunifying the motherland.”67 Therefore, the Chinese White Papers “Message 
to Compatriots in Taiwan,” “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China,” and 
“The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue”, all regard Taiwan as an 
“inalienable part of China”.68 Accordingly, any movement that either supports or 
promotes Taiwan independence is deemed as “[splitting] China’s sovereignty and 
territory integrity.”69  
 
    As for Taiwan, perhaps it is the only country adopting such an ambiguous 
definition of its territory within its Constitution. The Constitution of the Republic of 
China says, “The territory of the Republic of China within its existing national 
boundaries shall not be altered except by a resolution of the National Assembly” in 
Article 4. 70  Consequently, while Taipei has gradually shifted its guideline of 																																																																																																																																																													
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managing cross-Strait relations from a “pro-unification” to a “pro-independence” 
route,71 the lack of a clear definition of territory has provoked further controversy 
between pro-independence and pro-unification politicians over the question of 
whether the Chinese Mainland is territory contained in the ROC. To resolve this 
question, legislators in Taiwan applied for the “Interpretation” of the Constitution. 
The Judicial Yuan then issued “Interpretation No. 328” in 1993, which indicates: 
  
“Instead of enumerating the components of the R.O.C., a general provision 
was adopted and concurrently provided a special procedure for any 
change of national territory. It is understandable that this legislative policy 
was based upon political and historical reasons. Since the meaning of 
‘according to its existing national boundaries’ is closely related to the 
delimitation of national territory, accordingly, it is a significant political 
question.”72     
 
    According to “Interpretation No. 328,” the definition of the ROC’s territory is 
contingent on the political situation; hence, it allows Taiwanese leaders to freely 
define this as long as they are not disobeying the Constitution of the ROC. It then 
legitimized both the “Two-States Theory” and the interpretation of “one country on 
each side” proposed by President Lee Teng-hui and President Chen Shui-bian, 
respectively.73 Accompanied by the movement of “localization” or “de-Sinicization”, 
these statements have then raised Taiwanese consciousness of being an independent 																																																								
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Westphalian sovereign state.74 Even though Taiwan reaccepted the 1992 Consensus 
(or the “one-China principle”) in 2008, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou constantly 
stresses that “One China” refers to the ROC rather than the PRC for Taiwanese 
people.75 As a result, Taiwan’s interpretation of territoriality is in conflict with 
China’s, which further affects their perspectives on the noninterference principle.    
   
    Indeed, by connecting the Taiwan issue with the Westphalian principle of 
territoriality, Beijing firmly emphasizes the principle of noninterference because this 
issue should be deemed as China’s domestic affair. Beijing’s stance is made quite 
clear by reviewing the White Paper of “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of 
China”, which clearly says: 
 
“[China] adheres to the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful 
Co-existence…it expects all other governments to refrain from 
undermining China's interests or interfering in China's internal affairs and 
to correctly handle their relations with Taiwan.”76   
   
Based on this official document, intervention in the issue of cross-Strait relations is 
equivalent to the violation of China’s Westphalian sovereignty. To display 
determination to safeguard China’s Westphalian sovereignty over Taiwan, Beijing 
issued the “Anti-secession Law” in 2005, which in Article 3 legitimizes the use of 
force to deter intervention from external actors, as well as “Taiwan independence 																																																								
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secessionist forces” in Article 8.77    
 
    Taiwanese leaders also stress the Westphalian principle of noninterference, but 
distinct from China’s stance, the practice of this principle is only limited to Taiwan’s 
internal affairs, such as the issue of abandoning the death penalty requested by the 
European Union (EU). As to the issues regarding cross-Strait relations, excluding 
external intervention was never in the interests of Taiwan. The conflicting practice of 
noninterference principle between both sides actually originates from very different 
interpretations of territoriality. By emphasizing the reality that Taiwan exists in the 
international community as a sovereign state with the name of the Republic of China, 
for Taipei, cross-Strait affairs are by no means domestic issues.78 Furthermore, 
considering the factor of asymmetric power between China and Taiwan, the U.S. 
remains an indispensable actor in supporting Taiwan to secure territory.79 By this 
reasoning, the different understandings of territoriality between China and Taiwan 
has led to different interpretations of the norm of noninterference, which has blocked 
consensus.    
 
    In the context of the above analyses, Beijing’s insistence on protecting its 
Westphalian sovereignty over Taiwan does not bode well for the practice of the 
Westphalian principle of equality. From the perspectives of Chinese leaders, 
unification remains the only approach to resolve the Taiwan issue. Taiwan is 
perceived as an “inalienable part” of the PRC according to the “one-China principle” 
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and the “one country, two systems” scenario.80 Moreover, nearly all of China’s 
official documents about Taiwan define the relationship between China and Taiwan 
as the central government vis-à-vis the local government. All the deals between both 
sides should be arrangements made by Beijing rather than agreements. Nonetheless, 
the implementation of Beijing’s Taiwan policy has not been in accordance with 
official Chinese discourse since the innovation of the 1992 Consensus.81  
 
    In order to promote cross-Strait economic integration, Beijing has made 
concessions on its rigid claims of Westphalian sovereignty over Taiwan. In terms of 
the one-China principle, Beijing allowed Taiwan to have its own wording defining 
who represents China under the 1992 Consensus.82 Based on this consensus, both 
sides commenced negotiations over economic cooperation on “an equal footing” in 
1992, and the White Paper “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” 
published in 2000 further endorsed the principle of equality as the guideline for 
cross-Strait negotiations and dialogue.83 In this light, economic integration has been 
conducive to ameliorate enmity between China and Taiwan. After signing the ECFA, 
both sides’ officials have been allowed to directly speak out their official titles, which 
is another significant sign of progress in cross-Strait relations. A detailed analysis on 
how the ECFA impinges on both sides’ Westphalian sovereignty will be provided in 
the following chapters.  
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2.3.2 Defining Domestic Sovereignty 
    In addition to Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty is also an 
indispensable principle that enables a regime to possess the “right of governance”. 
Krasner defines domestic sovereignty as “the formal organization of political 
authority within a state and the ability of public authority to exercise effective control 
within the own borders of their polity.”84 According to this definition, “effective 
control” is the most essential condition that a regime must be equipped with so as to 
be the “absolute political authority” within the territory.85 Furthermore, domestic 
sovereignty cannot be shared. Conventional definitions of sovereignty that contend 
sovereignty is indivisible in essence should be catalogued into domestic 
sovereignty.86 Indeed, literature on domestic sovereignty asserts that once a regime 
fails to control its domestic affairs, it risks governing supremacy.87 In this case, a 
state’s domestic sovereignty is shared with or deprived by other authorities, leading 
to the state only existing in wording rather than in reality. Civil war is an extreme 
example of a challenge to domestic sovereignty within the territory. Other examples, 
such as international settlements in China’s major cities before WWII or the territory 
under the trusteeship of the UN, also represent infringements on the domestic 
sovereignty of a state.  
 
    While “effective control” is necessary for a regime to survive, governors spare 
no effort in obtaining legitimacy to justify their governing powers. 88 In fact, to 
ensure the effectiveness of control, the government needs to be granted consents 																																																								
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from citizens; otherwise rulers would face difficulties in putting their policies into 
effect.89 Although several scholars argue that the legitimacy of the government 
should be connected with democratic values, democracy is by no means the only way 
to legitimize an authority.90 Neither is it the only way in which rulers can assure the 
effectiveness of control. Monarchy, autarchy, democracy, and so on, are all regime 
modalities that involve the legitimacy of governing powers.91 The cases of China 
and Taiwan after the civil war in 1949 are the most ideal examples to support this 
argument. These cases also serve as empirical evidence to study the issue of how the 
civil war impinges on domestic sovereignty. So far, both sides effectively control 
their “internal” affairs, but their governing powers are justified with different 
approaches. 
 
    When analyzing the issue of whether Taiwan can make use of trade to create 
sovereignty, Sigrid Winkler lays more emphasis on the concept of “effectiveness of 
control”. 92 She argues that this condition is imperative for a de facto regime to 
survive, especially for those new regimes established through civil war.93 The 
history of the Chinese Civil War in the mid-twentieth century is a good case to 
illustrate this point. Thus far, both the PRC and ROC effectively control their own 
territory, and both regimes have been legitimized via domestic political processes, be 
it through authoritarian or democratic pathways. However, the road to this point had 
many obstacles. Both governments led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and 
the KMT, respectively, experienced bloody wars to uphold their domestic 																																																								
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sovereignty.  
 
    Since the end of the civil war on the Mainland in 1949, both the KMT and the 
CCP struggled to legitimate their governing power in order to effectively control 
their own territory. In the case of China, the CCP connects domestic sovereignty with 
popular sovereignty by asserting that “all power in the People’s Republic of China 
belongs to the people” in the Constitution.94 Hence the CCP’s governing power is 
rooted in Chinese people’s power.95 Additionally, Chinese leaders also connect the 
missions of fighting against imperialism and colonialism with the legitimacy of the 
CCP’s governing power, as these missions are listed in the Constitution of the PRC 
in 1954.96  
 
    Nonetheless, the path is not without obstacles for the CCP to obtain its 
governing legitimacy. The diverted courses of governance between Maoism and 
communism caused the Chinese Cultural Revolution between 1965 and 1975. In 
addition, the public appeals to the CCP to promote democratization resulted in the 
Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. Only after Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s speech 
during his trip to southern China in 1992 did Beijing eventually appease controversy 
over the courses of “reform and opening up” policy amongst Chinese leaders since 
1978.97 Economic prosperity, based on a socialist market economy, has been the 
most crucial factor in legitimizing the CPP’s power in the mainland since the 
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1990s.98   
 
 In the case of Taiwan, the KMT also faced severe challenges to its legitimacy 
because of Taiwanese concern over being colonialized by “mainlanders”.99 Although 
both Chinese and Taiwanese people share a history of fighting colonialism, those 
mainlanders who retreated from mainland China in 1949 had also been perceived as 
colonists or external governors by Taiwanese society. 100  For pro-independence 
historians, Taiwanese desire for self-determination emerged in 1895. Despite its short 
life, the “Democratic Republic of Taiwan” had established by Taiwanese to fight 
against Japanese colonialism right after the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 
1895.101  In order to support Taiwanese movements fighting against Japanese rulers, 
the CCP leader Mao Zedong also endorsed Taiwan’s independence movements in the 
1930s as shown in the “Declaration of August 1” by the CCP Central Committee in 
1935.102   
 
However, after the Japanese retreat from Taiwan in 1945, Taiwanese appeal to 
honor the rule of “self-determination” were buried until democratization in the late 
1980s. Those mainlanders who retreated from China in 1949 occupied almost all of 
the important positions in government and legislative institutions regardless of the 
fact that they only made up 15% of the total population in Taiwan.103 Moreover, by 
adopting the harsh and repressive measures to suppress dissidents during the Martial 
Law period (1949-1987), the KMT effectively controlled Taiwan by establishing an 																																																								
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authoritarian regime until the 1980s.104 The KMT’s lack of governing legitimacy 
eventually led Taiwan to democratize in the 1990s. Following the wave of 
democratization in Taiwan, the identity of “New Taiwanese” created by President 
Lee Teng-hui endowed Taiwanese elites with equal opportunities to participate in 
political affairs as mainlanders and their descendants have, and it further legitimized 
“the ROC in Taiwan”.105 
 
 The above historical review examines the difficulties that China and Taiwan 
have faced in attempting to reach consensus on the issues of domestic sovereignty, 
because both sides’ approaches to governing legitimacy have been different. As a 
result, Chinese leader Ye Jianying proposed the idea of “one country, two systems” in 
1981 so as to define Taiwan’s political status “after reunification”.106 Accordingly,  
 
“Taiwan will become a special administrative region. Different from the 
other provinces or regions of China, it will have its own administrative and 
legislative powers, an independent judiciary and the right of adjudication 
on the island. It may conclude commercial and cultural agreements with 
foreign countries and enjoy certain rights in foreign affairs. It will run its 
own party, political, military, economic, financial and cultural affairs. It 
may keep its military forces and the central government will not dispatch 
troops or administrative personnel to the island.”107 
 																																																								
104 Ibid. 
105 Teng-hui Lee, “Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap”, Foreign Affairs 78, no.6 
(1999): 9-14.  
106 Bush, Untying the Knot, 36-39. 
107 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC, “What Are the Basic Contents of ‘Peaceful Reunification; One 
Country, Two Systems’?”, 2001, accessed January 13, 2015, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ljzg_665465/3568_665529/t17794.shtml. 
	 79 
So far, “one-country, two systems” remains Beijing’s core policy for defining 
Taiwan’s political status; meanwhile, Beijing has also taken economic integration 
with Taiwan as the first step to achieve peaceful reunification.108  
 
    In response to China’s strategy of peaceful reunification, Taiwan has adopted a 
conservative policy of constraining economic exchanges with the mainland.109 Even 
though Ma’s administration agrees with promoting economic integration with China, 
Taipei still rejects the commencement of political negotiations with Beijing.110 
Theoretically, political dialogues should be accompanied by economic integration. 
Yet, contrary to this assumption, other than the 1992 Consensus, bilateral 
negotiations over political issues have been stagnant owing to the lack of “consensus” 
to tackle disputed sovereignty issues.111 It is notable that the 1992 Consensus was 
designed to put disputed sovereignty issues aside instead of resolving them 
concretely. It further affects the negotiation over the Cross-Strait peace agreement 
since both sides could find no common ground on which to define their statehoods 
based on the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.112 In this light, the bifurcation 
between China’s and Taiwan’s definitions of domestic sovereignty has impinged 
upon their interpretations of international legal sovereignty; and this issue will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
 
Apart from controversies over domestic sovereignty between China and Taiwan, 
scholars have cast doubts on whether Beijing has brought its influence to bear in the 
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process of Taiwan’s local and presidential elections by lobbying Taiwanese 
businessmen on the mainland. 113  Moreover, since the establishment of the 
Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Committee following the signing of the ECFA, 
the impacts of cross-Strait economic integration on Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty 
has become a prominent issue. This research will provide a detailed analysis of this 
phenomenon in the chapter 5 and 6. 
 
    To summarize, in order to evaluate China’s political leverage over Taiwan 
following cross-Strait economic integration, this section argues that de facto 
sovereignty should not be the static status quo. By employing Krasner’s work on 
Westphalian and domestic sovereignty, this research examines the impacts of 
cross-Strait economic integration on China’s and Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty in the 
following chapters, especially in terms of the “One-Country, Two Systems” proposal 
and the legitimacy of their governing powers. However, as many scholars have 
already pointed out, compared to de facto sovereignty, Beijing seems to pay much 
more attention to maintaining its de jure sovereignty over Taiwan.114 Sow Keat Tok 
even points out that Chinese leaders can make concessions to any issue regarding 
Taiwan as long as they preserve the “one-China principle” in the international 
community.115 The next part of this section explains de jure sovereignty in more 
detail.     
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2.4 De Jure Sovereignty: Definitions of International Legal and 
Interdependence Sovereignty 
Contemporary literature always connects the definition of de jure sovereignty 
with the concept of statehood that enables a regime to be perceived as a sovereign 
state by others.116 As such, sovereign states can act based on leaders’ or citizens’ 
interests to manage external relations in the international community.117 Thus far, de 
jure sovereignty remains the main theme of most literatures on cross-Strait relations. 
All of these studies indicate that Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty is still 
confined by the “one-China principle”.118 However, globalization has provided 
opportunities for Taipei to enlarge its international space because economic 
integration requires intensive cooperation among states. As interdependence 
sovereignty is the reward of multinational cooperation,119  it further raises the 
question of whether the enlargement of Taiwan’s international space in the 
post-ECFA era could consolidate its de jure sovereignty. As such, to address the 
puzzle of de jure sovereignty in studying cross-Strait relations, this section provides 
definitions of both international legal and interdependence sovereignty. 
 
2.4.1 Defining International Legal Sovereignty 
International legal sovereignty, as defined by Krasner, is “the practice of mutual 
recognition, usually between territorial entities that have juridical independence.”120 
Winkler emphasizes sufficient recognition when she defines international legal 																																																								
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sovereignty as: “the external recognition of a country by a sufficient number of other 
states, giving that country legitimacy to act internationally as an equal.”121 Given 
this definition of international legal sovereignty, acquiring worldwide recognition 
becomes the most important mission for a regime to obtain or secure its statehood on 
the global stage. UN membership is the most commonly used standard to evaluate 
international legal sovereignty because it directly proves sufficient recognitions of a 
sovereign state in the international community.122 However, this should not be taken 
as the only standard to evaluate international legal sovereignty, especially in the case 
of Taiwan.  
 
First of all, contradictory to the argument that a state can only acquire 
international legal sovereignty by participating in the UN, Winkler points out that 
most countries have gained international legal sovereignty before entering the UN.123 
This arises the question of how a regime obtains international legal sovereignty 
without globally-recognized statehood. Winkler’s study implies that a regime cannot 
acquire international legal sovereignty at once; by contrast, it is actually a gradual 
process of accumulation. In fact, international legal sovereignty is not a necessity for 
participating in IGOs as long as the regime holds de facto sovereignty.124 For a 
newly established regime or a country in civil war, de facto sovereigntyespecially 
with respect to domestic sovereignty  is an indispensable prerequisite to 
participating in the international community.125 As has been the case for Taiwan, 
Taiwan retains a seat in the WTO and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) despite 
its problematic statehood. Struggles to legitimize statehood in IGOs may be a 																																																								
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prominent issue for those members without recognition, as witnessed in the case of 
Taiwan. Nevertheless, by actively participating in IGOs, it is still possible to obtain 
international legal sovereignty because it helps to formulate or define statehood 
under the accumulated international norms in these multinational institutions.126 
Therefore, to explore how the ECFA impinges on the international legal sovereignty 
of China and Taiwan, chapters 5 and 6 also take into account international 
institutions where both sides are members.  
 
Furthermore, international recognitions of statehood may not correspond with 
reality.127 A failed state with problematic de facto sovereignty may still retain 
recognitions in the international community. For example, the KMT government lost 
the civil war in the mainland in 1949, yet it was not until 1971 that the CCP replaced 
the KMT’s seat in the UN as being the only legitimate regime in the mainland.128 By 
the same token, under the “one-China principle”, the CCP is the only legitimate 
owner of the island despite the fact that they have never successfully conquered 
Taiwan.129 The cases of PRC and ROC illustrate the fact that a regime’s de facto 
sovereignty does not necessarily legitimize its statehood in the international 
community and vice versa.  
 
Scholars attribute this phenomenon to realpolitik as there is no compulsory rule 
to regulate a state to recognize a newly established regime.130 Krasner points out that 
national interest, ideology, and even concern over “the distribution of power”, can 
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influence sovereign states to recognize other regimes.131 These factors are prominent 
in the cases of PRC and ROC. During the era of the Cold War, ideology led foreign 
policy; the spread of communism is what the US-lead “Democratic camp” aims to 
deter.132 In this situation, the ROC was able to secure its seat in the UN. However, in 
the 1970s, when uniting the PRC to balance the Soviet Union became the central 
goal of American strategy in East Asia, Washington traded the ROC’s membership in 
the UN for establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC.133 Henceforth, the PRC’s 
“one-China principle” became the paradigm for other countries to tackle their 
relations with China and Taiwan. It further generated a domino effect, as most 
countries established diplomatic relations with the PRC by severing relationships 
with Taiwan.134 Since Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty became curtailed 
under the “one-China principle”, Taipei’s initiatives to participate in IGOs have been 
further constrained. Therefore, as most literatures have already recognized, it is 
essential to discuss the international legal sovereignty of both China and Taiwan in 
the context of the “one-China principle”.    
 
The “one-China principle” remains the crux of conflicts between China and 
Taiwan. This controversy is caused by the overlapping interpretations of territoriality 
resulting from the civil war between the CCP and KMT as discussed above, which 
leads both sides’ leaders to hold different interpretations of which side has the 
legitimacy to represent China and Chinese people.135 Taiwanese leaders endeavored 
to get rid of the overlapping definitions of “one-China” by advocating the 																																																								
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“Two-States Theory” and “one state on each side”.136 Instead of ameliorating the 
controversy, cross-Strait relations became increasingly between 1996 and 2008, as 
these movements were perceived as “creeping independence” by Beijing.137 In this 
regard, the competition between Beijing and Taipei for defining Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty is a zero-sum game. However, it is noteworthy that 
both sides’ discourses of the “one-China principle” are not rigid.  
 
Beijing’s “one-China principle” can be traced as far back as the promulgation of 
the “Shanghai Communiqué” in 1972, which says: 
 
“[The] Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal 
government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been 
returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal 
affair in which no other country has the right to interfere...The Chinese 
Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of ‘one 
China, one Taiwan,’ ‘one China, two governments,’ ‘two Chinas,’ and 
‘independent Taiwan’ or advocate that ‘the status of Taiwan remains to be 
determined’.”138  
 
Accordingly, Taiwan is defined as the local government of the PRC. Dual 
recognition of “China”, separate recognitions of Taiwan and China, and 
simultaneous diplomatic relations with both sides are forbidden.139 Neither should 
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Taiwan be granted any international space.  
 
    Allen Carlson and Sow Keat Tok point out that Beijing displays “flexibility” on 
the “one-China principle” when promoting cross-Strait economic exchanges.140 
Indeed, to encourage bilateral dialogues and economic cooperation, Beijing amended 
the content of the “one-China principle” by issuing the White Paper “The Taiwan 
Question and Reunification of China” in 1993. Although the PRC still insisted that 
“one-China” refers to the PRC, Beijing stressed the “coexistence of the two systems” 
allowing both sides to stand “for a long time without one swallowing up the 
other”.141 Taiwan is no longer a province of the PRC but a “system” on the basis of 
the “one-China” framework.142  
 
    The definition of “one-China” has become more ambivalent since 2000. In 2000, 
Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen made further concessions on this issue by saying: 
“There is only one China in the world; both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one 
China; the sovereignty and territory of China cannot be split.”143 This exposition of 
the “one-China principle” served as the PRC’s statement when Taiwan entered into 
the WTO in 2002.144 After signing the ECFA, Beijing endorsed the 1992 Consensus, 
which allows each side to freely define “one-China”.145 Meanwhile, Beijing has also 
promised Taiwan its international space and agree not to hamper Taiwan’s attempts 
to sign FTAs with other countries.146 Compared to the contents of the Shanghai 																																																								
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Communiqué in 1972, Beijing’s modern discourse regarding the “one-China 
principle” is more flexible, yet it has still generated fierce debates in Taiwanese 
society.    
 
    Ever since democratization, Taipei has changed its stance from pro-unification 
to pro-independence.147 Taiwanese leaders no longer proclaim that the territory of 
the ROC covers the mainland when promoting “localization” and “de-Sinicization”, 
as mentioned before.148 Despite the fact that Taipei has not discarded the title of 
“Republic of China” yet, this shift in its political stance has subtly altered the 
definition of “one-China”. For Taipei, “one-China” should not include Taiwan but it 
could only indicate the “Republic of China in Taiwan” at most.149 From the late 
1990s onwards, various titles containing the words of “Taiwan” or “Taipei” have 
referred to the ROC, such as the “Republic of China (Taiwan)”shown on the 
passport “Chinese Taipei” or “The Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, 
Kinmen, and Matsu (TPKM)” in the WTO, and so on.150 By adopting these titles, 
the Taiwanese government expected to magnify its statehood on the global stage. 
Not until 2008 did Taiwan re-pick the 1992 Consensus, which then provoked fierce 
debates in Taiwan.151   
 
    In order to facilitate cross-Strait economic integration, Taipei reaccepted the 
1992 Consensus in 2008. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in the 1992 
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Consensus, “both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its 
definition.”152 Specifically, this political terminology is originated from an unofficial 
record between SEF and ARATS, which is: 
 
“We hold there is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is a part of 
China, which is yet to be reunified. The two sides should make joint efforts 
to go for negotiations and discussions based on equality on reunification 
under the one-China principle. A nation’s sovereignty and its territory are 
inseparable. Taiwan’s political status should be discussed on the basis of 
one-China principle.”153 
 
    By and large, the discourse of the 1992 Consensus is in accordance with 
Beijing’s modern “one-China principle” shown in the White Paper “The Taiwan 
Question and Reunification of China”. Both of these documents stress that 
reunification is the only approach that can resolve the sovereignty controversy across 
the Taiwan Strait. Most significantly, as the 1992 Consensus connects Taiwan with 
the mainland in the “one-China” framework, after signing the ECFA with China, 
Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty has been defined according to the 
“one-China principle” again.154  
 
    Nevertheless, re-embracing the “one-China principle” seems to allow Taiwan to 
enlarge its international space to unprecedented degree, and it seems to contradict 
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China’s national goal of reunification. After signing the ECFA, Beijing removed the 
barrier to Taiwan’s international space. Thus far, with Beijing’s consent, Taiwan has 
signed FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand, as well as obtaining a seat in the 
WHA.155 Additionally, Beijing also agreed with Taipei’s diplomatic truce initiative 
that allows Taiwan to preserve diplomatic relations with its pre-existing allies.156 
Whether this has actually assisted Taiwan in consolidating its international legal 
sovereignty will be analyzed in the following chapters. The other issue worthy of 
consideration is whether Taiwan’s effort to promote trade liberalization and 
economic integration has been conducive to consolidating its interdependence 
sovereignty.  
 
2.4.2 Interdependence Sovereignty 
    Interdependence sovereignty is a fairly new concept that emerged in the era of 
globalization. According to Krasner, interdependence sovereignty is “the ability of 
public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, 
or capital across the borders of their states.” 157  Given his definition of 
interdependence sovereignty, Krasner seems to pay much more attention to a 
regime’s de facto sovereignty.158 “Control” is the main aim of regimes because in 
the era of globalization trans-border activities have impinged on states’ ability to 
manage domestic affairs.159 Indeed, in addition to advanced technology and capital, 
globalization has also ‘globalized’ thorny problems (e.g. financial crisis and climate 																																																								
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issues) for every nation. In response to these “shared risks”, sovereign states search 
for mutual cooperation to strengthen their ability to tackle the risks.160 This is 
evidenced by the numerous international institutions and mechanisms of cooperation 
based upon which sovereign states have taken collective decisions and actions after 
WWII.  
 
    However, the impact of multilateral cooperation is by no means limited to de 
facto sovereignty; it has also generated controversy over the issues of legitimacy. 
Some scholars contend that implementing collective decisions inevitably requests 
sovereign states to surrender governing power to some extent.161 As a result, states 
have to “share sovereignty” with others in the process of collective decision-making, 
which in turn results in the loss of their authority in making domestic policy.162 
Collective decisions on monetary and tariff policies made by economic institutions 
are clear evidence of this. Nonetheless, it is notable that the legitimacy of collective 
decisions needs to be recognized by member states. Moreover, IGOs actually 
reinforce the international legal sovereignty of regimes rather than eroding it.  
 
   Firstly, interdependence sovereignty magnifies the role of sovereign states in the 
era of globalization.163 Despite scholars’ concern over whether sovereignty would be 
eroded in the process of globalization, the international system remains anarchic so 
that sovereign states are still the highest authorities of governance.164 In this case, an 
IGO would lack the legitimacy to stipulate member states to carry out its policy 
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without consents from member states. Even if a sovereign state decides to withdraw 
from an IGO, this action would not directly make this state losing international legal 
sovereignty.165 By contrast, the legitimacy of IGOs would be weakened if there were 
too many member states withdrawing their memberships. The best evidence of this is 
the doom of the League of Nations. 
 
    Furthermore, statehood is usually the precondition of obtaining interdependence 
sovereignty through IGOs. To raise the effectiveness of governance, multinational 
cooperation is the best option for rulers in the era of globalization. Notably, 
collective decisions made in IGOs need legitimacy; hence international institutions 
often require members to have international legal sovereignty in order to justify their 
policies.166 By carrying out the policies of IGOs, a sovereign state can strengthen its 
legitimacy in managing trans-border activities. Moreover, with the updated 
legitimacy endowed by IGOs, international legal sovereignty of regimes is solidified. 
In this light, apart from consolidating de facto sovereignty, interdependence 
sovereignty can create, or at least re-confirm, the international legal sovereignty of a 
regime.   
 
    The above analyses of interdependence sovereignty imply that the boundary 
between de facto and de jure sovereignty has been blurred, owing to the emergence 
of international institutions. With respect to de facto sovereignty, interdependence 
sovereignty solidifies states’ ability to cope with risks that have emerged in the wake 
of globalization. Meanwhile, interdependence sovereignty could create, or at least 
re-confirm, international legal sovereignty of regimes. For this research, the 																																																								
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discussion of interdependence sovereignty revolves around international economic 
institutions and economic integration. Through the lens of interdependence 
sovereignty, the legitimacy of both sides’ statehood should be confirmed in the 
process of economic integration be it at the bilateral or multilateral level. However, 
functions of interdependence sovereignty are questionable in the case of cross-Strait 
economic integration, especially in terms of forging Taiwan’s international legal 
sovereignty. 
 
    As mentioned before, Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty is problematic. 
At the bilateral level, cross-Strait economic integration is based on the ambiguous 
“one-China principle”, embodied in the 1992 Consensus.167 Therefore, there is no 
clear answer for which side’s principle of “one-China” has been confirmed in the 
process of economic integration. At the global level, although Taiwan holds a seat in 
the WTO and even in the UN-affiliated WHA, its problematic international legal 
sovereignty has not yet been resolved due to the prevalence of PRC’s “one-China 
principle”.168 In this case, analysts can only ensure that Taiwan’s membership in 
IGOs is conducive to consolidating its de facto sovereignty.169 The extent to which 
interdependence sovereignty create international legal sovereignty is still unclear. 
 
    Moreover, interdependence sovereignty may not even exist to Chinese 
academics; neither does it show in official discourse. So far, Chinese elites still 
believe that sovereignty is indivisible, and thus they believe that states only surrender 
portion of their “governing power” in the process of multilateral cooperation rather 
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than “sovereignty”. 170  Following this logic, for Beijing, promoting economic 
integration certainly does not impact issues of international legal sovereignty. By the 
same token, allowing Taiwan to participate in international economic institutions has 
no implications on Taiwan’s international status.  
 
    Contrary to Beijing’s discourse, Taiwan’s participation in international 
institutions or mechanisms of economic integration has been perceived as an 
expansion of its international space, which is crucial for Taiwan’s international legal 
sovereignty.171 Scholars also argue that the thriving economic development and its 
trade liberalization strategy has allowed Taiwan to convince the European Union (EU) 
and the US to support its entry into the WTO.172 By this reasoning, Taiwan’s 
strategy to consolidate international legal sovereignty is based upon its de facto 
sovereignty, which allows Taipei to bring influence to bear in the process of 
economic cooperation.173 This is entirely opposed to China’s grand strategy of 
peaceful reunification. Therefore, to make an overarching evaluation of the 
contentious issues of sovereignty between China and Taiwan in the context of 
economic integration, it is necessary to explore functional sovereignty, which bridges 
de facto and de jure sovereignty. 
2.5     Bridging De Facto and De Jure Sovereignty: Functional Sovereignty 
2.5.1 Defining Functional Sovereignty 
    Functional sovereignty, as defined by Winkler, is “a non-recognized 
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government’s exercise of sovereign powers over one or several narrowly defined 
issue areas in its international relations.” 174  Accordingly, the core feature of 
functional sovereignty is that it assists an authority with recognized de facto 
sovereignty but problematic statehood to act as a legal sovereign state in the 
international community.175 Although functional sovereignty enables a regime to 
have an interim arrangement of international legal sovereignty before receiving 
“sufficient recognitions” of statehood,176 it does not mean that there is a necessary 
order of actions for states to acquire sovereignty.  
 
    First of all, as Krasner points out, authorities with international legal 
sovereignty do not necessarily possess domestic sovereignty, such as Somalia.177 
Since de facto sovereignty is the prerequisite of functional sovereignty, a failed state 
cannot consolidate its de facto sovereignty by acquiring functional sovereignty. 
Furthermore, de facto sovereignty does not necessarily lead to functional sovereignty. 
For example, even though North Korea is upholding de facto sovereignty, its poor 
record on human rights and economic recession make it difficult for this regime to 
obtain recognition of its governing legitimacy in the international community. 
Pyongyang therefore possesses no functional sovereignty. Thus, functional 
sovereignty is only applicable to those regimes with sufficient recognition of their de 
facto sovereignty. 178  As has been the case for Taiwan, thriving economic 
development is the key to entering the international community.  
 
    In addition to democracy, Taiwan’s functional sovereignty stems from the 																																																								
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achievements of trade liberalization since the 1960s that have led it to pass through 
the process of industrialization. 179  Despite the fact that pirated manufacturing 
products have burdened Taiwan with the problem of intellectual property rights in 
the US market,180  the US, Japan, and West European countries have become 
Taiwan’s major trading partners since the 1970s. Moreover, as will be discussed in 
next chapter, by implementing unilateral trade liberalization, Taipei has successfully 
attracted investment from Japanese and American multinational corporations.181 
Since the 1980s, Taiwan has become the major source of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Southeast Asia and China.182 From the 1980s onwards, Taiwan has played 
an indispensable role in international production networks (IPN).183 Consequently, 
impelled by economic interests, European countries and the US encouraged Taiwan’s 
involvement in the world trade system, and they further supported Taiwan’s 
application to join the WTO in the late 1980s.184 Functional sovereignty has become 
Taipei’s main source to consolidate international legal sovereignty in the 
international community from thereon.185 
 
2.5.2 Functional Sovereignty in the Context of the “One-China Principle” 
    Generally speaking, Taiwan’s entry into the WTO magnifies the importance of 
functional sovereignty in enlarging its international space, and it also signifies the 
recognition of its de facto sovereignty.186 However, Taipei’s intention is by no means 
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limited to expanding its international space. After acquiring membership to the WTO 
in 2002, Taipei soon began to further its agendas of international legal sovereignty. 
Notably, in attempts to marginalize the “one-China principle”, instead of adopting 
the name of ROC, Taipei took the TPKM as its formal title in the WTO.187 Taipei 
also printed the official titles of each officer stations in Geneva in the WTO’s 
“telephone directory”, which provoked Beijing’s protest against Taiwan’s 
pro-independence movements.188 Similar attempts to secure its statehood can be 
observed in Taiwan’s enrollment in the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 
within the WTO, as well as its application to the WHA.189 Even at the bilateral level, 
Taipei prefers to adopt the title of TPKM to sign FTAs with trading partners in order 
to emphasize the title of ‘Taiwan’.190  
 
    The case of Taiwan’s activities in the WTO confirms that Taipei has never given 
up the intention of being a fully-fledged sovereign state and, most significantly, 
Taiwan’s functional sovereignty has roots in its economic prosperity.191 It seems that, 
on the one hand, Taipei aims to make use of its functional sovereignty to legitimize 
de facto sovereignty in the international community. On the other hand, Taiwanese 
leaders seemingly perceive functional sovereignty as a bridge connecting Taiwan’s 
de facto sovereignty with de jure sovereignty, which is beneficial in allowing Taipei 
to legitimize its statehood. Theoretically, as China has not yet abandoned its national 
goal of peaceful reunification, Taipei should face obstacles in carrying out this 
strategy.  
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    Indeed, in response to Taiwan’s activities aimed at promoting de jure 
independence, Beijing deterred Taiwan from participating in any multilateral 
mechanisms that would manifest Taiwan’s statehood. Under China’s pressure, the 
WTO rejected Taiwan’s application to the GPA in fear of legitimizing Taiwan’s 
governing power in the international community, which would contradict Beijing’s 
“one-China principle”.192  Moreover, Taiwan’s initiatives of participating in the 
process of regional economic integration, as well as signing FTAs with trading 
partners, also suffered from China’s opposition.193 In general, between 1996 and 
2008, the Taiwanese government was not able to successfully promote de jure 
independence. 194  Rather, in order to improve “economic isolation”, especially 
Taiwan’s marginalized position in the process of regional economic integration, 
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou decided to improve cross-Strait relations by 
signing the ECFA based on the 1992 Consensus.195 However, after signing the ECFA 
with China, Taiwan achieved its strategic goals set by pro-independence leaders, 
such as entry into the GPA and WHA.196 In this light, cross-Strait economic 
integration has appeared beneficial for Taiwan’s strategy of making use of functional 
sovereignty to consolidate de jure sovereignty, but Beijing’s political consideration 
behind the ECFA is not in line with Taiwan’s strategic goal of independence. 
 
    Most scholars argue that Taiwan’s decision to sign the ECFA has been 
conducive to ameliorating Beijing’s anxiety about Taiwan’s de jure independence.197 																																																								
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As mentioned before, cross-Strait negotiations over the ECFA are all based on the 
1992 Consensus. Following the implementation of the ECFA, Taiwan’s reacceptance 
of the “one-China principle” has helped Chinese leaders to define Taiwan’s 
international status.198  Moreover, as China has encroached upon nearly all of 
Taiwan’s international space ever since the rapprochement of Sino-U.S. relations, 
Beijing is supposed to have many more bargaining chips to trade with Taiwan for the 
“one-China principle”.199 Therefore, for Beijing, it is feasible to obtain Taipei’s 
commitment to the “one-China principle” by allowing Taiwan to participate in 
certain international organizations as shown in the policy document “One Country, 
Two Systems’ and Complete National Reunification”.200 By this reasoning, contrary 
to Taiwan’s strategic goal, Beijing believes that cross-Strait economic integration is 
leading both sides to peaceful reunification.  
 
    In summary, functional sovereignty is crucial for Taipei to enlarge international 
space; simultaneously, Taiwan also aims to acquire de jure sovereignty based on 
functional sovereignty. However, Beijing is confident in the “one-China principle”. 
As long as Taiwan admits to the “one-China principle”, Chinese leaders believe that 
they can easily cut the connection between Taiwan’s functional sovereignty and 
statehood. Therefore, achieving the goal of peaceful reunification is only a matter of 
time.201 Apparently, Taiwan’s strategic goals are contradictory to China’s; however, 
both sides believe that cross-Strait economic integration is beneficial for achieving 
their aims. To explore this puzzle, the next section of this chapter will review 
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interdependence theory and commercial diplomacy to construct an analytical 
framework. Moreover, in order to evaluate the extent to which China has infringed 
on Taiwan’s sovereignty, this research compiles a table of definitions of sovereignty 
and the controversies surrounding (see Table 2.5.1):  
 
Table 2.5.1 Definitions of Sovereignty and Controversies between China and 
Taiwan since the 1990s 
De Facto Sovereignty 
Definition: according to Sow Keat Tok, de facto sovereignty refers to “the right of 
governance” 
Components: Westphalian Sovereignty and Domestic Sovereignty 
Westphalian Sovereignty Domestic Sovereignty 
Definition: 
Krasner defines this as “political 
organization based on the exclusion of 
external actors from authority structures 
within a given territory”  
Controversies: 
1. Territoriality:  
   PRC: Taiwan is part of China 
   ROC: No definition in the    
   Constitution 
2. Equality: Both sides are equal 
political entities under the undefined 
“one-China” 
3. Noninterference: 
PRC: The Taiwan issue is domestic 
affair 
ROC: Cross-Strait relations are not 
domestic affairs  
Definition: 
Krasner defines this as “the formal 
organization of political authority within 
a state and the ability of public authority 
to exercise effective control within the 
own borders of their polity”  
Controversies: 
PRC: The Policy of “one country, two 
systems” 
ROC 
1999: “Two states” theory 
2000-2008: “One country on each side” 
2008-: The 1992 Consensus 
  
De Jure Sovereignty 
Definition: By referring to Sow Keat Tok’s work, de jure sovereignty can be 
understood as the statehood of a regime that enables it to act as a sovereign state in 
the international community   
Components: International Legal Sovereignty and Interdependence Sovereignty 
International Legal Sovereignty Interdependence Sovereignty 
Definition: 
Krasner defines this as “the practice of 
mutual recognition, usually between 
territorial entities that have juridical 
independence” 
Controversies: 
Definition: 
Krasner defines this as “the ability of 
public authorities to regulate the flow of 
information, ideas, goods, people, 
pollutants, or capital across the borders 
of their states” 
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PRC: The “one-China principle”, PRC is 
the only legitimate China 
ROC:  
1992-1995: the 1992 Consensus 
1995-1999: ROC in Taiwan 
1999-2002: Two-States Theory 
2002-2008: “one country on each side” 
2008-: the 1992 Consensus 
  
 
Controversies: 
PRC: Not shown in Chinese discourse 
of sovereignty 
ROC:  
Globalization and regional economic 
integration allow Taiwan to connect its 
participation in IGOs with statehood. 
  
Functional Sovereignty: Bridging De facto and De jure Sovereignty 
Definition:  
Winkler defines this as: “a non-recognized government’s exercise of sovereign 
powers over one or several narrowly defined issue areas in its international 
relations” 
Controversies: The China factor	
Controversies Conditions 
1. The “One-China Principle” 
PRC: Under the framework of the 
“One Country, Two Systems”, 
Taiwan is allowed to have certain 
international space as Hong Kong 
has. Taiwan’s participation in 
functional IGOs will not change the 
fact that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. 
ROC:  
(1) KMT: The “One-China 
Principle” means ROC, Taiwan’s 
participation in function IGOs 
like the WTO, could consolidate 
its de jure and de facto 
sovereignty.  
(2) DPP: The “One-China Principle” 
is not acceptable. Taiwan should 
actively participate in functional 
IGOs under the names of 
“TPKM”, “Taiwan”, or at least 
“ROC (Taiwan)” to magnify its 
de facto and de jure sovereignty.  
It is not necessary that every country 
with problematic statehood will possess 
functional sovereignty. In general, there 
are three conditions for state actors to 
acquire functional sovereignty 
1. De facto sovereignty: A state must 
effectively control its territory 
2. Globally-recognized governing 
legitimacy 
3. Interdependence sovereignty: 
Functional sovereignty requires 
regimes to have solid connections 
with the international community. In 
the case of Taiwan, functional 
sovereignty stems from its economic 
performances, as well as intensive 
trade relations with the US and EU. 
Sources: Krasner, Sovereignty, 1-25; Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, 49-106; Winkler, “Can Trade Make a Sovereign?”, 467-85; 
Winkler, “A Question of Sovereignty?”, 1-20.202 
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2.6 Economic Interdependence and Commercial Diplomacy 
    The last section illustrated China’s and Taiwan’s different understandings of 
sovereignty, and it confirmed that both sides’ strategic concerns over the ECFA are 
distinct from each other. China’s political motivation behind cross-Strait economic 
integration is to confine Taiwan’s de jure sovereignty in a way that is favorable for 
its national goal of peaceful reunification, whereas Taipei expects to consolidate 
functional sovereignty in order to obtain de jure sovereignty. As economic 
integration is the core approach through which both sides seek to further their 
agendas of sovereignty, this section first argues that commercial diplomacy is the 
main instrument for both sides to achieve their strategic goals. To support this 
argument, the first part of this section aims to study both sides’ strategies through the 
lens of commercial diplomacy. Meanwhile, this section will also compare 
commercial diplomacy with the commonly used theory of economic statecraft to 
rationalize the differences between them. In addition to the theory of economic 
statecraft, asymmetric economic interdependence is crucial for the effectiveness of 
commercial diplomacy as well. 203  Therefore, the second part of this section 
establishes the theoretical framework to evaluate the effectiveness of commercial 
diplomacy in the process of economic integration based on interdependence theory.  
 
2.6.1 Sovereignty and Commercial Diplomacy in the Process of Economic 
Integration 
    Sovereignty remains the core dispute between Taiwan and China, and Beijing 
has clearly indicated that there are only two ways to resolve the problempeaceful 																																																								
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reunification or war. By reviewing the document “Deng Xiaoping on One Country, 
Two Systems” published by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC, 
Beijing points out that “The world faces the choice between peaceful and 
non-peaceful means of solving disputes.”204 It further states, “If the problem cannot 
be solved by peaceful means, then it must be solved by force.”205 Despite the fact 
that Beijing has not yet abandoned the possibility of liberating Taiwan by force 
according to the Anti-Secession Law, peaceful reunification has become Beijing’s 
framework for managing the Taiwan issue since the implementation of the “reform 
and opening up” policy in 1978.206 Most significantly, the promotion of economic 
integration across the Taiwan Strait has featured heavily in China’s Taiwan policy 
from 1979 onwards. 
 
    Policy documents regarding the Taiwan issue published by Beijing prove that 
China’s Taiwan policy relies greatly on economic measures. According to the 
“Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, Beijing has officially listed “three direct links” 
between both sides namely “economic exchanges”, “postal services”, and 
“transportation”as the first step toward peaceful reunification.207 In 1990, Chinese 
leader Yang Shangkun declared that Beijing’s strategy for tackling the Taiwan issue 
should be to “use business to press politics and use the public to pressure the 
official[s]”.208 In 2004, at the Sixteenth Party Congress, Chinese leaders further 
confirmed that “economic development” is the key to achieving “national 
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unification”.209 To date, Chinese leaders have taken the ECFA as the cornerstone of 
their strategy of peaceful reunification.210 As such, the literature on cross-Strait 
economic integration focuses on the issue of China’s political leverage over Taiwan 
in accordance with the theory of economic statecraft.211 Contrary to this commonly 
adopted theory, subsequent analyses of both sides’ strategies for managing 
cross-Strait relations have highlighted commercial diplomacy.  
 
    This thesis argues that commercial diplomacy is the main instrument for China 
and Taiwan to further their interests in the process of economic integration. 
Commercial diplomacy, as defined by Ellen Frost, is “the use of commercial power 
such as market access or technology transfer to influence noncommercial decisions 
in the political or even the security realm.”212 Based on Frost’s research in China’s 
commercial diplomacy, the greater the “positive-sum economic incentive” China is 
able to offer its target countries, the greater the degree of China’s influence.213 
China’s investments in improving the infrastructure facilities of developing 
Southeast Asian states are clear evidence of this.214 As for economic coercion or 
sanctions, they are seldom on the list of China’s regional policy options because it 
would arouse concern over the “China menace”which isdetrimental for China’s 
“peaceful rise”and because the US and Japan are powerful regional players 
balancing China’s influence.215 These also serve as the reasons why economic 
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statecraft is not applicable in this research.  
 
    Whereas Frost argues influence stems from economic incentives in her work on 
commercial diplomacy, the literature on economic statecraft pays special attention to 
the state’s ability to impose economic sanctions on others. According to Jean-Marc 
Blanchard and Norrin Ripsman, the more specific definition of economic statecraft 
is: 
 
“an attempt by a sender state to influence a target state either to do 
something it would not originally do, or to forgo an action that it would 
otherwise engage in, by the manipulation of the market in a manner that 
provides economic benefits to states that comply and/or imposes economic 
penalties on those who fail to comply.”216 
 
    Going by this definition, the theory of economic statecraft entails the provision 
of economic incentives to lure “receivers” to alter policy in accordance with the 
interests of “senders”.217 Notably, the effectiveness of economic statecraft does not 
stem from “positive-sum economic incentives”, as commercial diplomacy does.218 
Instead, economic statecraft works because, leaders of “receivers” must face 
considerable damage from possible economic sanctions after receiving “economic 
incentives” from the “senders”, in particular when they have a propensity to proclaim 
against “senders’” preferences. 219  In this light, strategic interactions based on 
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economic statecraft could be seen as a zero-sum game, which is contradictory to 
China’s current strategy for managing relationships with Taiwan. 
 
    In the case of cross-Strait relations, Beijing’s strategy is, on the one hand, to 
bring in its influence to bear in the process of economic integration, in order to deter 
Taiwan’s pursuit of de jure independence.220 On the other hand, Chinese leaders also 
aim to make a good impression on Taiwanese people in order to convince them about 
peaceful reunification.221 Imposing economic sanctions on Taiwan is therefore not in 
Beijing’s interests.222 As discussed before, all Chinese official documents connect 
cross-Strait economic integration with national reunification. 223  Even though 
Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui and President Chen Shui-bian were supportive of 
de jure independence by challenging Beijing’s “one-China principle” in the 
international community, rather than threatening economic sanctions, Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao still urged for bilateral economic exchanges.224  
 
    The most prominent example of Beijing’s commercial diplomacy toward 
Taiwan against the backdrop of nervous cross-Strait relations was President Hu’s 
strategy of “into the island, into the households, and into the brains”.225 Despite 
chilled relations between both sides, Beijing adopted the unilateral measure of “fruit 
offensive” toward Taiwan by purchasing remnant fruits from Taiwanese farmers who 																																																								
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were supposed to be loyal supporters of the pro-independence partythe Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP). 226  Although the effectiveness of this strategy is 
questionable since the DPP still won Taiwan’s presidential election in 2004, it proves 
that even though Chinese leaders face a grim situation across the Taiwan Strait, 
commercial diplomacy remains the core strategy of Beijing’s Taiwan policy, rather 
than economic statecraft. 
 
In addition, scholars also cast doubt on the effectiveness of Beijing’s economic 
sanctions on Taiwan. As will be discussed in chapter 3 and 4, Taiwan’s economic 
performance depends heavily on the Chinese market owing to abundant resources 
and low salaries in the mainland.227 Theoretically, asymmetrically interdependent 
economic relations between both sides should allow Beijing to easily force Taiwan to 
comply with its agendas by wielding economic statecraft. In contrast, whenever 
Beijing signaled its intention to punish Taiwanese enterprises on the mainland, their 
efforts were always frustrated.  
 
For example, in order to prevent the DPP from retaining governing power in 
Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election, Beijing intended to push Taiwanese people into 
acknowledging that the pro-independence movement could endanger Taiwan’s 
economic prosperity.228 Punishing Taiwanese businessmen who overtly supported 
the DPP became a genuine policy option for Beijing. In 2001, the Minister of 
Foreign Economic Relations (PRC), Shih Guangsheng, said: “We will not allow 
Taiwanese businessmen to make political capital at home by supporting 																																																								
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independence and make economic profits in the mainland.”229 As has been the case 
for several leading Taiwanese information and communication technology (ICT) 
industries on the mainland (e.g., Acer Co. and Chi-Mei Co.), these entrepreneurs 
have all made announcements against Taiwanese independence movements under 
pressure from Beijing.230 Nonetheless, it did not shake President Chen Shui-bian’s 
public support, and he won the presidential election with an absolute majority in 
2004. Scholars conclude that China’s hostile measures led Taiwanese citizens to 
“rally-around-the flag”, which made them more hostile to Chinese appeals.231 
Moreover, Chinese leaders also confronted strong opposition from provincial 
governors since investment from Taiwanese enterprises contribute to local economic 
development.232 Consequently, Beijing downplayed its claim that it would impose 
sanctions on Taiwanese businessmen.  
 
However, it is notable that Beijing’s punishment of Taiwan’s advocacy of 
independence has primarily taken place in in the diplomatic realm rather than 
economic realm. In fact, before Taiwan re-endorsed the 1992 Consensus in 2008, 
China had blocked the enlargement of Taiwan’s international space, for example by 
vetoing Taiwan’s application to join the WHO. Meanwhile, Beijing also denounced 
FTAs between Taiwan and its trading partners.233 Most significantly, even after the 
signing of the ECFA, the diplomatic sanction remains Beijing’s key method for 
punishing Taipei for its attitude toward signing sub-agreements of the ECFA. 
Beijing’s strong opposition against the FTA between Taiwan and Malaysia after the 
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Sunflower Movement in 2014 is evidence of this fact.234  
 
In the context of the above arguments, this thesis argues that Beijing’s ability to 
impose economic sanctions on Taiwan is limited despite asymmetric economic 
interdependence between China and Taiwan. Nonetheless, this does not mean China 
has limited political leverage over Taiwan. As discussed before, commercial 
diplomacy contends that influence stems from “positive-sum economic incentives”, 
which are distinct from the theory of economic statecraft that stresses the ability of 
imposing economic sanctions on target states.235 Yet likewise economic statecraft, 
the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy is assumed to be covariant with the 
degree of economic interdependence. While Taiwan’s economic development relies 
heavily on China, asymmetric economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait 
should be conducive to strengthening Beijing’s political leverage over Taiwan. As 
such, the next part of this section will explore this issue based on interdependence 
theory. 
 
2.6.2 Interdependence Theory and Commercial Diplomacy 
The degree of economic interdependence is an important indicator for 
evaluating the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy, and in fact, it is probably the 
only indicator that can be supported by statistical data. However, before analyzing 
the effectiveness of China and Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy in the subsequent 
chapters, it is essential to clarify what impact economic interdependence has on the 
effectiveness of commercial diplomacy. To this end, it is essential to define what 
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economic interdependence is.  
 
Generally speaking, the establishment of economic interdependence networks 
among states has been facilitated by the breakthrough of technological innovation in 
the era of globalization. Following the innovation of communication and 
transportation technology, “transaction costs” across borders have been reduced, and 
thus entrepreneurs have been able to exploit comparative advantages (e.g., resources, 
lands, labors) in other countries to enhance their productivity.236 Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have mushroomed, which have in turn contributed to the 
establishment of “global production networks”. 237  Consequently, developed 
countries have relied on low-cost factors of production in developing countries to 
maintain thriving economic performance, whilst developing countries depend 
heavily on huge amounts of investments from MNCs to carry out their 
industrialization and economic development projects.238  
 
As will be discussed in chapter 4, economic interdependence between Taiwan 
and China has been facilitated by investment in the mainland, mainly injected by 
Taiwanese original equipment manufacturers (OEM). In brief, the operation strategy 
of these manufacturing industries is “receiving orders in Taiwan, manufacturing in 
Mainland China, transiting in Hong Kong, and selling overseas.”239 Taiwanese 
investments help China to create jobs and upgrading technology, which are crucial to 
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Beijing’s economic modernization.240 Meanwhile, cheap production factors in the 
mainland have also enhanced the productivity and competitive advantages of 
Taiwanese manufacturers, as well as being profitable for Taiwan’s overall economic 
performance.241 By this reasoning, economic interdependence is reciprocal and thus 
it should be symmetric. Yet, this assumption is contradicted by reality.   
 
There are many cases of asymmetric interdependent relations globally, and 
cross-Strait economic interdependence is another example of this. All economic 
indicators support the argument that Taiwan depends heavily on the Chinese market. 
With respect to bilateral investment, in 2014, China’s businesses invested US$334 
million in Taiwan while Taiwan’s enterprises invested US$10.2 billion in the 
mainland.242 Simultaneously, in terms of bilateral trade, China accounted for 39.74% 
of Taiwan’s total exports and 18.14% of total imports, whereas Taiwan only 
accounted for 1.98% of China’s total exports and 7.00% of China’s total imports.243 
So far, Taiwan is China’s seventh largest trading partner whilst China is the largest 
trading partner for Taiwan.244  
 
What captures analysts’ attention is the fact that asymmetric economic 
interdependence breeds either “sensitivity” or “vulnerability” for those countries 
depending heavily on their counterparts, which could be obstacles to their national 
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interests.245 The main reason for this is that “less dependent” states are supposed to 
have many more resources to “influence” others so that they comply with their 
interests. As Keohane and Nye write: 
  
 “It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources 
of influence for actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent 
actors can often use the interdependent relationship as a source of power 
in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues.”246 
 
As discussed before, in a relationship of asymmetric economic interdependence, 
commercial diplomacy is the major tool for states to further their interests. In order 
to resist attempts at commercial diplomacy from “less dependent actors”, the only 
approach is to substitute the pre-existing economic interdependence by establishing 
new interdependence networks with other countries.247  
 
    Similar to the theory of economic statecraft, the time that a target state needs to 
expend and the price it needs to pay to implementing alternative strategies have an 
impact on the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy.248 By reviewing the extent to 
which a target state could afford this loss, it is helpful to make a judgment as to 
whether an interdependent relationship is a “sensitive” or “vulnerable” type of 
economic interdependence.249 Keohane and Nye indicate that  
 
“Sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before 																																																								
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policies are altered to try to change the situation. Vulnerability means an 
actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after 
policies have been altered.”250  
 
    Accordingly, despite huge costs, as long as a target state can find an effective 
alternative strategy, it can be deemed to be only “sensitive” to its counterpart’s 
commercial diplomacy rather than “vulnerable”.251 As a result, the effectiveness of 
its counterpart’s commercial diplomacy would be constrained. In the same vein, if a 
target state could not propose any new policy or its alternative scenarios failed to 
change the situation of asymmetric economic interdependence, it would be 
“vulnerable” in an economic interdependent relationship.252 In this case, the target 
state has only limited ability to defy the agendas of its counterpart; the effectiveness 
of its counterpart’s commercial diplomacy is therefore considerable. However, by 
applying this theoretical approach to cross-Strait economic interdependence, the 
question of whether the economically interdependent relationship between both sides 
is sensitive or vulnerable is ambivalent. It is contingent on the development of 
cross-Strait relations.  
 
    Based on economic logic, cross-Strait economic interdependence is sensitive for 
Taiwan but not vulnerable. China’s comparative advantages, such as production 
factors, have attracted Taiwanese investment since the 1980s, which has resulted in 
asymmetric economic interdependence.253 Yet China is not the only country that 
possesses these advantages in the region. Other countries, such as Vietnam, India, 																																																								
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and even Indonesia, are potential partners for Taiwanese manufacturing industries. 
Additionally, the “race to the bottom” is a prevalent phenomenon among developing 
countries in East Asia. 254  In an attempt to attract FDI to boost economic 
development, developing countries have often adopted a series of unilateral 
preferential policies, such as tariff exemption, rent discount, and even lowering 
salaries.255 In this instance, considering the rising wages of Chinese labor and the 
increasing costs of land in the mainland, Taiwanese industries can expect greater 
profitability by moving their manufacturing facilities to these countries. As a result, 
Taiwan should be able to challenge China’s commercial diplomacy by directing its 
investment to other countries with low-cost production factors, such as Vietnam and 
India. 
 
    Nonetheless, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, Taiwan’s “go south” strategy 
only achieved limited gains in the 1990s, owing to the Asian financial crisis.256 Most 
importantly, cutting cross-Strait economic ties is also risky for Taiwan. First of all, 
Taipei seems to have no leeway to suspend cross-Strait economic integration 
unilaterally because it risks peace across the Taiwan Strait, especially after the 
signing of the ECFA with Beijing. As discussed before, China’s grand strategy of 
peaceful reunification is based on cross-Strait economic integration under the 
“one-China principle”. Meanwhile, Beijing has not yet abandoned the scenario of 
reunifying Taiwan by military measures. As shown in Article 8 of the Anti-Secession 
Law, once Beijing recognizes that “possibilities for a peaceful reunification” have 
been “completely exhausted”, it is legal for them to wield military power to reunify 																																																								
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Taiwan.257 In this light, war is the possible price of changing asymmetric economic 
interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, an outcome which Taiwan cannot afford.  
 
    Furthermore, Taiwan cannot establish formal economic relations without 
Beijing’s consent or acquiescence. Participating in the process of regional economic 
integration and signing FTAs with other countries remain Taiwan’s main strategies to 
reduce the degree of its economic dependence on China.258 However, the expansion 
of Taiwan’s international space is based on the development of cross-Strait relations. 
Before reaccepting the 1992 Consensus in 2008, Beijing spared no efforts to cut 
Taiwan’s external economic relations by preventing Taipei from signing FTAs with 
other countries. Despite Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen economic ties with Southeast 
Asian states by carrying out the “go south” strategy in the 1990s, it was blocked by 
Beijing due to nervous relations between both sides.259 As such, the strategy of 
shifting asymmetric economic interdependence does not appear feasible. In this light, 
Taiwan is the vulnerable party in the context of cross-Strait economic integration.  
 
    However, contradictory to the premise that Taiwan is vulnerable to Beijing’s 
commercial diplomacy, Taiwan seems to have opportunities to reduce the degree of 
asymmetric economic interdependence with China. Indeed, after signing the ECFA 
with China, Taiwan has been allowed by Beijing to institutionalize its economic 
relations with other countries.260 Notably, Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy has been 
embodied in its FTA strategy that has targeted its trading partners in the Asia-Pacific, 
and participation in the mechanisms of regional economic integration, such as the 																																																								
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TPP and RCEP, is still Taipei’s priority. Thus far, Taiwan has already signed FTAs 
with Singapore and New Zealand, and Taipei has also concluded the initial economic 
cooperation agreements with Japan.261 Besides, Taiwan has also endeavored to 
commence negotiations over FTAs with the United States.262 It appears that all the 
parties Taiwan targeted for negotiations are major players in the process of regional 
economic integration. As such, whether Beijing could wield commercial diplomacy 
to influence Taiwan to accept its agendas of peaceful reunification is contingent on 
Beijing’s ability to constrain Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy in both diplomatic and 
economic realms at the regional level.  
 
    To summarize, commercial diplomacy is the main tool used by both sides to 
further their agendas of sovereignty in the process of economic integration. However, 
the question of whether Taiwan is sensitive or vulnerable to Beijing’s commercial 
diplomacy in the context of asymmetric economic interdependence is still unclear. 
Due to the fact that East Asian regional integration is an important factor that 
influences the effectiveness of Chinese commercial diplomacy and also Taiwan’s 
strategy to counter Beijing’s influence, it is essential to take regional economic 
integration into consideration as discussed in chapter 3. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
    This chapter has constructed a theoretical framework for the subsequent 
chapters to evaluate the effectiveness of both China’s and Taiwan’s commercial 
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diplomacy in pursuing their interests of sovereignty in the process of economic 
integration. In addition to rationalizing both sides’ commercial diplomacy in the 
context of interdependence theory, this chapter has also proposed a new approach to 
define sovereignty in a way that is better suited for analyzing the extent to which has 
China infringed on Taiwan’s sovereignty in chapters 4, 5, and 6. Specifically, by 
reviewing Krasner’s work on sovereignty, this chapter categorizes de facto 
sovereignty into Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. De jure sovereignty is also 
split into international legal and interdependence sovereignty.263 Furthermore, based 
on Winkler’s works, this chapter has further utilized functional sovereignty to bridge 
de facto and de jure sovereignty so as to study the competition between Beijing’s and 
Taipei’s strategies for defining Taiwan’s status in the IGOs.264  
 
    By employing this theoretical framework to study cross-Strait relations in the 
post-ECFA era, this thesis argues that Taiwan aims to utilize commercial diplomacy 
to consolidate its functional and de facto sovereignty in the process of economic 
integration. In addition, Taipei also expects to legitimize its de jure sovereignty by 
participating in the process of regional economic integration and international 
institutions. Against Taipei’s strategy, Beijing aims to wield commercial diplomacy 
to institutionalize the “one-China principle” and keep Taiwan on the track of 
peaceful reunification. However, the question of which side’s strategy is more 
effective remains unclear. Although asymmetric economic interdependence seems to 
provide Beijing with many more resources to influence Taiwan, it may be limited 
owing to the expansion of Taiwan’s international space. Moreover, while Taiwan’s 
FTA strategy is to target major players in the Asia-Pacificespecially the US allies 																																																								
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in the region it may further influence the effectiveness of Beijing’s commercial 
diplomacy toward Taiwan. As such, to address the question of whether China has 
infringed upon Taiwan’s sovereignty by wielding commercial diplomacy in the 
process of economic integration, chapter 3 will extend the discussions from the 
bilateral to the regional level. Specifically, the next chapter will study cross-Strait 
relations in the context of regional economic integration to explore how, and to what 
extent, the ongoing progress of regional economic integration impinges on the 
effectiveness of both China and Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy, as well as their 
agendas of sovereignty at the regional level.  
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Chapter 3 Taiwan, Globalization and Regional Integration 
3.1 Introduction 
    Chapter 2 of this thesis established a theoretical framework to examine how, 
and to what extent, China could infringe on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of 
economic integration. In brief, commercial diplomacy is a major instrument for both 
China and Taiwan to further their political agendas of sovereignty in the process of 
economic integration. Whereas Taiwan assiduously wields commercial diplomacy to 
bridge its de facto sovereignty with functional sovereignty in attempts to fortify its 
statehood in the international community, China sedulously wields commercial 
diplomacy to consolidate the “one-China principle” so as to enclose Taiwan’s de jure 
sovereignty.1 Theoretically, the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy is covariant 
with the degree of asymmetric economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait.2 
As Taiwan’s economic performance is heavily reliant on the Chinese economy, 
especially after signing the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) with China in 2010, Taiwan is supposedly vulnerable to Beijing’s 
political leverage.3  
 
    Nonetheless, the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards 
Taiwan does not solely stem from asymmetric economic interdependence across the 
Taiwan Strait. Rather, this thesis argues that Taiwan’s marginalization in the process 
																																																								
1 Krasner, Sovereignty, 1-25; Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty, 49-106; Winkler, “Can Trade Make 
a Sovereign?”,467-85; Winkler, “A Question of Sovereignty?”, 1-20. 
2 Frost, “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia”, 96-97. Keohane and Nye, Power and 
Interdependence, 8-16. 
3 Huang, “On the Spillover Effect of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 18-21; 
Corcuff, “Ma Ying-jeou’s China-leaning Policy and the 1683 Fall of the Zheng in Taiwan, 93-103. 
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of regional economic integration is the precondition for Beijing to facilitate 
cross-Strait economic integration, which provides China with more advantages to 
wield commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. To support this argument, this chapter 
aims to prove that, before signing the ECFA with Taipei, Beijing had already set up 
regional conditions that entail Taiwan strengthening economic ties with China to 
secure its economic interests, as well as to improve its marginalized position in the 
process of regional economic integration. However, how did China take advantage of 
its economic rise to create conditions at the regional level for increasing its political 
leverage over Taiwan in the post-ECFA era? 
 
    To address this question, the next section of this chapter studies Taiwan’s 
position in the process of regional economic integration. In brief, this section finds 
that Taiwan had successfully sustained its connection with regional economic 
integration when East Asian economies preferred “open regionalism” in the early 
1990s.4 Nevertheless, following China’s economic rise in the late 1990s, there has 
been asymmetry between Taiwan’s regional position and its contribution to the 
process of regional economic integration. To explore this asymmetry, the third 
section studies both China’s and Taiwan’s roles in the process of regional economic 
together with their contributions to “parts and components trade” (or components 
trade) in the wave of East Asian regionalization.5 Moreover, this section also takes 
ASUS and YAGEO as case studies to illustrate the integration between China and 
Taiwan’s manufacturing supply chains in wave of East Asian regionalization. 
Through this approach, this chapter contends that China’s economic rise has 																																																								
4 Takashi Terada, “The US Struggles in APEC’s Trade Politics: Coalition-Building and Regional 
Integration in the Asia-Pacific”, International Negotiations 18, no.1 (2013): 49-50. 
5 Prema-chandra Athkorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia: Regionalization 
or Globalization?” Asia Economic Papers 10, no. 1 (2011): 65-67. 
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overshadowed East Asian countries’ roles in the process of regionalization, as China 
has integrated regional production networks (RPNs) into its economy since the 
2000s.  
 
    Most importantly, China’s economic rise has also provided Beijing with 
opportunities to shape regional economic integration mechanisms in which Taiwan 
has no role. As such, the fourth section explores what impact has Taiwan’s 
marginalization in the process of regional economic integration has had on its 
sovereignty. Meanwhile, this section also examines impact of Taiwan’s marginalized 
regional position on its economic interests through the lens of “noodle bowl effects” 
and trade “substitution effects”.6 After exploring Taiwan’s economic interests in the 
Mainland, this chapter then makes sense of Taiwan’s decision to sign the ECFA with 
China. As such, the fifth section illustrates Taiwan’s seesaw strategy for improving 
its regional position in the context of the balance of influence between the US and 
China. Finally, this chapter concludes that the ECFA is the outcome of both Beijing 
and Taipei’s effort to reconcile economic interests with political agendas. 
 
3.2 East Asian Economic Integration: Where is Taiwan? 
    This section studies the question of why Taiwan’s economic contribution in the 
process of regional economic integration is inconsistent with its position within 
economic integration mechanisms in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. It is 
unusual that Taiwan, as one of the four developed economies and the fifth largest 
																																																								
6 Jadish Bhagwati, “US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs”, Discussion Paper Series 726, 
Columbia University, (1995): 1-9.  
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economy in East Asia, has become a “bystander” in the process of economic 
integration at the regional level.7 With regards to the cause of Taiwan’s regionally 
marginalized position, most scholars ascribe this phenomenon to its contentious 
statehood.8 Notably, although Beijing had constrained Taiwan’s international legal 
sovereignty in regional institutions following its accession to the UN in 1971, 
Taiwan’s interdependence sovereignty at the regional level was not entirely curtailed 
until the late 1990s. As will be discussed in this section, in terms of encroaching on 
Taiwan’s interdependence sovereignty at the regional level, the degree of China’s 
economic growth is a determinant of the effectiveness of China’s commercial 
diplomacy. Not until China played a central role in the RPNs in the late 1990s could 
Beijing wield commercial diplomacy to redefine the geographic scope of regional 
economic integration mechanisms to isolate Taiwan.9  
 
3.2.1 China, Taiwan, and the US in the Asia-Pacific Region in the Early 1990s 
    Taiwan’s membership of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is the 
foremost evidence of Beijing’s inability to curtail Taiwan’s interdependence 
sovereignty at the regional level before China played a significant role in the process 
of regional economic integration. The main reason for this is that economic 
integration in the Asia-Pacific region is the “market driven” process propelled by 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from multinational corporations (MNCs) that 
facilitates the establishment of RPNs.10 This regional integration approach was not 																																																								
7 Kevin G. Nealer and Margaux Fimbres, “Taiwan and Regional Trade Organizations: An Urgent 
Need for Fresh Ideas”, Asia Policy 21 (2016): 69-70. 
8 Dent, “Taiwan and the New East Asian Regionalism”, 108-09; Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 
117-19. 
9 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 117-19; Athkorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East 
Asia”, 77-85. 
10 Chia, “The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia”, 1-2. 
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beneficial for Beijing to further its political agenda by utilizing commercial 
diplomacy before China became East Asian economies’ major trading partner in the 
late 1990s.  
 
    Speaking of the APEC, this is “open regionalism” led by the US and Japan, 
which delineated East Asia within “the Asia-Pacific region”.11 According to Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Richard Baldwin, “regionalism” refers to “preferential trade 
agreements” or “preferential trade liberalization” between “a subset of nations” 
within a geographically defined area. 12  Given the wide geographic scope of 
economic cooperation, as well as its promise of not arousing trade discrimination 
towards outsiders by raising tariffs, scholars label APEC as “open regionalism” in 
East Asia.13 Although scholars argue that the US had made use of APEC to hamper 
the construction of “authentic” East Asian regionalism, East Asian economies 
displayed positive attitudes towards the US-led “open regionalism” because of their 
interests of liberalizing trade relations with advanced economies.14  
 
    Indeed, the US and Japan’s leadership in APEC mainly stemmed from their 
importance as the major markets and top investors in the Asia-Pacific region, and 
Beijing had limited ability to reverse the situation.15 As shown in Table 3.2.1, in the 
1990s, Japan and the US were the major trading partners for East Asian economies, 
																																																								
11 Ibid. 
12 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Regionalism versus Multilateralism”, World Economy 15, no. 5 (1992): 535; 
Richard E. Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism”, The 
Singapore Economic Review 53, no. 3 (2008): 452-53.  
13 Tanaka, “The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework”, 54; Terada, “The US Struggles in 
APEC’s Trade Politic”, 50. 
14 Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, 1-14; Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl”, 
458-59. 
15 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 111-12; Linda Low, “Multilateralism, Regionalism, Bilateral and 
Crossregional Free Trade Agreements: All Paved with Good Intentions for ASEAN?”, Asian 
Economic Journal 17, no. 1 (2003): 65-67. 
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especially for ASEAN members. 16  In terms of trade share, these advanced 
economies accounted for more than 30% of Northeast Asian economies’ total trade 
before 2000. Most significantly, whereas Japan and the US shared about 35% of 
Southeast Asian countries’ total trade in the 1990s, China merely accounted for 3% 
on average. Therefore, it was in East Asian countries’ interest to consolidate their 
economic ties with the US and Japan, and they were also eager to reduce tariffs on 
the entry of their products into advanced economies.17 To this end, East Asian 
countries preferred to extend the geographic scope of economic collaboration from 
East Asia to the US in order to strengthen their connections with the US market.18 In 
this context, with support from most East Asian countries, the US had successfully 
established APEC in 1989. 
Table 3.2.1 Major Trading Partners’ Share of East Asia’s Total Trade  
Northeast Asia  
     Year  
 
Economy 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 8.42% 9.92% 9.51% 8.98% 7.74% 7.32% 6.84% 6.24% 6.00% 
EU 16.71% 14.55% 13.99% 13.46% 12.64% 12.39% 11.46% 11.20% 11.74% 
China 6.69% 11.50% 13.00% 15.81% 15.50% 14.76% 14.61% 14.73% 14.63% 
US 23.78% 20.69% 20.41% 14.84% 11.81% 11.16% 11.44% 11.40% 11.74% 
Taiwan 3.76% 4.65% 4.97% 4.90% 4.26% 3.88% 3.77% 3.99% 3.98% 
R.O.K 3.57% 4.41% 4.74% 5.42% 5.21% 5.16% 5.03% 5.04% 5.08% 
Southeast Asia  
    Year  
 
Economy 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Japan 21.15% 19.25% 16.05% 12.45% 10.99% 10.69% 10.66% 9.52% 9.04% 
EU 15.95% 14.89% 13.17% 11.60% 10.27% 10.10% 9.87% 9.85% 9.82% 
China 2.41% 2.90% 4.40% 9.21% 12.15% 12.57% 13.07% 14.20% 14.99% 
US 16.76% 16.01% 16.66% 12.54% 9.18% 8.34% 8.06% 8.26% 8.41% 
Taiwan 3.94% 3.58% 4.99% 4.30% 3.89% 3.88% 3.88% 4.05% 4.24% 
R.O.K 3.24% 3.85% 4.19% 4.23% 5.12% 5.24% 5.34% 5.35% 5.21% 
Note:  
1. According to the ADB Database, Northeast Asia encompasses China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Japan, Republic of Korea (R.O.K), and Mongolia; and Southeast Asia is composed of 10 ASEAN 
members.  
Source: Asian Development Bank (2015) “Integration Indicators”19 																																																								
16 Asian Development Bank, “Integration Indicators”. 
17 Jeffrey D. Wilson, “Mega-Regional Trade Deals in the Asia-Pacific: Choosing Between the TPP 
and RCEP?”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 45, no. 2 (2015): 345-46. 
18 Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl”, 458-59. 
19 Asian Development Bank, “Integration Indicators”.  
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    It is noteworthy that by establishing APEC, the US and its allies were able to 
exert influence on East Asian countries in the process of regional economic 
integration, which was in turn not favorable for Beijing to marginalize Taiwan’s 
regional position by utilizing commercial diplomacy.20 Politically, Taiwan, Japan, 
and South Korea were solid US military allies against the expansion of communism 
in East Asia, and Taipei still sustained formal diplomatic relations with South Korea 
in the early 1990s.21 This advantage was particularly important because the US and 
its allies, especially Japan, were decisive actors in APEC. In this light, Beijing could 
not easily intervene in Taiwan’s interdependence sovereignty at the beginning of the 
post-Cold War era.   
 
    Most importantly, from economic perspectives, China had not yet been a major 
trading partner for East Asian economies (see Table 3.2.1); neither had it been a 
major investors in East Asia in the early 1990s.22 This had affected China’s ability in 
interrupting Taiwan’s economic relations with East Asian countries. Notably, Taiwan 
was not only solid ally of the US but also an important trading partner, and it had 
further increased Taiwan’s bargaining chips to join the APEC.23 Specifically, in 
Northeast Asia, Taiwan still maintained strong economic ties with South Korea and 
Japan. Besides. In Southeast Asia, Taiwan was also one of the major trading partners 
(see Table 3.2.1),24 and one of the top three investors in this area (see Table 3.2.2) in 
																																																								
20 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 111-21. 
21 Steven Phillips, “Why Taiwan? ROC Leaders Explain Taiwan’s Strategic Value”, in The US 
Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations: Economic and Security Dynamics, ed. Peter C. Y. 
Chow (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 165-69. 
22 Asian Development Bank, “Integration Indicators”. 
23 Cheung, “APEC as a Regime”, 29-33. 
24 Asian Development Bank, “Integration Indicators”.  
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the 1990s.25 Since Taiwan had played an indispensable role in boosting Southeast 
Asian economic prosperity, most Southeast Asian economies still preferred to shelve 
the contentious sovereignty across the Taiwan Strait so as to include Taiwan in 
APEC.26 
 
Table 3.2.2 Taiwan’s Investment in Southeast Asia (Unit: US$1 million) 
      Country  
Year Thailand Malaysia 
The 
Philippines Indonesia Singapore Vietnam 
1959 - 1989 2,097  1,257  275  1,964  477  1  
1990 783  2,348  141  618  48  251  
1991 584  1,326  12  1,057  13  521  
1992 290  575  9  563  9  562  
1993 215  331  5  128  70  421  
1994 477  1,123  268  2,487  101  519  
1995 1,804  568  14  567  32  1,240  
1996 2,785  310  7  535  165  534  
1997 414  480  13  3,419  230  248  
1998 254  263  5  155  158  441  
1999 211  70  5  1,180  325  173  
2000 437  241  1  131  220  281  
2001 159  297  0  72  378  456  
Total 10,562 9,241 759 12,891 2,244 5,855 
Ranking 3 3 6 5 N/A 2 
Notes:  
1. The statistic of Taiwan’s investment in The Philippine does not contain investment in the Subic 
Bay and other special economic zones. Taiwanese investment in these areas had reached 
US$1,044 million in 2002. 
2. Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.) 
Source: Edited by the author based on the report of the Council for Economic 
Planning and Development, Executive Yuan (R.O.C.) to the Legislative Yuan (R.O.C.) 
conducted in 200227 
 
    In general, APEC is a successful example of Taiwan’s efforts to transform its 
economic advantages into bargaining chips for participating in the process of 																																																								
25 9*:"E6,<%, ”"4(;-@/6>A8'
D	”, 2002, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, Republic 
of China, “The Review of Go South Policy: How to make use of Economic Power to Establish 
Relationships with Southeast Asian Countries”, 2002, accessed January 24, 2016, 
http://npl.ly.gov.tw/npl/report/911226/10.pdf . 
26 Cheung, “APEC as a Regime”, 21-25. 
279*:"E6,<%,”"4(;-@/6>A8'
D	”, 2002, Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, Republic of 
China, “The Review of Go South Policy: How to make use of Economic Power to Establish 
Relationships with Southeast Asian Countries”, 2002 . 
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regional economic integration. The prevalence of open regionalism in the 
Asia-Pacific region was beneficial for Taiwan, in that it helped Taiwan to participate 
in the process of regional economic integration. While there was a huge gap in the 
degree of economic connections with East Asian economies between China and the 
US, and even with Japan in the early 1990s (see Table 3.2.1), China could not reverse 
the trend of East Asian “open regionalism”. Moreover, China had limited ability to 
challenge the US leadership and agendas in APEC, which confined Beijing’s ability 
to counter Washington’s arrangement for Taiwan’s APEC membership.28   
 
    However, Taipei has faced predicaments in wielding commercial diplomacy to 
join regional economic integration mechanisms after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
On the one hand, Washington’s influence in East Asia has declined due to the ebbing 
of the US-led “open regionalism” in the post-crisis era.29 On the other hand, China 
has gradually become an important trading partner for most East Asian economies, 
which has allowed Beijing to rival the US and Japan for regional leadership by 
influencing the construction of East Asian regionalism in a manner that is detrimental 
to Taiwan’s regional position.30  
 
    With respect to the decline of APEC’s relevance, most scholars ascribed this to 
US ambition to maintain its hegemonic role not only at the regional level but also at 
the global level during the 1997 Asian financial crisis.31 Firstly, the US firmly 
opposed Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) initiative due to the concern over the 
																																																								
28 Gary Klintworth, “China’s Evolving Relationship with APEC”, International Journal 50, no.3 
(1995): 500-504. 
29 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 110-19. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Tanaka, “The Development of the ASEAN+3 Framework”, 60-62; Beeson, Regionalism and 
Globalization in East Asia, 229-32.  
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fading of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) role.32 However, Washington did 
not propose efficient alternative solutions that would assist East Asian economies in 
passing through the crisis.33 Secondly, regardless of East Asian countries’ economic 
predicaments during the crisis, the US maintained a firm attitude towards regional 
trade liberalization in sensitive fish and forest products by promoting the Early 
Voluntary Sectoral Liberalization (EVSL) in order to solidify its WTO agendas of 
trade liberalization.34 Consequently, East Asian economies lost confidence in US-led 
multilateral institutions.35 APEC’s function of promoting regional integration has 
waned, and the US had also lost its power in promoting regional economic 
integration in the Asia-Pacific region.36 
 
3.2.2 The Tendency of “Authentic” East Asian Regionalism: Where is Taiwan? 
    Since the decline of US regional influence, there has been a tendency towards 
“authentic” regionalism among East Asian countries.37 As East Asian countries had 
felt resentment at US unilateralism in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, ASEAN took 
the initiative to extend the pre-existing sub-regional integration framework — the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) — from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia.38 
Thereafter ASEAN has launched various regional economic integration mechanisms, 
such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and ASEAN Plus Six (APS) projects.39 These 
ASEAN-centered integration mechanisms have often been deemed as “East Asian” 																																																								
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Terada, “The US Struggles in APEC’s Trade Politic”, 56-58. 
35 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 111-19; Yang Jiang, China’s Policymaking for Regional Economic 
Cooperation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 4-5. 
36 Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, 223-32. 
37 Ibid., 1-14. 
38 Chia, “The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia”, 3-5. 
39 David Camroux, “’Asia Whose Asia?’ Evolving Concepts of An Asian Community from the 1920s 
till Today”, in The Evolution of Regionalism in East Asia, ed. Heribert Dieter (New York: Routledge, 
2007): 15-19. 
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regionalism; henceforth, East Asia has been distinguished from the “Asia-pacific” 
region in terms of “regional” economic integration. In this regard, the geographically 
defined “region” does not necessarily correspond with the geographic scope of 
“regionalism”.40 Thus the definition of “region” became ambivalent. 
 
    The definition of “region” is more ambiguous in Asia where there are many 
great powers aiming to maintain their influence by defining the geographic scope of 
“regional” economic integration as discussed later.41 Generally speaking, there have 
been too many economic integration mechanisms in the “region” to define what 
exactly the “region is”. As shown in Figure 3.2.1, apart from APEC, there is the other 
US-centered integration frameworkthe TPPconnecting East Asian economies 
with American and even Oceania countries, which defines the “region” as the 
Asia-Pacific region. 42  Meanwhile, the “region” is also encompassing the 
ASEAN-centric but China-driven Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP), containing both APT and APS members that symbolizes inherent 
geographically defined East Asian regionalism.43 Although all of these economic 
integration mechanisms are aimed at establishing the Free Trade Area of the 
Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), they have already split the “region” into East Asia and the 
Asia-pacific region.44 Moreover, one can further divide East Asia into Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia, as there is a regional trade agreement (RTA) between China, 
Japan, and South Korea, and the AFTA encompassing every ASEAN member state.45 
																																																								
40 Dent, East Asian Regionalism, 2-6. 
41 Beeson, Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia, 7-15. 
42 Shintaro Hamanaka, “TPP Versus RCEP: Control of Membership and Agenda Setting”, Journal of 
East Asian Economic Integration 18, no. 2 (2014): 165-69. 
43 Panda, “Factoring the RCEP and the TPP”, 51-52. 
44 Hamanaka, “TPP Versus RCEP”, 169-77. 
45 Min-Hua Chiang, “The Potential China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Area”, East Asia: An 
International Quarterly 30, no.3 (2013): 199-201; Chia, “The Emerging Regional Economic 
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    In order to tackle the problem of defining the “region” after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, this thesis defines “East Asia” as a geographic zone that includes all 
of the RCEP members, as well as Taiwan and Hong Kong. With respect to “the 
Asia-Pacific region”, it covers all the members of TPP and RCEP, as well as Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. The broad term “regional economic integration” encompasses all 
the major economic integration mechanisms (e.g. APEC, TPP, RCEP, APT, and APS) 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, with respect to sub-regional integration, it is 
essential to put a specific sub-region title to define the scope of these integration 
architectures, such as Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and so on.	
	
Figure 3.2.1 East Asian Regional Economic Integration Mechanisms 
	Source:	Charted by Chun-Fang Hsu46    
  
    Notably, while this definition of the region combines geographic with 
economically parameters, an “economic region” does not necessarily cover every 
																																																																																																																																																													
Integration Architecture in East Asia”, 6-10.   
46 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014. The author is grateful to her generosity to 
share this figure. It is important to mention that this figure was also used in 3!+F-6,DC
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.2F2014), 29; Chen-Yuan Tung, The Next 
Critical Step for Taiwanese Economy (Taipei: DrMaster Press Co., Ltd.), 29.    
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economy in a “geographically defined region”.47 Economic connection is a crucial 
factor in deciding whether a country is in a “region” or not, and this factor explains 
the exclusion of Russia and Mongolia from East Asian regional economic 
integration. 48  However, Taiwan’s exclusion in East Asian regionalism is not 
reasonable from this perspective. In fact, as shown in Table 3.2.3, if one includes 
Taiwan into the APT, Taiwan will share around 10% of intra-regional trade among all 
the 16 economies (including Hong Kong and Macau). Furthermore, as shown in 
Table 3.2.4, more than 50% of Taiwan’s trade was in East Asia by 2000, and this 
ratio had been soared to 60% since 2005.49  
 
    Notwithstanding its strong economic ties with East Asian economies, Taiwan 
has still been expelled from the process of East Asian economic integration. China’s 
rapid economic growth is the core reason for this, as it gradually eclipsed Taiwan’s 
role in the process of regional economic integration. In terms of the share of East 
Asian economies’ total trade, as shown in Table 3.2.1, between 1990 and 2014, 
China’s ratio soared from 6.69% to 14.63% in East Asia, and from 2.41% to 14.99% 
in Southeast Asia, whilst Taiwan’s share only increased from 3.76% to 3.98% in 
Northeast Asia, and from 3.94% to 4.24% in Southeast Asia. Moreover, as shown in 
Table 3.2.4, China had shared around 40% of Taiwan’s intra-regional trade since 
2005. This proportion can be higher if we take Hong Kong’s ration into account.  
 
    The above economic indicators illustrate the eclipse of Taiwan’s economic 
importance in East Asia. As will be elaborated later, the major cause for this 																																																								
47 Dent, East Asian Regionalism, 2-6. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, ROC, “Trade Statistics”, 2016, accessed January 24, 2016, 
http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/  
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phenomenon has been China’s increasing role in RPNs. As mentioned before, 
China’s regional influence mainly stems from its pivotal role in RPNs, and this is the 
determinant of the effectiveness of Beijing’s commercial diplomacy in countering 
both Washington’s and Taipei’s political agendas at the regional level.50 However, 
several important questions need to be asked: how, and when, did China play a 
central role in RPNs? How has China’s economic rise impinged on Taiwan, as well 
as the US’ and Japan’s regional influence? To answer these questions, the next 
section will explore both China’s and Taiwan’s roles in the wave of East Asian 
regionalization. 
Table 3.2.3 Taiwan’s Intra-regional Trade Share (Unit: US$1 million) 
Year TW – China 
TW – 
HK 
TW – 
Japan 
TW – 
South 
Korea 
TW – 
ASEAN 
TW – 
APT 
Intra-regional 
Total Trade 
Value (APT) 
Intra-regional 
Trade Value 
(APT+Taiwan) 
Taiwan’s 
share 
1991 4,234 13,568 27,763 3,124 13,599 62,287 470,373 532,660 11.69% 
1992 6,587 15,463 30,614 3,578 15,990 72,232 562,363 634,595 11.38% 
1993 14,395 15,790 31,881 3,704 17,961 83,731 636,933 720,664 11.62% 
1994 16,326 17,573 34,509 4,531 22,000 94,939 714,905 809,844 11.72% 
1995 17,880 21,329 43,312 6,445 24,625 113,591 868,146 981,737 11.57% 
1996 18,990 20,240 40,953 6,730 29,243 116,155 1,071,864 1,188,019 9.78% 
1997 19,834 20,817 40,034 7,020 31,976 119,680 1,123,368 1,243,048 9.63% 
1998 20,560 17,819 35,825 6,817 26,865 107,887 919,923 1,027,810 10.50% 
1999 23,479 17,225 41,874 9,317 31,528 123,422 1,024,307 1,147,729 10.75% 
2000 30,537 21,087 53,868 12,727 39,700 157,919 1,294,782 1,452,701 10.87% 
2001 32,350 18,423 38,436 10,137 33,653 132,999 1,208,224 1,341,223 9.92% 
2002 44,672 19,361 39,865 11,464 35,438 150,799 1,335,609 1,486,408 10.15% 
2003 58,367 21,571 45,584 12,924 38,594 177,039 1,633,033 1,810,072 9.78% 
2004 78,307 26,113 58,679 17,157 48,629 228,884 2,035,873 2,264,757 10.11% 
2005 91,214 28,163 61,823 18,912 53,201 253,313 2,323,440 2,576,753 9.83% 
2006 107,880 31,707 64,376 22,283 61,390 287,636 2,656,573 2,944,209 9.77% 
2007 124,466 33,117 64,696 22,994 65,676 310,950 3,028,954 3,339,904 9.31% 
2008 129,216 31,758 67,870 22,105 69,593 320,542 3,441,578 3,762,120 8.52% 
2009 106,219 29,744 54,771 19,353 56,261 266,348 2,889,786 3,156,134 8.44% 
2010 145,288 37,792 75,478 28,478 78,186 365,222 3,797,583 4,162,805 8.77% 
2011 159,961 42,061 74,024 32,891 92,825 401,761 4,438,241 4,840,002 8.30% 
2012 168,963 42,028 70,085 28,827 96,311 406,214 4,624,469 5,030,683 8.07% 
2013 197,162 43,769 65,322 30,332 101,980 438,565 4,711,404 5,149,969 8.52% 
2014 198,593 49,042 64,257 30,767 108,318 450,977 4,763,694 5,214,671 8.65% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the database of Asian Development Bank 
(2015) “Integration Indicators”51 
 																																																								
50 Athkorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia”, 77-85. 
51 Asian Development Bank, “Integration Indicators”. 
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Table 3.2.4 Taiwan’s Total Trade in East Asia (Unit: US$1 million) 
       Year 
Country 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
Brunei  72  0.034% 15  0.005% 18  0.005% 37  0.007% 373  0.073% 
Cambodia 34  0.016% 204  0.071% 339  0.089% 487  0.093% 744  0.146% 
China 3,468  1.611% 10,441  3.621% 63,736  16.727% 112,880  21.467% 115,392  22.670% 
Hong Kong 27,948  12.987% 33,521  11.626% 36,145  9.486% 39,434  7.499% 39,479  7.756% 
Indonesia 4,019  1.868% 4,749  1.647% 6,901  1.811% 10,530  2.002% 8,967  1.762% 
Japan 43,422  20.177% 55,156  19.130% 61,163  16.052% 69,922  13.298% 57,975  11.390% 
South Korea 6,899  3.206% 12,896  4.473% 19,116  5.017% 26,740  5.085% 25,589  5.027% 
Laos 23  0.011% 6  0.002% 11  0.003% 11  0.002% 17  0.003% 
Malaysia 5,852  2.719% 8,937  3.100% 9,500  2.493% 13,643  2.595% 13,649  2.682% 
Myanmar 63  0.029% 235  0.082% 131  0.034% 171  0.032% 270  0.053% 
The Philippines 2,277  1.058% 6,629  2.299% 7,120  1.868% 8,302  1.579% 9,280  1.823% 
Singapore 7,363  3.421% 10,469  3.631% 13,003  3.412% 19,732  3.753% 24,367  4.787% 
Thailand 4,557  2.117% 5,330  1.849% 6,707  1.760% 9,117  1.734% 9,597  1.886% 
Vietnam 1,284  0.597% 2,132  0.740% 4,804  1.261% 8,816  1.677% 11,986  2.355% 
Intra-Regional  
Trade 107,282  49.851% 150,720  52.276% 228,694  60.018% 319,822  60.823% 317,687  62.413% 
Global 215,204  100.000% 288,321  100.000% 381,035  100.000% 525,829  100.000% 508,999  100.000% 
Source: Compiled from the Database of Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.)52 
																																																								
52 Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, ROC, “Trade Statistics”. 
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3.3 East Asian Regionalization: Source of Influence 
    The previous section of this chapter studied Taiwan’s regional position in the 
1990s, and it also found that Taiwan has faced the difficulties to participate in the 
new wave of East Asian regionalism by wielding commercial diplomacy since the 
decline of APEC’s relevance of economic integration in East Asia after the 1997 
Asian financial crisis. As briefly discussed before, China’s economic rise has been 
the main reason for this, as Taiwan’s contribution in the process of East Asian 
economic integration has eclipsed. This section further ascribes Taiwan’s 
predicament of utilizing commercial diplomacy for securing its regional position to 
China’s pivotal role in East Asian RPNs. To support this argument, this section 
studies the roles of China and Taiwan in East Asian RPNs. Specifically, according to 
statistics in intra-regional parts and components trade, this section finds that East 
Asian RPNs are centered towards the Chinese market, and Taiwanese manufacturing 
industries are also heavily dependent on the low-cost production factors in the 
Mainland. As Taiwan’s supply chains have been integrated into the Chinese economy 
in the process of East Asian regionalization, its has increased the degree of Taiwan’s 
economic dependence on the Mainland. This has then provided Beijing with many 
more resources to further its sovereignty interests by wielding commercial diplomacy 
vis-à-vis Taiwan, as will be detailed in the next section. 
 
3.3.1 Taiwan in the Process of East Asian Regionalization 
3.3.1.1 East Asian Regionalization and Regional Production Networks 
    Regionalization, as defined by Christopher Dent, is “micro-level processes that 
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stem from regional concentrations of interconnecting private or civil sector 
activities”, especially in the economic realm.53 Andrew Hull further stresses the 
geographic area within which these processes occur, as he indicates: 
“[regionalization] lays particular weight on autonomous economic processes which 
led to higher level of economic interdependence within a given geopolitical area than 
between that area and the rest of the world”. 54  Although this definition of 
regionalization confines the scope of economic integration to a geographically 
bounded area, regionalization should not be perceived as a force in conflict with 
globalization. By contrast, trends of regionalization actually epitomize the current 
wave of globalization, as is clear from the case of East Asian regionalization.55 
 
    As mentioned before, the proliferation of RPNs has featured greatly in the 
process of East Asian regionalization since the 1980s, and it has also laid the 
foundations of the “market driven” economic integration approach in the region.56 
Most scholars ascribe the growth of RPNs to the propagation of international 
production networks (IPNs).57 According to Chunji Yun, an IPN is: “an international 
division of labour, in which each function or discrete stage of a value chain is 
spatially or geographically relocated in the most efficient site, and undertaken by 
different firms including MNCs [multinational corporations] and local firms”.58  
 
																																																								
53 Dent, East Asian Regionalism, 7. 
54 Andrew Hull, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”, Review of 
International Studies 21, no. 4 (1995): 334. 
55 Shaun Breslin, “Theorising East Asian Regionalism(s): New Regionalism and Asia’s Future(s)”, in 
Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa G. Curley and Nicholas Thomas (New York: 
Routledge, 2007): 32-33; Dent, East Asian Regionalism, 16. 
56 Chia, “The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia”, 1-2. 
57 Chunji Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State: Lessons from East 
Asian Developmental Experience”, The European Journal of Development Research 15, no.1 (2003): 
173-74. 
58 Ibid., 173. 
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    The progress of communication and transportation technology in the era of 
globalization is the main catalyst of the reproduction of IPNs, because it has led to 
the reduction of transactions and transportation cost.59 MNCs have therefore been 
able to utilize low-cost production factors (e.g. cheap labors, resources and so on) in 
developing economies to maintain or even enhance their industrial competency.60 
Subsequently, MNCs began to outsource a portion or even all of their products to 
manufacturers in developing economies so as to cut their operating costs.61 This has 
resulted in the segmentation of manufacturing processes, which has further 
facilitated parts and components trade between developed and developing 
economies.62  
 
    The connection between IPNs and RPNs is the similarities in their 
manufacturing processes, as well as solid partnerships between regional 
manufacturers and MNCs within production networks.63 In fact, most IPNs are 
RPNs because MNCs generally prefer to reallocate their production chains within a 
region due to their considerations of market approximation.64 Even though an MNC 
is outside a region, it can easily create a business operation center in the targeted 
regional market or sign a contract with a “local manufacturer” to organize its 
regional supply chain, thanks to the reduction of transactions cost in the era of 
																																																								
59 Ross Garnaut, “ASEAN and the Regionalization and Globalization of World Trade”, ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin 14, no. 3 (1998): 215-16. 
60 Gary Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S. Retailers 
Shape Overseas Production Networks” in Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, ed. Gary Gereffi 
and Miguel Korzeniewicz (Connecticut: Westport, 1994), 96-100. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Atchukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia: Regionalization or 
Globalization?”, 65-67. 
63 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State” 175; Mike Hobday, 
“Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics: Samsung of Korea and ACER of Taiwan”, Asia Pacific 
Business Review 4, no. 2-3 (1998): 49-51.  
64 Ibid.  
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globalization.65 In general, within the RPNs, the MNCs from developed economies 
have assisted East Asian developing economies in transforming their 
industrialization strategies from “import-substituting” to “export-oriented”, which 
accelerating their economic development as will be elaborated below.66 
           
    Today, East Asia has been described as “world factory” because manufacturers 
in the region’s developing economies have been responsible for a large portion of 
global manufacturing orders. 67  By 2005, more than 40% of the world’s 
manufacturing products were made in East Asia.68 The high productivity of East 
Asian manufacturers roots in the propagation of RPNs. 69  Meanwhile, the 
proliferation of RPNs has driven the rapid growth of intra-regional parts and 
components trade in the 1980s, which then generated the wave of East Asian 
regionalization.70 Therefore, to understand the emergence of regionalization in East 
Asia, this chapter conducts statistics on East Asian “parts and components trade” by 
adopting “Harmonized System of trade classification (HS)” and the “Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC)” as the standards of commodity 
classification to illustrate the proliferation of RPNs (please see Appendix III for the 
statistic method).71  
																																																								
65 Garnaut, “ASEAN and the Regionalization and Globalization of World Trade”, 215-19. 
66 Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains”, 100-01. 
67 Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl”, 453-54. 
68 Atchukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia”, 70-75. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Chia, “The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia”, 1-2. 
71 Atchukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia”, 65-95; Baldwin, “Managing 
the Noodle Bowl”, 459-62. 
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Table 3.3.1 The Value of Parts and Components Total Trade in East Asia based on SITC Standard (Unit: US$) 
             Year 
Economies 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 582,383,375  191,037,038  336,213,163  568,502,214  761,606,894  
Cambodia 303,978,460  166,530,543  365,869,411  722,608,706  2,260,539,894  
China 64,693,910,345  141,738,806,457  484,462,680,586  908,052,210,846  1,019,198,770,302  
China, Hong Kong SAR 42,769,880,362  57,856,544,140  145,116,042,743  242,039,270,144  326,840,854,524  
Indonesia 5,483,648,566  9,549,579,057  28,820,024,848  41,082,706,324  41,841,132,460  
Japan 107,523,872,861  134,122,675,786  202,828,896,040  268,022,691,809  261,013,901,515  
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 110,943,222  219,256,874  212,379,001  709,767,324  2,322,983,928  
Malaysia 44,798,272,597  67,067,383,691  92,971,880,926  125,317,753,458  127,237,964,588  
Myanmar 353,372,503  287,595,995  362,744,543  1,420,994,435  4,983,077,603  
Philippines 10,515,260,635  28,825,237,540  46,662,788,198  56,500,859,011  58,291,964,329  
Rep. of Korea 32,970,840,476  54,447,482,727  119,450,344,975  189,835,179,997  240,002,449,489  
Singapore 58,645,347,907  72,179,535,152  88,841,276,780  111,292,755,774  118,300,900,768  
Thailand 24,376,144,794  29,874,786,128  52,496,044,834  88,091,286,757  87,390,257,418  
Viet Nam 1,630,237,354  2,872,817,599  6,420,050,958  22,134,952,312  65,491,350,470  
Parts and Components 
Trade within East Asia 394,758,093,457  599,399,268,727  1,269,347,237,006  2,055,791,539,111  2,355,937,754,182  
Total Trade of Parts and 
Components (PC) 885,059,329,967  1,280,462,405,605  2,247,777,721,997  3,434,054,813,620  3,984,177,187,940  
Intra-Regional Parts and 
Components Trade Share 44.60% 46.81% 56.47% 59.86% 59.13% 
Regional Economies’ Total 
Trade of Manufacturing 
Goods (M) 2,089,705,114,382  2,578,811,011,401  4,362,806,101,046  6,962,971,702,495  8,866,594,902,127  
Total Share (PC/M) 42.35% 49.65% 51.52% 49.32% 44.93% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade Database72 																																																								
72 UN, “UN Comtrade Database”. 
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    Table 3.3.1 shows the total value of East Asian parts and components trade and 
its share of total manufacturing trade. According to this table, components trade 
constitutes a large portion of East Asia’s trade in manufactured commodities. 
Between 2000 and 2014, an average of 47% of East Asia’s total trade in 
manufactured goods was composed of parts and components products. Furthermore, 
according to Table 3.3.1, the total value of East Asian economies’ components trade 
soared from US$885 billion in 1995 to US$3.98 trillion in 2014. Simultaneously, the 
total amount of intra-regional parts and components trade was also on the increase, 
as the value had been raised from US$394 billion in 1995 to US$2.35 trillion in 2014. 
Since the ratio of intra-regional components trade had also grown from 44.60% in 
1995 to 59.13% in 2014, this table basically demonstrates the proliferation of RPNs 
in East Asia, as well as the progress of East Asian regionalization. 
 
    Notably, there is a gap between intra-regional component exports and imports as 
shown in Table 3.3.2. For example, in 2014, 46.47% of parts and components goods 
produced in East Asia were exported to other economies in the region whilst 66.89% 
of components imported by East Asian manufacturers were from regional economies. 
This asymmetric share probably mirrors the developing strategy of East Asian 
economies, as well as the progress of East Asian regionalization.   
 
    Specifically, in 2014, the total value of East Asia’s parts and components 
exports was US$2.23 trillion whilst the value of its imports was US$1.62 trillion. 
These statistics may magnify that “export-oriented industrialization strategy” has 
guided economic development of East Asian developing economies, as most scholars 
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have noted. 73  Moreover, while Table 3.3.2 indicates that more than 50% of 
manufactured components still left the region, it also reflects the connection between 
East Asian RPNs and IPNs. In addition, the high ratio of intra-regional parts and 
components imports could reflect the growing interdependent networks following the 
proliferation of RPNs in East Asia. Meanwhile, the rising ratio of intra-regional parts 
and components imports suggests that East Asia is emerging as a trade bloc, which 
further confirms the effectiveness of East Asian economic integration.  
 
Table 3.3.2 The Share between East Asian Economies’ Trade in Parts and 
Components, and Trade in Manufacturing Products 
                                  
                        Year  
Subject                  
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
The Rate of Intra-Regional Parts 
and Components Exports  
36.61% 38.27% 45.99% 49.22% 51.15% 
The Share of Total Manufacturing 
Exports 47.61% 52.25% 52.03% 48.07% 46.47% 
The Rate of Intra-Regional Parts 
and Components Total Imports  
57.31% 58.55% 67.40% 69.58% 66.89% 
The Share of Total Manufacturing 
imports 36.94% 47.01% 49.09% 47.72% 47.61% 
The Rate of Intra-Regional Parts 
and Components Total Trade  44.60% 46.81% 56.47% 59.86% 59.13% 
The Share of Total Trade of 
Manufacturing Products 42.35% 49.65% 51.52% 49.32% 44.93% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database74 
 
    To quickly understand East Asian countries’ contribution to the RPNs, Table 
3.3.3 displays each regional economy’s share of inter-regional parts and components 
trade. Unsurprisingly, China accounts for an overwhelmingly high ratio of 																																																								
73 Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains”, 100-1. 
74 UN, “UN Comtrade Database”. 
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intra-regional parts and components trade, as its share has soared from 16.39% in 
1995 to 43.26% in 2014. Furthermore, except for South Korea and Vietnam, the rest 
of regional economies share has been constantly in decline. As will be discussed later, 
this data supports the argument that China has integrated East Asian RPNs into its 
economy following its economic rise, which provided Beijing with more advantages 
to wield commercial diplomacy to further its interests in the process of East Asian 
economic integration. Nonetheless, according to Table 3.3.3, China did not play an 
important role in East Asian RPNs until 2000. Japan’s share of intra-regional parts 
and components trade remained far higher than the rest of the regional economies in 
the 1990s, which was 27.24% in 1995. In fact, before China’s economic rise, Japan 
was the major driver of the proliferation of East Asian RPNs since the 1980s. 
 
Table 3.3.3 East Asian Economies’ Share of Regional Components Trade  
           Year 
Economies 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei  0.15% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 
Cambodia 0.08% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.10% 
China 16.39% 23.65% 38.17% 44.17% 43.26% 
Hong Kong 10.83% 9.65% 11.43% 11.77% 13.87% 
Indonesia 1.39% 1.59% 2.27% 2.00% 1.78% 
Japan 27.24% 22.38% 15.98% 13.04% 11.08% 
Laos  0.03% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.10% 
Malaysia 11.35% 11.19% 7.32% 6.10% 5.40% 
Myanmar 0.09% 0.05% 0.03% 0.07% 0.21% 
Philippines 2.66% 4.81% 3.68% 2.75% 2.47% 
South Korea 8.35% 9.08% 9.41% 9.23% 10.19% 
Singapore 14.86% 12.04% 7.00% 5.41% 5.02% 
Thailand 6.17% 4.98% 4.14% 4.29% 3.71% 
Vietnam 0.41% 0.48% 0.51% 1.08% 2.78% 
Regional Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database75 
 																																																								
75 Ibid. 
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   Given Japan’s central role in the process of regionalization, contemporary 
literature on East Asian regionalization revolve around how regional economies 
benefited from the Japan-driven development approach of RPNs known as “the 
model of flying geese” caused by the phenomenon of industry offshoring from Japan 
to East Asian developing economies following its progress of industrialization.76 
However, the Japanese flying geese model cannot entirely explain the formation of 
East Asian RPNs, especially in Taiwan and South Korea.77 In order to understand 
the roles of Taiwan and South Korea in the process of East Asian regionalization, as 
well as their trajectories of industrialization, it is essential to study the US-initiated 
‘buyer-driven commodity chains’ (BDCCs).78  
 
3.3.1.2 Taiwan and the US-driven BDCCs 
    The BDCCs have contributed to Northeast Asian industrialization, especially in 
the cases of Taiwan and South Korea, as well as China since the late 1990s. Most 
importantly, the BDCCs have also led to the establishment of interdependent 
production networks between these economies.79 According to Chunji Yun, the 
definition of BDCCs is: 
 
“IPNs organised by merchandisers including trading companies, large 
retailers, and brand-name firms, which have competitive advantages in 
																																																								
76 For more details concerning Japanese model of flying geese, please refer to Andrew Staples, 
“Responses to Regionalism: Cooperate Strategy in East Asia” in The Evolution of Regionalism in Asia, 
ed. Heribert Dieter (New York: Routledge, 2007): 109-11; Yun, “International Production Networks 
and the Role of the State”, 175-77; Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity 
Chains”, 96-97. 
77 Hobday, “Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 51-53. 
78 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 177-81. 
79 Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains”, 97-100. 
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distribution and marketing end; core competences of the organisers lie in 
branding and marketing power”.80 
 
    Taiwan’s connection with the US-driven BDCCs in East Asia can be traced back 
to the 1960s when the Taiwanese government still focused on the development of 
labor-intensive manufacturing industries at the startup stage of industrialization. 81 
The low-cost labor force in Taiwan was the core factor that impelled US electronic 
manufacturers to reallocate their labor-intensive production lines to the island so as 
to maintain their competiveness in the home market.82 Simultaneously, Taiwan also 
established export-processing zones (EPZ) in Kaohsiung City where MNCs could 
enjoy the privileges of lower tariffs, and these preferential trade policies had 
equipped it with further incentives to lure US electronic industries.83  
 
    Notably, after US enterprises stationing their production lines in EPZs, Taiwan 
endeavored to create connections between their manufacturers and US electronic 
manufacturing industries in the 1970s.84 From thereon, there has been a proliferation 
of small and medium-sized local manufacturers (or small and medium-sized 
enterprises, SMEs) producing electronic components for US manufacturers in 
EPZs. 85  These SMEs laid the substantial foundations of the development of 
Taiwanese and South Korean information and communication technology (ICT) 
industries in the 1980s,86 and Taiwan’s electronic components manufacturer 
																																																								
80 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 177. 
81 Hobday, “Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 48-51. 
82 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 177-78. 
83 Dent, “Taiwan and the New East Asian Regionalism”, 120. 
84 Dieter Ernst, “Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing: What Permits Small Taiwanese Firms 
to Compete in the Computer Industry?”, Asia Pacific journal of Management 17, no. 2 (2000):231-33. 
85 Hobday, “Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 51-56. 
86 Ibid. 
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Yageo is a case in point. 
 
   Today, Yageo is an MNC that has business operation centers and factories in 
Taiwan, China, the US and Europe, and it is also the largest passive components 
manufacturer in the world.87 The major component product of Yageo is multi-layer 
ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) that are widely used in ICT products, consumption 
electronics (e.g. televisions, radios and so on) and automobile electronics.88 In 2013, 
its annual revenue reached US$830 million of which MLCC products occupied more 
than 80%.89 This company manufactured about 160 billion units of MLCC per 
month on average.90 However, in the early stage after its establishment in 1977, 
Yageo was still an SME, and its revenue relied on the orders from foreign electronic 
industries in the EPZ in Kaohsiung City.91 Meanwhile, by comparing Yageo’s annual 
revenue with its productivity, it is not difficult to see how low the price of a single 
MLCC unit is. In this case, to increase business revenue, Yageo’s strategy was 
similar to most well-developed Taiwanese components manufacturers, namely it 
invested in research and development (R&D) to fulfill the strategy of ‘low-margin, 
high volume’.92  
 
    In terms of assisting Taiwanese component manufacturers in upgrading 
manufacturing technology, the US electronic industries played an important role in 
the 1970s.93 Solid strategic partnerships with US electronic industries allowed 
																																																								
87 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Jacky B. Chen, interviewed by author, 
December 16, 2014. 
88 Jacky B. Chen, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 180. 
93 Ibid. 
	 144 
Taiwan to acquire advanced production technology through business exchanges or 
direct technology transfer (especially semiconductor technology transfer from Radio 
Corporation of America).94 Besides, the increasing orders from US MNCs allowed 
Taiwan’s SMEs to increase their investment in R&D.95 By this reasoning, the US 
electronic industries enhanced both the quality and productivity of Taiwanese 
components manufacturers, and also assisted Taiwan’s SMEs in achieving the 
strategy of “low-margin, high volume”.96  
 
    Following the rapid progress of Taiwan’s manufacturing skills in the 1980s, US 
enterprises  the electronic and ICT industries in particular  decided to 
outsource all of their products to Taiwan’s manufacturing industries in order to 
further reduce their operating costs. 97 Subsequently, Taiwan’s ICT industries have 
taken the form of original equipment manufacturers (OEM) on the world stage.98 
According to Mike Hobday, the OEM and its business model can be understood as 
“the [manufacturer] produces a good to the exact specification of a foreign buyer or 
[MNC], which then markets the product under its own brand name using its own 
distribution [or marketing] channels”.99 Generally speaking, the OEM business 
model could benefit NIEs’ economic development in two waysby allowing faster
progress towards industrialization and industry upgrading.100 The case of ASUS 
clearly illustrates not only the development of Taiwan’s OEM but also the OEM 
business model’s contribution to the progress of Taiwan’s industrialization. 
 																																																								
94 Hobday, “Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 51-56. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 178-180. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Hobday, “Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 55. 
100 Ibid., 72-74; Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 178-180. 
	 145 
    ASUS is an original brand manufacturer (OBM) in Taiwan, and one of the top 
five largest brands of laptops and personal computers (PCs) in the world. In 2013, 
ASUS’ annual revenue was about US$15 billion of which about 65% came from the 
sales of PCs and laptops.101 Before 2006, ASUS was the largest OEM in Taiwan, and 
its main business was producing components of mobiles, laptops and PCs (especially 
motherboards) for US and Japan’s ICT industries, such as Apple and Dell, which 
contributed to 60% of ASUS annual revenue.102 Notably, ASUS was also responsible 
for assembling ICT products for customers, as several components of ASUS 
costumers’ products were from Taiwanese SMEs.103 This business operation model 
has generated “horizontal integration” between OEMs and component manufacturers 
in Taiwan.104 Subsequently, it has catalyzed the establishment of complete supply 
chains of ICT products in Taiwan, which allowed Taiwanese OEMs like ASUS to 
commence the project of building their own brands.105 The pattern of industrial 
transformation will be illustrated with the case of ASUS in the context of Taiwan’s 
“go south” strategy in chapter 4.  
 
    Following the progress of industrialization in Taiwan, as well as in South Korea, 
similar to the Japanese model of “flying geese”, both economies’ ICT industries have 
also reallocated their supply chains to ASEAN developing economies due to the 
rising cost of production factors in their home countries in the 1990s.106 The 
distribution of BDCCs could be seen by reviewing intra-regional parts and 
components trade of Taiwan’s and South Korean ICT industries, as listed in Tables 
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3.3.4 and 3.3.5. Accordingly, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, 
were major investment targets of Taiwan’s and South Korean ICT industries. In this 
regard, concerning Taiwan’s contribution to Southeast Asian economies’ projects of 
industrialization, it is not surprising that these developing economies supported 
Taiwan’s participation in APEC in the 1990s despite the lack of formal diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan as mentioned in the previous section. Nonetheless, the BDCCs 
did not benefit ASEAN developing economies in the long term. As shown in Table 
3.3.4 and 3.3.5, both Taiwanese and South Korean production chains of ICT 
industries have been converged toward the Chinese market since 2005. This then 
influenced the effectiveness of Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy for participating in 
the new wave of East Asian regionalism as will be detailed in the next section. 
 
Table 3.3.4 East Asian Economies’ Share of Taiwan’s Intra-regional Trade in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
            Year  1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
China 1.87% 5.75% 27.32% 38.53% 38.60% 
Hong Kong 19.51% 20.05% 18.23% 15.81% 18.22% 
Indonesia 0.85% 0.52% 0.47% 0.34% 0.28% 
Japan 43.42% 34.13% 22.79% 17.12% 12.05% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
South Korea,  8.76% 9.86% 12.15% 10.33% 9.34% 
Laos 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 7.70% 8.50% 4.89% 3.99% 4.36% 
Myanmar 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
The Philippines  1.62% 6.51% 4.16% 2.70% 2.36% 
Singapore 12.10% 11.50% 7.48% 8.72% 11.76% 
Thailand 3.99% 2.94% 2.28% 2.11% 1.78% 
Vietnam 0.18% 0.24% 0.19% 0.34% 1.23% 
Subtotal 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the data compiled from the Database of 
Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.)107   																																																								
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Table 3.3.5 East Asian Economies’ Share of South Korea’s Intra-regional Trade 
in Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
        Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei  0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 
China 5.81% 5.32% 15.57% 39.56% 56.28% 58.80% 
Hong Kong  11.25% 11.19% 10.76% 10.90% 10.85% 10.53% 
Indonesia 0.76% 1.38% 1.37% 1.05% 1.06% 0.76% 
Japan 67.00% 54.43% 41.73% 28.65% 15.21% 10.65% 
Laos  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
Malaysia 3.84% 6.74% 8.86% 4.18% 3.35% 2.35% 
Myanmar 0.02% 0.09% 0.04% 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 
Philippines 1.15% 1.91% 6.57% 3.71% 2.88% 3.03% 
Singapore 8.16% 15.84% 11.43% 9.13% 7.24% 6.28% 
Thailand 2.02% 2.51% 3.29% 2.31% 1.85% 1.47% 
Vietnam 0.00% 0.57% 0.37% 0.51% 1.25% 6.03% 
Subtotal 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database108       
 
3.3.2 The Rise of China and the Redistribution of East Asian RPNs 
    Since China’s economic rise in the 1990s, East Asian RPNs have become 
gradually oriented towards the Chinese market, and this phenomenon has led to the 
redistribution of RPNs after 2000. There is much evidence to support this argument. 
Table 3.3.3 shows that there was a nearly three-fold increase in China’s share of 
intra-regional parts and components trade between 1995 and 2014. If Hong Kong is 
taken into account, the Chinese economy shared 57.13% of regional component trade 
in 2014. This figure supports the argument that China has played a central role in 
East Asian RPNs since the 2000s. 
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Table 3.3.6 East Asian Economies’ Share of Japan’s Intra-regional Trade in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
        Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei  0.02% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 
China 8.07% 12.83% 21.16% 38.31% 50.11% 55.45% 
Hong Kong  20.23% 15.85% 13.94% 13.31% 9.98% 8.10% 
Indonesia 2.40% 2.79% 3.48% 2.34% 2.30% 2.16% 
Laos 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 9.25% 14.35% 12.65% 6.99% 6.81% 5.35% 
Myanmar 0.07% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 
Philippines 3.14% 4.91% 8.33% 6.06% 3.97% 4.25% 
South Korea 25.93% 20.99% 19.01% 17.32% 11.68% 10.74% 
Singapore 22.07% 19.10% 13.08% 6.77% 5.37% 4.05% 
Thailand 8.62% 8.96% 7.60% 7.70% 7.52% 6.43% 
Vietnam 0.20% 0.17% 0.70% 1.18% 2.22% 3.36% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database109 
 
    Furthermore, with respect to East Asian ICT supply chains; China has already 
integrated both the US-driven BDCCs and Japan oriented RPNs into its economy. 
Tables 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 demonstrate that China has played a central role in the 
US-driven BDCCs, and superseded Japan as the largest regional trading partner of 
both Taiwan and South Korea in electronic parts and components trade in 2005. 
Meanwhile, with the exception of Singapore, ASEAN developing economies’ share 
of both Taiwan and South Korean intra-regional electronic component trade had 
fallen to less than 3% by 2014. By the same token, Table 3.3.6 shows that China’s 
share of Japan’s intra-regional electronic parts and components trade has reached 
50% since 2010, whereas Southeast Asian economies, such as Singapore and 
Malaysia, have fallen from double digits to 5% on average since 2010. So far, South 
Korea is the only East Asian economy that can sustain 10% of Japan’s electronic 																																																								
109 Ibid. 
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component trade. 
 
     In addition, it is noteworthy that this trend actually emerged after 1995, as 
Hong Kong captured a double-digit share of Taiwan, Japan and South Korea’s 
intra-regional electronic component trade in the 1990s (see Tables 3.3.4, 3.3.5 and 
3.3.6). The main reason for this is that Hong Kong serves as an important gateway 
for both Taiwanese and South Korean ICT industries to connect their production 
lines in China with global customers, especially in Taiwan’s case.110 Generally 
speaking, these statistics likely reflect the redistribution of ICT regional supply 
chains following China’s economic rise. Notably, it has further resulted in 
asymmetric economic interdependence between China and those economies focusing 
on the development of ICT industries.  
 
    The asymmetric interdependencies between China and those regional 
economies specializing in ICT industries can be double-checked by exploring the 
distribution of China’s intra-regional electronic component trade. Table 3.3.7 
illustrates China’s major trading partners in electronic components trade in East Asia. 
South Korea and Japan were China’s major trading partners in intra-regional ICT 
component trade, as they shared 25.52% and 17.85% of such trade in 2014. In 
addition to Japan and South Korea, Hong Kong also occupied a large portion of 
China’s electronic component trade in East Asia as the ratio reached 32.67% in 2014, 
which may mirror the value of China’s ICT component trade with other East Asian 
economies. Besides, if one adds Taiwan into the calculation of China’s inter-regional 
ICT component trade, the share among those East Asian economies specializing in 
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ICT industries will be more equal. Obviously, in terms of ICT parts and components 
trade, whilst East Asian economies are relying heavily on the Chinese market (see 
Table 3.3.4, 3.3.5, and 3.3.6), China’s ratio is equally distributed throughout regional 
industrialized economies. As such, there has been asymmetric interdependence 
between China and Taiwan, as well as with South Korea, and even Japan. 
 
Table 3.3.7 East Asian Economies’ Share of China’s Intra-regional Trade in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
                Year 
Countries 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 
Cambodia 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.03% 0.05% 
Hong Kong  35.25% 27.22% 26.96% 29.55% 32.67% 
Indonesia 0.71% 1.39% 0.98% 1.39% 1.53% 
Japan 48.69% 41.14% 27.08% 22.99% 17.85% 
Laos 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.15% 
Malaysia 1.77% 5.62% 7.85% 9.43% 8.21% 
Myanmar 0.19% 0.10% 0.04% 0.11% 0.32% 
Philippines 0.43% 2.40% 5.32% 3.00% 2.53% 
South Korea 7.07% 13.31% 22.09% 24.16% 25.52% 
Singapore 4.83% 6.28% 6.64% 4.73% 4.16% 
Thailand 0.78% 2.39% 2.77% 3.27% 2.91% 
Vietnam 0.24% 0.09% 0.24% 1.31% 4.07% 
Subtotal 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database111 
     
    With regard to China’s role in Japan-centered RPNs of automobile industries, 
China has also become the largest regional partner in Japan’s automobile component 
trade in East Asia since 2000. As shown in Table 3.3.8, China’s share has soared 
from 3.91% in 1990 to 50.84% in 2014, which represents a stunning seventeen-fold 
increase in the last 25 years. Although this figure suggests that China has integrated 
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Japan-centered automobile RPNs into its economy in the 2000s, notably, the 
development of China’s automobile industries may also rely heavily on Japan’s 
MNCs. 
 
Table 3.3.8 East Asian Economies’ Share of Japan’s Intra-regional Trade in 
Automobile Components (HS87) 
         Year 
Country           
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei  0.89% 0.46% 0.45% 0.47% 0.27% 0.17% 
Cambodia 0.03% 0.22% 0.20% 0.14% 0.08% 0.18% 
China 3.91% 8.29% 19.14% 34.63% 50.87% 50.84% 
Hong Kong  11.60% 13.62% 10.72% 4.99% 2.51% 3.10% 
Indonesia 13.74% 13.22% 11.92% 9.55% 9.59% 8.58% 
Laos 0.11% 0.07% 0.12% 0.05% 0.09% 0.26% 
Malaysia 14.01% 13.22% 12.62% 9.90% 7.16% 6.57% 
Myanmar 0.53% 0.42% 0.23% 0.15% 0.15% 2.56% 
The Philippines 7.73% 8.51% 8.16% 4.46% 3.64% 4.32% 
South Korea 8.13% 6.36% 8.70% 9.43% 6.86% 5.28% 
Singapore 10.27% 6.14% 10.58% 7.07% 1.40% 2.08% 
Thailand 28.21% 27.90% 15.48% 17.18% 15.57% 12.82% 
Vietnam 0.84% 1.55% 1.68% 1.97% 1.79% 3.23% 
Subotal 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database112  
 
    As shown in Table 3.3.9, Japan had consistently been China’s largest trading 
partner in automobile components since its share rose steadily above 50% between 
1995 and 2014. In this light, despite the fact that Japan’s automobile supply chains 
have been directed towards China, economic interdependence between China and 
Japan in this field is still symmetric. The strong performance of Japanese automobile 
industries compensates for the impact of its ICT industries’ overdependence on the 
Chinese market, and it may also imply that Japan is the only economy in East Asia 
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that can just about maintain symmetric economic interdependence with China. This 
may partly explain why Japan is still able to rival China in terms of regional 
leadership in the constructive process of East Asian regionalism. 
 
Table 3.3.9 East Asian Economies’ Share of China’s Intra-regional Trade in 
Automobile Components (HS87)  
                  
Year  
Countries 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei  0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.07% 
Cambodia 0.21% 0.11% 0.07% 0.10% 0.29% 
Hong Kong  9.23% 9.73% 3.13% 1.81% 1.98% 
Indonesia 2.55% 9.04% 3.97% 2.29% 3.45% 
Japan 57.79% 56.45% 60.04% 66.81% 55.26% 
Laos 0.56% 0.18% 0.19% 0.22% 0.43% 
Malaysia 1.39% 1.38% 2.27% 2.57% 3.87% 
Myanmar 3.71% 0.52% 0.58% 1.78% 2.65% 
The Philippines 1.69% 0.70% 1.62% 1.26% 2.61% 
South Korea 12.33% 5.59% 23.45% 18.20% 19.59% 
Singapore 5.02% 1.65% 1.01% 0.80% 0.99% 
Thailand 3.41% 0.54% 1.66% 1.78% 3.35% 
Vietnam 2.10% 14.10% 1.99% 2.37% 5.47% 
Subtotal 100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
100.00
% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database113 
 
    There are three key factors that help us understand why all of East Asian RPNs 
converge on China. The first and foremost one is China’s steady and rapid economic 
growth after the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up” 
policy.114 This factor became more important in the late 1990s, as China was the 
only economy that could still maintain a stable economic growth rate after the 1997 
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Asian financial crisis.115 Table 3.3.10 displays China’s annual GDP growth rates and 
purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita between 1996 and 2014. The Asian 
financial crisis had a negative impact on the Chinese economy, but it was quite 
limited as China’s GDP growth rates merely declined from 9.23% in 1997 to 7.85% 
in 1998.116 
 
Table 3.3.10 Indicators of China’s Economic Growth between 1996 and 2014 
Year Annual Growth Rate 
of Real GDP(%) 
PPP Per Capita (Unit: 
Current International 
Dollar) 
PPP Per Capita 
Annual Growth Rate 
(%) 
1996 9.92 2,052.315 10.75 
1997 9.23 2,246.692 9.47 
1998 7.85 2,437.493 8.49 
1999 7.62 2,641.669 8.38 
2000 8.43 2,907.448 10.06 
2005 11.35 5,042.251 14.22 
2010 10.63 9,215.399 11.42 
2014 7.27 13,224.002 8.50 
Source: Compiled from the IMF “World Economic Outlook Database” and the ADB 
Database of “Economic and Financial Indicators”117 
 
    Meanwhile, accompanied by the thriving economic development, there was also 
a rapid growth in China’s PPP per capita reflecting the rise of the Chinese market in 
the 1990s. Despite the financial crisis in 1997, as shown in Table 3.3.10, China still 
sustained steadfast annual growth rates in its PPP per capita, which was around 9% 
in 1997 and 1998. The positive and high growth rates of China’s GDP and PPP per 
capita imply that the Chinese market remained substantial and steady during the 
crisis. Henceforth, China became a shelter for commercial enterprises to weather 
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through the financial crisis.118  
     
    In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China’s economy grew at an 
unprecedented pace. As shown in Table 3.3.10, China achieved double-digits growth 
rates in GDP in 2005 and 2010.119 Most significantly, between 2000 and 2014, 
China had a quadruple growth in amount of its PPP per capita, which was equivalent 
to US$13,224 in 2014. Given China’s thriving and sustained economic performance, 
as well as its large population of 1.3 billion people, most MNCs have targeted the 
Chinese market in attempts to enlarge their economies of scale.120 As will be 
discussed below, as a result of China’s preferential policies and the low-cost 
production factors, East Asian manufacturers have decided to relocate their supply 
chains to the Mainland.       
 
    In addition to robust economic performance, China’s preferential policies have 
further incentivized investment from East Asian manufacturing industries, similar to 
East Asian developing economies. A good example of this is China’s effort in 
establishing special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong Province and Fujian 
Province.121 In order to attract investment from MNCs, Beijing set relatively low 
standards of labor salary within SEZs.122 Furthermore, the Chinese government also 
provided MNCs with preferential treatments in rents, electricity, and currency 
exchange rates and so on within the SEZs.123 Most significantly, given China’s 
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geographical proximity to Hong Kong  especially the short distance between its 
EPZs in Guangdong province and Hong Kong  MNCs can further utilize Hong 
Kong’s advantage of intermediary trade to enjoy tariff discounts in exports and 
imports.124 
 
   Finally, as most scholars have noted, the low-cost labor force in the Chinese 
market also serves as an important incentive that propels East Asian manufacturing 
industries to relocate production lines in China.125 However, as will be discussed 
together with Taiwan’s Mainland fever in chapter 4, China’s labor skills has been 
largely enhanced following the popularization of higher education since the 1990s.126 
This has provided manufacturers with further incentives to relocate their production 
line in the Chinese market. 
    
    In summary, China has played a pivotal role in RPNs since the 2000s. While 
China shared more than 50% of electronic and automobile parts and components 
trade in East Asia in 2014 (see Tables, 3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.3.7 and 3.3.8), it proves that 
China has successfully integrated both of the Japan-centered RPNs and East Asian 
BDCCs into its economy. Meanwhile, given the disproportionate ratios of bilateral 
component trade between China and East Asian economies, it is clear that there has 
also been asymmetric economic interdependence between China and regional 
economies and Taiwan is no exception. The specific reasons for Taiwan’s “Mainland 
fever” will be examined with the cases of ASUS and Yageo in chapter 4 so as to 																																																								
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125 Yue-man Yeung et. al., “China’s Special Economic Zones at 30”, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics 50, no. 2 (2009): 224-25. 
126 William W. Keller and Louis W. Pauly, “Building a Technocracy in China: Semiconductors and 
Security”, in China’s Rise and the Balance of Influence in Asia, ed. William W. Keller and Thomas G. 
Rawski (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007): 61.  
	 156 
explain its unsuccessful “Go South” strategy that aimed to redirect Taiwan’s 
industrial distribution from China to ASEAN developing economies in the process of 
East Asian economic integration. 127  Generally speaking, China’s economic 
advantages obtained in the process of regionalization provide Beijing with more 
resources to compete with the US and Japan for regional leadership.128 Most 
importantly, as will be discussed below, China’s advantageous position in the process 
of East Asian regionalization has also allowed Beijing to shape East Asian 
regionalism in its interests since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
     
3.4 China-Led East Asian Regionalism: The Impacts on Taiwan’s Economic 
and Sovereignty Interests 
    The previous section explored both Taiwan’s and China’s roles in the context of 
economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region. By studying parts and components 
trade between East Asian economies, it confirmed that following China’s economic 
rise, both the Japan-driven and the US-centered RPNs have been converged on the 
Chinese market. In this section, this chapter argues that China’s central role in the 
process of East Asian regionalization has allowed Beijing to further its regional 
interests in the construction of East Asian regionalism. Notably, since the ebbing of 
the US-driven open regionalism after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China has taken 
this advantage to initiate an ASEAN-centered regionalism as being favorable for 
Beijing to pursue its interests in East Asian by utilizing commercial diplomacy.129 
Meanwhile, China has also excluded Taiwan from regional economic integration 																																																								
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frameworks by institutionalizing the “one-China principle” in ASEAN-centered 
regional institutions. As will be discussed below, this has resulted in the erosion of 
Taiwan’s functional and de jure sovereignty at the regional level. Additionally, 
Taiwan’s economic interests has also been endangered owing to the potential 
“substitution effects” bred by the TPP and RCEP. 
 
3.4.1 Taiwan’s Sovereignty in the Context of East Asian Regionalism  
    In chapter 2, this thesis contended that China’s influence should be covariant 
with “positive-sum economic incentives” that it is able to offer for other countries.130 
Following this logic, China’s regional influence roots in its contribution to the 
process of regionalization. Indeed, not until China successfully integrated the 
US-driven BDCCs and the Japan-centered RPNs into its economy in the 2000s could 
Beijing take the initiative to compete with the US in defining regionalism. This has 
had negative impact on Taiwan’s regional position and its economic interests in the 
Asia-pacific region, which is evident from Taiwan’s marginalized position in process 
of constructing TPP and RCEP.131 As will be elaborated below, the foremost impact 
on Taiwan has been the erosion of its sovereignty, and thus the following paragraphs 
will examine this issue in the context of regionalism.  
   
3.4.1.1 APEC and Taiwan’s Sovereignty 
    Thus far, APEC is the only regional integration mechanism in which Taiwan 
still possesses a seat. In addition to Taiwan’s potential economic contribution to 
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regional prosperity, this achievement can also be attributed to Beijing’s limited 
ability to further its political agenda in the process of regional economic integration 
because China had not yet played an important role in the process of regionalization. 
However, it is noteworthy that Taiwan’s membership in APEC might also be in line 
with China’s political and economic interests. 
 
    First of all, from an economic perspective, the establishment of APEC also 
fitted China’s economic interests, and thus Beijing intended to join this forum.132 In 
fact, in order to promote China’s economic modernization in the 1990s, Beijing 
needed technological assistance and investment from Taiwan and advanced 
economies. 133  However, most regional advanced economies still maintained a 
conservative attitude towards the issue of cultivating economic ties with China, and 
China’s relations with these countries were still tepid following the end of the Cold 
War.134 Facing this situation, Beijing aimed to consolidate bilateral relations with the 
US and major East Asian economies (e.g. Japan and South Korea) by participating in 
APEC.135 Additionally, Beijing also aimed to make use of this platform to deepen 
economic cooperation with regional economies, because this was favorable for its 
economic development in the post-Cold War era.136  In this context, Taiwan’s 
membership of APEC was in line with China’s economic interests because Taiwan 
had been among the top three investors in the Mainland but still lacked official 
economic links.137 As such, instead of deterring Taiwan from being an APEC 
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member, China tolerated its co-existence with Taiwan in APEC.138 
 
    Furthermore, politically, China was not powerful enough to oppose 
Washington’s agenda regarding regional economic integration, as mentioned before. 
Moreover, following the progress of China’s economic modernization since the 
1980s, East Asian countries questioned whether China might try to transfer its 
economic power into military power, which could endanger regional stability.139 To 
mute the voice of ‘China threats’ in the post-Cold War era, Beijing focused on the 
“good neighbor policy”,140 and thus Beijing chose to accommodate the US and its 
allies in APEC rather than challenging their regional interests.141 As a result, Beijing 
basically acquiesced to the US arrangement for Taiwan to become a member of 
APEC insofar as it did not clash with the “one-China principle”.142 
 
    Nonetheless, in spite of its inability to prevent Taiwan from participating in 
APEC, Beijing still successfully confined Taiwan’s membership within the 
“one-China principle”. Indeed, Taiwan has been defined as an “economic entity” 
rather than a sovereign state in APEC due to China’s influence.143 Notably, most 
East Asian countries had already normalized their relations with China in the late 
1980s, and thus it is not surprising that the “one-China principle” reached the level of 
consensus among APEC members before Taiwan’s enrolment. 144  Beijing had 
constrained Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty by defining Taiwan as an 																																																								
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“economic entity” titled “Chinese Taipei” in APEC; hence Taiwanese leaders were 
forbidden to attend any APEC summit.145  
 
    Regardless of China’s encroachment on Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty, 
Taiwan has still been able to preserve its interdependence and functional sovereignty 
at the regional level through APEC. Taiwan has pressed this advantage by making 
use of APEC as a platform to further its functional sovereignty by wielding 
commercial diplomacy in attempts to acquire de jure sovereignty in the international 
community. This function is especially important for Taiwan since most East Asian 
countries severed their diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the late 1980s. 
Specifically, APEC provided an ideal locus where Taiwan could commence official 
negotiations with East Asian countries.146  
 
    At the bilateral level, Taiwan connected its de jure sovereignty with 
interdependence sovereignty through its functional sovereignty in APEC. The most 
prominent cases have been Taiwan’s negotiations with Indonesia and the Philippines 
over the issue of bilateral investments before the formal assembly of the 1993 Bogor 
Summit.147 These negotiations laid the foundation of Taiwan’s “go south” strategy, 
which was crucial for Taiwan to not only strengthen its economic ties but also 
develop official relationships with ASEAN members in the 1990s as will be 
discussed in chapter 4.148  
 
    Most significantly, Taiwan signed the Trade and Investment Framework 																																																								
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Agreement (TIFA) with the US in 1994 after Washington’s pronouncement of its 
ambition to construct the “Pacific Community” in APEC.149 As will be detailed in 
chapter 6, this agreement serves as an important precondition for Taiwan to join TPP, 
which is key for Taipei to improve its marginalized regional position, as well as to 
counter China’s commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era.150 In this regard, 
APEC’s economic cooperation mechanisms provided Taipei with more opportunities 
to sign bilateral economic agreements with regional economies. It then magnified the 
Taiwanese government’s functions as a de facto regime, which is favorable for 
Taiwan to further its interest in international legal sovereignty.   
 
    At the regional level, Taiwan also strengthened economic interdependence with 
ASEAN members through multiple economic cooperation scenarios in APEC,151 
which solidified its interdependence sovereignty. As a member of APEC, Taiwan 
fulfilled its obligation to contribute to regional prosperity under the US regional 
integration proposal of the “Pacific Community” in 1993.152 For example, Taiwan 
tried to build upon its successful experience in the Hsinchu Science Park by 
establishing the Subic Bay Industrial Park in the Philippines, so as to assist Manila’s 
industrialization.153 So far, most Filipino manufacturers in the Subic Bay Industrial 
Park specialize in manufacturing parts and components for ICT products in the RPNs, 
and they are still receiving technological assistance and management from Taiwanese 
ICT industries.154    
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    In addition, APEC also contributed to the extension of Taiwan’s 
interdependence sovereignty from the regional to the global level. It is noteworthy 
that although APEC’s goal is to promote regional economic integration, all of 
APEC’s measures of trade liberalization adopt the standard set by the WTO in the 
Uruguay Round.155 Taking the EVSL as an example, APEC did urge its members to 
cut tariff on ICT products before 2000 based on the Information Technology 
Agreement (ITA) of the WTO.156 In this context, as a member of APEC, Taiwan was 
able to recalibrate its domestic trade policy to meet the WTO standards, which aided 
in its accession into the WTO in 2002.157  
 
3.4.1.2 Taiwan’s Sovereignty in the New Wave of Regionalism 
    Before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Taiwan was able to extend its functional 
and interdependence sovereignty through APEC, and this forum also enabled it to 
establish economic partnerships with East Asian economies despite the lack of 
formal diplomatic relations. However, since the decline of APEC’s relevance in the 
late 1990s, the evolution of East Asian regionalism has become a multi-track process 
in the context of the rivalry between China and the U.S. for regional leadership.158 
Thus far, the US-led TPP and China-driven RCEP featured heavily in this 
competition. Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 3.2.1, Taiwan became marginalized in 
the new wave of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. From thereon, Taiwan has 
faced difficulties in retaining its regional position by wielding commercial diplomacy, 
which has resulted in negative impacts upon its sovereignty interests.  																																																								
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    Generally speaking, Taiwan’s regionally marginalized position has been 
detrimental for Taipei to secure its interests of de jure and functional sovereignty. 
First of all, at the bilateral level, as most Taiwanese elites point out, participating in 
multilateral mechanisms is vital to establish economic ties with major trading 
partners without formal diplomatic relations.159 The key reason is that Taiwan can 
barely sustain its diplomatic relations with just 22 countries, and none of them are 
Taiwan’s major trading partners in the Asia-Pacific region. As Taiwan has been 
excluded from primary economic integration mechanisms in the region, it is difficult 
for Taipei to commence negotiation over the issues of bilateral economic integration 
in the lack of formal diplomatic relations with its major trading partners in East Asia. 
By this reasoning, Taiwan’s isolated position in the process of regional economic 
integration has impinged upon its interests of consolidating functional and 
interdependence sovereignty, not to mention further its interests of international legal 
sovereignty.  
 
    Moreover, at the regional level, Beijing has infringed on not only Taiwan’s 
functional sovereignty but also de jure sovereignty. The ASEAN-centered regional 
institutions in which the US plays almost no role (except for ARF) have been useful 
platforms for Beijing to further its “one-China principle”.160 In the 1990s, China 
spared no effort in legitimizing its “one-China principle” in ASEAN. In 1994, after 
considering the huge volume of Taiwan’s investment in Southeast Asia, ASEAN 
members had intended to discuss Taiwan’s regional position via “track-two 																																																								
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conferences”, but Beijing soon expressed its strong opposition this initiative.161 
After the 1997 financial crisis, Beijing even used its financial aids to Southeast Asian 
economies as bargaining chips to lobby ASEAN members for their official 
endorsement of the “one-China principle”.162  
 
    As the result of China’s commercial diplomacy, ASEAN officially endorsed the 
“one-China principle” in 1999 and reaffirmed this principle in 2004 to ensure 
China’s positive attitude towards the China-ASEAN FTA (CAFTA).163 From that 
point forward, China successfully deprived Taiwan of its international legal 
sovereignty at the regional level, and further constrained Taiwan’s ability to 
commence negotiations over the issue of participating in regional economic 
integration mechanisms without Beijing’s consent. This has then in turn enhanced the 
effectiveness of Beijing’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan, as will be 
discussed in chapter 5 and 6.   
 
3.4.2 Taiwan’s Isolated Regional Position: Economic Impacts on Taiwan 
    Aside from the negative impacts on Taiwan’s sovereignty, the economic impact 
caused by Taiwan’s marginalized position in the Asia-Pacific region is also worthy of 
consideration. Ideally, Taiwan should participate in regional economic integration 
mechanisms as many as it can; at least, it should aim at joining US-led regional 
economic integration frameworks. However, Taiwan’s focus is mainly on the 
ASEAN-centered integration frameworks supported by China rather than the US-led 																																																								
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TPP. The main reason for this is that TPP did not become a concrete regional 
economic integration mechanism until the US participation in 2008. Moreover, 
according to the official report conducted by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
in 2013, TPP only accounted for 34% of Taiwan’s total trade, whereas RCEP 
accounted for 57%.164 Yet, based on the interviews with Taiwanese elites, Taipei’s 
concern over the TPP seemingly revolves around its strategic value, namely its 
ability to decrease Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Chinese market and to 
compensate the negative economic impact on Taiwan generated by RCEP. 165 
Chapter 6 will study these issues in more detail. 
 
    Nonetheless, at the formative stage of ASEAN-centered economic integration 
frameworks, Taiwan did not pay close attention to these mechanisms because Japan 
and South Korea were still outsiders. Moreover, ASEAN members are not Taiwan’s 
major trading partners; neither are they major economic competitors vis-à-vis Taiwan. 
According to the evaluation conducted by Taiwan’s Executive Yuan in 2004, the 
negative impacts of CAFTA would only be seen on “Taiwan’s textile industries, 
wood processing industries, and petrochemical industries”.166 As these are not 
Taiwan’s key industries, Taiwan would only suffer a 0.05% decrease of annual GDP 
growth rate by losing US$149 million.167 
 
    Moreover, the Taiwanese government also casts doubt on the effectiveness of 																																																								
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CAFTA owing to the problem of the ‘noodle bowel effects’.168 As Bhagwati points 
out, the proliferation of FTAs is the key cause of the “spaghetti bowl” effect because 
it also raises numerous “rules of origin” (ROOs) in discerning the ‘nationality of 
goods’ for tariff reductions. 169  Specifically, an effective FTA entails a high 
utilization rate of ROOs, but it is a challenge for every government. In fact, 
identifying “nationality of goods” is not easy due to the rise of parts and components 
trade following the segmentation of production chains in the era of globalization.170 
In this case, the administrative cost of applying ROOs can be even higher than 
product values; it then results in a low utilization rate of ROOs.171 Furthermore, 
given the miscellaneous and heterogeneous ROOs among FTAs, it is fairly difficult 
for the government to standardize ROOs, and therefore analysts question whether an 
economy can effectively achieve the goal of trade liberalization by signing bilateral 
or regional FTAs.172     
 
    The “noodle bowl syndrome” is especially significant in East Asia while 
regional economies have endeavored to sign FTAs due to the uncertainty of trade 
liberalization progress at the regional level and the WTO after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis.173 Apart from interests in pursuing trade liberalization, East Asian 
countries, and even the US, are also used to utilize RTAs as instruments to 
consolidate bilateral relations or strategic partnerships in the security realm, as has 
been the case for the FTA between the US and Singapore.174 Subsequently, East 
Asian economies have been entangled with the problem of miscellaneous ROOs 																																																								
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within a great number of FTAs.  
 
Table 3.4.1 The Number of East Asian Economies’ FTAs by 2015 
Countries The Number of FTAs Rank 
Brunei Darussalam 12 9 
Cambodia 8 14 
China, People’s Republic of 22 4 
Hong Kong, China  5 15 
Indonesia 17 7 
Japan 24 2 
Korea, Republic of 23 3 
Lao PDR 10 10 
Malaysia 21 5 
Myanmar 10 10 
Singapore 32 1 
Taiwan 9 13 
Thailand 21 5 
The Philippines 10 10 
Vietnam 15 8 
Source: Compiled from ADB (2015), “Free Trade Agreements”175 
 
    As shown in Table 3.4.1, most East Asian economies have had at least 10 FTAs 
at the same time, and regional economic powers, such as Japan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and China, possessed more than 20 FTAs by 2015. Moreover, 
Table 3.4.2 provides the number of cumulative FTAs in Asia.176 Stunningly, between 
1995 and 2015, there has been a seven-fold increase in the number of FTAs, reaching 
215 by 2015. Given the intricate FTA networks in East Asia, it is not unusual to 
witness Taiwan’s doubt about the effectiveness of CAFTA in the official evaluation. 
Actually, according to Baldwin’s study, since the establishment of AFTA in 1992, 
this agreement had only benefited about 3% of total trade among ASEAN members 
in terms of preferential tariff treatments.177  
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Table 3.4.2 The Total Number of FTAs in Asia in 2015 
Year 
Under Negotiation 
Signed but not yet 
in Effect 
Signed and in 
Effect Total Proposed 
Framework 
Agreement signed 
Negotiations 
launched 
1975 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1991 0 0 2 5 7 1 
1995 0 0 9 22 31 1 
2000 0 6 10 35 51 3 
2005 16 28 17 63 124 37 
2010 11 47 15 106 179 53 
2011 12 47 14 114 187 57 
2012 10 58 12 120 200 48 
2013 9 61 10 125 205 53 
2014 5 66 12 130 213 59 
2015 5 62 14 134 215 67 
Source: Compiled from ADB (2015), “Free Trade Agreements”178 
 
    Due to the probable limited effectiveness of CAFTA in trade liberalization, as 
well as its limited impact on Taiwan’s economy, Taipei remained confident in the “go 
south” strategy for responding to CAFTA, which will be studied in more detail in 
chapter 4.179 In addition, Taiwan aims to promote trade liberalization in the WTO 
and APEC in order to cope with the negative economic implications of by 
CAFTA.180 However, when Seoul and Tokyo commenced FTA negotiates with 
China and ASEAN, Taipei’s worried about the “trade diversion effect”’, particularly 
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on its ICT industries.181 
 
    “Trade diversion effect”, as defined by Bhagwati, is “taking trade away from 
efficient outside suppliers and giving it to inefficient member countries” after the 
implementation of an FTA.182 This effect contradicts to the initial purpose of trade 
liberalization, namely“trade-creating”, which means “generating trade from one 
more-efficient member at the expense of another less efficient member”.183 In theory, 
once the trade diversion effects had been felt following the establishment of an FTA, 
both FTA members and “outsides” would suffer economic loss since the FTA has lost 
its function of “trade creation”.184  
 
    Taiwan’s concern over the “trade diversion effects” is mainly based upon the 
above FTA theory, but it may be slightly different from theoretical arguments. It is 
noteworthy that Taiwan’s worries about the establishment of APT largely stems from 
the potential loss of its competitiveness vis-à-vis Japanese and South Korean 
electronic and ICT industries; however, none of manufacturers in these countries are 
“inefficient” in these fields.185 Japanese electronic enterprises, such as SONY and 
TOSHIBA, and South Korean ICT industries, such as Samsung and LG, are all 
strong competitors for Taiwan’s electronic and ICT industries. As such, in order to 
distinguish the difference between Taiwan’s contemplations and the theoretical 
context of the FTA theory, this thesis replaced the term of “trade diversion effects” 
by the “trade substitution effects” as defined in chapter 1. Taiwan’s concern over the 
“trade substitution effects” generated by the APT has two main aspects.      																																																								
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    Firstly, following the establishment of APT, South Korean ICT products could 
substitute Taiwan’s.186 The aforementioned industrialization trajectories of Taiwan 
and South Korea in the process of East Asian regionalization augur severe 
competition between them. Both economies have focused on the development of ICT 
industries to facilitate the progress of industrialization, and currently, the ICT 
products still constitute a large proportion of their exports.187 In considering Taiwan 
and South Korea’s highly competitive and overlapping export commodities, the 
Taiwanese government worried that Taiwan’s ICT industries would lose its 
competitiveness vis-à-vis South Korea following the establishment of the APT.188  
 
    The disadvantageous position of Taiwan may further deteriorate following 
Japan’s enrolment in the APT and TPP.189 On the one hand, Japan’s enrolment in 
APT may cause the redistribution of electronic RPNs by directing investment from 
Taiwan to Mainland China and Southeast Asian economies, which would endanger 
the survival of Taiwan’s electronic SMEs.190 On the other, it may be more difficult 
for Taiwan’s electronic industries, especially those manufacturers of consuming 
electronic products, to rival Japan’s enterprises for the share of East Asian 
markets.191  
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    Thus far, despite most analysts’ expectations, the TPP negotiations were 
concluded in 2015. Meanwhile, in response to the US-led TPP, East Asian economies 
have endeavored to expand the scope of regional economic integration by 
establishing RCEP based upon pre-existing APT projects.192 Moreover, to tackle the 
“noodle bowl effects”, TPP members have integrated miscellaneous ROOs into three 
classification standards listed in TPP Chapter 3.193 In the case of RCEP, ASEAN has 
also commissioned several study groups to research the issue of ROOs.194 This new 
situation is apparently not in the Taiwanese government’s anticipation, and the 
formation of RCEP and TPP can possibly magnify the negative economic 
implications for Taiwan caused by its marginalized regional position. To tackle this 
problem, Taiwan must generate new strategies. However, Taiwan has confronted 
strategic predicament whilst Beijing has spared no effort to deter Taiwan’s FTA 
negotiations with East Asian economies by reiterating the “one-China principle”.195 
In this regard, Taiwan’s economic agendas have become political issues.  
3.5 The ECFA: Taiwan’s Response to the TPP and RCEP 
    After studying impact bred by Taiwan’s regionally marginalized position on its 
economic and sovereignty interests, this section contends that the ECFA is a 
contingency plan of Taiwan’s regional strategy. As the China factor is the main 
obstacle to Taiwan’s goal of participating in regional economic integration, Ma’s 
administration has shifted its strategic logic from confrontation to cooperation with 
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China, which this thesis terms the “seesawing strategy”. Based on this new regional 
strategy, Taiwan has decided to promote cross-Strait economic integration under the 
ECFA since 2010, in exchange for the improvement of its regional position.196 
However, Taiwan’s “seesawing strategy” has generated controversy in Taiwan, which 
is most evident in the case of the 2014 Sunflower Movement. Yet there is evidence 
that President Ma’s strategy is more reasonable than some skeptics assert. 
 
3.5.1 Taiwan’s Strategic Predicament in East Asia  
    Facing possible “trade substitution effects” generated by the establishment of 
the APT and RCEP discussed in the previous section, ideally, Taiwan’s regional 
strategies should be signing more FTAs with its trading partners and expressing 
interests of participating in the ongoing formation of regional economic integration 
mechanisms or commence the negotiation over the issue of participation in the 
US-led TPP.197 Currently, Taiwan is indeed pursuing these strategies, but their 
effectiveness has seemingly been constrained. 
 
     First of all, in terms of joining in TPP, its accession process for a new member 
was not beneficial for Taiwan. The accession rules of TPP are listed in Article 
30.4.198 In brief, a prospective member must obtain each member’s agreement 
through bilateral negotiation.199 In addition, each individual member may set its own 
conditions that a new member has to meet in exchange as shown in the first clause of 
Article 30.4.200 Moreover, a new member must also agree to accept all the concluded 																																																								
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clauses of TPP and cannot oppose any issue that is currently in negotiation between 
original members. 201  Additionally, through bilateral negotiation, an incumbent 
member of TPP can also use its endorsement as a bargaining chip to force a new 
member to make concessions on a specific issue.202  
 
    In this context, if Taiwan expects to join in TPP, Taipei must accept all the deals 
that have been agreed by incumbent members. However, it is not the most difficult 
part for Taiwan to access TPP, the key obstacle is actually the process of acquiring 
consent of every TPP member through bilateral negotiation. Taiwan does not have 
formal diplomatic relations with any TPP member. Ostensibly, the regulations of 
membership contained in the TPP agreement favor Taiwan’s accession because 
statehood is not a prerequisite.203 However, it is difficult to imagine that Washington 
will ignore Beijing’s attitude and unilaterally support Taiwan’s membership of TPP, 
and the China factor remains the main obstacle stooping Taiwan from carrying out its 
regional strategy, as most Taiwanese policymakers pointed out.204  
 
    In addition, as mentioned before, Beijing has also pressed this advantage to set 
the agenda of the “one-China principle” at the regional level.205 Moreover, to join 
TPP, Taiwan has to conclude sensitive agricultural issues with Washington so as to 
put the disputed TIFA into practice, raising the issue of food safety, which has 
tortured the Taiwanese government since the late 1990s.206 All of these difficulties 																																																								
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cannot be resolved in a short span of time. Chapter 6 will elaborate these issues in 
the context of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy for participating in TPP and RCEP in 
more details. 
 
    Furthermore, supporting Taiwan’s membership in regional economic integration 
mechanisms is not in line with East Asian countries’ economic interests because it 
may risk their relations with China.207 Notably, in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, the inherent geographically defined East Asian regionalism, in 
particular the China-initiated APT and RCEP, had substituted for the US-initiated 
open regionalism as the main theme of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific 
region before the emergence of the US-led TPP in the late 2000s.208 During this 
period, China has been as leader or ‘propeller’ of East Asian regionalism.209 The 
major reason for this is that, on the one hand, most East Asian economies have relied 
heavily on the Chinese market to revive their economic performance in the 
post-crisis era.210 On the other hand, China has also integrated East Asian RPNs into 
its economy, which has caused asymmetric economic interdependence between 
China and East Asian economies as discussed before. Consequently, China’s 
importance as a trading partner has continued to increase. 
 
    As shown in Table 3.2.1, between 1995 and 2005, China’s share of Southeast 
Asian economies’ total trade quadrupled, and it formally surpassed Japan and the US 
as the largest trading partner of these economies in 2010.211 In Northeast Asia, China 
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has also replaced the US and EU as the most important trading partner of regional 
economies (see Table 3.2.1).212 Compared with China’s double-digit share of East 
Asian economies’ total trade, Taiwan’s importance as a trading partner greatly 
diminished, despite the fact that Taiwan had a steady annual share of around 4% 
between 1990 and 2014 (see Table 3.2.1). By this reasoning, China’s rise has 
overshadowed Taiwan’s economic contribution to East Asian economies. 
Consequently, Taiwan has gradually lost its bargaining capacity in relation to new 
economic integration mechanisms in East Asia, especially when the US and is absent 
from the APT and RCEP.  As Taiwan’s former Premier, Professor Liu Chao-shiuan 
says:  
 
“We hope to resolve the problem [of economic marginalization] by 
adopting an open attitude towards trade liberalization, but time is not on 
our side. In the past, we had the economic advantages to influence or even 
control the course of events … but China is rising with unprecedented 
speed. The wax and wane of China and Taiwan’s powers makes us worry 
about our situation, and our economic performance is no longer far in 
advance in East Asia”.213  
     
   Finally, as China has played an important role in promoting regional economic 
integration and development, it has become a hub of FTAs in East Asia as shown in 
Table 3.4.1.214 By 2015, China had 22 FTAs either in effect or under negotiation, 
and 17 of them were with Asia-Pacific economies.215 This implies that Taiwan is not 																																																								
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the only source from which China can obtain advanced technology and management 
skills essential for Beijing’s projects of industrialization. Moreover, although Taiwan 
did not entirely normalize bilateral economic relations with China until 2008, as will 
be elaborated later, the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China has 
continually increased despite Taipei’s measures to restrict cross-Strait economic 
exchanges.216 As a result, unlike the case of APEC, Beijing has no reason to make 
concessions on the issue of Taiwan’s participation in regional economic integration 
mechanisms, and this has also enlarged Beijing’s capacity to wield commercial 
diplomacy towards Taiwan, which will be discussed in chapter 5. 
 
3.5.2 The ECFA as the Contingency Plan of Taiwan’s Regional Strategy? 
   Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou verified this strategic dilemma in 2014 when he 
said:  
 
“Taiwan has long performed well in external trade, but in the past 10 
years or so, countries around the world have signed free trade agreements. 
Many countries want to do business with Taiwan, but when it comes to 
signing a FTA with us, they become hesitant, because of our diplomatic 
predicament.”217  
 
This is most evident in Taiwan’s stagnant negotiations in the early 2000s with 
Singapore and New Zealand over FTAs, as Beijing’s opposition directly resulted in 
																																																								
216 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 48-71. 
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the suspension of these negotiations until 2012.218  
 
    In order to overcome the China factor, President Ma took the initiative to 
improve cross-Strait relations as the first step towards expanding Taiwan’s 
“international space”.219 Specifically, after improving bilateral relations with China, 
Ma’s administration further expects Beijing to support its regional policy in the 
post-ECFA era. 220  In this regard, instead of solely focusing on obtaining 
Washington’s support, the key element of President Ma’s regional strategy is now 
seemingly the attempt to improve Taiwan’s regionally marginalized position by 
“seesawing” between China and the US. Despite the fierce opposition to this tactic, 
evidenced by the 2014 Sunflower Movement mentioned in chapter 1, President Ma’s 
“seesawing strategy” is in fact based on rational concerns.   
 
    From an economic perspective, as several scholars point out, Taiwan could 
probably make use of the ECFA to decrease the negative economic impacts 
generated by TPP and RCEP.221 Firstly, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, China’s share of Taiwan’s total trade was 21.1% in 2013.222 This ratio is 
stunning because it is equivalent to two-thirds of TPP’s and a half of RCEP’s share 
of Taiwan’s total trade. Therefore, promoting cross-Strait economic integration is 
indeed the most feasible and efficient scenario to cope with the negative economic 
impacts from TPP and RCEP, despite the fact that Taiwan cannot join these economic 
mechanisms. Besides, after the improvement of cross-Strait relations, Taiwan was 
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also able to commence FTA negotiations with Japan, Singapore and New Zealand, 
which could not only decrease economic impacts on Taiwan caused by regional trade 
liberalization but also lay foundations for Taiwan to participate in TPP and RCEP.223 
 
    Additionally, all the commodities contained in ECFA’s early harvest list upon 
which Beijing promised to impose tariff reductions, are from those Taiwanese 
manufacturers that suffered economic loss following the establishment of the APT. 
Specifically, the “Product List Under the Early Harvest on the Mainland Side” 
encompasses the products of petrochemical manufacturers from No.26 to No.75, and 
the products of textile manufacturer from No.132 to No.264.224 Moreover, in order 
to decrease negative economic impacts on Taiwan’s electronic and ICT industries 
caused by the APT, Taiwan has also successfully convinced Beijing to expand the 
scope of ITA, as the machinery and electronic products are listed between No.344 
and No.482, and from No.530 to No.539.225 Notwithstanding this contribution, the 
ECFA has still become the topic of intense debate among Taiwanese elites due to the 
limited benefits for Taiwan’s economic development, as well as the increasing degree 
of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China.226 Chapter 6 will explore these issues 
in more detail.     
 
    Aside from Taiwan’s economic strategy concerns, the ECFA can also be deemed 
as the byproduct of Taiwan’s “seesawing strategy”. Before the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, support from the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region were vital in 
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allowing Taiwan to counter Beijing’s opposition against Taiwan’s membership in 
regional organizations. 227  However, as the US is now absent from the 
ASEAN-centered regional economic integration frameworks, it is not practical to 
keep adopting the strategy of jumping on the bandwagon with the US to counter 
China’s influence. In contrast, while China plays an indispensable role in the 
formative process of RCEP, Taiwan needs to improve its relations with China in 
order to access this regional economic integration mechanism. 
 
    Moreover, as mentioned before, although these is a possibility for Taiwan to 
improve its regional position following the establishment of the US-led TPP, good 
relations with China remains the precondition of Taiwan’s accession.228 This is due 
to these unique accession rules of TPP. As stipulated in Chapter 30 of the TPP 
agreement, an economy that wishes to be a new member of TPP has to obtain 
consent from all the incumbent TPP members through bilateral negotiations.229 This 
regulation has created leeway for China to intervene in the negotiation between 
Taiwan and the TPP members, as has been the case for the FTA negotiations between 
Taiwan and Singapore, and with New Zealand.230 As such, Taiwan has to improve 
relations with China in order to ensure the smooth negotiation process with TPP 
members. Thus far, Taiwan has successfully signed FTAs with Singapore and New 
Zealand after signing the ECFA with China, which seems to push Taiwan closer to 
the goal of participating in TPP. Yet in the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement in 
2014, the pending ECFA sub-agreements motivated Beijing to pressure Malaysia to 
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suspend FTA negotiations with Taiwan.231 In this regard, Taiwan seems to be passive 
when implementing its regional strategy; chapter 5 and 6 will explore this issue in 
more details.  
 
    Most significantly, despite the fact that the development of cross-Strait relations 
is an important determinant of Taiwan’s regional strategy, Washington still plays an 
important role. In fact, Taiwan’s strategy for tackling regional economic integration 
is similar to most developed East Asian countries’ regional strategies. As several 
scholars have noted, while TPP and RCEP may co-exist in the Asia-Pacific region, 
most East Asian developed economies, such as Japan and Singapore, has made use of 
its accession of RCEP to increase their bargaining chips in negotiating TPP, or vice 
versa.232 In the same vein, Taiwan also intends to take advantage of its close 
economic relations with China to leverage Washington’s support for its membership 
of the TPP and vice versa. The effectiveness of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy will be 
further examined in chapter 6 by drawing on interviews with Taiwanese elites. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
    In the summary, this chapter confirms that the ECFA represents Taiwan’s 
contingency plan in response to Beijing’s containment on Taipei’s regional strategy 
in the context of the establishment of TPP and RCEP. Specifically, this chapter 
studied the roles of Taiwan and China in the context of regionalization and 
regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, and it found that China’s economic rise is the major 
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cause of Taiwan’s isolation and strategic predicaments in relation to regional 
economic integration. These phenomena emerged in the late 1990s when China 
began to play a pivotal role in the process of regionalization, which allowed it to 
integrate East Asian RPNs into its economy. The result has been asymmetric 
economic interdependence between China and most East Asian economies. As such, 
China’s regional influence has been enhanced, which has allowed Beijing to rival 
Washington for regional leadership by taking the initiative to shape East Asian 
regionalism.233  
 
    Beijing then pressed its economic advantage to marginalize Taiwan in the 
process of regional economic integration, which has been detrimental for Taiwan’s 
sovereignty interests. Notably, China’s rise has overshadowed Taiwan’s economic 
importance in East Asia. Since East Asian RPNs are centered around the Chinese 
market, China has served as an ‘engine’ in boosting regional economic growth.234 
Therefore, unlike the case of supporting Taiwan’s enrolment in APEC in the early 
1990s, East Asian countries must take Beijing’s concerns into account when 
engaging with Taiwan, because tense relations with China may endanger their 
economic interests. As a result, the effectiveness of Taipei’s commercial diplomacy is 
limited with regards to its participation in regional economic integration 
mechanisms. 
 
    Most significantly, the increasing degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on 
China has also constrained Taiwan’s ability to counterbalance China’s political 
agenda. China has not only integrated East Asian RPNs but also Taiwan’s 																																																								
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manufacturing supply chains into its economy. In addition to signing FTAs with 
important regional trading partners, strengthening economic ties with the Mainland is 
also an essential task for Taiwan to cope with the negative economic impacts 
generated by the establishment of TPP and RCEP. As such, instead of balancing 
China, Taiwan has seemingly chosen to seesaw between Beijing and Washington to 
improve its regional position. Thus the ECFA can be seen as the result of Taiwan’s 
seesawing strategy, which is also an outcome of both Taipei’s and Beijing’s efforts to 
reconcile their economic interests and political agendas. 
 
    In the context of the above arguments, in terms of improving its marginalized 
position in the process of regional economic integration, Taiwan had no alternative 
but to sign the ECFA with Beijing. Nonetheless, China’s effort to exclude Taiwan 
from regional economic integration frameworks was not the only reason that Taipei 
to signed the ECFA. In order to promote its agenda of peaceful reunification with 
Taiwan, Beijing has endeavored to provide preferential treatment for Taiwanese 
businessmen since the 1980s. 235  However, promoting cross-Strait economic 
integration has not been a smooth process for Beijing. In fact, between 1993 and 
2008, the “Go South” strategy was Taiwan’s key strategy for countering Beijing’s 
one-China principle at the regional level. By carrying out this strategy, Taipei 
expected to strengthen its economic ties with ASEAN economies, and it also aimed 
to decrease its economic dependence on the Chinese market. 236  Only when 
cross-Strait relations became nervous would Taipei make concessions on China’s 
proposals for bilateral economic cooperation. The next chapter will study these 
issues in more detail. 																																																								
235 Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond, 
85-95. 
236 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 45-47. 
	 183 
Chapter 4 Cross-Strait Relations between 1990 and 2008: Reconciling 
Economic Interests with Sovereignty Agendas 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3, this thesis explored the dynamics of economic integration in the 
Asia-Pacific region that drive Beijing and Taipei to extend their strategic concerns 
over cross-Strait relations from the bilateral level to the regional level. In brief, 
before signing the ECFA with Taiwan in 2010, Beijing had created regional 
conditions that called for concessions from Taipei in order to reinforce cross-Strait 
economic ties for securing its economic and sovereignty interests at the regional 
level. Specifically, China’s predominance lay in the rapid progress of its economic 
modernization. By investigating East Asian parts and components trade, the previous 
chapter finds that since China’s economic rise in the late 1990s, there had been a 
tendency among East Asian manufacturers to relocate their production lines to the 
Chinese market. This trend had generated asymmetric economic interdependencies 
between China and East Asian economies, and even with Taiwan, which further 
provided Beijing with more opportunities to marginalize Taiwan by utilizing 
commercial diplomacy during the wave of East Asian regionalism after the 1997 
Asian financial crisis. Facing this strategic predicament, following President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s inauguration in 2008, Taiwan began to shift its regional strategy from 
confrontation to cooperation with China in order to improve its regional position. In 
this case, promoting cross-Strait economic integration became Taipei’s priority in 
attempts to convince Beijing of the improvement of Taiwan’s “international space”,1 
and thus the ECFA is actually Taipei’s contingency plan.  																																																								
1 Nealer and Fimbres, “Taiwan and Regional Trade Organizations”, 73-77. 
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    Succeeding the discussion in chapter 3, this chapter further studies how the 
dynamics of regional economic integration have impacted on cross-Strait economic 
exchanges and in turn influenced China’s and Taiwan’s strategies for managing 
bilateral relations. In addition, this chapter aims at addressing the question of how 
China and Taiwan reconciled the disputed sovereignty issues with their economic 
interests in the process of cross-Strait economic integration before the signing of the 
ECFA in 2010. In line with the core argument of this thesis, this chapter argues that 
China’s predominant role in the process of regional economic integration has helped 
Beijing to convince Taiwan of facilitating cross-Strait economic integration, which 
enhances the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in infringing on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty.  
 
    Notably, China’s commercial diplomacy was not as effective as Chinese leaders 
would have expected, as Beijing did not successfully convince Taipei to lift 
restrictions on cross-Strait economic exchanges until 2008. Neither did Beijing’s 
preferential trade policy targeting Taiwanese enterprises prevent Taipei from 
pursuing movements towards independence during the presidencies of Lee Teng-hui 
and Chen Shui-bian.2 Nonetheless, regardless of the political and economic barriers 
to bilateral economic exchanges between 1990 and 2008, the degree of Taiwan’s 
economic dependence on the Chinese market still soared significantly because of 
China’s economic advantages in the process of East Asian economic integration. This 
laid foundations for the ECFA, which allowed Beijing to utilize commercial 																																																								
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diplomacy to further its unification agendas with regards to Taiwan in the process of 
cross-Strait economic integration.   
 
    In order to study cross-Strait relations in the context of bilateral economic 
integration, the next section of this chapter addresses the question of how the 
dynamics of regional economic integration have impinged upon cross-Strait 
economic integration. In addition, by drawing on interviews with Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs, the next section also examines the cause of Taiwan’s heavy economic 
dependence on the Chinese market by studying the “Mainland fever” that emerged in 
Taiwan in the 1990s.3 The third section then discusses Taiwan’s struggle to reconcile 
its sovereignty agendas with economic interests in managing cross-Strait relations 
between 1996 and 2008. In order to strategically pursue Taiwan’s sovereignty, Taipei 
adopted a series of policies to reduce the degree of its economic dependence on 
China. Yet, these policies were unable to direct Taiwan’s investment away from 
China in the wave of East Asian regionalization.  
 
    After evaluating Taiwan’s Mainland policy under the Lee Teng-hui and Chen 
Shui-bian administrations, the fourth section studies Beijing’s Taiwan policy of “hard 
manners became harder, soft manners became softer” in response to Taiwan’s 
measures to counter its commercial diplomacy.4  In short, while stressing that 
military measures remained on the table for China in its attempt to resolve the 
disputed Taiwan issue, Chinese leaders also adopted unilateral preferential trade 
policies targeting Taiwanese businessmen under its grand strategy of “achieving 
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unification through economic integration”.5 Finally, this chapter concludes that the 
ECFA is a contingency plan of related to Taiwan’s mainland policy, as the previous 
policies were ineffective and destabilizing with regards to cross-Strait relations. 
 
4.2 Asymmetric Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait 
    By retracing the history of cross-Strait relations, it is clear that economic 
integration has always been a highly contentious issue between China and Taiwan 
because the two governments have connected these issues with their disputed 
sovereignty agendas.6 As mentioned in chapter 1, between 1978 and 2008, Beijing 
sedulously advocated cross-Strait economic liberalization in an attempt to further its 
peaceful reunification agenda towards Taiwan, while Taipei prudently managed or 
even restricted economic exchanges with China in order to safeguard Taiwan’s 
sovereignty.7 However, “Mainland fever”, the term used to describe the rapid growth 
of China’s share of Taiwan’s total exports along with a multitude of Taiwan’s 
investment in the mainland since the 1990s, adumbrated the invalidity of Taiwan’s 
policies in managing cross-Strait economic relations.8 Moreover, this phenomenon 
has led to asymmetric economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait that 
resulted in Taipei struggling to reconcile its economic interests with its sovereignty 
agendas, as will be explored in the next section.  
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    With respect to the cause of “Mainland fever” among Taiwanese entrepreneurs, 
most scholars ascribe this phenomenon to inherent comparative advantages in the 
Chinese market, such as abundant resources, as well as low-cost land and labor.9 All 
of these factors are true, yet they cannot sufficiently explain why Taiwan’s policy for 
managing cross-Strait economic exchanges was ineffective before 2008.10 Even 
though the government had proposed Southeast Asian economies as alternatives to 
China by considering their similar comparative advantages, the Chinese market 
remained the main destination of Taiwanese investment.11 To resolve these puzzles, 
this section contends that the dynamics of regional economic integration should be 
taken into account. 
 
4.2.1 Taiwan’s “Mainland Fever”  
    Taiwan’s unsuccessful policy for tackling Mainland fever should be attributed to 
Taiwan’s strategy for industrialization in the wake of East Asian regionalization that 
made Taiwan focus mainly on the development of its information and 
communication technology (ICT) industries.12 When China began to play a pivotal 
role in regional production networks (RPNs), together with its initiative for 
implementing a series of preferential policies targeting Taiwanese ICT manufacturers, 
the Chinese market became vital for sustaining the competitiveness of Taiwan’s ICT 
industries. Statistics on cross-Strait trade and investment are important evidence to 																																																								
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support these arguments, as they reflect not only Taiwan’s Mainland fever but also 
the impact of regional economic integration on cross-Strait economic exchanges. 
 
Table 4.2.1 Taiwan’s Investment in China between 1991 and 2008 (Unit: 
US$1,000) 
Year Taiwan’s 
investment in 
China 
Taiwan’s 
investment in 
countries other 
than China 
Taiwan’s total 
outward 
investment 
China’s 
share 
1991 174,158 1,656,321 1,830,479 9.51% 
1992 264,992 887,259 1,152,251 23.00% 
1993 3,168,411 1,661,046 4,829,457 65.61% 
1996 1,229,241 2,165,404 3,394,645 36.21% 
1997 4,334,313 2,893,826 7,228,139 59.96% 
1998 2,034,621 3,296,302 5,330,923 38.17% 
1999 1,252,780 3,296,013 4,548,793 27.54% 
2000 2,607,142 5,077,062 7,684,204 33.93% 
2001 2,784,147 4,391,654 7,175,801 38.80% 
2002 6,723,058 3,370,046 10,093,104 66.61% 
2003 7,698,784 3,968,588 11,667,372 65.99% 
2004 6,940,663 3,382,022 10,322,685 67.24% 
2005 6,006,953 2,447,449 8,454,402 71.05% 
2006 7,642,335 4,315,426 11,957,761 63.91% 
2007 9,970,545 6,469,978 16,440,523 60.65% 
2008 10,691,390 4,466,491 15,157,881 70.53% 
Source: Compiled from Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
R.O.C. (2016) “Monthly Report (December 2015)”13 
 
    Table 4.2.1 shows the amount of Taiwanese investment in the Chinese market, 
which is a chief indicator for illustrating Taiwan’s Mainland fever. The first legal 
Taiwanese investment in the Chinese market can be traced back to Taiwan’s abolition 
of the Martial Law in 1987, which drove the government to further renounce its 
long-standing Mainland policy of “no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise” 
that had existed since 1949.14 In 1990, Taiwan first approved labor-intensive and 
highly polluted industries to invest in China under “the Statute Governing the 																																																								
13 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”. 
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Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area”.15 
Furthermore, this Statute was amended in 1993, which allowed 3,764 labor-intensive 
industries to invest in China with simplified procedures of censorship if their capitals 
were less than US$1 million.16 Following the loosening of Taiwan’s regulations in 
managing its investment in China, Taiwan’s capital in the Chinese market grew 
eighteen fold, as it raised from US$174 million in 1991 to US$3,168 million in 1993 
(see Table 4.2.1). From 1993 onwards, except for during the cross-Strait crisis in 
1996 and the Asian financial crisis, Taiwan’s investment in China always constituted 
more than 60% of its total outward investment despite the government’s restrictions. 
 
    Aside from Taiwan’s investment in China, statistics on total trade value across 
the Taiwan Strait is another important indicator for evaluating Taiwan’s Mainland 
fever, which are listed in Table 4.2.2 together with Taiwan’s top three trading 
partners. With this table, it is not difficult to see China’s increasing importance as 
Taiwan’s trading partner since the early 1990s, although commodities were required 
to go through a third economy in the absence of the “three direct links” between 
Taiwan and the Mainland until 2008.17 Specifically, between 1993 and 1997, total 
trade value between both sides quadrupled, and China’s rank in the share of Taiwan’s 
total export climbed from eighty-fifth to twenty-third. Meanwhile, China also 
became one of Taiwan’s top ten import partners in 1997. Since 2007, China has 
steadily been the largest trading partner of Taiwan. However, it is noteworthy that 
above statistics probably underestimate the total cross-Strait trade value.  
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Table 4.2.2 Taiwan’s top three trading partners and China’s share between 1993 
and 2015 (Unit: US$1 million) 
Year Economy 
Total trade Total exports Total imports 
Rank Amount 
Share 
(%) 
Rank Amount 
Share 
(%) 
Rank Amount 
Share 
(%) 
1993 
U.S. 1 40,310 24.86 1 23,588 27.72 2 16,722 21.70 
Japan 2 32,163 19.84 3 8,977 10.55 1 23,186 30.09 
Hong Kong 3 20,183 12.45 2 18,454 21.69 8 1,729 2.24 
China 21 1,032 0.64 85 16 0.02 16 1,015 1.32 
1997 
U.S. 1 52,785 22.32 1 29,551 24.21 2 23,233 20.31 
Japan 2 40,712 17.21 3 11,691 9.58 1 29,021 25.36 
Hong Kong 3 30,684 12.97 2 28,688 23.50 11 1,996 1.74 
China 12 4,542 1.92 23 626 0.51 7 3,915 3.42 
2002 
U.S. 1 45,620 18.36 2 27,365 20.22 2 18,255 16.12 
Japan 2 39,731 15.99 3 12,368 9.14 1 27,363 24.16 
Hong Kong 3 34,874 14.03 1 32,959 24.36 13 1,915 1.69 
China 4 18,495 7.44 4 10,528 7.78 3 7,968 7.04 
2007 
China 1 90,431 19.41 1 62,416 25.30 2 28,014 12.78 
Japan 2 61,869 13.28 4 15,933 6.46 1 45,936 20.95 
U.S. 3 58,585 12.57 3 32,078 13.00 3 26,508 12.09 
2012 
China 1 121,621 21.28 1 80,714 26.80 2 40,907 15.13 
Japan 2 66,561 11.64 5 18,988 6.31 1 47,573 17.59 
U.S. 3 56,579 9.90 3 32,975 10.95 3 23,603 8.73 
2015 
China 1 115,392 22.67 1 71,209 25.40 1 44,183 19.33 
U.S. 2 60,658 11.92 3 34,249 12.22 3 26,409 11.55 
Japan 3 57,975 11.39 4 19,274 6.87 2 38,700 16.93 
Source: Compiled from the Database of Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.)18 
 
    In fact, China might have already become Taiwan’s third largest trading partner 
in 1993, when the total trade value between Hong Kong and Taiwan is taken into 
account. The main reason for this is that Hong Kong played an important 
intermediate role in cross-Strait economic exchanges before Taiwan fully liberalized 
direct trade with China by signing the ECFA in 2010. Indeed, despite Taiwan’s 
gradual openness to indirect trade with Chinese businesses since 1990, under the 
																																																								
18 Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, ROC (2016) “Trade Statistics”. 
	 191 
“Regulations Governing Permission of Trade between Taiwan Area and Mainland 
Area”, most commodities remained on the prohibition list in the 1990s.19 In order to 
eschew the government’s surveillance, Chinese and Taiwanese businessmen utilized 
their subsidiaries or intermediate traders in Hong Kong to transport their 
commodities.20 “Triangular trade” between China, Taiwan and Hong Kong was 
therefore thriving, which explains the great volume of trade value between Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, particularly with respect to exports.21  
 
    As shown in Table 4.2.2, in the 1990s, Hong Kong was Taiwan’s third largest 
trading partner, sharing about 12% of Taiwan’s total trade, behind only the U.S. and 
Japan. Notably, Hong Kong’s importance lay in its significant share of Taiwan’s total 
exports. Hong Kong absorbed more than one-fifth of Taiwan’s outward commodities 
while it shared just 2% of Taiwan’s total imports on average in the 1990s. Since most 
of Taiwan’s commodities exported to Hong Kong were supposed to be re-transported 
to the Mainland, Taiwan has actually relied heavily on the Chinese market since the 
early 1990s. Not until Taiwan’s opening to the “mini three direct links” in 2001, 
which permit cross-Strait direct shipments between Taiwan’s islets and China’s 
Fujian Province, did Hong Kong’s intermediate role in trade between Taiwan and 
China start to become eclipsed.22 Hong Kong’s importance further declined after 
Taiwan’s entry into the WTO in 2002, which entailed the government lifting its ban 
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21 Yun-Han Chu, “The East Asian NICs: A State-Led Path to the Developed World”, in Global 
Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development, ed. Barbara Stallings 
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Quarterly 24, no. 4 (2001): 60. 
	 192 
on trade with China.23 By 2002, China had become the fourth largest economy- 
close behind Hong Kong in terms of the share of Taiwan’s total exports. From 2007 
onwards, China has always shared more than a quarter of Taiwan’s total exports, 
which was even greater than the sum of Japanese and US shares.            
 
    So far, this section has illustrated the phenomenon of Taiwan’s Mainland fever 
with statistics on investment and total trade value as shown in Table 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. 
In terms of the main cause of this phenomenon, Taiwan’s industrialization strategy 
during East Asian regionalization is an important factor. As discussed together in 
chapter 3, Taiwan’s industrialization began through participation in the distribution 
of the US-centered “buyer-driven commodity chains” (BDCCs) in East Asia in the 
1970s. 24  From thereon, developing ICT industries became the main focus of 
Taiwan’s industrialization policy, and they have contributed more than 50% of 
Taiwan’s total export since the 1990s.25 Within the BDCCs, most Taiwanese ICT 
industries are original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) responsible for 
manufacturing or assembling specific components of products on behalf of US 
MNCs.26 However, the business operation model of OEMs makes Taiwan’s ICT 
industries highly sensitive to production costs. While the progress of industrialization 
raised production costs in Taiwan in the 1990s, there had been a tendency among 
Taiwanese ICT manufacturers to relocate their manufacturing facilities to the 
Mainland so as to utilize the low-cost production factors in the Chinese market.27 
This trend counteracted Taiwan’s Mainland fever, which can be illustrated by 
																																																								
23 Hsieh, “The China-Taiwan ECFA”, 123-30. 
24 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 179-81. 
25 Ernst, “Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing”, 223-31; Chen et al., “The ECFA and Its 
Expected Effect on Cross-Strait Trade and Investment”, 110-21. 
26 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 179-81. 
27 Bush, Untying the Knot, 28-35. 
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exploring the structure of Taiwan’s investment, as well as the main commodities it 
traded with China.  
 
    With reference to the structure of Taiwan’s investment in China, capital was 
mainly provided by Taiwanese manufacturers, and most scholars point out that their 
investment in China was trade-oriented. 28  Indeed, Taiwanese manufacturing 
industries made up more than 80% of Taiwan’s total outward investment to China 
before 2010, as shown in Table 4.2.3 below. 29  Among these manufacturing 
industries, the ICT industries — “electronic parts and components manufacturing” 
and “computers, electronic and optical products manufacturing” — steadily 
contributed about 40% of Taiwan’s total investment in the Mainland since 2000.30 
As discussed in chapter 3, Taiwanese ICT industries’ roles within the BDCCs were 
OEMs that fabricate components of products and then export them to US customers 
for marketing.31 Therefore, the scale of investment in China by Taiwanese ICT 
industries suggests not only their heavy dependence on the low-cost production 
factors in the Chinese market but also the “vertical division of labor” between China 
and Taiwan in the wave of East Asian regionalization.32 Statistics on Taiwan’s 
components trade with China and Hong Kong further support these arguments. 
 
 
 
 																																																								
28 Huang, “TPP Versus ECFA”, 97-98; Luo and Howe, “Direct Investment and Economic Integration 
in the Asia Pacific”, 751-55.   
29 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains”, 97-100; Hobday, 
“Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 55-56.  
32 Xiangming Chen, “Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia: ‘Go West, but also Go 
South’”, Asian Survey 36, no.5 (1996): 456-60. 
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Table 4.2.3 Statistics on Taiwan’s manufacturing investment in China between 
1998 and 2010 (Unit: US$1 million) 
Year 
Manufacturing 
industries 
Electronic 
components 
manufacturing 
Computers, 
electronic and 
optical products 
manufacturing 
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
1994 962 92.13% 41 4.24% 48 5.02% 
1996 1,229 90.78% 88 7.19% 115 9.36% 
1998 2,035  89.98% 281  13.83% 342  16.79% 
2000 2,607  91.45% 412  15.82% 699  26.80% 
2002 6,723  90.40% 1,088  16.18% 1,063  15.81% 
2004 6,941  90.55% 1,482  21.36% 1,140  16.42% 
2006 7,642  87.01% 1,619  21.18% 1,472  19.26% 
2008 10,691  81.95% 2,052  19.19% 1,783  16.68% 
2010 14,618  74.16% 4,854  33.21% 1,235  8.45% 
Source: Compiled from Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
R.O.C. (2016) “Monthly Report (December 2015)”.33 
 
    Table 4.2.4 listed statistics on Taiwan’s major traded commodities with China 
between 1993 and 2008. Corresponding with Taiwan’s trade-oriented investment in 
China, parts and components trade featured centrally in Taiwan’s total trade with the 
Mainland, which accounted for more than 56.59%. The role of East Asian 
regionalization in propelling cross-Strait economic integration is evidenced by the 
huge amount of ICT components trade between Taiwan and China. Among the traded 
intermediate goods, ICT components (HS85 and HS90) made up 76% of cross-Strait 
parts and components trade valued at a stunning US$207 billion in total between 
1993 and 2008. 
 																																																								
33 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”. 
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Table 4.2.4 Taiwan’s components trade with China between 1993 and 2008  
Commodity Value 
(Unit: US$) 
The share of 
components trade 
The share of 
total trade 
HS85 141,406,191,558 51.64% 29.22% 
HS90 66,725,776,170 24.37% 13.79% 
HS84 60,698,163,912 22.17% 12.54% 
HS87 5,011,218,905 1.83% 1.04% 
Subtotal of 
components trade 
273,841,350,545 100.00% 56.59% 
Total trade value 483,881,463,737  100.00% 
Note: 1. For the definitions of HS code and components trade, please refer to   
       Appendix III  
     2. The total value of ICT components trade is the sum of HS85 and HS87 
Source: Compiled from the Database of Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.) 34 
 
    The burgeoning ICT components trade across the Taiwan Strait began in the 
2000s when East Asian RPNs converged on the Chinese market. As shown in Table 
4.2.5 below, trade of ICT components between China and Taiwan commenced in 
1993, but it only accounted for 6.52% of cross-Strait total trade value. Nonetheless, 
since China began to play a pivotal role in the process of East Asian regionalization 
following its economic rise in the late 1990s, there had been quintuple growth in the 
share of ICT components trade in the total cross-Strait trade between 1993 and 2000. 
This growth was more significant, which is clear from the ICT components trade 
value figures during this period, which soared from US$67 million in 1993 to 
US$3.2 billion in 2000. The share of ICT components trade had further raised from 
30.86% in 2000 to 43.96% in 2005. By 2010, it shared more than half of Taiwan’s 
total trade value with China. Since these intermediate goods still need to be 																																																								
34 Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, ROC, “Trade Statistics”. 
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manufactured in either China or Taiwan for final exports, the enormous share and 
value of components trade suggest deep integration between both economies during 
East Asian regionalization. However, the total trade value of ICT components trade 
between China and Taiwan should be far greater than Taiwan’s official statistics, 
which implies that there was much deeper integration between both sides than the 
Taiwanese government had estimated.  
 
Table 4.2.5 The share and value of Taiwan’s ICT components trade with China 
between 1993 and 2010 
Year Commodities 
Total trade value 
Amount (US$) Share 
1993 
HS85 67,182,730  6.51% 
HS90 70,801  0.01% 
Total trade value 1,031,706,213  100.00% 
1995 
HS85 557,174,094  16.07% 
HS90 8,289,576  0.24% 
total trade value 3,467,857,572  100.00% 
2000 
HS85 3,107,236,365  29.76% 
HS90 115,949,377  1.11% 
total trade value 10,440,540,918  100.00% 
2005 
HS85 18,816,956,136  29.52% 
HS90 9,201,013,331  14.44% 
total trade value 63,736,408,872  100.00% 
2010 
HS85 36,925,970,311  32.71% 
HS90 19,632,598,937  17.39% 
total trade value 112,879,654,027  100.00% 
Source: Compiled from the Database of Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.) 35 
 																																																								
35 Ibid. 
	 197 
    Indeed, as mentioned before, because of Taiwan’s stringent restrictions on trade 
with China prior to its participation in the WTO in 2002, statistics on Taiwan’s 
components trade with Hong Kong should not be left out when studying cross-Strait 
economic integration.36 Despite the fact that Taiwan permitted ICT components 
trade with China in 1993, most of these commodities remained on the forbidden list 
due to Taiwan’s protectionism and its concern over “national security” according to 
Article 8 of “Regulations Governing Permission of Trade Between Taiwan Area and 
Mainland Area”. 37  However, these stipulations did not chime with Taiwan’s 
manufacturers’ interests; particularly considering that some enterprises had relocated 
their production lines to China regardless of the government’s restrictions in the early 
1990s.38 In this case, most Taiwanese manufacturers took advantage of Hong Kong’s 
role as an intermediary in order to escape from the government’s monitoring.39      
    
    Consequently, as shown in Table 4.2.6, parts and components trade between 
Hong Kong and Taiwan thrived in the early 1990s, and its total value between 1991 
and 2008 was even larger than the accumulated components trade value between 
Taiwan and China in 2008 (see Table 4.2.4). Similar to the structure of trade across 
the Taiwan Strait, according to Table 4.2.6, 50% of the total trade value between 
Taiwan and Hong Kong was from parts and components trade, of which ICT 
intermediate goods accounted for 74.69%. Since most of these products were 
re-exported to China for further processing, statistics on components trade between 																																																								
36 Sam, “Economic Management in Taiwan and Mainland China”, 74-77; Fuller, “The Cross-Strait 
Economic Relationship’s Impact”, 240-41; Ministry of Justice, ROC, “Regulations Governing 
Permission of Trade between Taiwan Area and Mainland Area”. 
37 Ministry of Justice, ROC, “Regulations Governing Permission of Trade between Taiwan Area and 
Mainland Area”; Keller and Pauly, “Building a Technocracy in China”, 52-55. 
38 Chen, “Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia”, 456-60. 
39 Shengliang Sun, “Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Beijing’s Policy Adjustment” 
in Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations since 1979: Policy Adjustment and Institutional Change Across the 
Straits, ed. Kevin G. Cai (London: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2011), 67-69.  
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Taiwan and Hong Kong help to demonstrate that cross-Strait economic integration is 
mainly driven by the dynamics of East Asian regionalization. 
 
Table 4.2.6 Taiwan’s components trade with Hong Kong between 1991 and 2008  
Commodity Value 
(Unit: US$) 
The share of 
components trade 
The share of 
total trade 
HS85 189,758,899,977 67.43% 35.60% 
HS90 20,420,777,128 7.26% 3.83% 
HS84 63,922,741,197 22.72% 11.99% 
HS87 7,298,747,507 2.59% 1.37% 
Subtotal of 
components trade 
281,401,165,809 100.00% 52.79% 
Total trade value 533,087,953,219  100.00% 
Note: 1. For the definitions of HS code and components trade, please refer to   
       Appendix III  
     2. The total value of ICT components trade is the sum of HS85 and HS87 
Source: Compiled from the Database of Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.) 40 
 
4.2.2 The Causes of Taiwan’s Mainland Fever 
    After illustrating Mainland fever using statistics on Taiwan’s investment and 
trade with in China and Hong Kong, this subsection provides explanations for why 
the Chinese market is so important for Taiwan. In general, the reasons for Taiwan’s 
Mainland fever are twofold. First of all, Taiwan’s industrialization strategy, which 
mainly concentrated on the development of the ICT industries during East Asian 
regionalization, accounts for Mainland fever. According to interviews with 
Taiwanese businessmen, because Taiwanese ICT industries are largely composed of 
																																																								
40 Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, ROC, “Trade Statistics”. 
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OEMs, China’s inherent comparative advantages are very important and in fact 
non-substitutable for them, especially when they were in the process of industrial 
upgrading and transformation.41 Moreover, China’s unilateral preferential policies 
targeting Taiwanese businesses further provided these industries with more 
advantages to compete with South Korean and Japanese industries.42 These factors 
will be specified in more details below. 
 
4.2.2.1 The Importance of the Chinese Market 
    Taiwan’s strategy of industrialization is a major cause of Mainland fever 
because the development of ICT industries in the wave of East Asian regionalization 
features greatly in this strategy that magnifies the complementary nature between the 
Chinese and Taiwanese economies. It was difficult to imagine that Taiwan, as a small 
economy with limited labors, capital, and market size, would be able to create the 
“economic miracle” in the 1980s by cultivating its ICT industries.43 However, 
Taiwan’s unique approach to industrialization — developing small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) specialized in manufacturing specific components 
for US ICT industries —  not only helped it to overcome the aforementioned 
inherent disadvantages but also allowed it to be integrated into the BDCCs.44  
 
    As most scholars and Taiwanese elites point out, “flexibility” is the crucial 
advantage of Taiwanese SMEs that further enabled Taiwan to adapt itself to the 																																																								
41 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, 
December 26, 2014. 
42 Phillip C. Saunders, “Long-Term Trends in China-Taiwan Relations: Implications for U.S. Taiwan 
Policy”, Asian Survey 45, no. 6 (2005): 983-85. 
43 Ernst, “Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing”, 223-25. 
44 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 179-81; Hobday, “Latecomer 
Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 67-72. 
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BDCCs. 45  Firstly, Taiwanese SMEs do not have sufficient labor and capital. 
Therefore, they usually invest in necessary manufacturing facilities and skills that 
equip them with capability to undertake certain stages of the manufacturing 
process.46 Although this business operation strategy largely limits the tasks they 
undertake, which further constrain their profits, this strategy has enabled these SMEs 
to meet the customers’ requirements of punctuality and quality within the BDCCs.47 
Meanwhile, by strategically focusing on the specific stages of the manufacturing 
process, Taiwanese SMEs can evade “heavy fixed capital costs” in production, which 
enables them to quickly switch manufactures with limited expense so that they can 
promptly react to fluctuations in the market.48 Besides, with the government’s aid in 
technology transfer, especially from the Industrial Technology Research Institute 
(ITRI), the cost for SMEs in shifting production could be even lower.49     
 
    Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, horizontal integration has been an 
important approach to assist Taiwanese SMEs in overcoming their disadvantages (e.g. 
limited labor force and capital) to achieve economies of scale.50 Accompanied by 
horizontal divisions of labor, the ICT industry clusters emerged in Northern Taiwan 
and the area near the EPZ in Kaohsiung City. Within these integrated production 
networks, Taiwanese SMEs strengthened their connection and cooperation among 
each other and even with MNCs, beneficial for them to improve or polish their 
manufacturing skills.51 Most importantly, the entwisted production networks also 
enabled them to more easily access different production networks organized by other 																																																								
45 Ernst, “Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing”, 228-31. Jiun-Wei Lu, interviewed by author, 
March 10, 2014; Tsao-Shan Chou, interviewed by author, April 15, 2014.   
46 Ibid. 
47 Gereffi, “The Organization of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains”, 99-101. 
48 Ernst, “Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing”, 228. 
49 Fuller, “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship’s Impact”, 252-53. 
50 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 179-81.  
51 Ernst, “Inter-Organizational Knowledge Outsourcing”, 228-31. 
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MNCs by shifting production.52 According to Taiwanese entrepreneurs, this not only 
helped Taiwanese SMEs to pass through seasons of slack demands, but also assisted 
them in expanding business niches.53  
     
    Despite the fact that Taiwan’s strategy for cultivating SMEs with expertise in 
producing ICT components within the BDCCs created the “economic miracle”, this 
strategy has been not feasible for maintaining the competitiveness of its ICT 
industries since the 1990s. Firstly, after the Plaza Accords in 1985, the Taiwanese 
government also faced heavy pressure to appreciate its currency,54 and the New 
Taiwan Dollar (NTD) appreciated 34.22% against the U.S. Dollar between 1985 and 
1992.55 The appreciation of NTD negatively impacted upon Taiwanese SMEs’ 
profits from exports; combined with rising costs in land and labor in Taiwan, SMEs 
moved to the Chinese market so as to protect their business interests.56           
 
    Secondly, most Taiwanese SMEs were OEMs in the ICT industries, but this 
business operation model could only generate limited profits. In order to enlarge their 
business niches, Taiwanese SMEs proceeded to implement industrial transformation 
and upgrading in order to become original design manufacturers (ODMs) or even 
original brand manufacturers (OBMs).57 This mission entails entrepreneurs investing 
more in research and development (R&D), as well as marketing strategy.58 However, 
																																																								
52 Ibid. 
53 Brian H. Lin, interviewed by author, December 11, 2014; Henry H. Ho, interviewed by author, 
December 11, 2014.  
54 Fuller, “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship’s Impact”, 241. 
55 Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (2016), “New Taiwan Dollar Exchange Rates 
(Interbank Spot Market Closing Rates)”, 2016, accessed January 24, 2016, 
http://www.cbc.gov.tw/content.asp?CuItem=1879. 
56 Brian H. Lin, interviewed by author, December 11, 2014; Henry H. Ho, interviewed by author, 
December 11, 2014. 
57 Hobday, “Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 54-56. 
58 Ibid., 72-74. 
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OEM’s the low-profit business operation model constrained their resources available 
for R&D. Meanwhile, following Taiwan’s democratization, the government cannot 
“pick the winner” by unconditionally transferring technology to a certain enterprise, 
as was the case for the establishment of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 
Company (TSMC) in the 1980s.59 In this case, SMEs had to either lower the product 
cost or expand economies of scale so as to spare more resources for R&D.60 
Nevertheless, the inherent disadvantages of the Taiwanese economy restrict the 
feasibility of these scenarios, which drove SMEs to relocate their production lines to 
an economy that could satisfy their demands. 
 
    Due to the above predicaments in industrial development, industry offshoring 
has been prevalent among Taiwanese SMEs since the 1990s, and China is their main 
destination. This has resulted in vaporization of Taiwan’s ICT industry clusters, 
which further drove large enterprises and component manufacturers, such as ASUS 
and Yageo, to move their factories to the Mainland.61 In the case of ASUS, except 
for the two factories for production experiments, most of their manufacturing 
facilities were relocated to China in the 1990s in order to utilize the advantages of 
new ICT industry clusters around Shanghai City and Guangdong Province.62 Yageo, 
the largest providers of passive components in the world, relocated its factories to 
Shanghai and the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Guangdong Province due to the 
fact that most of their buyers had moved to China, combined with the rising 
production costs in Taiwan.63 By 2013, Yageo’s factories in China accounted for 
																																																								
59 Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, March 14, 2014.  
60 Hobday, “Latecomer Catch-up Strategy in Electronics”, 72-74. 
61 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, 
December 26, 2014. 
62 Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, December 26, 2014. 
63 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Jacky B. Chen, interviewed by author, 
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manufacturing 70% of their products.64  
 
    The key motivations behind firms’ decisions to invest in China were, similar to 
most East Asian manufactures’ concerns in the context of regionalization discussed 
in chapter 3, low-cost labor, abundant resources and the large size of the Mainland’s 
market. These comparative advantages attracted Taiwanese businessmen to relocate 
their manufacturing facilities to China since the 1990s.65 This then led to the 
creation of a unique business operation model among the ICT industries in China, 
Taiwan and even Hong Kong, which is “receiving orders in Taiwan, manufacturing 
in Mainland China, transiting in Hong Kong, and selling overseas”.66 In general, this 
vertical division of labor across the Taiwan Strait has allowed Taiwanese ICT 
industries to avail from utilizing China’s comparative advantages in order to reduce 
production costs, and thus Taiwanese OEMs have been able to maintain their 
competitiveness.67  
 
    Furthermore, the Chinese market contains more than 1.3 billion consumers. 
While the rapid progress of China’s economic development has boosted Chinese 
purchasing power, most MNCs also planned to access into the Chinese market.68 
Subsequently, requests from buyers entailed Taiwanese OEMs and components 
providers to establishing complete supply chains in the Chinese market, or otherwise 
they would lose their orders.69 As Yageo’s Corporate Development Department 																																																																																																																																																													
December 16, 2014. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, 
December 26, 2014. 
66 Huang, “TPP versus ECFA”, 97. 
67 Chen, et al., “The ECFA and Its Expected Effect on Cross-Strait Trade and Investment”, 109-15. 
68 Wong, “Commentary: A China-centric Economic Order in East Asia”, 286-87. 
69 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, 
December 26, 2014. 
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manager, Mr. Jacky B. Chen, said: “No business can make profits without 
customers… If our customers want to go to the Mainland, we should be there. If we 
were not there, our competitors would be”.70 The other interviewees from Taiwanese 
enterprises also share the same perspective.71 By this reasoning, Taiwanese OEMs 
were highly sensitive to buyers’ decisions to access the Chinese market, and this 
augured ill for Taiwan’s policies in managing cross-Strait economic exchanges, 
which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
    The above comparative advantages magnify the importance of the Chinese 
market, but the real factors that make it irreplaceable for Taiwanese ICT industries 
are the common language and culture across the Taiwan Strait, as well as its 
contribution to the industrial transformation and upgrading of Taiwanese ICT 
industries.72  The language and cultural similarities between Taiwan and China 
provide Taiwanese entrepreneurs the opportunity to utilize the comparative 
advantages of the Chinese market for their projects of industrial transformation and 
upgrading. Due to the advantage of having similar cultural traits with China, 
Taiwanese ICT industries are able to access and integrate into the Chinese market in 
a relatively short period of time vis-à-vis their rivals from South Korea and Japan.73 
Moreover, thanks to the common language and culture, Taiwanese businessmen can 
easily and quickly establish cooperative relationships with Chinese officers, venders, 
and manufacturers, which largely decreases the time it takes for them to establish 
																																																								
70 Jacky B. Chen, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014. 
71 Brian H. Lin, interviewed by author, December 11, 2014; Henry H. Ho, interviewed by author, 
December 11, 2014.; Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, 
interviewed by author, December 26, 2014. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
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supply chains in the Mainland.74 Aside from the reduction in time costs, language 
and cultural similarities between China and Taiwan helped Taiwanese ICT industries 
to save more costs in employee training and management and therefore they can 
afford to spend more on R&D.75 
 
    In addition, the enhancement of labor skill and the large number of consumers 
in the Chinese market have also contributed to the industrial transformation and 
upgrading of Taiwanese ICT industries. First of all, with respect to the contribution 
made by well-educated Chinese labor, particularly Chinese engineers, the 
enhancement of their professional skills allows Taiwanese ICT industries to pay 
more attention to R&D. Notably, the increasing number of university graduates in 
engineering and sciences from Chinese universities has contributed to the 
enhancement of China’s labor skills. According to William Keller and Louis Pauly’s 
survey, between 1994 and 2003, there was a 3.5-fold increase in the number of 
undergraduate students majoring in engineering and sciences at Chinese universities, 
which has surpassed 4 million in 2003.76 Although China has not yet exceeded 
Japan and NIEs in technical innovation, their education system has equipped Chinese 
production engineers with the ability to resolve production lines problems in a short 
space of time.77  
 
    Despite the fact that Chinese engineers’ professional skills have improved, their 
wages remain much lower than those in NIEs. Hence Taiwanese entrepreneurs are 																																																								
74 Gordon C. K. Cheung, “New Approaches to Cross-Strait Integration and Its Impacts on Taiwan’s 
Domestic Economy: An Emerging ‘Chaiwan’?”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 39, no.1 (2010): 
17-18. 
75 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, 
December 26, 2014. 
76 Keller and Pauly, “Building a Technocracy in China”, 61.  
77 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, 
December 26, 2014. 
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able to employ more production engineers so as to assure the smooth operation of 
their production lines with less human resources costs.78 As the result of the 
large-scale recruitment of Chinese engineers, Taiwanese engineers have less duties to 
maintain production lines in China and thus they can concentrate on the projects of 
R&D.79 Meanwhile, as Yageo’s CEO Dora W. Chang, and Asus’ Chief Manager 
Kent S. Chien point out, the budgets for human resources can also be used to expand 
R&D for industrial transformation and upgrading, or simply redirect remnant capital 
to their projects of technical innovation.80 
 
    Apart from the contribution made by Chinese engineers, the large size of the 
Chinese market has allowed Taiwanese ICT industries to sustain economies of scale 
despite suffering sanctions from the US and Japanese ICT industries in the process of 
industrial transformation from OEMs to ODMs or OBMs.81 Specifically, as most 
scholars have noted, a key factor that enabled Taiwanese ICT industries to 
experience rapid and burgeoning development had been its ability to utilize 
“distribution channels” (or marketing channels) of buyers under the OEM’s business 
operation model.82 As a result, without developing marketing strategy, Taiwanese 
OEMs were still able to access the global market— especially the markets of 
advanced economies— through MNCs’ marketing channels.  
 
    However, the lack of proficient marketing strategies and distribution channels 
became problems when Taiwanese ICT industries planned to transform from OEMs 
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81 Ibid. 
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to OBMs.83 In order to hamper potential rivals in their markets, buyers are generally 
inclined to deter an OEM from turning into an OBM. As such, Taiwanese ICT 
industries can no longer take advantage of buyers’ distribution channels to market 
their products in advanced economies. Hence Taiwanese enterprises must create their 
own marketing strategies and marketing channels, and thus the non-OECD countries 
become their main target markets at the initial stage of their transforming into 
OBMs.84 Amongst the non-OECD markets, China has captured the most attention 
from Taiwanese ICT industries, given its large market size and the similarities in 
language and culture across the Taiwan Strait. This then magnifies the importance of 
the Chinese market in supporting the industrial transformation and upgrading of 
Taiwanese ICT industries. The case of ASUS is a good example of this.   
 
    As mentioned in chapter 3, before it became an OBM in 2006, ASUS was the 
largest OEM in Taiwan and was responsible for producing components of mobiles, 
laptops and PCs for Apple and Dell — 60% of ASUS’s annual revenue in average 
came from these businesses. 85 In the late 1990s, when ASUS started to carry out its 
strategy of industrial transformation, it began to catch the attention of its customers. 
Kent S. Chien said: “When we were focusing on brand building, many of our 
customers, including Dell and Apple, expressed strong opposition to us”.86 He 
further elaborated: “Our customers even threatened to cancel their orders, but our 
annual revenue was mainly from these orders at that time”.87 In order to resolve this 
crisis, in 2006, ASUS decided to segment its OEM department by establishing a new 
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company —Pegatron Corporation— to keep fabricating products for their buyers.88 
This measure helped ASUS to preserve its customers and thus stabilize its revenue in 
the process of brand building. Nonetheless, ASUS still suffered a certain degree of 
loss, as Foxconn overtook ASUS’s leadership of Taiwan’s OEMs in 2007.89 
 
   While ASUS suffered a loss of orders and marketing channels owing to sanctions 
imposed by the US and Japanese MNCs, it was imperative for ASUS to quickly 
penetrate the market in order to sustain its strategy of industrial transformation. In 
this case, China became ASUS’ target market because cultural and language 
similarities reduced the time and expenses needed for marketing strategy.90 Kent S. 
Chien further indicated that:  
 
“since we [ASUS] have more competitiveness in the Mainland, we should 
certainly go there to achieve economies of scale as soon as possible. After this, 
we would have chance to extend our business to the US or EU… Actually, we 
have no reason to ignore the largest market in the world [China] even after 
entering into American or European markets”.91  
 
By this reasoning, after accessing the Chinese market, ASUS could utilize China’s 
large market to compensate for its inability to access advanced economies due to the 
lack of marketing channels. Additionally, considerable revenue from sales in the 
Chinese market could further assist ASUS in expanding its distribution channels in 
the OECD markets. Taiwanese ICT industries therefore perceive the success of 																																																								
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entering into the Chinese market as an essential precondition for their strategies of 
industrial transformation and upgrading.    
   
4.2.2.2 China’s Unilateral Trade Preferential Policy 
    So far, this section has explored how Taiwanese ICT industries benefited from 
the low-cost production factors in the Chinese market, and also confirmed the 
importance of the Chinese market for their strategies of industrial upgrading and 
transformation. However, Taiwan’s Mainland fever is by no means purely caused by 
economic dynamics. Rather, China’s unilateral trade preferential policies for Taiwan 
has also been important in generating this phenomenon because they further 
provided Taiwanese businessmen with advantages to rival Japanese, South Korean, 
and even US ICT industries.   
 
    Following the implementation of China’s “reform and opening up” strategy in 
1978, the pursuit of economic development in a peaceful environment became the 
main mission of Chinese leaders. In this context, Beijing soon issued the “Message 
to Compatriots in Taiwan” in January 1979, which confirmed peaceful reunification 
as the framework for tackling the Taiwan issue, and facilitating economic exchanges 
across the Taiwan Strait became the main theme of Beijing’s Taiwan policy.92 
Beijing’s first concerted policy effort in promoting cross-Strait economic exchanges 
was the “Temporary Regulations Regarding Opening Trade with Taiwan” issued in 
May 1979, which unilaterally legitimized trade with Taiwan.93 Moreover, Beijing 
enacted more preferential policies towards Taiwanese entrepreneurs by issuing the 																																																								
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“Supplementary Regulations on Purchase of Taiwan Products” in 1980, which 
stipulated that Chinese enterprises should offer a minimum 20% discount to 
Taiwanese businessmen when they purchased goods or resources from the 
Mainland.94 Simultaneously, Taiwanese businesses could also enjoy tariff exemption 
when exporting goods manufactured in Taiwan to the Chinese market.95    
 
    Apart from the above preferential trade policies, Beijing also unilaterally 
implemented a series of preferential investment policies targeting Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries. China’s motivations with regards to these policies 
stemmed from its interest in economic development under the “reform and opening 
up” strategy. As most Chinese elites point out, on the one hand, given the advanced 
technology and manufacturing skills of Taiwan, investment from Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries could make a significant contribution to China’s projects of 
industrialization and economic modernization.96 On the other hand, language and 
cultural similarities meant that it only took Chinese manufacturers a short period of 
time to learn manufacturing skills from Taiwanese enterprises, which accelerated the 
process of China’s industrialization.97 As a result, in attempting to attract Taiwanese 
investment, in 1981, Chinese leader Ye Jianying first announced that “industrialists 
and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in various economic 
undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights, interests, and profits are 
guaranteed”.98  
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   Furthermore, in line with its strategy of attracting foreign direct investment by 
establishing the SEZs discussed in chapter 3, in 1983 the Chinese government 
published the “Special Preferential Scheme for Investment by Taiwan Compatriots in 
the Special Economic Zones”.99 According to this scheme, aside from pre-existing 
preferential treatment within SEZs, Taiwanese businessmen were also exempted 
from the “land use fees” for five years and corporate income tax for four years after 
the first profit-earning year.100 Furthermore, they could also enjoy a 50% reduction 
of corporate income tax after the fifth year of profit-making.101 Moreover, the 
Chinese government also allowed 30% of goods produced by Taiwanese 
manufactures in the Mainland to have direct access to the Chinese market within the 
official marketing channels.102 Finally, the Chinese government also promised to 
protect those Taiwanese enterprises from Taiwan’s punishment by ensuring that their 
investments in the Mainland were kept confidential.103  
 
    In 1988, Beijing further published the “Regulations of the State Council of The 
People’s Republic of China for Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots to Invest in the 
Mainland”, which affirmed that Taiwanese people would enjoy the privileges of 
establishing “wholly-owned enterprises”, “purchasing enterprise shares and bonds”, 
“buying real estate”, and applying for preferential tariff treatments as well as loans 
with low-interest.104 Most importantly, in Article 8, Beijing assured Taiwanese 
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businessmen that the government would not “nationalize Taiwanese assets” in any 
circumstance.105 According to Article 18, in addition to preferential treatment from 
the central government, preferential policies issued by the local governments would 
also be applicable to Taiwanese enterprises in the mean time.106  
 
    In general, by reviewing China’s preferential policy measures targeting Taiwan, 
it is clear that the treatment Taiwanese businesses experienced in the Mainland was 
far better than the other foreign investors and nearly equivalent to Chinese domestic 
enterprises. For example, whereas Beijing had allowed Taiwan to establish 
“wholly-owned enterprises” with simplified approval procedures, other foreign 
investors were still required to go through a series of stringent censorship 
mechanisms in order to establish an enterprise in China with rigid preconditions 
based on the “Law of People’s Republic of China on Foreign Capital Enterprises” 
before the 2000s.107 The uniquely low corporate income tax rates and extraordinary 
raw material discounts for Taiwanese manufacturers also greatly reduced their 
production costs in the mainland. As such, since the 1990s, most MNCs have 
preferred to outsource their products to Taiwanese enterprises in the Mainland, 
especially when they planned to access the Chinese market.108 As investing in China 
was conducive to increasing order volume, the Mainland became the main 
destination for Taiwan’s outward investments (see Table 4.2.1) following Taiwan’s 
decision to relax the rules on investment in China in the early 1990. The problem of 																																																																																																																																																													
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“hollowing-out” effects captured attention of Taiwanese policymakers, yet they were 
more concerned about the erosion of sovereignty in the process of cross-Strait 
economic integration.    
 
    Indeed, it is noteworthy that China’s preferential trade and investment policies 
targeting Taiwanese enterprises are not purely driven by economic modernization. 
Instead, Chinese leaders subtly incorporated its peaceful reunification agendas with 
the above preferential policies in 1979, which has then evolved as China’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan since the 1980s. This is most evident in the 
“Temporary Regulations Regarding Opening Trade with Taiwan” promulgated in 
1979, which explicitly clarified: “Trade with Taiwan is a special form of trade in the 
transitional period before Taiwan returns to the motherland…to create conditions for 
unification of the motherland” in Article 1.109 Similar announcements were “Deng 
Xiaoping’s Six Conceptions for the Peaceful Reunification”, President Jiang Zemin’s 
“Eight Point Proposal”, and President Hu Jintao’s “Six Proposals”, which all stress 
that cross-Strait economic integration is crucial for China’s strategy of “peaceful 
reunification”.110 In response to China’s commercial diplomacy, as will be discussed 
in the next section, Taiwanese leaders adopted several policies to limit cross-Strait 
economic exchanges between 1996 and 2008 so as to safeguard Taiwan’s 
sovereignty. 
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4.3 Taiwan: The Struggle between Economic and Sovereignty Interests 
    The economic dynamics of Asia-Pacific regional integration have impinged on 
cross-Strait economic integration. However, as opposed to economic dynamics, 
political issues — particularly the controversies over sovereignty between China and 
Taiwan — have always been obstacles to the development of cross-Strait economic 
integration. As will be discussed in this section, Beijing’s intention of taking 
advantage of Taiwan’s Mainland fever to further its reunification agenda in the 
process of cross-Strait economic integration has captured the attention of Taiwanese 
leaders. As such, during Lee Teng-hui’s and Chen Shui-bian’s presidencies, they 
spared no effort to promote Taiwan’s independence movements. 111 Meanwhile, in 
order to reduce the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, the “No 
Haste, Be Patient” and “Active Management, Effective Opening” policies dominated 
Taiwan’s strategies concerning cross-Strait economic exchanges.112 Additionally, the 
Taiwanese government also adopted the “go south” strategy in an attempt to direct 
Taiwan’s investment from China to ASEAN.113 Nonetheless, Taiwan’s policies for 
restricting cross-Strait economic exchanges were unsuccessful because they 
contradicted the economic dynamics across the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s “go south” policy was also limited following the onset of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis.114  
 
																																																								
111 Hickey, “Wake Up to Reality”, 4-7. 
112 T. Y. Wang, “Lifting the ‘No Haste, Be Patient’ Policy: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations”, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15, no. 1 (2002): 132; To-hai, Liou, “Cross- Taiwan Straits 
Economic Relations and the ECFA”, in Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations since 1979: Policy Adjustment 
and Institutional Change Across the Straits, ed. Kevin G. Cai (London: World Scientific Publishing 
Co. Pte. Ltd., 2011), 160-63.    
113 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 45-47. 
114 Ibid. 
	 215 
4.3.1 Taiwan: Managing Cross-Strait Economic Exchanges 
     As most Taiwanese policymakers have pointed out, between 1996 and 2008 
Taiwan often struggled to maintain equilibrium between economic and sovereignty 
interests, with regards to managing cross-Strait economic integration.115 By studying 
Taiwan’s policies concerning cross-Strait economic integration during this period, we 
can see that Taipei’s attitude towards the issues of liberalizing economic exchanges 
with the Mainland became volatile. While Beijing furthered its interest of promoting 
the “one-China principle” in the process of cross-Strait economic cooperation, Taipei 
often restricted economic exchanges with China in order to reduce the degree of 
Taiwan’s economic dependence on China. 116  When Taiwanese businessmen 
organized interest groups to lobby the government to promote cross-Strait economic 
cooperation, Taipei was forced to switch its mainland policy from “positive 
management” to “positive opening”.117  
 
4.3.1.1 The “No Haste, Be Patient” Policy in the Context of “Special State-to-State 
Relationship” 
    Taiwan’s struggle to balance its economic and sovereignty interests can be 
traced back to 1996, when Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui announced the “No 
Haste, Be Patient” policy towards China.118 The “No Haste, Be Patient” policy was 
the first policy aimed at restricting cross-Strait economic exchanges since Taiwan’s 
promise to gradually liberalize economic relations with China in 1990. Following the 
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announcement of this policy, Taipei amended the “Review Guidelines for Investment 
and Technological Cooperation in the Mainland Area” in 1997 so as to strengthen 
surveillance of Taiwanese high-tech industries’ investment in China — particularly 
investment from Taiwanese ICT industries — in an attempt to combat Mainland 
fever. 119  In general, Taiwan stipulated that all entrepreneurs must be granted 
permission by the government before investing in any project in the mainland, and 
the total amount of their investment could not surpass US$50 million.120 Meanwhile, 
Taiwan also imposed stringent measures including heavy fines and the revocation of 
investment permission in order to punish delinquent enterprises.121  
 
    With respect to Taiwan’s motivation behind the “No Haste, Be Patient” policy, 
Taiwanese policymakers under Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, such as former Vice 
Premier Professor Liu Chao-shiuan, former Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council 
Professor Su Chi, former Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council Professor 
Lin Chong-pin, all pointed out that Taiwan’s political concerns outweighed economic 
interests in managing cross-Strait economic relations at that moment.122 Generally 
speaking, there were two factors that drove Taipei to restrict cross-Strait economic 
exchanges: the threat to Taiwan’s sovereignty interests caused by Mainland fever, 
and the nervous relations between China and Taiwan in 1996 provoked by Taiwan’s 
unilateral movements towards consolidating its domestic and international legal 
sovereignty.123  																																																								
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    Indeed, since Taiwan gradually opened economic exchanges with China in the 
early 1990s, the question of how to safeguard its sovereignty whilst pursuing 
economic interest in the process of cross-Strait economic integration has been a 
recurrent dilemma. Although Taiwan’s policy of restricting economic exchanges with 
the Mainland was mainly driven by its concern over sovereign interests, it is 
noteworthy that at the initial stage of the resumption of cross-Strait economic 
exchanges in the early 1990s, Taiwan’s Mainland policy was actually propelled by its 
interests in economic development. 124  Not until Taiwan’s sovereignty interests 
confronted severe challenges caused by Mainland fever, as well as China’s assertive 
attitude in defining Taiwan’s political status, did Taipei adopt the “No Haste, Be 
Patient” policy for managing cross-Strait economic relations. 
    
    In the early 1990s, Taipei’s concerns over opening cross-Strait economic 
exchanges were actually rooted in the interests of exploiting the low-cost production 
factors in the Chinese market in order to assist Taiwanese manufacturing industries 
in maintaining their competitiveness.125 For this purpose, the strategic logic of 
“buying time in order to create strategic space” seemingly dominated Taiwan’s 
Mainland policy, and accordingly Taipei shelved controversies over sovereignty so as 
to promote cross-Strait economic exchanges.126 As such, rather than directly defying 
Beijing’s reunification agenda, Taipei strategically took the issues of cross-Strait 
economic liberalization as the main theme of cross-Strait negotiation in an attempt to 
avoid political dialogues concerning reunification.  																																																								
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    Taking the “Guidelines for National Unification” promulgated in 1991 as an 
example, it is clear that Taiwan explicitly claimed that the issue of reunification was 
non-negotiable until both sides become fully-fledged democracies.127 Meanwhile, 
through this guideline, Taiwan also indicated that it would not commence negotiation 
over the “three direct links” with Beijing unless China implements a project of 
democratization.128 Notably, although China had been carrying out its economic 
reform project since 1978, political reform — particularly in terms of 
democratization — remained unforeseeable in the short term. By this reasoning, 
Taiwan’s intention to avoid political dialogue with China in the process of 
cross-Strait economic cooperation was very apparent.  
 
    Nevertheless, according to these guidelines, the Taiwanese government made a 
promise to “gradually ease various restrictions” on cross-Strait economic exchanges 
insofar as these measures would not endanger Taiwan’s national security. 129 
Subsequently, Taiwan established the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation 
(SEF) to negotiate economic issues with China’s semi-official Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) based on the 1992 Consensus.130 
Moreover, by amending the “Statute Governing the Relations between the People of 
the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” in 1993, Taiwan permitted indirect trade 
with the Mainland and allowed more than 3,700 industries to invest in the Chinese 
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market.131 However, President Lee Teng-hui’s initial Mainland policy had generated 
disaffection among not only Taiwanese businessmen but also Chinese leaders. 
   
    First of all, despite the fact that Taipei had relaxed restrictions on investment in 
the Mainland, most Taiwanese manufacturers, especially the ICT and petrochemical 
industries, remained on the “prohibition list” of the “Regulations Governing 
Permission of Trade between Taiwan Area and Mainland Area”.132 Entrepreneurs 
from Taiwan’s large corporations therefore spared no effort in lobbying the 
government to liberalize economic relations with China, and some of them had even 
eschewed the government’s restrictions to invest in China.133  
 
    The most popular case was Formosa Plastics Group’s power plant projects in 
Fujian Province, which were worth more than US$3 billion in total.134 Regardless of 
the government’s prohibition, Wang Yung-chin, President of the Formosa Plastics 
Group, established subsidiaries in a third country in order to inject capital into his 
power plant projects in China.135 In addition to the case of Formosa Plastics Group, 
other Taiwanese entrepreneurs, such as Chang Yung-fa (President of the Evergreen 
Corporation) and Morris Chang (Chairman of TSMC), had also lobbied the 
government to lift restrictions on cross-Strait economic relations.136 Facing great 
pressure from enterprises, combined with the rapid growth of Taiwan’s investment in 
China since 1993 (see Table 4.2.1), Lee Teng-hui’s administration was worried about 																																																								
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the emergence of a “fifth column” following the development of cross-Strait 
economic cooperation.137 Meanwhile, President Lee Teng-hui also worried that 
complying with Taiwanese businessmen’s demands would eventually drag Taiwan 
back to the negotiation table, which would provide Beijing with more bargaining 
chips that it could be used to trap Taiwan with its “one-China” framework.138 As 
such, Taipei decided to restrict cross-Strait economic exchanges by implementing the 
“No Haste, Be Patient” policy. 
 
    In addition to the aforementioned political pressure caused by Mainland fever, 
the disputed sovereignty issue between China and Taiwan has always been an 
obstacle to cross-Strait economic integration. As discussed before, while Taiwan’s 
Mainland policy was mainly driven by economic interests in the early 1990s, Taipei 
chose to downplay discrepancies between both sides’ definitions of the “one-China 
principle”. Nonetheless, owing to Beijing’s insistence on the principle that any 
negotiation with Taiwan must be based on the “one-China principle”, as Professor Su 
Chi indicated, Taiwan’s strategy was to blur Beijing’s “one-China principle” by 
proposing “one China, respective interpretations”, which then became the 1992 
Consensus discussed in chapters 1 and 2.139  
 
    Chinese leaders reluctantly accepted this ambiguous definition of “one-China” 
in order to ensure smooth negotiations between the SEF and ARATS in 1992, as 
facilitating cross-Strait economic exchanges was also in line with Beijing’s economic 
interests.140 However, in 1993, Beijing erased this ambivalence by issuing the White 																																																								
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Paper of “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China”, which claimed: “there 
is only one China and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole 
legal government of China, and Taiwan is part of China”.141 In this context, 
continuing economic negotiations with China entailed Taiwan endorsing Beijing’s 
“one-China principle”, which would be detrimental to Taiwan’s sovereignty. On the 
one hand, ratifying the PRC as “the sole legal government of China” would endanger 
Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty since Taipei had adhered to the 1992 
Consensus.142 On the other hand, as Beijing claimed that “China” could only be 
referred to as the PRC, accepting that Taiwan is inseparable from China would be 
equivalent to endorsing China’s “one country, two systems formula”, allowing 
Beijing to encroach on Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty.143  
 
    In response to China’s assertive attitude towards the “one-China principle”, 
Taipei slowed its negotiations with Beijing. Since 1994, the SEF reached no new 
agreements concerning cross-Strait exchanges with the ARATS except the issue of 
transportation between Hong Kong and Taiwan after 1997. 144  President Lee 
Teng-hui also carried out a two-pronged strategy aimed at consolidating Taiwan’s 
sovereignty.  
 
    Firstly, in an attempt to consolidate Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty, President 
Lee promoted a direct Presidential election in Taiwan, which was held in 1996. As 
discussed in chapter 2, the KMT had always been taken as an “external governing 
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power” in Taiwan which was a result of the Chinese civil war.145 In this regard, the 
KMT government could only represent “Republic of China” on the Mainland rather 
than Taiwan. and this had justified Beijing’s statement that Taiwan “became an issue 
only as an aftermath of the ensuing civil war started by Kuomintang” which is 
“China’s” domestic affair. 146 Therefore, President Lee Teng-hui decided to facilitate 
the project of democratization.  
 
    As President Lee won the 1996 presidential campaign, the KMT government 
has not only legitimized its governing power but also confirmed the “Republic of 
China on Taiwan” that enabled Taipei to counter Beijing’s “one country, two systems” 
framework.147 Notably, in the process of Taiwan’s democratization President Lee 
further reshaped Taiwanese national identity by creating the term “New Taiwanese”, 
which means “those who are willing to fight for the prosperity and survival of their 
country, regardless of when they or their forbears arrived on Taiwan, regardless of 
their provincial heritage or native language”.148 This challenged the credibility of 
Beijing’s assertion that both peoples are Chinese and that “national reunification…is 
a sacrosanct mission of the entire Chinese people”.149     
 
   Secondly, aside from promoting democratization, Lee’s administration adopted 
the strategy of “pragmatic diplomacy” for consolidating Taiwan’s de jure 
sovereignty. 150  The main mission of this strategy was to counter Beijing’s 
“one-China principle” in the international community by disseminating “the 																																																								
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Republic of China on Taiwan”, as demonstrated during President Lee Teng-hui’s 
speech at Cornell University in the US in 1995.151  At the same time, Lee’s 
administration also forged the “go south” policy aimed at strengthening relations 
with ASEAN countries by deepening bilateral economic cooperation, which will be 
discussed later.152   
    
   In order to counter Taipei’s pro-independence policy, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin 
soon issued the “Eight-point Proposal” in 1995 that clearly expressed Beijing’s 
stance of against “Taiwan’s activities in ‘expanding its living space internationally’, 
aimed at creating ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’.”153  Moreover, to 
demonstrate their determination to reunify Taiwan, China also held a series of 
military maneuvers and missile tests in the Taiwan Straits between 1995 and 1996, 
which resulted in the third cross-Strait crisis. From thereon, Beijing spared no effort 
in downgrading Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty by defining the island as a 
“province” of the PRC.154 Beijing’s assertive attitude eventually pushed President 
Lee Teng-hui to defend Taiwan’s statehood by proposing the “two state theory”, 
which defined cross-Strait relations as “a special state-to-state relationship”.155  
     
    Specifically, during an interview with Voice of Germany on July 9, 1999, 
President Lee said: 
 
“The 1991 constitutional amendments have placed cross-Strait relations as 
a state-to-state relationship, rather than an internal relationship of ‘one 																																																								
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China’ between a legitimate government and a renegade group, or between 
a central government and a local government.”156 
 
President Lee had later reiterated that his statement was based on the status quo 
across the Taiwan Strait, thus suggesting that this statement was not accidental.157  
 
    However, as President Lee did not specify his motivation for making this 
statement, there has been a great deal of speculation amongst analysts about what he 
actually wanted to imply. Some scholars suspected that he intended to further 
promote de jure independence by amending the constitution, while others questioned 
whether this statement was intended to prevent further semi-official talks with 
Beijing on “the 50th anniversary of the PRC”.158 There was even a strong suspicion 
that President Lee tried to assist the DPP’s presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, to 
win the campaign in 2000.159 Although Lee’s real intentions may not become 
apparent until there is more evidence, it is clear that his statement regarding the 
“special state-to-state relationship” has had a profound impact on the 1992 
Consensus. 
 
    First of all, President Lee distinguished Taiwan’s “territoriality” from the 
Mainland in his statement on the “ special state-to-state relationship” based on the 
ROC’s constitution, which has impacted upon Beijing’s sovereignty claim over 
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Taiwan based on the 1992 Consensus.160 As discussed in chapter 2, the 1992 
Consensus provides no clear answer to the question of who represents “China”.161 
Article 4 of the ROC’s Constitution delineates no clear national boundary.162 As 
such, the implicit juridical link between China and Taiwan was found in the PRC’s 
Constitution and Taiwan’s “Guideline for National Unification”.163 However, when 
speaking of the “special state-to-state relationship”, President Lee cited “Article 10 
of the Additional Articles” of the ROC’s constitution which “limits the area covered 
by the Constitution of the Taiwan area”, in order to define Taiwan’s territory.164 He 
further highlighted that both the PRC and ROC coexist in the international system, 
which is equivalent to the “two China” discourse.165 While President Lee rejected 
that the ROC’s territory is “overlapping” with the PRC, this  was equivalent to 
denying Beijing’s claims on Taiwan’s international legal and Westphalian 
sovereignty.   
 
    In addition to territoriality, President Lee Teng-hui also emphasized Taiwan’s 
domestic sovereignty by citing “Article 2 of Additional Articles” of the ROC’s 
Constitution, which necessitates that Taiwan’s president be elected following a direct 
presidential campaign.166 This clearly illustrates the divergence between the Chinese 
and Taiwanese regimes. Combined with the aforementioned “New Taiwanese” 
identity, President Lee’s “special state-to-state relationship” further strengthened 
Taiwanese identity, which then allowed Taiwanese people to discern “us” from “them” 
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in the process of cross-Strait exchanges. Subsequently, Lien Chan’s (the KMT 
presidential candidate) discourse of “Chinese helping Chinese” and his policy of 
rapprochement of cross-Strait relations became unpopular in Taiwanese society 
during the 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns.167 Meanwhile, as a result of the 
emergence of Taiwanese identity, Beijing faced difficulties in making “Chinese 
nationalism” appeal to Taiwanese people.168 This explains why the 1992 Consensus 
had lost its momentum until 2008.    
 
    Following President Lee’s announcement of the “special state-to-state 
relationship”, the 1992 Consensus was abolished. Beijing also displayed a hostile 
attitude towards Taiwan’s attempts at attaining independence by holding military 
exercises targeting Taiwan’s outlying islands.169 In general, between 1996 and 2000, 
as a consequence of tense relations across the Taiwan Strait caused by the disputed 
“one-China principle”, the progress of normalization of cross-Strait economic 
relations became stagnant. Professor Liu Chao-shiuan said: “The mainland expected 
us [Taiwan] to accept their ‘one-China’ framework … However, it was not 
acceptable for us because there were polarized opinions on this issue in Taiwan.”170 
He further elaborated that: “When either of us [the mainland or Taiwan] stubbornly 
required the other side to accept its own framework [the ‘one-China’ framework] as a 
precondition of cross-Strait exchanges, the government had no space to promote 
bilateral cooperation.”171  
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4.3.1.2 President Chen Shui-bian’s Mainland Policy 
    Cross-Strait relations were strained under Lee Teng-hui’s final presidency, and 
these became even more fragile after Chen Shui-bian — a pro-independence leader 
from the DPP — won Taiwan’s presidential election in 2000. As most analysts 
observed, during President Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, from 2000 to 2008, 
Taiwan’s Mainland policy was erratic and more assertive in terms of pursuing 
Taiwan’s de jure sovereignty than Lee’s administration.172 Many examples support 
this argument. At the beginning of the first term of his presidency, President Chen 
Shui-bian took a positive attitude towards cross-Strait economic integration, but he 
then condemned Beijing’s initiative of promoting economic exchanges with Taiwan 
as “sugar coated poison”.173 Nonetheless, during his presidency, Taiwan eased 
restrictions on economic exchanges with China, typified by the “Active Opening, 
Effective Management” policy.174 
     
    Another case of Taipei’s volatile Mainland policy under Chen Shui-bian’s 
presidency has been his promise of not adopting a pro-independence policy. In his 
inaugural speech in 2000, President Chen promised that he would “not declare 
independence”, “not change the national title”, “ not push forth the inclusion of the 
so-called ‘state-to-state’ description in the Constitution”, “not promote a referendum 
to change the status quo”, and claimed that “there is no question of abolishing the 
Guidelines for national Unification and the National Unification Council” insofar as 
																																																								
172 Gunter Schubert and Stefan Braig, “How to Face An Embracing China? The DPP’s Identity 
Politics and Cross-Strait Relations During and After the Chen Shui-bian Era”, in Taiwanese Identity in 
the Twenty-first Century: Domestics, Regional and Global Perspectives, ed. Gunter Schubert and Jens 
Damm (New York: Routledge, 2011), 72-88. 
173 Hickey, “Wake Up to Reality”, 2. 
174 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 50-62. 
	 228 
the mainland “has no intention to use military force against Taiwan”.175 However, 
these promises were exposed as nothing but rhetoric. Even though China’s Vice 
Premier leader Qian Qichen recalibrated Beijing’s “one-China principle” based on 
the 1992 Consensus by emphasizing the “equality” between both sides in September 
2000, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian was still resolute in assuming de jure 
independence.176      
 
    In 2002, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian proposed the “one country on 
each side”, and unlike his “five noes policy”, this statement is by no means rhetoric 
alone.177 The first step President Chen took was to announce a referendum on the 
status quo of Taiwan Strait in 2003, but this plan was deterred by the US.178 
Nonetheless, he still successfully held the “defensive referendum” on the issue of 
military procurement in the 2004 presidential election. 179  Regardless of 
Washington’s opposition, Chen’s administration abandoned both the “Guidelines for 
National Unification and the National Unification Council” following Taiwan’s 
constitutional reform in 2006.180 In 2007, President Chen further promoted “a 
referendum on joining the UN”.181 All of these strategies to promote independence 
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dragged Taiwan away from Beijing’s “one-China” framework, and they also 
impacted upon the 1992 Consensus manifested in two ways. 
 
    Firstly, as most scholars have pointed out, in terms of promoting de jure 
independence, Chen’s administration went much further than the former President 
Lee Teng-hui.182 Indeed, at the global level, President Chen successfully illustrated 
Taiwan’s unique territoriality in the international system following Taiwan’s 
accession into the WTO under the name of the “Separate Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”.183 It is true that Taiwan’s participation did not 
directly help to consolidate its statehood, and furthermore Beijing spared no effort in 
attempting to infringe upon Taiwan’s status in the WTO.184 However, Taiwan’s 
place in the WTO has been referenced widely in bilateral FTAs with other countries 
in the post-ECFA era.185 Chapter 6 will study in more detail the issue of whether this 
will result in the erosion of Beijing’s “one-China principle”. 
 
    At the bilateral level, the territoriality of Taiwan’s Westphalian sovereignty has 
been further confirmed under Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. As previously discussed, 
the connection of “juridical territoriality” between China and Taiwan under the 1992 
Consensus has been weakened due to President Lee’s statement regarding the 
“special state-to-state relationship”. President Chen further curtailed this link by 
abolishing the “Guidelines for National Unification”. 186  This movement 
demonstrates that pursuing reunification with the Mainland is no longer one of 
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Taiwan’s objectives, and thus the essence of the 1992 Consensus under President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s presidency has become very different from the 1990s. Specifically, 
owing to the lack of juridical link of the PRC’s and the ROC’s territories, the 
commonly employed discourse of “Taiwan is Taiwan, China is China” since the late 
1990s has been further affirmed.187 As a result, the definition of the ROC under the 
1992 Consensus can at most be understood to mean the “ROC on Taiwan”, and this 
also gives weight to President Ma Ying-jeou’s assertion that the 1992 Consensus 
represents the spirit of “mutual non-denial”.188 Chapter 6 will study whether this is 
likely result in the erosion of Beijing’s “one-China principle”. 
 
    Secondly, similar to President Lee Teng-hui’s contribution, President Chen 
Shui-bian’s success in promoting the 2004 and 2008 referenda contributed to the 
consolidation of not only Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty but also Taiwanese 
identity.189 The two referenda under Chen Shui-bian’s presidency signified the 
achievements of Taiwan’s democratization, and again reminded Taiwanese people of 
the utterly divergent Chinese and Taiwanese regimes.190 Moreover, during the 
debates over the referendum issues, in addition to succeeding former President Lee 
Teng-hui’s strategy to cultivate Taiwanese identity, President Chen also aimed at 
constructing an “us” and “them” identity, which even construed China as the 
“enemy”.191 According to a poll conducted by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, 
53.1% of Taiwanese people believe that the Mainland held “hostile” attitudes 
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towards Taiwan.192 Furthermore, the ratio of people who identified as exclusively 
Taiwanese increased from 39.7% in 2000 to 48.4% in 2008.193 President Chen’s 
attempts to cultivate Taiwanese identity thus created difficulties for Beijing in 
convincing Taiwanese of the 1992 Consensus by emphasizing Chinese nationalism in 
the post-ECFA era.  
 
    Although President Chen implemented assertive policy in an attempt to promote 
de jure independence, he simultaneously recalibrated President Lee’s conservative 
policy in managing cross-Strait economic integration in an attempt to pursue 
economic interests.194 According to the document titled “The DPP Administration’s 
Logic and Policy on China”, Taiwan’s Mainland policy goals included “building a 
consensus on national identity”, “safeguarding the integrity of Taiwan’s sovereignty”, 
and promoting “a future of co-existence and co-prosperity”.195 This document also 
argued that the Taiwanese government should achieve the above strategic goals by 
“negotiating a cross-Strait ‘peace and stability framework for interaction’”, 
“developing cooperative economic relations” with China, and “facilitating the 
democratization of the PRC government”.196 Professor Chen Ming-tong, former 
Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, summarized President Chen’s strategic 
logic as “using limited conflicts with [Beijing’s Taiwan policy] to expand strategic 
space, making limited compromise in order to preserve strategic achievements”.197 
According to this reasoning, the strategic goal of Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy 																																																								
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was to press Beijing to ratify the co-existence of the PRC and the ROC. Meanwhile, 
Taipei also intended to utilize commercial diplomacy to maintain stability across the 
Taiwan Strait while pursuing international legal sovereignty.  
 
    However, maintaining equilibrium between economic and sovereignty interests 
remained a trial for the Taiwanese government. Initially, after winning the 
presidential election in 2000, President Chen Shui-bian displayed a consistently 
positive attitude towards cross-Strait economic and even political dialogues in an 
attempt to convince Beijing to not set any prerequisites for bilateral negotiations.198 
Yet Taipei did not fully achieve its strategic goals. Despite the fact that Chinese 
leaders softened its definition of the “one-China principle” mentioned before,199 
Beijing still insisted on “the PRC as the sole legitimate government representing the 
whole of China” according to its White Paper “The One-China Principle and the 
Taiwan Issue”.200 Notably, Beijing also rejected to further concessions to Taipei. The 
main reason for this was that Taipei had lost its bargaining chips following the onset 
of the domestic financial crisis in 2001. 
 
    Taiwan’s financial crisis in 2001 was caused by a slump in US stock market 
because of the bursting of the “dot-com bubble”,201 and its negative impact on 
Taiwan’s economic performance was more considerable than the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. Notably, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Index declined 
heavily from 8939.52 on 31 May 2000 to 3446.26 on 3 October 2001 — the lowest 
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point in the record of Taiwan’s stock market.202 The evaporation of stock market 
value had an impact on Taiwanese SMEs’ costs and this in turn resulted in another 
wave of industrial offshoring.203 In an attempt to gain more votes in the legislative 
elections in December 2001, Taiwan’s opposition parties took advantage of this crisis 
to collaborate with entrepreneurs and lobby Chen’s administration to liberalize 
economic relations with China.204 Hence, in May 2001, the Taiwanese government 
established the Economic Development Advisory Committee (EDAC), which 
contained politicians from opposition parties and Taiwanese entrepreneurs to adjust 
Taiwan’s policy for managing cross-Strait economic relations.205  
 
    Three months later, Chen’s administration created the “Active Opening, 
Effective Management” policy as a substitute for President Lee Teng-hui’s “No 
Haste, Be Patient” policy, based on the EDAC’s suggestion. 206  Chen’s 
administration added about 3,000 industries onto the “permission list” of Taiwanese 
investment in the Mainland. 207  Meanwhile, Taiwanese entrepreneurs were not 
required to obey the previous regulations that forbade them from investing more than 
US$50 million in the mainland. 208  As an alternative, from 2001, Taiwanese 
enterprises were allowed to inject more capital into the Chinese market so long as the 
total amount of their investments did not exceed 40% of their business net profits.209 
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Most significantly, Taiwan also opened the “mini three direct links” that allowed 
direct transportation between China’s Fujian province and Taiwan’s remote 
islands — Kinmen and Matsu as an experiment to prepare for opening the “three 
direct links” in the future.210  
 
    However, the implementation of the “Active Opening, Effective Management” 
policy did not correspond with President Chen’s strategic goals. Firstly, Beijing still 
firmly held on to its “one-China principle” for addressing the Taiwan issue, but the 
Taiwanese government eased restrictions against economic exchanges with the 
Mainland instead of utilizing commercial diplomacy to bargain with Beijing. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy was limited following 
the implementation of this policy because the degree of Taiwan’s economic 
dependence increased as a result of the huge outflow of Taiwanese investment into 
China (see Table 4.2.1). As such, since 2002, President Chen refused to commence 
any official or semi-official negotiation with the Mainland, and he further challenged 
Beijing’s “one-China principle” by proposing the notion of “one country on each side” 
as discussed above. 211  However, President Chen’s pro-independent route 
encountered severe challenges. In response to President Chen’s pro-independence 
policy, Beijing signaled its determination of using military force to fight against 
Taiwan’s unilateral independence movements by making the “Anti-secession Law” 
in 2005 as discussed in chapter 2, and this henceforth deteriorated cross-Strait 
relations.212  
 
    In addition to tense relations with Beijing, President Chen Shui-bian’s strategy 																																																								
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of reshaping Taiwan’s national identity was also defied by the advocators of the 1992 
Consensus in Taiwanese society. On the one hand, Taiwan’s poor economic 
performance after the 2001 financial crisis motivated Taiwanese entrepreneurs to 
press the government to promote full economic liberalization across the Taiwan 
Strait even though it would entail Taipei to accepting the 1992 Consensus .213 On the 
other hand, the KMT attempted to improve cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s 
economic performance by opening up economic and political dialogues with China 
based on the 1992 Consensus during Taiwan’s presidential campaign in 2004.214 
Although the DPP won this campaign, this did not help Chen’s administration to 
appease domestic controversy over its pro-independent course in managing 
cross-Strait economic relations. In contrast, Taiwanese public opinion turned to 
support the liberalization of economic exchanges with the Mainland, and thus the 
government was pressured to recalibrate its Mainland policy by Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs.215 
 
    In order to prepare for the local elections in Taiwan, as well as to ameliorate 
tense relations with China, Chen Shui-bian’s administration commenced dialogues 
with Beijing to discuss “cross-Strait direct charter flights during the Chinese Lunar 
New Year” in Macau in 2005.216 However, as Taipei still firmly rejected the 1992 
Consensus, this raised the question of whether the “one-China principle” was the 
prerequisite of this negotiation. Policymakers in the Chen administration named this 
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negotiation the “Macau Model”.217 They even advocated the use of the “Macau 
Model” to address cross-Strait dialogues thereafter because this model was not based 
on the 1992 Consensus.218 Yet most Chinese and Taiwanese elites could not ratify 
this statement.  
 
    Doctor Huang Chieh-cheng, former Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs 
Council in Chen’s administration, questioned the statement that Beijing abandoned 
the “one-China principle” in the process of the negotiation with Taiwan in Macau in 
2005.219 He further said:  
 
“I can tell you Beijing firmly insisted in the ‘one-China’ principle in the 
process of cross-Strait communication. In order to allow both sides’ people, 
especially Taiwanese businessmen in the Mainland, to have a good 
Chinese New Year, I suggested adding two words to this principle, which 
became the ‘one Chinese New Year principle’ … In this case, cross-Strait 
negotiations were based on our people’s interests instead of political 
concerns”.220 
 
    In effect, most Chinese elites pointed out that there was no necessity to stress 
that the “Macau Model” was based on the “one-China principle” because this 
negotiation only touched on the issues of route planning concerning direct flights 
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across the Taiwan Strait.221 For Beijing, the conclusion made in this negotiation can 
be easily defined as “the arrangement for domestic airlines across the Taiwan Strait”, 
and this is the reason for why Taiwan’s Airlines are allowed to land at not only 
international airports but also domestic airports in the Mainland.222 In this light, 
Beijing made use of the “Macau Model” to trap Taiwan with its “one-China 
principle”, which formed a challenge to Taipei’s political status at the bilateral and 
even global level.    
 
    In addition, it is noteworthy that the cross-Strait negotiation in Macau in 2005 
was operated by non-governmental organizations.223 Senior KMT policymakers 
therefore pointed out that the Macau Model actually manifested the strategic 
predicament facing Chen’s administration because Taipei was unable to launch even 
semi-official dialogues with Beijing due to tense bilateral relations.224 Professor Su 
Chi said:  
 
“The Macau Model was a really low-level form of cross-Strait negotiations. 
Furthermore, unlike the significant contribution made by the Koo-Wang 
talks to the improvement of cross-Strait relations, the Macau Model saw no 
achievements in this sense because both sides [China and Taiwan] only 
discussed technical details about direct charter flights … [Under Ma 
Ying-jeou’s presidency], the level of cross-Strait negotiations have been 
much higher than in this model; President Ma even plans to meet with Xi 
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Jinping. It’s impossible to imagine both sides readopting such a low-level 
negotiation like the case of the Macau Model”.225   
 
    Generally speaking, as the Macau Model emerged from non-official 
negotiations between China and Taiwan, this model might allow Beijing to define 
cross-Strait affairs as non-governmental issues. In this regard, the Macau Model 
could be detrimental not only to Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty but also its 
domestic sovereignty, which contradicts President Chen’s strategic goals of 
consolidating Taiwan’s sovereignty. Regardless of the above disputes over the Macau 
Model, there is no need to deny that this negotiation laid the foundations for the issue 
of opening the three direct links in 2008.226 Nevertheless, the effort to open direct 
charter flights to the Mainland during the Chinese New Year did not assist Chen’s 
administration in soothing the pressure of fully opening cross-Strait exchanges. 
Instead, this pressure became much greater after the KMT and the CCP reached a 
consensus on promoting cross-Strait economic cooperation through a meeting 
between Chairman Lien Chan and Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2005.227  
 
    Consequently, President Chen Shui-bian rejected consideration of opening 
cross-Strait economic exchanges by announcing the policy of “Active Management, 
Effective Opening” in 2006.228 Following the implementation of this policy, the 
government encouraged Taiwanese businesses to direct their investment to Southeast 
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Asia by promoting the “go south” policy.229 Meanwhile, Chen’s administration also 
imposed strict measures to ban illegal outward investment to the Mainland by 
Taiwanese enterprises, particularly Taiwanese ICT companies. 230  For instance, 
Chen’s administration filed a lawsuit against the UMC — Taiwan’s second largest 
semi-conductor manufacturer — in order to punish their illegal investment in China, 
which antagonized Taiwanese entrepreneurs.231 However, in contrast to the “No 
Haste, Be Patient” policy, the government made no further regulations to substitute 
for the previous cross-Strait economic policy. Professor Chen Ming-tong explained: 
  
“It is not effective to restrict economic exchanges by making a policy. We 
[Chen’s administration] lifted the ceiling on the maximum amount of 
Taiwanese investment allowed in China, and only large high-tech 
industries could meet this ceiling … The real goal of the [Active 
Management, Effective Opening] policy was to increase Taiwanese 
awareness of China’s political intention towards us … Certainly, we also 
aimed to preserve Taiwan’s economic advantages and bargaining chips for 
future [negotiations with China]”.232 
       
4.3.2 Evaluating Taiwan’s Go South Strategy 
    The above paragraphs traced Taiwan’s cross-Strait economic policy between 
1996 and 2008. In brief, by adopting the “No Haste, Be Patient” and “Active 
Management, Effective Opening” policies, Taipei’s strategic goal was to combat 
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Mainland fever so as to counter China’s commercial diplomacy in the process of 
cross-Strait economic integration. Notably, aside from the aforementioned policy, 
Taipei extended its strategy for managing cross-Strait economic relations from the 
bilateral to the regional level by implementing the “go south” policy.233 In fact, since 
1994, in coordination with its policy for constraining cross-Strait economic 
exchanges, Taipei had encouraged Taiwanese businessmen to look southwards by 
investing in ASEAN economies rather than “going west” to the Chinese market.234 
Moreover, following the implementation of the “go south” policy, Taipei had also 
furthered its sovereignty interests by utilizing commercial diplomacy. The most 
direct evidence of this was President Lee Teng-hui’s “vacation diplomacy” in the 
1990s, as Taiwan’s senior level officials actively made use of their holidays to visit 
ASEAN members to discuss the issues of bilateral cooperation regardless of 
Beijing’s strong opposition.235 Nonetheless, as analyzed in chapter 3, after China 
became the main trading partner and investor in the region, ASEAN economies 
endorsed Beijing’s “one-China principle” in 1999, which constrained Taiwan’s 
strategic space to further its sovereign interests. 236 Most importantly, as will be 
discussed below, the “go south” policy did not help Taipei to twist asymmetric 
economic interdependence with China.         
 
    The origins of Taiwan’s “go south” strategy can be traced as early back to 1994 
when the government published the “Guideline on Enhancing Economic and Trade 
Relations with Southeast Asia”. 237  Initially, reducing the degree of Taiwan’s 
																																																								
233 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 45-47. 
234 Yang and Hsiao, “Tai-shang (Taiwan Business) in Southeast Asia”, 215-17; Chen, “Taiwan 
Investments in China and Southeast Asia”, 456-60.  
235 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, 25-29. 
236 Hughes, “China’s Membership of the ARF”, 63-65.  
237 Yang and Hsiao, “Tai-shang (Taiwan Business) in Southeast Asia”, 219. 
	 241 
economic dependence on China was contained in the second part of the guidelines.238 
In addition to this mission, assisting labor-intensive and highly-polluted industries’ 
(e.g. textile and clothing industries) in seeking new manufacturing bases was also an 
important policy goal according to senior officers served in the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (ROC).239 After helping the above industries to relocate their 
production lines to Southeast Asia, the government then planned to make use of 
spare land and labor to cultivate competitive high-tech industries.240 However, when 
Taipei began to adopt a series of policies in restricting economic exchanges with 
China in 1996, downgrading the importance of the Chinese market for Taiwanese 
businessmen become the main strategic goal of the “go south” policy.241  
 
    Indeed, in coordination with the “No Haste, Be Patient” policy, the Taiwanese 
government soon renewed the “go south” policy. 242  Taiwanese policymakers 
believed that ASEAN economies could be an ideal alternative to substitute for the 
Chinese market as the major destination for Taiwanese investment.243 The main 
reasons for this included “cultural similarities” between Taiwan and ASEAN nations 
(considering the large number of overseas ethnics Chinese in Southeast Asia), 
ASEAN’s efforts to promote regional economic integration, and “abundant low-cost 
labor forces and resources” according to the “Guidelines on Enhancing Economic 
and Trade Relations with Southeast Asia in the Sixth Phase”.244 In order to convince 																																																								
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enterprises to invest in Southeast Asia, the Taiwanese government further made 
investments in Southeast Asia through several state-owned enterprises (SOEs), such 
as the Taiwan Salt Corporation and Taiwan Sugar Corporation.245 Meanwhile, Taipei 
also decided to use the “go south” policy as a long-term strategy by renewing the 
guidelines regularly so as to display the government’s commitments to this economic 
strategy. 
 
    Despite Taipei’s effort to promote the “go south” policy, most Taiwanese 
businessmen, particularly entrepreneurs in ICT industries, contended that they should 
not direct their investment from China to ASEAN countries for several reasons.246 
First of all, ASEAN economies were heavily impacted by the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. It was certainly not wise to inject capital into the region given the unstable 
currency of Southeast Asian economies in the late 1990s. Furthermore, Yageo’s CEO 
Dora W. Chang and ASUS Chief Manager Kent S. Chien also indicated that 
compared with Chinese labor, it is difficult and even costly to manage labor in 
Southeast Asia because of the difference in language between Taiwanese managers 
and workers in most ASEAN countries.247 Besides, as mentioned before, while 
Chinese labor skills have improved since the 1990s, 248  most Taiwanese ICT 
industries still prefer to relocate their production lines in China rather than ASEAN. 
         
    In addition, despite ASEAN’s effort in promoting regional economic integration 
since the 1990s, this achievement was not attractive to Taiwanese entrepreneurs. First 
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of all, after the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the 
ASEAN-10 is indeed a large market with a population more than 600 million 
people.249 However, by considering the huge economic development gap among 
ASEAN members, Taiwan’s “go south” policy could only aim at strengthening 
bilateral economic ties with the relatively advanced ASEAN-6 and Vietnam 
(ASEAN-7) but not the whole ASEAN.250 Notably, most of these economies are 
archipelagos. This piecemeal geographical distribution highlights the disadvantage of 
ASEAN-7’s small hinterland, which eclipses its market advantage. When the 
progress of infrastructural development was very slow in most ASEAN economies in 
the 1990s, ASEAN-7’s disadvantage with regards to terrain was magnified.251 
Therefore, most Taiwanese businessmen still prefer to relocate their production lines 
in China given its large hinterland and good infrastructure.252 
 
    Most importantly, as discussed in chapter 3, East Asian economic integration 
was inefficient because of miscellaneous ROOs created by numerous FTAs in the 
region, and thus the utility rate of these FTAs was fairly low.253 As such, business 
profits generated by East Asian FTAs were limited, which influenced Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs’ interests in investing in ASEAN-7. Meanwhile, in spite of the lack of 
FTAs between Taiwan and ASEAN economies until 2012, most entrepreneurs 
indicated that this did not have a considerable impact on their business interests, and 																																																								
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Taiwan’s ICT products especially have enjoyed tariff reduction under the ITA 
following Taiwan’s participation in the WTO.254 Mr. Kent S. Chien indicated: “even 
though an enterprise intends to take advantage of these FTAs, this is just paperwork 
for companies”.255 He further said:  
 
“At most, companies only need to set up an office to handle paperwork in a 
country that has an FTA with Taiwan and our target market in Southeast 
Asia. Even if Taiwan has no connection to bring us into ASEAN economies, 
they can still enter into the market through the Cayman Islands and so 
on … This will increase our cost in paperwork, but there is no reason to 
spend a great amount of money on opening a new production line just for 
an FTA”.256 
     
    Generally speaking, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s “go south” strategy was 
limited in reducing the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China due to the 
lack of incentives to motivate Taiwanese ICT industries to redirect their investments 
from China to ASEAN-7. Annual statistics regarding Taiwanese investment in 
Southeast Asia before 2012 is not available, but according to “The Guidelines on 
Enhancing Economic and Trade Relations with Southeast Asia in the Sixth Phase”, 
Taiwanese investments in the region were mainly consisted of textiles, clothing, 
wood, agricultural, food and beverage, and chemical industries before 2008.257 With 
respect to Taiwanese ICT industries, although they also contributed a large amount of 																																																								
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capital in ASEAN economies, their investments were mainly concentrated in 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and The Philippines before 2008.258 As discussed in 
chapter 3, Taiwanese investments in Singapore were based on the concern of 
utilizing its advantage of intermediary trade. As for the other three economies, they 
were mainly responsible for producing low-value added components such as a hard 
disk drives, which were then transported to the Chinese market for fabrication.259  
 
Table 4.3.1 Taiwan’s Late Registered Investment in China between 1993 and 
2008 
Year Approved Mainland Investment Late Registered Investment Total 
Case Amount 
(US$1,000) 
Case Amount 
(US$1,000) 
1993 1,262 1,140,365 8,067 2,028,046 3,168,411 
1996 383 1,229,241 0 0 1,229,241 
1997 728 1,614,542 7,997 2,719,771 4,334,313 
1998 641 1,519,209 643 515,412 2,034,621 
1999 488 1,252,780 0 0 1,252,780 
2000 840 2,607,142 0 0 2,607,142 
2001 1,186 2,784,147 0 0 2,784,147 
2002 1,490 3,858,757 3,950 2,864,301 6,723,058 
2003 1,837 4,594,985 8,268 3,103,799 7,698,784 
2004 2,000 6,939,912 4 751 6,940,663 
2005 1,287 6,002,029 10 4,924 6,006,953 
2006 897 7,375,197 193 267,138 7,642,335 
2007 779 9,676,420 217 294,125 9,970,545 
2008 482 9,843,355 161 848,035 10,691,390 
Note: Statistics on ‘Late Registered Investment’ were from Taiwanese enterprises’ applications 
based on the “Statute Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the 
Mainland Area”, which had been amended in 1993, 1997, and 2002. 
Source: Compiled from Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
R.O.C. (2016) “Monthly Report (December 2015)”260 
 
    Due to the fact that production lines of Taiwanese ICT industries were still 
converged on the Chinese market, Taipei did not achieve its main strategic goal by 
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adopting the “go south” policy. This then in turn impacted on the effectiveness of 
Taiwan’s policy in restricting cross-Strait economic exchanges. Indeed, as shown in 
Table 4.2.1, the Chinese market was still the main destination for Taiwanese 
manufacturing investment since ASEAN-7 was not an ideal substitution for the 
Chinese market. While the Taiwanese government adopted a series of stringent 
policies for stipulating Taiwanese investment in China, most Taiwanese enterprises 
eschewed these regulations by increasing their “paperwork” in order to transfer 
money to tax heavens, and then redirected their capital to the Chinese market. 261 
 
    Table 4.3.1 shows Taiwan’s illegal investment that was later ratified by the 
government after the amendment of the “Regulations Governing Permission of Trade 
between Taiwan Area and Mainland Area” between 1993 and 2008.262 This table 
demonstrates Taiwan’s predicament in restricting cross-Strait economic exchanges 
through the use of policy tools, and the amount of Taiwanese capital in China was 
always much higher than Taiwan’s official data. For example, regardless of Taiwan’s 
relaxation of its investment in the mainland in 1993, only 1,262 investment cases 
were reported to the authorities whilst 8,067 investment projects in the Chinese 
market were not under the government’s control. In 1997, while Taipei adopted the 
“No Haste, Be Patient” policy, less than 10% of Taiwanese investment projects in 
China were reported to the government. Stunningly, the total amount of late 
registered investment was US$2.7 billion in 1997, which was much higher than the 
amount of approved projects. Moreover, since President Chen Shui-bian had a 
cautious attitude towards cross-Strait economic exchanges in 2002, there had always 
been late-registered investment projects in the Chinese market. In 2003, the number 																																																								
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of unreported cases hit a record high, and the total amount of these investments also 
reached US$3.1 billion. 
 
    The above statistics on Taiwan’s late-registered investment were entirely based 
on voluntary reports to the government, following the lifting of restrictions on 
investing in China.263 As a result, there may still be many unreported Taiwanese 
investment projects, and thus the amount of Taiwan’s total investment in the Chinese 
market between 1993 and 2008 could be higher than the statistical data shown on 
Table 4.3.1. In this light, although Taiwanese investment in China made up less than 
40% of Taiwan’s total outward investment (see Table 4.2.1), it is reasonable to 
question the effectiveness of Taiwan’s policy in constraining investment in the 
Mainland. Additionally, as several scholars have noted, Taiwan’s investment in 
China’s major investors increased rapidly since the 1990s, there was a great 
possibility that Taiwanese entrepreneurs made use of its subsidiaries or business 
partners in a third country to inject capital to China.264 By this reasoning, President 
Lee’s “No Haste, Be Patient” policy might not have been as effective as statistic data 
suggested. 
 
    In the summary, Taiwan’s “go south” policy did not effectively assist Taiwan in 
reversing the relations of asymmetric economic dependence across the Taiwan Strait. 
Rather, as ASEAN-7 could not replace China’s role as an important market and 
manufacturing base for Taiwan’s main manufacturing industry — the ICT industries, 
most Taiwanese investment still targeted the Chinese market. Consequently, 
regardless of Taiwan’s prohibitions, Taiwanese businessmen spared no effort in 																																																								
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eschewing the government’s surveillance so as to inject capital into the mainland, 
which resulted in the failure of the “No Haste, Be Patient” and “Active Management, 
Effective Opening” policies. 
     
4.4 The ECFA as The Contingency Plan of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy 
    This section evaluates Beijing’s Taiwan policy between 1996 and 2008, and 
subsequently argues that the ECFA was a contingency plan of Taiwan’s policy in 
managing cross-Strait relations given pervious policies only achieved limited effect. 
In fact, in response to Taiwan’s assertive attitude towards its de jure sovereignty, 
Beijing implemented a “two-handed” strategy by displaying its military power whilst 
actively providing positive economic incentives to Taipei.265 Not only has this 
strategy deteriorated Taiwan’s international political status, but it has also assisted 
Beijing in increasing the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China 
regardless of Taiwan’s effort in limiting bilateral economic exchanges. Consequently, 
after his inauguration in 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou transformed Taiwan’s strategy 
towards Beijing from one of confrontation to one of cooperation. The issue of 
promoting the ECFA has thus featured largely in the rapprochement of cross-Strait 
relations. 
 
4.4.1 Beijing’s Response: “Hard Became Harder, Soft Became Softer” 
    Between 1996 and 2008, whereas Taiwanese leaders endeavored to restrict 
cross-Strait economic exchanges in coordination with their strategies in solidifying 																																																								
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its international legal and domestic sovereignty, Chinese leaders spared no effort to 
prevent Taiwan from deorbiting from its “one-China” trajectory. Specifically, for 
Beijing, the task of deterring Taiwan’s independence movement was of greater 
importance than the mission of facilitating cross-Strait reunification peacefully.266 
Following this logic maintaining the “status quo across the Taiwan Strait” became 
the main goal of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. For this purpose, a “two-handed” strategy, 
which has been termed “the hard [coercive measures] becomes harder and the soft 
[détente measures], softer”, played a large role in Beijing’s Taiwan policy at that 
time.267  
 
    Generally speaking, China’s coercive measures in hampering Taiwan’s 
independence movements were mainly manifested on military and diplomatic 
fronts.268 As far as military measures are concerned, although China had ceased 
artillery engagements with Taiwan following the implementation of the “reform and 
opening up” policy, Beijing did not (and never has) erase the option of restoring 
Taiwan through war, as shown in every White Paper on the Taiwan issue.269 When 
Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui advocated Taiwan’s domestic and international 
legal sovereignty in 1996 and 1999 respectively, signaling the bottom line of 
“one-China” became an important policy tool for Beijing to impede Taiwan’s 
independence movements.270 The most prominent examples were China’s military 
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exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 and 1999.271  
 
    Nonetheless, these measures were not as effective as Beijing had anticipated. 
Indeed, Beijing’s coercive manners did not shake President Lee’s determination to 
promote Taiwan’s democratization in his presidential campaign in 1996.272 Neither 
did Beijing successfully prevent the pro-independence party — the DPP — from 
obtaining governing power through the presidential election in 2000. Most 
importantly, beyond the bilateral level across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing also risked 
damaging its relations with the US by threatening Taiwan of military conflicts. 
Notably, Washington had always requested Beijing and Taipei to envisage a peaceful 
scenario for resolving their dispute over sovereignty.273 Thus Beijing’s military 
exercises targeting Taiwan was equivalent to challenging Washington’s security 
interests in East Asia.  
 
    As a result, in order to avoid direct conflicts with the US, Beijing adjusted its 
method of displaying military power against Taiwan after Chinese leader Hu Jintao 
took the helm in 2002. China’s military exercises were no longer held in the Taiwan 
Strait. However, this does not mean that the Chinese leaders softened its militarism; 
Beijing’s alternative was to increase the number of missiles aiming at Taiwan.274 
Additionally, Beijing also passed the Anti-secession Law in 2005, legitimizing the 
use of military measures to resolve the Taiwan issue in case of “Taiwan 
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independence” or “interference by any outside forces”.275 This clearly sent Beijing’s 
bottom line to Taipei. 
 
    On the diplomatic front, the PRC’s stance on the “one-China principle” became 
more assertive. Beijing even issued the policy of “three empties” in 1997 attempting 
to expel Taiwan from international organizations, “exhaust[ing]” Taipei’s budgets in 
establishing diplomatic relations with other states, as well as rubbing out all of 
Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. 276  Thereon, at the bilateral level, Beijing actively 
competed with Taipei in offering financial aids to African and Central American 
countries, and the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies decreased from 29 in 2000 to 
23 in 2008. 277 At regional and global levels, Beijing further infringed on Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty by defining this island as a “province of China”.278 
Under this narrow definition, Taiwan’s political status was even lower than Beijing’s 
initial offer within the “one country, two systems” framework after reunification.279 
Furthermore, while Beijing could not tolerate Taiwan’s enrollment in any 
international organization even under the title of “Chinese Taipei”, Taipei had no 
leeway to make a self-interpretation over the “one-China principle” based on the 
“1992 Consensus”. Consequently, except for the WTO, Taiwan faced difficulties in 
participating in IGOs and even INGOs.280 The failure of Taiwan’s applications to the 
WHO in 2005 is clear evidence.  
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    Apart from the above coercive manners aimed at forcing Taipei to abolish its 
policy in acquiring de jure sovereignty, Beijing also endeavored to practice the 
strategy of “using business to press politics and using the public to pressure the 
official[s]”.281 Chinese leaders have never abandoned the strategy of achieving the 
national goal of peaceful reunification through commercial diplomacy. As early as 
the Jiang Zemin era, despite tense relations with Taiwan provoked by the disputed 
issue of sovereignty, Beijing still stressed the principle of “pinning its hope on the 
people of Taiwan”.282 Based on this principle, Beijing released more preferential 
treatments for Taiwanese businessmen in order to attract more Taiwanese 
investments by assuring their business interests in the Mainland. 
 
    The most prominent preferential policy adopted by Beijing was the 
promulgation of the “Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Investments of Taiwan” in 1999.283 
These rules legitimized all the preferential treatments targeting Taiwanese 
businessmen since the 1980s discussed in the second section. Moreover, Beijing 
confirmed that Taiwanese enterprises in the Mainland must be treated as Chinese 
domestic companies, and they were allowed to utilize preferential treatments issued 
by the central and provincial governments at the same time.284 Most importantly, 
Beijing approved Taiwanese businessmen to “freely” organize provincial and central 
associations so that they could have direct channels to communicate with the Chinese 
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government.285    
 
   Since the 2000s, the successor of President Jiang Zemin — President Hu 
Jintao — seemingly put more emphasis on soft manners when addressing the Taiwan 
issue, particularly when Beijing’s coercive manners did not effectively prevented 
Taipei from adopting pro-independence policies. Most notably, while expressing 
Beijing’s firm attitude against Taiwan’s independence movements by publishing the 
“Anti-secession Law” in 2005, President Hu also displayed his soft manners towards 
Taiwan by reiterating “peaceful reunification” as the main goal of Beijing’s Taiwan 
policy.286 As such, in March 2005, President Hu made “a four-point guideline” 
concerning Beijing’s agenda of “peaceful reunification” in an attempt to encourage 
Taipei to resume dialogues with Beijing, and he further stressed that Beijing would 
“never change the principle of placing hope on the Taiwan people”.287 Subsequently, 
between 2005 and 2008, Beijing offered more trade preferential treatments to Taiwan. 
However, different from the previous preferential policies in Jiang Zemin’s era, 
President Hu’s commercial diplomacy might have actually enabled Beijing to extend 
its influence from Taiwanese businessmen in the Mainland to Taiwanese society in 
general. 
 
    For example, as we have already seen in chapter 1, when Taiwanese fruit 
farmers suffered considerable business loss due to over-production, China 
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unilaterally opened its market to import fruits from Taiwan.288 In coordination with 
this preferential treatment, China’s commercial diplomacy took the form of “fruit 
offensive” policy.289 Guided by this policy, Beijing purchased tons of leftover fruits 
from Taiwanese farmers in an attempt to lower DPP’s approval rate since most of 
these farmers were loyal supporters of the DPP.290 In addition, Beijing further 
established the “Cross-Strait Agricultural Cooperation Experimental Zones” in 
Fujian Province, so as to attract Taiwanese farmers to invest in the Mainland.291   
 
    Most importantly, even though Beijing had made unilateral preferential trade 
policies for Taiwan in the late 1990s, the effectiveness of such commercial 
diplomacy was often limited in furthering its political agenda towards Taiwan 
because of the suspension of semi-official cross-Strait dialogues. In order to improve 
this predicament, President Hu Jintao adopted another noteworthy form of 
cross-Strait dialogues. Beijing actively invited KMT politicians to the Mainland to 
discuss issues concerning cross-Strait economic cooperation, and most of Hu’s 
preferential treatments for Taiwan were released after these meetings.292 By holding 
meetings with Taiwan’s pro-unification leaders, Beijing aimed, on the one hand, to 
exert pressure on Chen Shui-bian’s administration to recalibrate its Mainland policy 
based on the “one-China principle”.293 On the other hand, Beijing also intended to 
magnify KMT’s expertise in managing cross-Strait relations, in the hope of helping 
the party in defeat the DPP in the presidential election in 2008. 
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    In spite of improvements of the bilateral relationship between the CCP and 
KMT, it remains difficult to make a clear judgment on whether President Hu’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan was effective or not. During Chen 
Shui-bian’s presidency, Taipei did not soften its assertive attitude towards pursuing 
de jure independence, nor did Chen’s administration resume the suspended 
semi-official negotiations with Beijing. Moreover, although the KMT won the 
presidential campaign in 2008, most scholars ascribed this to Taiwan’s poor 
economic performance under President Chen Shui-bian’s leadership and — most 
significantly — to the scandal of his corruption.294 In this light, President Chen’s 
poor record in tackling cross-Strait relations was not the key factor that should be 
blamed for the DPP’s loss.  
 
    In summary, despite the fact that Beijing did not manage to impede Taipei’s 
resolution to pursue independence movements with its “two-handed” strategy, this 
strategy had made Taipei encounter a strategic dilemma in managing its cross-Strait 
relations. At the bilateral level, Beijing’s coercive manners have sent clear signals to 
Taipei, declaring that a war across the Taiwan Strait and limited diplomatic space 
would be the price for Taiwan’s independence movements.295 Resuming cross-Strait 
negotiations based on the “one-China principle” seemed to be the only approach to 
improve Taiwan’s tense relations with China, but this scenario conflicted with both 
President Lee Teng-hui’s and Chen Shui-bian’s strategic goals to solidify Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty. Moreover, from the perspective of Taiwan’s domestic 
politics, the meetings between the KMT and the CCP since 2005 have heavily 
impacted the authority of the DPP administration in managing cross-Strait 																																																								
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relations.296 Combining with Beijing’s “soft” preferential policies, which aimed at 
luring Taiwanese investments, President Lee’s and Chen’s policies in restricting 
cross-Strait economic exchanges have faced severe challenges. 
   
4.4.2 Taiwan’s New Mainland Policy: The ECFA 
    Cross-strait relations were nervous between 1996 and 2008, but there was a 
dramatic improvement in bilateral relations after the KMT regained power in 2008. 
The key factor was the substantial reform of Taiwan’s Mainland policy. Since 
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration in 2008, Taipei soon resumed the 
bilateral talks between the SEF and the ARATS based on the 1992 Consensus, and 
Taiwan further expressed benign attitude towards China by opening the “three direct 
links” in November 2008.297 In 2010, both sides even achieved a milestone in 
cross-Strait relations by signing the ECFA, which officially formed the prologue for 
cross-Strait economic integration. The issue of economic integration has henceforth 
featured a major role in cross-Strait rapprochement during Ma Ying-jeou’s 
presidency.      
 
    President Ma’s new Mainland policy — particularly the ECFA which promoted 
cross-Strait economic integration — symbolized a shift in Taiwan’s strategic logic in 
managing cross-Strait relations, from one of confrontation to one of cooperation with 
Beijing. However, the ECFA was in fact Taipei’s contingency plan for managing both 
cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s own economic problem. Besides, as will be 
discussed below, President Ma’s new Mainland policy has been met with fierce 																																																								
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debates in Taiwanese society. As far as the reason Taipei adopted this contingency 
plan is concerned, most Taiwanese elites observed that Taipei’s strategic concern 
were placed on three fronts: improving Taiwan’s economic performance, enlarging 
Taiwan’s diplomatic space and stabilizing cross-Strait relations.298  
 
    First of all, on the economic front, boosting Taiwan’s economic growth was one 
of the priorities after President Ma’s inauguration.299 As he had promised that during 
his presidency, Taiwan would achieve “ a 6% annual GDP growth, an annual per 
capita income at least US$30,000; and unemployment rate of no more than 3%”, the 
achievement of this mission became crucial for the credibility of the new 
government.300 As such, it was urgent for his administration to show the public signs 
of economic revival, a difficult task given the heavy impact on Taiwan’s economic 
development during the 2008 global financial crisis.301 To the extent that China was 
the only economy with a burgeoning growth among Taiwan’s major trading partners, 
facilitating economic integration with China seemed to be the only feasible solution 
that could allow Taiwan to gain economic growth in a short term. Combined with 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ appeals to the government for liberalizing cross-Strait 
economic exchanges (discussed in the previous section), Ma’s administration 
eventually took cross-Strait economic integration as its top priority.302   
 
																																																								
298 Chong-pin Lin, interviewed by author, February 19, 2014; Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 
18, 2014; Chao-Shiuan Liu, interviewed by author, March 24, 2014; Chien-Min Chao, interviewed by 
author, April 4, 2014.  
299 Ibid. 
300 Stephanie Chao, “Lawmakers Demand Ma Pay for Broken Pledges”, The China Post, May 17, 
2016, accessed August 16, 2016, 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2016/05/17/466404/Lawmakers-demand.
htm. 
301 Joe Thomas Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook for the Relationship across the Taiwan Strait”, 
Issues & Studies 48, no. 4 (2012): 116-21. 
302 Ibid. 
	 258 
    On the diplomatic front, the mission of expanding Taiwan’s international space 
was equally important as pursuing Taiwan’s economic development, especially when 
President Ma attributed Taiwan’s poor economic performance to its regionally 
isolated position.303 At the regional level, as previously analyzed in chapter 3, the 
potential side-effect of “trade substitution” had captured the attention of Taiwanese 
policymakers following the rapid growth of the number of FTAs in East Asia. 304 
Yet, Taipei did not have an effective policy tool for tackling this problem, because 
the “China factor” served as an obstacle to Taiwan’s FTA strategy. At the global level, 
owing to the tightened cross-Strait relations between 1996 and 2008 provoked by the 
disputed “one-China principle”, the number of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies had 
decreased to 23 by 2008. Meanwhile, Taipei failed to gain entry to important IGOs 
other than the WTO. In this light, Taipei’s previous strategy in challenging Beijing’s 
political agendas did not assist Taiwan in getting rid of the “one-China” framework. 
On the contrary, it resulted in a shrink of Taiwan’s international space, detrimental to 
its international legal and interdependence sovereignty.  
 
    Since Taiwan only had limited policy tools for achieving its economic and 
diplomatic goals in the context of tense cross-Strait relations, stabilizing bilateral 
relations with China was especially important for delivering President Ma’s policy 
goals.305 Professor Su Chi, former General Secretary of the National Security 
Council (ROC) in the Ma administration, indicated that: 
 
“Our [the Taiwanese government’s] decision to sign the ECFA was 																																																								
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actually driven by a set of strategies, and there is an order of priority 
between each of them. After signing the ECFA with Beijing, our next step is 
to sign the FTAs with Singapore and New Zealand. Afterwards, we expect 
to dovetail with the international community … Even though we did not set 
this order of priority, other countries would do so… For example, 
Southeast Asian countries, Singapore, and New Zealand were only willing 
to conclude an FTA with us after we signed the ECFA with Beijing.”306 
 
Accordingly, the development of cross-Strait relations was key to the effectiveness of 
President Ma’s economic policy. Doing so, however, would impinge on his strategies 
for acquiring Taiwan’s international space. Chapter 6 will study this issue in more 
detail.  
 
    During President Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, Taipei did achieve several 
strategic goals. After the improvement of cross-Strait relations, Beijing softened its 
assertive attitude towards Taiwan’s political status, and Chinese President Hu Jintao 
further advocated the “peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” in 2008.307 As 
such, Taiwan managed to not only sign FTAs with several of its targeting trading 
partners, but also join some IGOs such as its enrolment in the WHA. Despite the 
above achievements, criticism of Taipei’s new Mainland policy was never appeased. 
As introduced in chapter 1, the foremost controversy over the ECFA stemmed from 
the disputed 1992 Consensus, and Taiwanese pro-independence politicians contended 
that Beijing could infringe on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of economic 
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integration.308 In addition, given the considerable amount of Taiwanese investment 
in China, some Taiwanese elites further questioned if the ECFA has caused the 
“hollowing out” effect endangering Taiwan’s economic security.309 Chapter 6 will 
evaluate the effectiveness of Taipei’s new Mainland policy in more detail.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
    To sum up, this chapter studied Taiwan’s strategic dilemma in maintaining 
equilibrium between economic and sovereign interests between 1990 and 2008, and 
posited that Taiwan’s “Mainland fever” in the wave of East Asian regionalization 
was the main cause of this predicament. Specifically, China’s low-cost production 
factors have been beneficial to Taiwanese ICT industries for maintaining their 
competitiveness within the BDCCs. Meanwhile, China’s large market size and the 
common language and culture shared with Taiwan, have also provided Taiwanese 
ICT industries with unique advantages in the process of industrial transformation and 
upgrading.310 As such, the Chinese market has become the main target of Taiwanese 
investment, and this commercial diplomacy allowed Beijing to take advantage of 
Taiwan’s Mainland fever to further its political interests on Taiwan.  
 
    Although the increasing degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China has 
captured the attention of Taiwanese leaders, Taipei did not have effective policy 
instruments to reverse this situation. Nor did Taipei successfully counter Beijing’s 
																																																								
308 Hickey, “Wake Up to Reality”, 3-5. 
309 Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 18-20; Hong and Yang, “The Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement between China and Taiwan”, 88-90. 
310 Dora W. Chang, interviewed by author, December 16, 2014; Kent S. Chien, interviewed by author, 
December 26, 2014. 
	 261 
commercial diplomacy by assertively solidifying Taiwan’s statehood during Lee 
Teng-hui’s and Chen Shui-bian’s presidencies. First, Taipei’s measures in restricting 
cross-Strait economic relations entirely conflicted with the economic dynamics of 
cross-Strait integration. Thus Taiwanese entrepreneurs were reluctant or even refused 
to cooperate with the government’s policies. Second, in spite of Taiwan’s effort to 
implement the “go south” policy, ASEAN-7 was not an ideal substitution for China 
as the main production bases of Taiwanese ICT industries, particularly when ASEAN 
economic development was affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis.311 Most 
importantly, instead of forcing Beijing to loosen its definition of the “one-China 
principle”, Taipei’s unilateral movement of pursuing de jure sovereignty only 
resulted in tense relations with China. This then increased the difficulty for Taipei to 
enlarge its international space, and has a detrimental impact to its economic interests 
and de jure sovereignty.  
 
    Taipei’s determination to pursue its international legal sovereignty magnified 
the limited effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in stopping Taipei from 
carrying out pro-independence policies between 1996 and 2008. Nonetheless, by 
adopting a “two-handed” strategy, Beijing still managed to convince Taipei to 
promote cross-Strait economic integration by signing the ECFA after President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s inauguration in 2008. For Taipei, the ECFA was a contingency plan for 
removing the obstacle of the “China factor” to Taiwan’s international space, in a bid 
to secure Taiwan’s economic and sovereign interests. However, as most critics have 
contended, the ECFA might be more favorable to Beijing for encroaching on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty in the promotion of bilateral economic integration, since the 
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1992 Consensus was the prerequisite of this agreement.312 This controversy has 
raised the question of whether Beijing could infringe on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the 
process of cross-Strait economic integration. Moreover, it has also raised the 
question of whether Taipei has achieved its strategic goals after signing the ECFA 
with Beijing. To address these questions, chapters 5 and 6 will respectively evaluate 
Beijing’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan and Taipei’s strategy for countering 
China’s commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era. 
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Chapter 5 China’s Commercial Diplomacy towards Taiwan in the 
Post-ECFA Era 
5.1 Introduction 
    In chapter 4, this thesis studied cross-Strait relations in the context of economic 
integration at the bilateral level, across the Taiwan Strait, and the regional level in 
East Asia. In general, between 1996 and 2008, whilst Beijing faced the difficulties in 
convincing Taiwan of the “one-China” by utilizing commercial diplomacy in the 
process of cross-Strait economic integration, reconciling economic and sovereignty 
interests in the process of cross-Strait economic integration was also a challenge for 
Taiwan with regards to its relations with China. On the one hand, comparative 
advantages in the Chinese market had been crucial for Taiwan’s major industries — 
the ICT manufacturers — to maintain their competitiveness in the wave of East 
Asian regionalization.1 On the other hand, this economic dynamic had generated 
Taiwan’s “Mainland fever”, which provided Beijing with many more resources to 
utilize commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. Yet Taipei was unable to secure its 
economic and sovereign interests simultaneously. The degree of Taiwan’s economic 
dependence on China was increasing despite Taipei’s efforts to restrict bilateral 
economic exchanges. Additionally, rather than successfully solidifying Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty, Taipei’s pro-independence policies provoked Beijing 
to adopt the narrowly defined “one-China principle”. This had further risked 
Taiwan’s security interest, as has been the case for the 1996 cross-Strait crisis.2 
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Consequently, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou considered the ECFA a 
contingency plan related to Taiwan’s Mainland policy and the key strategy for 
acquiring international space so as to consolidate its de jure sovereignty.3  
 
    Notably, contradictory to Taiwan’s strategic goals, Beijing’s concern over the 
ECFA was actually based on its guideline of “peaceful reunification”.4 The different 
strategic goals held by Beijing and Taipei concerning the issue of facilitating 
cross-Strait economic integration led to the formulation of this thesis — that is, 
whether the ECFA helped China to encroach upon Taiwan’s sovereignty, or whether 
it has assisted Taiwan in countering the “one-China principle” following the 
expansion of its international space in the post-ECFA era. Studying this question is 
especially important because this thesis contends that Beijing has utilized 
commercial diplomacy to infringe on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the process of 
cross-Strait economic integration after signing the ECFA with Taipei. As such, in this 
chapter, this thesis evaluates both Beijing’s and Taipei’s strategies for managing 
cross-Strait relations respectively.  
 
    The core purpose of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness of China’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan in the post-ECFA era. Specifically, this 
chapter will answer three sub-questions stemming from the aforementioned core 
research question. Firstly, what strategic goals has Beijing achieved by utilizing 
commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era? Secondly, how has Chinese leaders 
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defined Taiwan’s political status based on the 1992 Consensus in the post-ECFA era? 
Thirdly, how, and to what extent, has Beijing extended its influence to Taiwanese 
society in the post-ECFA era?    
 
    In order to address these questions, the next section of this chapter will analyze 
Beijing’s strategic goals in the post-ECFA era by drawing on interviews with Chinese 
elites and Beijing’s official documents concerning the Taiwan issue. As we shall see 
in the next section, the “peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” and the 
institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus were the main accomplishments of 
China’s commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era. However, it is noteworthy that 
Beijing has made concessions on Taiwan’s international space in an attempt to 
encourage Taipei to sign the ECFA based on the 1992 Consensus.5 The third section 
studies Beijing’s strategy in managing Taiwan’s international space and its definition 
over the “One Country, Two Systems” framework so as to examine if China has 
encroached on Taiwan’s sovereignty in the post-ECFA era.  
  
    The fourth section of this chapter evaluates Beijing’s influence on Taiwanese 
society in the post-ECFA era. In brief, regardless of Beijing’s effort to practice the 
guideline of “placing hope on the Taiwan people”, the onset of the Sunflower 
Movement in 2014 symbolized Taiwanese antagonism towards Beijing’s 
reunification agendas in the process of cross-Strait economic integration.6 Finally, 
this chapter concludes that, although China has seemingly locked Taiwan within its 
“one-China” framework, Beijing did not successfully convince Taiwan of peaceful 																																																								
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reunification in the post-ECFA era. 
 
5.2 The ECFA: Evaluating Beijing’s Strategic Goals 
    Cross-Strait relations experienced a turbulent period between 1996 and 2008; 
however, there has been a significant improvement of bilateral relations particularly   
after Beijing and Taipei signed the ECFA in June 2010. Whereas Taipei took the 
initiative to improve cross-Strait relations, Chinese leaders have made considerable 
economic concessions by offering more preferential tariff treatments for Taiwanese 
enterprises in the negotiation process over the ECFA with Taipei.7 Simultaneously, 
Beijing has also softened their language concerning Taiwan’s political status, and 
Chinese leaders even expressed goodwill in allowing Taiwan to sign FTAs with its 
trading partners and participate in IGOs.8 Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the 
generous offers made by Beijing did not conflict with its political interests in Taiwan. 
Rather, after signing the ECFA with Taipei, it has not only institutionalized 
cross-Strait economic exchanges but also stabilized cross-Strait relations based on 
the 1992 Consensus. This has been beneficial for Chinese leaders to pursue peaceful 
reunification by utilizing commercial diplomacy in the context of “peaceful 
development of cross-Strait relations”.9       
 
5.2.1 The ECFA and China’s Commercial Diplomacy towards Taiwan 
    As previously discussed in chapter 1, the ECFA is not economically beneficial 																																																								
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for China because Beijing only foresees a 0.17% annual GDP growth rate after 
signing this agreement with Taipei.10 Neither is it an “asymmetric” economic 
agreement for the Mainland since Beijing is obliged to remove tariffs on 272 items 
more than Taipei according to the Early Harvest List of the ECFA.11 As most 
scholars have noted, China’s generous economic concessions to Taiwan suggest that 
Beijing’s political gains from the ECFA have outweighed the economic conflicts 
generated by this agreement. 12  Indeed, as discussed in chapter 1, the ECFA 
embodies contemporary China's commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. Beijing’s 
political concern over the ECFA should be understood in relation to China’s 
long-standing strategic goal of “peaceful reunification” that has existed since the 
Deng Xiaoping’s era.13 Specifically, as we have already seen in chapters 2 and 4, the 
strategic logic of creating a stable environment for “accomplishing peaceful 
reunification step by step” has guided Beijing’s Taiwan policy since the 1990s.14 In 
2008, Chinese President Hu Jintao further stressed that promoting cross-Strait 
economic integration is the key to the “peaceful development of cross-Strait 
relations”, which is a crucial step for Beijing to achieve its national goal of “peaceful 
reunification”.15  
 
    In effect, the foremost achievement of Beijing’s commercial diplomacy in the 
post-ECFA era has been the “peaceful development” of the PRC-Taiwan relations in 
																																																								
10 Hong and Yang, “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between China and Taiwan”, 
91. 
11 Tung and Yeh, “Development of A Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 
41-44. 
12 Hong and Yang, “The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between China and Taiwan”, 
94-95. 
13 TAO, “Deng Xiaoping’s Six Concepts of Peaceful Reunification (1983)”, 2002, accessed January 
13, 2015, http://www.gwytb. gov.cn/en/Special/OneChinaPrinciple/201103/t20110317_1790064.htm  
14 TAO, “Jiang Zemin’s Eight-Point Proposal”, 1995, accessed January 13, 2015, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/Jiang/ 201103/t20110316_1789198.htm  
15 TAO, “Let’s Us Join Hand to Promote the Peaceful Development of Cross-Strait Relations”.  
	 268 
the context of cross-Strait economic integration.16 The most direct evidence of this 
is Chinese President Hu Jintao’s address at the meeting with the KMT Honorary 
Chairman Wu Poh-hsiung in July 2010; he said: “this agreement [ECFA] was an 
important achievement in the peaceful development of relations across the Taiwan 
Strait and a sign that economic and trade ties have entered a new stage”.17 
Succeeding President Hu, Chinese President Xi Jinping clearly expressed Beijing’s 
determination “to continue promoting the peaceful development of cross-Strait ties” 
at the CCP-KMT meeting in February 2013. 18  He said: “We will maintain 
consistency in policies toward Taiwan by unswervingly upholding the one-China 
principle and continuing to promote cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation”.19  
 
   Chinese scholars further rationalized the connection between “peaceful 
development” across the Taiwan Strait and the development of cross-Strait economic 
integration. Professor Li Yihu, Dean of the School of International Studies (SIS) at 
the Peking University, observed: “Rational thinking [by Chinese and Taiwanese 
leaders] comes from economic interests”.20  Between 1949 and 1987, Taipei’s 
implementation of the “no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise” policy had 
resulted in stalemate with regards to cross-Strait relations.21 While there was no 
room for Beijing to adopt non-military strategies to tackle the Taiwan issue, taking 
Taiwan by force appeared to be the only feasible approach for Beijing.  
 																																																								
16 Jianwei Wang, “Is the Honeymoon Over?”, 152-57.   
17 TAO, “Hu Jintao Meets with KMT Honorary Chairman”, 2010, accessed on August 25, 2016, 
http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Headline/201103/t20110316_1787914.htm  
18 Xinhua, “Xi Meets KMT’s Lien, Stresses Cross-Strait Ties”, The China Times, February 25, 2013, 
accessed February 4th, 2015, http://thechinatimes.com/online/2013/02/6688.html   
19 Ibid. 
20 Yihu Li, interviewed by author, December 2, 2013. 
21 Chi Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China: A Tail Wagging Two Dogs (New York: Routledge, 
2010), 5-6. 
	 269 
    Following the gradual resumption of cross-Strait economic exchanges after the 
1990s, the burgeoning economic ties between both sides helped to stabilize bilateral 
relations.22 Yet due to the lack of an institutional arrangement between Beijing and 
Taipei before the signing of the ECFA, the development of bilateral economic 
relations was subject to “the zero-sum Green-Blue [DPP-KMT] politics in the 
Taiwan island” as several Chinese elites have noted.23  As such, ensuring the 
long-term stability across the Taiwan Strait by promoting cross-Strait economic 
integration remained a crucial mission for Beijing so as to “create favorable 
conditions” for “peaceful reunification”. 24  By this reasoning, as cross-Strait 
economic ties have been institutionalized since the signing of the ECFA, this should 
have assisted Beijing in promoting “peaceful development” so as to fulfill “peaceful 
reunification” across the Taiwan Strait.   
 
    In the context of “peaceful development” between Taiwan and the Mainland, 
there are three main “favorable conditions for peaceful reunification” that Beijing 
expects to create by utilizing commercial diplomacy through the ECFA.25 Firstly, 
after the signing of the ECFA, cross-Strait economic integration has been 
institutionalized, a goal that Beijing had strived for since the 1980s. Based upon this 
foundation, Beijing intends to build “mutual trust” with Taipei in order to commence 
political negotiation one day.26 So far, under the framework of the ECFA, Beijing 
and Taipei have jointly established the “Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation 																																																								
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Committee” (CSECC) in which both sides’ economic officials meet regularly to 
discuss bilateral trade affairs.27 Although the concrete statutes have not yet been 
established due to the unsettled political bifurcation between Taipei and Beijing, the 
establishment of the CSECC symbolizes that the level of bilateral talks has been 
enhanced from semi-official dialogue to official negotiation. However, the 
institutionalization of cross-Strait economic relations has seemingly had a limited 
effect in persuading Taipei to negotiate political issues with Beijing. As will be 
specified later, Taipei’s refusal to discuss the Cross-Strait peace agreement with 
Beijing based on the “one-China principle” was the most prominent case. 28 
Moreover, even though both sides’ leaders met in Singapore in 2015, no concrete 
agreement or consensus was reached.29  
 
    Secondly, the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic integration has 
assisted Beijing in enhancing the effectiveness of commercial diplomacy. Unlike the 
previous unilateral preferential policy that only applied to Taiwanese businessmen on 
the Mainland, the ECFA has provided Beijing with a solid platform upon which 
Chinese leaders can further their political agendas by utilizing commercial 
diplomacy towards Taiwan. In other words, in the post ECFA-era, Beijing has been 
able to exert its influence over the whole of Taiwanese society by creating 
preferential policies and economic concessions so as to fulfill its strategic guideline 
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of “placing hope on the Taiwan people”.30 Beijing’s concrete tactics in this regard 
have been its economic concessions to Taiwan in negotiating the Early Harvest List 
of the ECFA. As discussed before, regardless of Taiwan’s heavy protectionism on 
agriculture, Beijing promised zero tariffs on 18 sensitive agricultural products 
imported from Taiwan.31 Simultaneously, China fulfilled its obligation by reducing 
tariff on 539 imported goods from Taiwan, which assisted Taiwanese petrochemical 
and machinery industries in reducing negatively impacted bred by the establishment 
of the APT.32 
 
    Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao clarified Beijing’s motivation behind these 
concessions in 2010 by saying: “we [Beijing] will let the people in Taiwan benefit 
more from the ECFA … because ‘we [Taiwanese and Chinese] are brothers’”.33 
Premier Wen also expressed his wish to witness both sides’ peoples’ efforts to 
promote reunification, as he said: “‘difference between brothers cannot sever their 
brother ties’. I believe as bothers, we will eventually solve the problems”.34 Through 
Premier Wen’s speech, it is not difficult to see Beijing’s efforts to convince 
Taiwanese of the benefits generated by cross-Strait economic integration. Moreover, 
Beijing’s generous economic concessions also demonstrated that Chinese leaders 
have more confidence in managing the Taiwan issue.35 Likewise Professor Tang 
Yonghong from the Taiwan Research Institute at the Xiamen University said: “The 
Chinese mainland is playing the core role in the process of globalization. We have 
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strong economic growth, and we can take care of the Taiwanese people’s economic 
interests now”.36 He further pointed out that: “under these circumstances, it is only 
natural for Beijing to leverage Taiwan by making use of economic advantages”.37 
     
    In addition, Chinese elites further pointed out that “with supports from the 
Taiwanese people”, the development of cross-Strait economic integration is 
anticipated to be stable even if the DPP returns to power in future.38 The core reason 
for this is that the DPP cannot win a election by ignoring the economic interests 
represented by the ECFA, which correspond with the needs of the Taiwanese 
people.39 In this regard, the solid relations of economic interdependence across the 
Taiwan Strait in the post-ECFA era seems to be a strong constraint on the DPP’s 
pro-independence policy. Subsequently, Beijing hopes that Taiwanese will “expect 
the prospect of peaceful reunification”.40    
 
     Thirdly, following the steady development of cross-Strait economic integration, 
Beijing hopes to resolve the Taiwan issue through political negotiation with Taipei 
based upon the foundation of mutual trust and the Taiwanese expectation of 
“peaceful reunification”.41 Yet Beijing has faced difficulties in persuading Taipei to 
commence political talks about cross-Strait peace agreements and “confidence 
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building measures (CBM)” based on the “one-China principle”.42 The main obstacle 
has been the political bifurcation of the “one-China principle” between Beijing and 
Taipei. Chinese leaders firmly insisted that there should be no ambiguity in the 
“one-China principle” while these agreements would directly touch upon both sides’ 
political statuses, but Beijing’s definition of this principle has not been popular in 
Taiwan.43 Besides, the pro-independence parties in Taiwan also spared no effort in 
attacking Beijing and the Ma administration by criticizing the cross-Strait peace 
agreement as “a treaty of surrender”.44 Given strong opposition from Taiwanese 
society, in 2011, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou announced that he would only 
focus on the issues of cross-Strait economic and cultural exchanges during his 
presidency.45  
 
     In spite of this failure, Beijing retains positive attitude towards promoting 
“peaceful development” across the Taiwan Strait in the context of cross-Strait 
economic integration so as to pursue “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. In May 
2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping indicated that: “[The] policy to promote peaceful 
development of cross-Strait relations will not change, and neither will the pragmatic 
measures to boost exchanges, cooperation and mutual benefits”.46 He further said: 
“It will be easy to seek solutions to many difficult problems when there is mutual 
trust between compatriots (from both sides)”.47 In this regard, President Xi basically 
obey the principle of “easy issues before difficult issues and economy [economic 																																																								
42 Francis Yi-Hua Kan, “The Prospects for Cross-Taiwan Strait Confidence Building Measures: 
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43 Ibid. 
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issue] before politics [political agendas]” in managing the Taiwan issue, which was 
set by his predecessor Hu Jintao.48 Accordingly, beginning political negotiation over 
“peaceful reunification” with Taipei is not an urgent mission for Chinese leaders. At 
least, this task can be shelved until the establishment of cross-Strait mutual trust, 
since Beijing has not yet made a concrete schedule for retrieving Taiwan.49  
 
    In the above context, Chinese elites believe that, insofar as Taipei and Beijing 
can keep deepening bilateral economic integration, cross-Strait political negotiation 
over the issue of “peaceful reunification” may still be possible.50 For example, 
Professor Chen Xiancai from the Taiwan Research Institute at the Xiamen University 
said:  
 
“The current attitude of Beijing [towards the Taiwan issue] is to promote 
peaceful reunification gradually because Beijing believes time is on its side. 
Bilateral exchanges would help both sides [the Chinese mainland and 
Taiwan] to eliminate biases and differences between one another … This 
will lead us to the road of peaceful reunification”.51   
 
    In brief, cross-Strait relations are reaching the stage of “peaceful development” 
and heading towards “peaceful reunification” following the institutionalization of 
cross-Strait economic integration. Beijing believes that the collaboration with Taipei 
in promoting cross-Strait economic integration is conducive to the establishment of 
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“mutual trust”, which is an important foundation of cross-Strait political negotiation. 
Despite the failure of commencing political negotiations with Taipei, Beijing is 
confident to further its peaceful reunification agendas towards Taiwan by utilizing 
commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era. As such, Beijing does not rush to 
utterly resolve the Taiwan issue. In addition, as will be discussed below, after signing 
the ECFA with Taipei, Beijing institutionalized the ambivalent “one-China 
principle” — the 1992 Consensus — across the Taiwan Strait. This is another 
significant achievement of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan in the 
post-ECFA era. 
 
5.2.2 Institutionalizing the 1992 Consensus 
    The institutionalization of cross-Strait economic integration has been favorable 
for enhancing the effectiveness of Beijing’s commercial diplomacy in furthering its 
political agendas towards Taiwan. The other significant political achievement of 
Beijing’s commercial diplomacy has been the institutionalization of the 1992 
Consensus after signing the ECFA with Taipei. As specified in chapter 2, the 1992 
Consensus is an ambivalent “one-China principle”. Although this consensus still 
adheres to the prevalent rule that “there is only one China” in the international 
community, Beijing and Taipei can freely define which party represents the “whole 
of China”.52 Abided by the previous convention of the talks between the ARATS 
and the SEF, the 1992 Consensus remains a bilateral oral agreement which does not 
imprint on any cross-Strait agreement including the ECFA.  
 
    Nevertheless, the cause of Beijing’s belief that the 1992 Consensus became 																																																								
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much more credible across the Taiwan Strait following the development of 
cross-Strait economic relations can be traced back to Taiwanese President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s inauguration speech. In his inauguration ceremony in 2008, in order to 
revive Taiwan’s economic development by facilitating economic integration with 
China, President Ma said: “I want to reiterate that, based on the ‘1992 Consensus’, 
[cross-Strait] negotiations should resume at the earliest time possible”.53 Notably, 
this was the first time that Taipei officially confirmed the 1992 Consensus, as this 
consensus had normally been referred by the semi-official institution — the SEF. In 
return for Taipei’s benign attitude towards cross-Strait negotiations, Beijing also 
officially ratified the 1992 Consensus in December 2008, as Chinese President Hu 
Jintao said: “Since May of this year [2008]… cross-Straits consultation has been able 
to resume and achieve significant fruits on the basis of the 1992 Consensus”.54 Most 
significantly, in the phone meeting with the U.S. President George W. Bush, 
President Hu also confirmed Beijing’s ratification of the 1992 Consensus and 
obtained positive response from Washington.55  
 
    In the above context, for Chinese leaders, Taiwan’s international legal 
sovereignty had been officially locked into Beijing’s “one-China” framework since 
the 1992 Consensus became the official “oral agreement” across the Taiwan Strait. 
Meanwhile, with Washington’s endorsement, Beijing not only reaffirmed the 
legitimacy of its international legal sovereignty over Taiwan, but it also enhanced the 
credibility of the 1992 Consensus by embedding this oral agreement into the 
triangular framework between China, Taiwan and the US. Most importantly, as 																																																								
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shown in the discussion below, the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic 
integration is also conducive to the institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus. 
 
    The foremost reason why the ECFA has contributed to the institutionalization of 
the 1992 Consensus lies in the fact that this “oral agreement” is the prerequisite of 
cross-Strait negotiations over economic integration. Specifically, while Beijing 
successfully convinced Taipei to promote bilateral economic integration by signing 
the ECFA in 2010 based on the 1992 Consensus, this was equivalent to reconfirming 
that the “one-China principle” is the foundation of cross-Strait economic relations. 
The 1992 Consensus has henceforth been institutionalized following the 
institutionalization of cross-Strait economic integration. In other words, without this 
loosely-defined “one-China principle”, there should be no cross-Strait economic 
integration agreement. The director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council 
(PRC), Wang Yi, emphasized that: “Cross-straits ties can hardly remain stable and 
peaceful if they are not founded on an anti-Taiwan independence stance and the 1992 
Consensus on the one-China principle”.56 Additionally, the meeting between the 
CCP and Taiwan’s governing party — the KMT — after the APEC Summit in 
November 2011 has further consolidated the legitimacy of the 1992 Consensus after 
the signing of the ECFA, as both parties claimed that: “cross-Strait ties must be built 
on the ‘1992 Consensus’”.57      
 
    Furthermore, as introduced in chapter 1, the ECFA is a “framework agreement” 
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of cross-Strait economic integration that encompasses all subsequent agreements 
involving bilateral economic cooperation between Beijing and Taipei.	 58 Since the 
1992 Consensus is the foundation of the ECFA, this “oral agreement” can also apply 
to all sub-agreements of the ECFA as a prerequisite. In this regard, for Beijing, 
encouraging Taipei to sign the sub-agreements of the ECFA is equivalent to making 
Taipei ratify the 1992 Consensus repeatedly, which has made this “oral agreement” 
more durable. As a result, insofar as Beijing assures that Taipei keeps deepening 
cross-Strait economic integration under the ECFA, the “one-China principle” would 
be continually institutionalized across the Taiwan Strait. Under this circumstance, the 
only approach that would allow Taipei to fully reverse the 1992 Consensus would be 
to abolish the ECFA but this is difficult to imagine. Most Chinese elites therefore 
believe that the development of cross-Strait relations will remain in the stage of 
“peaceful development”, as this would be beneficial for Beijing to lead Taiwan 
towards “peaceful reunification”.59  
 
     However, as Beijing and Taipei have not yet made a concrete agreement on the 
1992 Consensus, there is another factor that may impinge on the effectiveness of 
China’s commercial diplomacy in solidifying the “one-China principle” across the 
Taiwan Strait. As scholars have noted, Taiwan is a fully-fledged democracy, and this 
means that the pro-independence DPP may return to power one day, despite its failed 
presidential campaigns in 2008 and 2012.60 Since the 1992 Consensus remains 
unacceptable to the DPP, it is possible to imagine the suspension of cross-Strait 
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economic integration if the DPP were to win a presidential election.61 Yet most 
Chinese elites point out that this is not an outcome that Beijing should be worried 
about.62  
 
    As discussed in the previous subsection, given the deepening bilateral economic 
interdependence in the post-ECFA era, Chinese elites contend that Beijing may have 
prevented Taipei from abolishing the ECFA, even though the DPP could obtain 
governing power.63 In this case, it would be difficult to reverse the 1992 Consensus. 
Professor Li Yihu observed that: “Many people have benefited from cross-Strait 
economic interdependence, and Taiwanese enterprises would not agree with the 
suspension of cross-Strait economic exchanges”.64 He further predicted that: “at 
most, the DPP may be passive in promoting cross-Strait economic integration, but 
they may be unable to fully abort the ECFA”.65 
 
    Corresponding with Professor Li’s anticipation, although the DPP is reluctant to 
negotiate sub-agreements of the ECFA with Beijing after returning to office in 2016, 
the new government has no intention of reversing the ECFA.66 Meanwhile, despite 
the fact that Taiwan’s new President Tsai Ing-wen is reluctant to accept the 1992 
Consensus, she proposes no new substitute for this ambivalent “one-China principle” 
in defining cross-Strait political status. Rather, President Tsai adopted a cautious 
attitude by recognizing the 1992 Consensus as a “fact” acknowledged between both 																																																								
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sides in her presidential inauguration ceremony.67  
 
    In the context of the institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus in the 
post-ECFA era, Beijing has seemingly confined Taiwan within its “one-China” 
framework. For Chinese leaders, as long as they can ensure that implementing the 
ECFA remains in Taiwan’s interests by utilizing commercial diplomacy, Taipei 
cannot stray too far from the 1992 Consensus even though the DPP has returned to 
office. By this reasoning, it is not difficult to understand why Chinese leaders 
applaud the ECFA’s contribution to “opposing ‘Taiwan’s independence’” and forcing 
Taipei and Beijing to “[uphold] the 1992 Consensus”.68 As Chinese elites observed, 
insofar as Taipei sticks to the 1992 Consensus, resolving the Taiwan issue will not be 
on Beijing’s priority list. 69  Indeed, by the end of Taiwanese President Ma 
Ying-jeou’s presidency, maintaining “the peaceful development of Cross-Strait 
relations” and “[pushing] forward the follow-up talks of the ECFA” so as to further 
the agenda of “peaceful reunification” towards Taiwan remained the main theme of 
Beijing’s Taiwan policy.70 Nonetheless, analysts cast doubts on the effectiveness of 
China’s commercial diplomacy in guiding Taiwan towards “peaceful reunification” 
in the post-ECFA era.  
 
    Firstly, in the context of the above discussion, it is clear that “peaceful 
development” is an incremental project aimed at promoting “peaceful reunification” 
with Taiwan. As the core concept of “peaceful development” is to maintain the 																																																								
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stability of the “status quo” across the Taiwan Strait, some observers have pointed 
out that this is equivalent to ratifying “Taiwan’s de facto independence from 
China”. 71  Secondly, in addition to economic concessions, China has also 
compromised Taiwan’s appeals to participate in IGOs and sign FTAs with other 
economies in exchange for Taipei’s positive attitude towards the ECFA.72 While the 
Ma’s administration actively sought the opportunity to participate in IGOs, this has 
further raised the question of whether Taipei could acquire statehood based on its de 
facto political status endorsed by China.73 As will be discussed later, Beijing is also 
confident of managing Taiwan’s international space based on the 1992 Consensus, as 
well as the “One Country, Two Systems” framework. 
     
5.3 Managing Taiwan’s Political Status in the Post-ECFA Era 
    The previous section evaluated the strategic goals and effectiveness of China’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan in the post-ECFA era. Generally speaking, 
after signing the ECFA with Taiwan, Chinese leaders have ensured “peaceful 
development” across the Taiwan Strait by using commercial diplomacy, which is 
conducive to their strategic goal of “peaceful reunification”. However, leading 
Taiwan towards “peaceful reunification” by utilizing commercial diplomacy in the 
post-ECFA era probably remains a challenge for Beijing. On the one hand, Beijing 
has been unsuccessful in persuading Taipei to commence political negotiation based 
on the foundation of bilateral economic integration. On the other hand, the 1992 
Consensus did not clearly define whether the PRC or the ROC represented the one 																																																								
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“China” in the world. 74  Combined with China’s concession on Taiwan’s 
“international space” in exchange for Taipei’s cooperation to institutionalize 
cross-Strait economic integration, the question of whether this would be detrimental 
to Beijing’s strategic goal of “peaceful reunification” is worthy of consideration.75 
Nonetheless, as will be argued in this section, the institutionalization of the 1992 
Consensus has assisted Beijing in encroaching on Taiwan’s de jure and functional 
sovereignty beyond the bilateral level across the Taiwan Strait. In this case, the only 
issue with which Chinese leaders need to be concerned is making an appropriate 
arrangement for Taiwan’s international and political status based on the 1992 
Consensus.  
 
5.3.1 Taiwan’s International Space and the “One-China Principle” 
    In the post-ECFA era, the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic 
integration has assisted Beijing in institutionalizing the 1992 Consensus at the 
bilateral level across the Taiwan Strait, which is undoubtedly a significant 
achievement of China’s commercial diplomacy. Nonetheless, as Beijing’s 
“one-China principle” has taken the form of the 1992 Consensus, it has created the 
illusion that Beijing has recalibrated its strategies for “peaceful reunification”. This is 
most evident in Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s statement concerning the 1992 
Consensus. His support of this consensus symbolizes “the principle of mutual 
non-recognition of sovereignty and mutual non-denial of jurisdiction between the 
two sides of the Taiwan Strait”.76 While Beijing rewarded Taipei with “international 
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space” in return for its cooperative attitude towards the ECFA, the Taiwanese 
government further claimed that “during the process of economic and cultural 
exchanges [with the Mainland], the sovereignty of the Republic of China has not 
suffered, on the contrary it has [been] consolidated”.77  
    
    Contrary to Taipei’s conceptualization above, Chinese elites argued that 
Beijing’s concession to Taiwan’s “international space” did no harm to its national 
goal of “peaceful reunification”.78 Rather, this concession can assist Beijing in 
defining Taipei’s political status as part of China based on the institutionalized 1992 
Consensus in the post-ECFA era.79 The main reason of this is rooted in the 
connection between the “one-China” framework and the PRC’s international legal 
sovereignty. As stated in the previous discussion, the 1992 Consensus between 
Beijing and Taipei did not clearly stipulate that the PRC had the absolute right to 
represent “the whole of China” including Taiwan.80 Notwithstanding its ambivalent 
definition on the “one-China principle”, the institutionalization of the 1992 
Consensus seemingly built up Chinese leaders’ confidence in achieving the ultimate 
goal of “peaceful reunification” in the post-ECFA era.  
 
    In effect, before the institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus, Beijing already 
had been confident in tackling the disputed issue of Taiwan’s de facto and de jure 
sovereignty. Beijing’s confidence stemmed mainly from the worldwide ratified 
international legal sovereignty over “China”, as discussed in chapter 2. Since Beijing 																																																																																																																																																													
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has obtained global ratification on its legitimacy of governing “China”, Chinese 
leaders have reiterated that “everything, including Taipei’s status in international 
community, is negotiable” insofar as Taipei embraces the “one-China” framework.81 
In 2000, Chinese leaders further softened the definition of the “one-China principle” 
by defining both Taipei’s and Beijing’s statuses as equal but subordinate to the 
“one-China principle”.82 Because the 1992 Consensus in the post-ECFA era is 
basically in line with this new definition, Chinese leaders have interpreted Taipei’s 
reacceptance of this “oral agreement” as a willingness to be defined under Beijing’s 
broader “one-China” framework.83 This has allowed Beijing to connect Taiwan’s 
political status with the PRC’s international legal sovereignty, which further confirms 
the legitimacy of Beijing’s ownership of Taiwan in the international community. In 
this context, Chinese leaders have conceptualized the 1992 Consensus as an “oral 
agreement” that both sides can coexist within the “one-China” framework, but that 
the PRC will shoulder the responsibility to represent “China” in the world.  
     
    Based on Beijing’s conceptualization of the 1992 Consensus in the context of 
the “one-China” framework, allowing Taipei to participate in international 
organizations that involve no issue regarding sovereignty does not conflict with 
Beijing’s national goal of “peaceful reunification”.84 Nevertheless, given the lack of 
a concrete political agreement confirming Taiwan’s political status under the 
“one-China” framework, any initiative of Taipei concerning the issues of its 																																																								
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international space still needs to go through cross-Strait consultation mechanisms to 
obtain Beijing’s arrangement.85 Moreover, while the disputed issue of sovereignty 
between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan has not yet been resolved, most Chinese 
scholars pointed out that Beijing’s arrangement must manifest the fact that Taipei is 
subordinate to “China” based on the “one-China principle”.86 Generally speaking, 
Beijing’s concessions on Taipei’s international space in the post-ECFA era were 
related to three aspects: Taiwan’s participation in inter-governmental organizations 
(IGOs), signing “FTAs” with other economies, and the “diplomatic truce” between 
both sides.87 As specified below, all of these concessions have assisted Beijing in 
magnifying its international legal sovereignty over Taiwan at best and deterring 
Taiwan’s independence at worst. 
 
    In terms of Beijing’s concessions to Taiwan’s wish to participate in more IGOs, 
the most significant case has been Taiwan’s participation in the World Health 
Assembly (WHA) so as to lure Taipei to sign the ECFA based on the 1992 
Consensus.88 From the perspectives of Chinese elites, this concession has been 
helpful for Beijing to further its “peaceful reunification” agenda towards Taiwan, 
because this has corresponded with the Taiwanese people’s expectation and Beijing’s 
“one-China principle” simultaneously.89 In fact, as early as the onset of the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in Taiwan in 2003, Taipei had 
expressed its wish to participate in the WHO. 90  However, Beijing’s ruthless 
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statement, “Taiwan, as a province of China, has no right to participate in the WHO”, 
severely damaged Beijing’s image in Taiwanese society.91 Meanwhile, Beijing also 
faced strong criticism of its neglect of Taiwanese “health rights and human rights”.92 
 
    Doctor Zhang Wensheng, Director of Political Sciences of the Taiwan Research 
Institute at the Xiamen University, observed that “while Taipei connected this issue 
[participating in the WHO] with human rights, Beijing was under great pressure to 
make a compromise in order to look after the Taiwanese people’s health and 
interests”.93 Therefore, after Taipei accepted the 1992 Consensus, Beijing soon 
approved Taipei’s initiative of attending the WHA as an “observer” since 2009. In 
this positive response to Taipei, Beijing expected to improve its previously negative 
image in Taiwanese society to fulfill its strategic guideline of “placing hope on the 
Taiwan people” for promoting peaceful reunification.94  
 
    In addition, it is noteworthy that Beijing has also taken this opportunity to lock 
Taiwan into the aforementioned narrowly defined “one-China” framework at the 
global level. Ostensibly, Beijing’s goodwill in inviting Taipei to attend the WHA is 
based on the 1992 Consensus at the bilateral level. Thus, Beijing’s and Taipei’s status 
in the WHA ought to manifest the spirit of this consensus that both regimes belong to 
“one China” but “on an equal footing” with respect to their political status.95 
However, the WHO is a UN-affiliated institution. Beijing has defined Taiwan’s status 																																																								
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in the WHA as “the province of China” by citing the “United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 2758”, and thus Taipei could not attend the WHA without 
Beijing’s invitation letter.96  In this regard, Beijing has infringed on Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty at the global level. Meanwhile, in this case, Taiwan’s 
interdependence and functional sovereignty have been encroached upon because 
Beijing has constrained Taipei’s function as a regime that represents all Taiwanese in 
securing their “health rights” by collaborating with other regimes in the WHA.97 
The detailed process of Beijing’s operation in managing Taipei’s political status in 
the WHA will be discussed further along with Taipei’s strategies for consolidating its 
de jure and functional sovereignty at the global level in chapter 6. 
 
    Apart from the compromises to Taipei’s entrance into the IGOs, Beijing has 
displayed a positive attitude towards Taiwan’s initiatives of participating in economic 
integration mechanisms at the regional level and signing bilateral FTAs with other 
economies. 98  Again, based on the institutionalized 1992 Consensus in the 
post-ECFA era, these concessions are also in line with Beijing’s interests in 
consolidating its international legal sovereignty over Taiwan under the “one-China” 
framework. At the regional level China has not fulfilled its promise of supporting 
Taiwan’s entry into regional institutions in the post-ECFA era. However, even though 
Beijing would admit Taipei to access to regional economic integration mechanisms 
one day, Taipei’s political status should be under the “one China” framework rather 
than an “economy” as is the case for Taipei’s membership in APEC under the name 
“Chinese Taipei”.  																																																								
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    Specifically, Taipei’s accession into APEC as an “economy” was not in line with 
Beijing’s interests in defining Taipei’s political status under the “one-China 
principle”. As discussed in chapter 3, the core reason for Beijing’s tolerance with 
Taipei’s membership in APEC was the consequence of the limited effectiveness of its 
commercial diplomacy in countering the US’ and its allies’ influence in the process 
of regional economic integration until the late 1990s. Therefore, as shown in all 
White Papers about the Taiwan issue, Beijing constantly stressed that Taipei’s current 
memberships in regional institutions are “ad hoc arrangement[s] and cannot 
constitute a ‘model’ applicable to other inter-governmental organizations and 
international gatherings”.99  Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 3, since China has 
played a key role in promoting East Asian economic integration mechanisms, 
obtaining Beijing’s support has become essential for Taipei to participate in the 
ASEAN-centered economic integration frameworks.  
 
    Subsequently, signing the ECFA with Beijing has become Taipei’s contingency 
plan for improving its regionally marginalized position. This then provided Beijing 
with more advantages to utilize commercial diplomacy in infringing on Taiwan’s de 
jure and even functional sovereignty at the regional level in the post-ECFA era. 
Indeed, as mentioned in chapter 1, Chinese President Hu Jintao has emphasized the 
contribution of the ECFA in helping Taipei improve its isolated position in East 
Asia.100 The main reason for this is that Taipei can connect with the ongoing process 
of regional economic integration through the Chinese market under the ECFA, which 
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has magnified Beijing’s legitimacy over Taiwan at the regional level.101 Additionally, 
Beijing has also reiterated that Taiwan’s connection with regional economic 
integration mechanisms must go through the Chinese mainland. The most prominent 
case was Beijing’s announcement concerning Taipei’s application to the Asian 
Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), as Chinese officials clearly indicated: 
“[A] future Taiwanese bid to join the bank would have to be submitted to China’s 
[the PRC’s] finance ministry”.102  
 
    At the bilateral level concerning the FTAs between Taiwan and other economies, 
the foremost compromises that Beijing has made so far have been Taipei’s 
agreements with Singapore and New Zealand.103 Indeed, after signing the ECFA 
with Taipei, Beijing has mhad a positive response to Taipei’s initiatives of signing 
FTAs with other sovereign states.104 Nevertheless, Beijing has prevented Taipei 
from utilizing bilateral FTAs with other countries as foundations to acquire statehood. 
As Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying said in 2013: “We have 
no objection to non-governmental business and cultural exchanges between foreign 
countries and the region of Taiwan but oppose the development of any official ties 
between them”.105 Accordingly, from Beijing’s perspectives, Taipei’s FTAs with 
other economies ought to involve agendas of economic cooperation only. Issues 
concerning sovereignty should not be contained within these FTAs.   
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    In addition, China has further adopted several measures to consolidate its 
international legal sovereignty over Taiwan, and confine Taiwan’s interdependence 
sovereignty. First, probably inspired by the patterns of both sides’ accession into the 
WTO, Beijing only allowed Taipei to sign FTAs with those countries that had 
finalized FTAs with China so as to shape the image that Taiwan’s political status is 
subordinate to the PRC.106 Secondly, Beijing has stressed Taipei’s duty of obtaining 
ratification from Beijing before commencing FTA negotiations with other nations.107 
In this case, Beijing has magnified its ownership of Taiwan in the international 
community again. Meanwhile, this has reflected that Taipei cannot solidify its 
interdependence sovereignty without Beijing’s approval. Most significantly, Beijing 
has urged other countries to take the ECFA as a template to cultivate economic ties 
with Taipei without touching on sensitive sovereignty issues across the Taiwan 
Strait.108  
 
    As Professor Liu Guoshen, Dean of the Taiwan Research Institute at the 
Xiamen University observed: “The ECFA is helpful for Taipei to resolve the 
problem of economic marginalization”.109 He further elaborated that: 
 
“Beijing has noticed Taipei’s interest to deepen economic cooperation 
with other economies. However, before both sides resolving the political 
problem [the disputed issue of sovereignty], we need to make an agreement 
[ECFA] first … This agreement must assure both parties would not 
disobey the “one-China principle” after signing economic agreements with 																																																								
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other economies … By doing so, Beijing doesn’t need to worry about a 
split across the Taiwan Strait when Taipei develops economic relations 
with other economies.”110   
 
    Thus far, the ECFA is the concrete agreement based on the 1992 Consensus 
between Beijing and Taipei. While Beijing intends to standardize all of Taiwan’s 
FTAs with other countries in accordance with the ECFA, this probably symbolizes 
that all of the new FTAs that Taiwan made in the post-ECFA era are based on the 
“one-China principle”. Consequently, as will be discussed in chapter 6, Beijing 
already has infringed on Taiwan’s de jure sovereignty following the 
institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus under the ECFA. This is undoubtedly an 
achievement of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan in the post-ECFA 
era. 
 
    The final aspect of Beijing’s compromise with Taipei in the post-ECFA era has 
been its acquiescence to Taipei’s initiative of “diplomatic truce” based on the 1992 
Consensus so as to ensure the smooth progress of cross-Strait economic 
integration.111 According to this consensus, Beijing and Taipei promised not to rival 
for diplomatic allies between each other. Meanwhile, in order to display its sincerity, 
Beijing rejected three of Taipei’s diplomatic allies’ — Paraguay, Malawi, and El 
Salvador — initiatives of shifting their diplomatic relations from the ROC to the 
PRC in 2010.112 Ostensibly, cross-Strait diplomatic truce is seemingly beneficial for 
Taiwan since Taipei is able to preserve the current 22 diplomatic allies that it has at 
this moment. Moreover, Taipei can save a huge amount of budget in securing or 																																																								
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developing its diplomatic ties with other states, as with the “checkbook diplomacy” 
featured largely in Taiwan’s previous diplomatic strategies. 113  However, the 
significant political interest that Beijing has obtained through the diplomatic truce 
across the Taiwan Strait has been the freeze of Taiwan’s strategies for strengthening 
its international legal sovereignty.   
 
    As discussed in chapter 2, acquiring international legal sovereignty is an 
incremental process that entails a regime obtaining ratifications of its statehood from 
“a sufficient number of other states”.114 Since Beijing successfully enticed Taipei to 
implement the diplomatic truce by wielding commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA 
era, Chinese leaders could ensure that Taipei would not endeavor to further its 
interest of international legal sovereignty during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency.115 
Following this logic, the status quo across the Taiwan Strait based on the 1992 
Consensus is anticipated to be more stable, which is beneficial for Beijing to further 
its political agenda of “peaceful reunification”. Even though Taipei would like to 
reverse the “diplomatic truce” one day, according to Professor Pan Rui’s (Center for 
American Studies, Fudan University) observation, Beijing would definitely have the 
ability to make Taipei possess less diplomatic allies than the number that it currently 
has.116 In this light, it is not difficult to see Beijing’s achievement in deterring 
Taiwan’s independence after signing the ECFA with Taipei. 
     
    So far, this subsection has discussed Beijing’s concessions to Taipei’s 
international space in the post-ECFA era, and it also confirmed that the 																																																								
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institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus has assisted Beijing in applying the 
“one-China” framework to define Taiwan’s international status. Therefore, from 
Beijing’s perspectives, making compromises to Taiwan’s international space would 
not risk its national goal of “peaceful reunification”, but it could manifest the 
legitimacy of Beijing’s ownership of Taiwan. However, it is notable that Beijing did 
not fully satisfy Taipei’s interests in expanding its international space.  
 
    Indeed, Beijing only allows Taiwan access to the WHA and the Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) in the WTO to date.117 As for other IGOs that Taipei 
has long wished to join, such as “the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization”, and the “World Meteorological Organization”, Beijing has 
not had any response. 118  Neither has Beijing approved Taipei’s initiative to 
participate in any regional economic integration mechanism. The most prominent 
example has been the case of Beijing’s refusal to Taiwan’s application to the AIIB. 
Most significantly, due to the stagnant progress of cross-Strait economic integration 
since 2014, Beijing officially opposed the FTA between Taiwan and Malaysia.119 
Apparently, Beijing still has a cautious attitude towards the expansion of Taiwan’s 
international space. In fact, as will be detailed in chapter 6, Beijing’s compromises to 
Taiwan’s international space are important bargaining chips for enticing Taipei to 
keep promoting the ECFA and abiding by the 1992 Consensus. In other words, only 
when Beijing verifies the effectiveness of its commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan 
following the progress of cross-Strait economic integration will Taipei be rewarded 
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international space.       
 
5.3.2 The “One Country, Two Systems” Framework in the Post-ECFA Era 
    The previous subsection examined how Beijing has connected the 
institutionalized 1992 Consensus with the “one-China” framework in arranging 
Taiwan’s international status in the post-ECFA era. Under this “one-China” 
framework, Beijing’s approvals of Taipei’s enrollment in several IGOs and the 
signing of FTAs with its trading partners have solidified the legitimacy of its de jure 
sovereign claim over Taiwan. Although these approvals seemingly generated no 
negative impact on Beijing’s “one-China principle”,   the expansion of Taiwan’s 
international space has caused analysts to question whether the “One Country, Two 
Systems” framework remains Beijing’s framework in defining Taiwan’s political 
status after peaceful reunification.120 Combined with Beijing’s low-key attitude with 
respect to the “One Country, Two Systems” framework in the post-ECFA era, 
scholars have supposed that Beijing has adopted the other frameworks based on 
confederation, federalism, or even integration experience of the EU in defining 
Taiwan’s status.121 Yet, as discussed below, the “One Country, Two Systems” 
framework remains Beijing’s only framework in governing Taiwan’s de facto and 
functional sovereignty after achieving its goal of “peaceful reunification”. Most 
importantly, despite the fact that Chinese scholars also have proposed several 
scenarios for governing Taiwan’s political status after peaceful reunification, all of 
these initiatives still correspond with the framework of “One Country, Two 																																																								
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Systems”.      
 
    The misunderstanding that the “One Country, Two Systems” framework might 
no longer be Beijing’s option in defining Taiwan’s status in the post-ECFA era was 
caused mainly by the omission of this framework in Chinese leaders’ speeches 
regarding the Taiwan issue. In effect, after signing the ECFA with Taipei, Beijing 
seldom mentioned Taiwan’s political status after reunification. For example, in every 
meeting between the CCP and KMT in the post-ECFA era, Chinese President Hu 
Jintao only stressed the issue of continuing to promote “peaceful development of 
cross-Strait relations” based on 1992 Consensus.122 He mentioned nothing about the 
“One Country, Two Systems” framework.  
 
    Succeeding President Hu’s Taiwan policy, Chinese President Xi Jinping 
seemingly has avoided talking about this agenda as much as he could. President Xi 
did not touch on the Taiwan issue in any remarks concerning the practice of the “One 
Country, Two Systems” framework in Hong Kong and Macau. The most direct 
evidence of this is his remarks on “the 15th Anniversary of Macau’s Return to China”, 
as the Taiwan issue was absent from this speech.123 Even in the meetings of the 
Central Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, according to official news releases, 
Chinese leaders’ discussion concerning the Taiwan issue revolved around the topics 
of the ECFA, the 1992 Consensus, and peaceful development.124 However, this does 
not mean that Chinese leaders have discarded the “One Country, Two Systems” 
framework.  																																																								
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    Notably, the “One Country, Two Systems” framework remains in every Chinese 
White Paper concerning cross-Strait relations, and Beijing has had no intention to 
reverse the previous Taiwan policies by making a new White Paper thus far. 
Moreover, despite the fact that Chinese leaders seldom talked about this framework 
in the post-ECFA era, in the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 
2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping said the following for the first (and perhaps only) 
time during Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency: “Peaceful reunification 
and one country, two systems are our guiding principles in solving the Taiwan 
issue”.125 By this reasoning, instead of abandoning the framework of the “One 
Country, Two Systems” in managing Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty, Beijing 
seemingly chose to downplay this issue after signing the ECFA with Taipei.   
 
    Chinese scholars rationalized Beijing’ low-key attitude towards the “One 
Country, Two Systems” framework in managing the Taiwan issue by emphasizing 
the 1992 Consensus across the Taiwan Strait and Beijing’s tactic of “wining 
Taiwanese hearts for promoting peaceful reunification”.126 In the post-ECFA era, 
Taipei has reaccepted the 1992 Consensus, which has been equivalent of endorsing 
the “one-China” framework from Beijing’s perspective. Since Beijing has already 
persuaded Taipei to accept the concept that both sides exist under “the notion of one 
country”, it is unnecessary to hasten in pushing Taipei to accept the proposal of “two 
systems” after peaceful reunification at this stage.127 Moreover, as discussed in the 
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previous section, after signing the ECFA with Taipei, making Taiwanese recognize 
peaceful reunification is a core strategic goal of Beijing’s commercial diplomacy. 
However, as presented in the next section, Beijing’s agenda of “peaceful 
reunification” is still not popular in Taiwanese society. Therefore, the time is not ripe 
for Beijing to ask Taiwanese people to accept the framework of “One Country, Two 
Systems”.128   
     
    Now that the “One Country, Two Systems” framework is Beijing’s main 
proposal in dealing with the issue of Taiwan’s de facto and functional sovereignty 
after reunification, the key question for Chinese leaders is how to fit Taiwan to this 
framework. In fact, taking the “One Country, Two Systems” framework to define 
Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty after reunification can be a difficult task for Chinese 
leaders. First, it is doubtful whether Beijing could secure its Westphalian sovereignty 
over Taiwan under this framework because Beijing had promised Taiwan to preserve 
its own troops after returning to the motherland.129  Furthermore, Beijing had 
pledged not to change Taipei’s political and social system after reunification in spite 
of the fact that Taiwan has been a full-fledged democracy.130 In this case, Beijing 
might not possess domestic sovereignty over Taiwan until the CCP wins the election 
in the island.  
 
    Most importantly, Taiwan has 22 diplomatic allies and memberships in several 
IGOs in the international community, and it also holds 9 FTAs with other economies. 
This has magnified Taiwan’s functional sovereignty. As discussed in the previous 																																																																																																																																																													
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subsection, China had indeed endeavored to encroach on Taiwan’s functional 
sovereignty by reiterating that Taipei’s international activities must obtain agreement 
from Beijing.131 Despite this effort, Taiwan still has independent seats from the 
Chinese mainland in IGOs, and Beijing cannot play any role on behalf of Taipei in 
the process of negotiation over bilateral cooperation between Taiwan and other 
regimes. Thus, even though Taipei admits that it belongs to “China” after returning to 
the motherland, managing Taipei’s pre-existing seats in IGOs and agreements with 
other nations remains a problem for Chinese leaders. While Beijing promised Taipei 
a larger international space in the post-ECFA era, Chinese leaders might have faced 
more difficulties in searching for an adequate scenario for managing Taiwan’s 
functional sovereignty after reunification. Besides, analysts used to refer to Hong 
Kong as a template for Taiwan under the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, 
but this case might no longer be suitable, given Taiwan’s current political and 
international status.132  
 
    In response to these puzzles, all of China’s elites pointed out that flexibility is 
an important trait of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, and thus Hong 
Kong might not be a reference of Taiwan’s political status under this framework.133 
Specifically, Chinese scholars have contended that Taiwan’s status must be higher 
than Hong Kong’s under this framework after reunification, and some of them 
further suggested several reunification models for Beijing’s consideration based on 
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the framework of the “One Country, Two Systems”.134 For example, Professor Li 
Yihu proposed the “Taiwan model”, which emphasizes Taiwan’s higher political 
status compared to Hong Kong and Macau after reunification.135 Professor Liu 
Guoshen developed the “nation-sphere theory” in which both Beijing and Taipei can 
consider adopting the model of “joint representative” in the international community 
since both sides belong to “one China”.136 Professor Chu Shulong even designed the 
model of “one country, two central governments” to magnify that Taiwan’s political 
status is subordinate to “China”, but its political status will be higher than Hong 
Kong and Macau after returning to the motherland.137       
 
    Thus far, none of the aforementioned models have been adopted as Beijing’s 
concrete scenario under the framework of “One Country, Two Systems” for 
governing Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty after peaceful reunification. As Professor Li 
Yihu observed: 
 
“‘One Country, Two Systems’ itself has immense flexibility and 
malleability, and can accommodate and integrate dozens of different 
models of unification, such as multi-system nations, federalism, and so on. 
Therefore, the specific scenario of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ will 
depend on Taiwan's circumstances upon unification.”138 
   
In brief, Beijing still insists on using the framework of “One Country, Two Systems” 
to deal with the issue of Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty after accomplishing its 																																																								
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national goal of “peaceful reunification”. However, it may be difficult to see a clear 
project for Taiwan under this framework until Beijing successfully launches 
cross-Strait political negotiation over the issue of Taiwan’s return to the motherland. 
 
    In summary, creating a concrete scenario for managing Taiwan’s political status 
within the framework of “One Country, Two Systems” is not an easy task. Beijing’s 
compromises regarding Taiwan’s international space in the post-ECFA era have made 
this mission more difficult. Yet, Beijing has not rushed in dealing with this issue 
because Taipei’s political status already has been enclosed by the “one-China” 
framework following the institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus in the 
post-ECFA era.139 Moreover, the 1992 Consensus has allowed Beijing to define 
Taiwan’s international status under the “one-China” framework in the international 
community, which has in turn resulted in Beijing’s infringement of Taiwan’s de jure 
and even functional sovereignty. However, as discussed in chapter 2, Taipei’s 
interpretation of the 1992 Consensus is entirely different from Beijing’s. 140 
Therefore, for Taiwanese leaders, Beijing’s concessions to its international space 
might provide them with more opportunities to further Taiwan’s interests of de jure 
and functional sovereignty in the world. This would enable Taiwan to escape from 
Beijing’s “one-China” framework. Chapter 6 will discuss this issue in more detail. 
 
5.4 China’s Influence on Taiwan in the Post-ECFA Era 
    After exploring Beijing’s sovereignty agenda towards Taiwan, this section 																																																								
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discusses how China exerts its influence in Taiwanese society by wielding 
commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era. Theoretically, while Taiwan’s 
economic development relies heavily on the Chinese economy, Beijing should 
successfully obtain Taiwanese support to cross-Strait economic integration, 
particularly after making economic concessions to Taiwan through the ECFA. 
Beijing also expected the Taiwanese people to gradually recognize “peaceful 
reunification” following the progress of cross-Strait economic integration. 141 
Contrary to Beijing’s anticipation, the Taiwanese people were not satisfied with the 
asymmetric relations of economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, owing to 
the risk of Taiwan’s economic security and sovereignty interests.142 This further 
provoked Taiwanese to organize the Sunflower Movement in 2014, which then 
resulted in the stagnant progress of the ECFA.143 These phenomena reflected the 
limited effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in helping Beijing to achieve 
its strategic goal of “placing hope on the Taiwan people”.   
 
5.4.1 Cross-Strait Economic Integration: The Model of “Win-Win” or 
“Hollowing-Out”? 
    Since Beijing and Taipei commenced bilateral negotiation over the ECFA, 
Chinese leaders have constantly stressed that cross-Strait economic integration is 
based on the model of “win-win” so as to pursue economic prosperity 
collaboratively.144 In order to make the Taiwanese people realize the benefits of 
cross-Strait economic integration, Beijing has also made significant economic 																																																								
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concessions to Taiwan. As mentioned in the first section, Beijing has imposed 
zero-tariffs on 250 more items than Taiwan at the initial stage of cross-Strait 
economic integration.145 In addition, in negotiating the CSSTA with Taipei, Beijing 
also promised to open 80 service industries to Taiwanese enterprises, while Taiwan 
only agreed to open 64 service industries (and 37 of them have already been opened 
to Chinese investors under the WTO framework). 146  Nonetheless, Beijing’s 
commercial diplomacy was not popular in Taiwan, and this even caused the 
Sunflower Movement in 2014, which was detrimental to the progress of cross-Strait 
economic integration. 
 
    Most scholars attributed the Taiwanese people’s oppositions to their fear of 
witnessing the Taiwanese economy being “hollowed-out” by the Chinese market, 
which would further result in the loss of Taiwanese political autonomy in the 
post-ECFA era.147 Speaking of the “hollowing-out effects”, this is not a new issue 
since Taipei had already implemented a series of policies in restricting cross-Strait 
economic exchanges based on this concern between 1996 and 2008, as detailed in 
chapter 4. The Taiwanese people’s concern over the “hollowing-out effects” 
following the strengthening of cross-Strait economic ties is mainly rooted in the huge 
outflow of Taiwanese capital to the Mainland since the 1990s (see Table 4.2.1).148 
After signing the ECFA with Beijing, the asymmetric relations of economic 
interdependence between Taiwan and China became more prominent. As will be 
discussed later in chapter 6, in 2009, the Chinese market had already shared 70.38% 
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before Taipei signed the ECFA with Beijing (see Table 6.2.3). While the ECFA was 
in effect in 2010, 83.81% of Taiwanese outward investment went to the Chinese 
market (see Table 6.2.3). Analysts argue that Beijing’s effort to marginalize Taiwan’s 
international and regional space should be blamed for this consequence.149 Some 
scholars then questioned if the ECFA had endangered Taiwan’s economic and 
political autonomy, which may allow China to further merge Taiwan.150   
 
    Furthermore, the argument that cross-Strait economic integration is based on the 
model of “win-win” and is beneficial for Taiwan’s economic performance is not 
convincing for most Taiwanese people. Firstly, as will be discussed in chapter 6, after 
signing the ECFA with Beijing, Taiwan’s economic performance did not correspond 
with the official anticipation.151 This then drove the Taiwanese people to question 
ECFA’s contribution to Taiwan’s economic development. Secondly, Taiwanese 
outward investments to the Chinese market have always been accompanied with 
industrial offshoring since Taiwan’s manufacturing industries are the major 
investors.152 This has further supported the argument of the “hollowing-out” effect. 
Most importantly, following the implementation of the ECFA, Chinese entrepreneurs 
have actively utilized this agreement to merge Taiwanese ICT corporations step by 
step. The most disputed and unsettled case to date has been China’s Tsinghua 
Unigroup’s initiative to merge Taiwan’s MediaTek, which is the largest ODM of 
semiconductors in Taiwan and the second largest in the world.153 Although there is 
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no evidence to prove Beijing’s involvement in Tsinghua Unigroup’s initiative, 
incidents like this have strengthened the impression that Beijing aims to “hollow-out” 
Taiwan’s technology in the process of cross-Strait economic integration. 
 
    No Chinese interviewees agreed with the above argument that cross-Strait 
economic integration has generated the “hollowing-out” effect in Taiwan. Rather, all 
of them emphasized the complementarity of the Chinese and Taiwanese economies 
in the wave of globalization and regional economic integration. Indeed, as discussed 
in chapters 3 and 4, since China has begun to play a pivotal role in the process of 
regionalization since the late 1990s, there has been division of labor between Taiwan 
and the Chinese mainland.154 While the Taiwanese manufacturers — especially the 
ICT industries — have benefited from low-cost production factors in the Chinese 
market, Chinese manufacturers have been rewarded abundant capital, advanced 
technology, and efficient managing skills from Taiwanese enterprises.155 Apart from 
the aforementioned comparative advantages, following the development of both 
economies, as Professor Wang Yong from the SIS at the Peking University noted, 
there has been a “new division of labor between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland” 
in the post-ECFA era. He further explained: 
 
“For the Taiwanese economy, cross-Strait economic integration will allow 
Taiwanese enterprises to take advantage of the large market in the Chinese 
mainland … and the innovative marketing strategies of Taiwanese 
companies may influence other [Chinese] enterprises’ marketing behavior 
in the mainland. In the end, these advantages will amplify and create a 																																																								
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win-win situation where both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland benefit 
from integration.”156   
  
    Chinese scholars further attributed Taiwan’s fear of the “hollowed-out” effect in 
the post-ECFA era to the slow progress of Taiwan’s industrial transformation and 
upgrading rather than cross-Strait economic integration.157 They pointed out that in 
the era of globalization, the offshoring of labor-intensive industries is a common 
phenomenon for all economies following the progress of their industrialization.158 
However, whether this phenomenon would generate the “hollowing-out” effect in an 
economy depends on whether this economy can cultivate another new industry to 
sustain its economic development.159 In the case of Taiwan, as discussed in chapter 
4, Taipei’s effort to cultivate the ICT industries did offset the economic loss caused 
by the offshoring of labor-intensive industries since the 1980s, and this even helped 
Taiwan to create the “economic miracle”.160 Yet, as Doctor Zhang Wensheng 
observed, “the Taiwanese authorities did not do that much for industrial 
transformation and upgrading since the mid-1990s”.161  Therefore, most of the 
Taiwanese ICT industries still adopt the low-profit business model of OEM as 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4. In order to tackle the “hollowing-out” effect, Chinese 
scholars suggested that Taipei should take advantage of cross-Strait economic 
integration to make strategies for industrial transformation and upgrading so as to 
cultivate more OBMs with advanced and innovative technology.162 																																																								
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    In addition, Chinese elites also believe that the ECFA has largely satisfied 
Taiwanese interests of economic development. First of all, as discussed in chapter 4, 
Taiwan’s economic development has faced a predicament since the 2000s. As Beijing 
has opened its markets and offered more preferential treatments to Taiwanese 
enterprises through the ECFA, cross-Strait economic integration should have 
provided Taipei with an opportunity to pursue better economic performance.163 
Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, Taiwan’s isolated position in the process of 
regionalization and its protectionism have impinged on its economic performance. 
Since the Chinese economy has played an indispensable role in the process of 
regionalization and even globalization, signing the ECFA with Beijing should be in 
Taipei’s priority so as to connect itself with regional and global economic integration 
mechanisms through the Chinese mainland.164  
 
    In general, Chinese elites do not think that the ECFA has generated the 
“hollowing-out” effect in Taiwan. Rather, by considering the ECFA’s contribution to 
Taiwan’s economic development, this agreement should have Taiwanese support and 
Beijing should be able to gradually further its peaceful reunification agendas towards 
Taiwan. However, contrary to Beijing’s expectation, the ECFA was not popular in 
Taiwanese society. The “hollowing-out” effect is not the only reason. As will be 
specified below, Beijing’s intention of shaping Taiwan’s public opinion in the 
post-ECFA era has also provoked the Taiwanese to advocate stopping negotiation 
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with Beijing over the sub-agreements of the ECFA. This has then affected the 
effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in furthering its political agendas of 
“peaceful reunification” towards Taiwan.   
 
5.4.2 Shaping Taiwan’s Public Opinion on Peaceful Reunification? 
    Since signing the ECFA with Taiwan, Beijing has spared no effort in furthering 
its reunification agenda in Taiwanese society by wielding commercial diplomacy. 
Aside from making economic concessions to enhance its image in Taiwan, the other 
concrete measures adopted by Beijing have been its initiatives requesting Taipei to 
allow Chinese enterprises to invest or even purchase Taiwan’s news, 
telecommunication, and publishing industries by signing the CSSTA with Taiwan.165 
These initiatives manifested Beijing’s intention of influencing Taiwan’s public 
opinion by wielding commercial diplomacy, which was one of the main reasons that 
drove the Taiwanese to launch the Sunflower Movement in 2014 aimed at opposing 
deeper cross-Strait economic integration. 166  The Sunflower Movement was a 
surprise for Beijing and Taipei because both sides’ leaders thought cross-Strait 
economic integration was based on the model of “win-win”, and because Taipei had 
not yet allowed Chinese businessmen to directly invest in the aforementioned 
industries.167  
 
    Contrary to the government’s ideas, analysts criticized that Beijing’s Taiwan 
policy is to “buy Taiwan for reunification” in the post-ECFA era.168 Opponents of 
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the ECFA further contended that investment and the proposals of merging Taiwan’s 
news media made by Hong Kong’s corporations or Taiwanese corporations in the 
Chinese market has probably enabled Beijing to exert influence into Taiwanese 
society. The most significant case at this bid is the Want-Want Corporation’s projects 
for merging Taiwan’s news media despite the lack of direct evidence to support its 
ties with Beijing.169 Specifically, the Want-Want Corporation is one of the top-three 
largest Taiwanese food industries; as early as the 1990s, it had relocated most of its 
production bases to the Mainland. In 2009, the Want-Want Corporation launched the 
first wave of initiatives in merging several of Taiwan’s news media that confronted 
difficulties in operation and that were popular among Taiwanese audiences, such as 
the CTV, CtiTV, and China Times.170  The “pro-China editorial slant” of the 
Want-Want China Times Media Group had generated a doubt that the Want-Want 
Corporation’s initiatives were not purely based on commercial interests, and it 
remained difficult to prove Beijing’s involvement in these cases.171  
 
    In 2012, when the Taiwanese government planned to approve another series of 
the Want-Want Corporation’s projects for purchasing Taiwan’s popular news 
media — the Apple Daily and Next Media Group, this provoked Taiwanese to launch 
the Anti-Media Monopoly Movement. 172  In addition to fighting against the 
emerging media monopoly in Taiwan, opponents further argued that Beijing is 
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behind the Want Want Corporations given its considerable investment in China.173 
In March 2013, The Economist revealed that the Want-Want Corporation enjoyed the 
treatment of China’s state-owned enterprises, as Beijing has subsided US$47 million 
to this company in 2011, which was equivalent to 11.3% of its annual net profit.174 
Combined with its “pro-China editorial slant” in reporting the Sunflower Movement 
and the ECFA,175 the Want-Want China Times Media Group was once again 
surrounded by protestors in the Sunflower Movement regardless of its clarification. 
Finally, the Want-Want Corporation did not obtain the government’s ratification to its 
proposals of buying the Apple Daily and Next Media Group. 
 
   The disputed initiatives of the Want Want China Times Media Group symbolized 
the Taiwanese people’s cautious attitude towards Beijing’s influence in the 
Taiwanese society by wielding commercial diplomacy in the post-ECFA era. Notably, 
the Want-Want Corporation is not the only case that caused widespread discontent in 
Taiwanese society. For the opponents of the ECFA, other cases, such as Chinese 
direct or indirect investments in Taiwan’s mobile corporations, banks, and so on, are 
seemingly in line with the assertion that Beijing expects to “buy Taiwan for 
reunification” in the process of cross-Strait economic integration.176 Although this 
assertion may not be rational, it actually reflects the widespread discontent with 
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Beijing’s reunification agenda in Taiwanese society. Taiwanese resentment against 
Beijing’s political agenda then caused the Sunflower Movement in 2014, which has 
resulted in the stagnant progress of cross-Strait economic integration from 
thereon.177   
 
Figure 5.4.1 The Fluctuation of Taiwanese Attitude towards the Issue of 
“Unification-Independence” 
 
Source: Compiled form Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 
“Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend Distribution in 
Taiwan (1992/06~2016/06)”, 2016.178 
 
     In general, the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in appealing 
“peaceful reunification” to the Taiwanese people has been limited in the post –ECFA 
era. The poll conducted by the outstanding Election Study Center of the National 
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Chengchi University can support this argument. As shown in Figure 5.4.1, in terms 
of the Taiwanese people’s attitude towards unification, only 9.2% of the Taiwanese 
supported Beijing’s reunification agenda in 2014, which was even lower than the 
same percentage (10.2%) in the year of the signing of the ECFA in 2010.179 With 
respect to attitude towards independence, the support rate had slightly increased from 
22.4% in 2010 to 23.9% in 2014. So far, maintaining the status quo across the 
Taiwan Strait remains the consensus among the Taiwanese people, as this option has 
steadily obtained support from 60% of the Taiwanese in the post-ECFA era. This 
survey has implied the limited effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in 
directing Taiwan’s public opinion towards “peaceful reunification”.     
 
    In addition, as most scholars have noted, under the strategic guideline of 
“placing hope on the Taiwanese people”, Beijing has expected the Taiwanese to 
gradually recognize that both sides’ peoples across the Taiwan Strait are “Chinese” 
following the progress of cross-Strait economic integration.180 Based on this shared 
identity between both sides’ peoples, Beijing then hopes that the Taiwanese will 
accept its reunification agenda.181 However, contrary to Beijing’s expectation, the 
percentage of Taiwanese who identified themselves as “Chinese” did not increase in 
the post-ECFA era. Rather, according to Figure 5.4.2, there have been more 
Taiwanese people who identified themselves as “Taiwanese but not Chinese”, as this 
percentage raised from 51.6% in 2009 to 60.6% in 2014. This statistical data further 
suggests that China’s commercial diplomacy has limited effectiveness with respect to 
helping Beijing shape “Chinese identity” in Taiwan in the post-ECFA era. 																																																								
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180 Keng, “Understanding Integration and ‘Spillover’ across the Taiwan Strait”, 165-168; Lin, 
“Beijing’s Evolving Policy and Strategic Thinking on Taiwan”, 74-76. 
181 Ibid. 
	 312 
 
Figure 5.4.2 The Fluctuation of Taiwanese Identity 
 
Source: Compiled form Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 
“Taiwan/Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan (1992/06~2016/06)”, 
2016.182 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
   In summary, by utilizing commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan in the 
post-ECFA era, Beijing expects “the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations” 
in the context intensive cross-Strait economic integration based on the 1992 
Consensus.183 Meanwhile, Beijing also intends to exert its influence over Taiwanese 
society so as to persuade the Taiwanese people to accept its reunification agenda. Yet 
Beijing has not fully accomplished these strategic goals. With respect to Beijing’s 
influence on Taiwanese attitude towards unification, making economic concession to 																																																								
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Taiwan did not assist Chinese leaders in “winning hearts and minds of the Taiwanese 
people” for “peaceful reunification”.184 By contrast, the widespread suspicion that 
Beijing intends to “buy Taiwan for reunification” in Taiwanese society provoked the 
Taiwanese people to fight against Taipei’s decision to deepen economic integration 
with China by launching the Sunflower Movement in 2014.185 Moreover, polls 
conducted by the NCCU (see Figure 5.4.1 and 5.4.2) have also reflected that both 
Beijing’s reunification agenda and the ECFA have remained unpopular in Taiwanese 
society.  
 
    However, from Beijing’s perspectives, the ECFA has still made contribution to 
“peaceful development of cross-Strait relations”, leading both sides towards the path 
of “peaceful reunification”.186  The institutionalization of cross-Strait economic 
integration has been one of Beijing’s significant achievements after signing the 
ECFA with Taipei. Insofar as Taipei’s decision to not fully reverse the ECFA, Beijing 
can further its political agendas towards Taiwan by utilizing commercial diplomacy.  
 
    Most importantly, following the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic 
integration, the 1992 Consensus has also been institutionalized across the Taiwan 
Strait. Beijing has then connected this loosely defined “one-China principle” with its 
narrowly defined “one-China” framework in managing Taiwan’s international status. 
By defining Taiwan’s political status under the “one-China” framework in the 
international community, Beijing has infringed on Taiwan’s de jure and functional 
sovereignty at the global and regional level. In this regard, for Chinese leaders, how 
to make a feasible scenario in managing Taiwan’s de facto and functional 																																																								
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sovereignty after fulfilling peaceful reunification based on the “One Country, Two 
Systems” framework seems to be the only question that they need to ponder. 
 
    Despite Chinese leaders’ confidence in managing the contentious sovereignty 
issue of Taiwan, it is inappropriate to conclude the effectiveness of China’s 
commercial diplomacy without evaluating Taiwan’s strategy in furthering its 
sovereignty interests. As will be discussed in the next chapter, from Taipei’s 
perspectives, Beijing’s endorsement of the 1992 Consensus symbolizes that Chinese 
leaders have accepted the existence of the ROC, which directly conflicts with 
Beijing’s conceptualization.187 In addition, Taipei has also aimed to consolidate its 
interdependence and international legal sovereignty based on its solid functional 
sovereignty and following the enlargement of its international space.    
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Chapter 6 Chapter 6: The ECFA and Taiwan’s Sovereignty Interests 
6.1 Introduction 
    The previous chapter analyzed the strategic goals of Beijing’s commercial 
diplomacy towards Taiwan in the post-ECFA era. Specifically, the previous chapter 
has shown the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in allowing China to 
extend its influence towards both the Taiwanese government and the society. 
Following the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic integration, Beijing has 
always aimed to guide Taiwan heading towards “peaceful reunification” in the 
context of “peaceful development of cross-Strait relations”.1 Although Beijing has 
not yet convinced the Taiwanese people of reunification by utilizing commercial 
diplomacy, it is noteworthy that Beijing has institutionalized the 1992 Consensus by 
signing the ECFA with Taipei. From Beijing’s perspectives, Taipei’s reacceptance of 
the 1922 Consensus was equivalent to the endorsement of the “one-China” 
framework. This has made Beijing be confident in managing Taiwan’s de jure and 
functional sovereignty in the international community, and thus Beijing was willing 
to make concession to Taiwan’s international space in the post-ECFA era. By making 
positive responses to Taiwan’s international space, Beijing expected Taipei to 
continuously promote the ECFA so as to pave the way towards peaceful 
reunification. 
 
     Yet Taiwan’s strategic goals of Cross-Strait economic integration are entirely 
counter to China’s agenda of peaceful reunification. According to Taiwan’s President 
Ma Ying-jeou, on the one hand, by signing the ECFA with China, Taipei aimed to 																																																								
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improve its isolated position in the international community so as to boost its 
economic performance.2 On the other hand, enlarging Taiwan’s international space 
was also Taipei’s strategic goal behind the ECFA, which stands in opposite to 
China’s expectation of peaceful reunification. 3  However, Taiwan’s strategy in 
countering China’s commercial diplomacy raise several questions that are crucial to 
judge the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. Has the 
ECFA increased the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Chinese market 
beneficial for Beijing to wield commercial diplomacy? Has the ECFA really caused 
the “hollowing-out” effect in Taiwan? Most importantly, has Taiwan’s sovereignty 
been eroded in the process of Cross-Strait economic integration? 
 
    To address these questions, the next section first studies Taiwan’s strategic 
concerns and their challenges when carrying out commercial diplomacy at the global 
and regional levels by drawing on interviews with senior Taiwanese policy makers. 
As the huge outflow of Taiwan’s FDI has generated concern among Taiwanese 
scholars over the “hollowing-out” effect,4 the next section also reviews Taiwan’s 
capital flows between 2010 and 2014 so as to examine whether Taiwan’s strategy for 
tackling regional economic integration is conducive to decrease the degree of its 
economic dependence on Mainland. In brief, the share of Taiwan’s investment in 
China has been decreasing in the post-ECFA era, but the Chinese market has still 
been the top choice where Taiwanese manufacturers prefer to inject their investment. 
Nonetheless, this may manifest the constraints of China’s commercial diplomacy 																																																								
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towards Taiwan while the “hollowing-out” effect is only limited to Taiwanese 
manufacturing industries that share less than 30% of Taiwan’s total GDP.5  
 
    The third section further studies the effectiveness of Taiwan’s commercial 
diplomacy in respect to consolidate its de jure and functional sovereignty at the 
regional and global levels. In general, although Taiwan did successfully expand its 
international space by signing FTAs with several important regional trading partners 
and participating in several international organizations in the post-ECFA era, the 
one-China principle remains an obstacle to Taiwan’s goal of being a fully-fledged 
sovereign state.  
 
    After evaluating Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy in helping it to secure its 
economic and sovereignty interests at the global and regional levels, the forth section 
explores the impact of Cross-Strait economic integration on both Taiwan’s economic 
performance and de facto sovereignty. By taking the “Economic Indicators EBook” 
published by the MOEA (ROC) as the main index, this section argues that the 
ECFA’s contribution on Taiwan’s economic performance does not meet Taipei’s 
expectations.6 In addition, despite the fact that the ECFA has not yet allowed China 
to encroach on Taiwan’s Westphalian sovereignty, Beijing might have encroached on 
Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty. It is noteworthy that the ECFA has institutionalized 
the 1992 Consensus across the Taiwan Strait, which has legitimized the one-China 
principle by connecting both sides’ constitution with each other. Finally, given the 
pros and cons of China’s and Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy in reconciling their 
sovereignty agendas and economic interests, this chapter concludes that both sides 																																																								
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have faced strategic dilemma after signing the ECFA. 	
6.2 Taiwan’s Strategic Concerns over the ECFA at the Regional Level 
    As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the ECFA is Taiwan’s contingency plan for 
tackling impact bred by its regionally marginalized position since the late 1990s. 
This section further rationalizes Taiwan’s strategic concerns over the ECFA with 
regards to its economic interests in order to evaluate the effectiveness of Taiwan’s 
strategy in the post-ECFA era in a later section. Generally speaking, by carrying out 
interviews with policymakers in Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, tackling the 
“substitution effects” at the regional level was the main incentive that drove Taipei to 
sign the ECFA with Beijing in 2010. Meanwhile, following the improvement of 
cross-Strait relations, Taipei also expects to deepen economic cooperation with its 
major trading partners in an attempt to deal with the problem caused by the 
“hollowing-out” effect. In addition, Taiwan also aims to decrease its economic 
dependence on the Chinese market so as to counter Beijing’s commercial diplomacy. 
All of these strategic concerns will be further elaborated below.  
 
6.2.1 Taiwan’s Regional Economic integration and Taiwan’s International Space 
   For those who study the relationship between trade and sovereignty, Taiwan’s 
participation in the WTO in 2002 is an ideal case to explore the issue of how trade 
liberalization can consolidate state sovereignty.7 Taiwan’s successful entry into the 
WTO has enlarged Taiwan’s international space and consolidated its “functional 																																																								
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sovereignty”.8 Scholars attribute the success to Taiwan’s promotion of unilateral 
economic liberalization, which has led EU and the US to support Taiwan’s 
membership based upon their economic interests.9 As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, 
in 1990, the year of its application to the GATT, Taiwan already played an 
indispensable role in international production networks, and both EU and the US 
were major markets for Taiwan’s manufacturing products. 10  Thus facilitating 
Taiwan’s trade liberalization was the common interest shared by both the US and the 
EU. Moreover, it were also in EU and the US interests to liberalize Taiwan’s 
procurement policy, which would be beneficial for their manufacturers to sell public 
goods to Taiwan (i.e. the French enterprise of Metro for Taiwan’s underground 
system). 11  Although sovereignty assertions made by Beijing had provoked 
controversy over Taiwan’s membership in the WTO, Taiwan still obtained 
membership one day latter than the PRC.12     
 
    Taiwan’s efforts in facilitating unilateral trade liberalization, however, cannot 
help it to join the process of regional trade liberalization. Taiwan’s authorities ascribe 
the isolated position in the region to the “China factor”. Interviews with Taiwanese 
policymakers illustrate the difficulty in bypassing China to sign FTAs with other 
countries. Mrs. Hsu Chun-fang, former Deputy Director of the Bureau of Foreign 
Trade in the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA, ROC), says: “The development 
of Taiwan’s relations with other countries is contingent on the development of 
Cross-Strait relations. If we fail to manage Cross-Strait relations, it is impossible to 
																																																								
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Dent, “Taiwan and the New East Asian Regionalism”, 121-23. 
11 Winkler, “A Question of Sovereignty?”, 4-6. 
12 Ibid. 
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have good relations with others”.13 Taiwan’s General Secretary of the MOEA (ROC), 
Mrs. Chou Tsao-shan, further specifies this point. She says:  
 
“It is impossible to ignore the ‘China factor’ when we negotiate over an 
FTA with our trading partners. Even though we do not care about their 
[Beijing’s] attitude, other countries care…When we tried to negotiate with 
the EU over the issue of trade liberalization, they told us to manage our 
relations with Mainland China first…We cannot verify whether China has 
influenced others attitude towards signing an FTA with us, but you can feel 
‘China factor’ has influenced the process of negotiation…Our counterpart 
always stands in the shadow of Mainland China”.14  
 
    For the Taiwan authorities, China’s influence is an important variable that 
impacts upon their effort to negotiate FTAs with trading partners. While Taiwan 
touched a nerve with Beijing with regards to sovereignty by advocating “one country 
on each side” in 2002, Taiwan’s international space was blocked by Beijing.15 As a 
result, Taiwan missed the opportunity to participate in the wave of regional trade 
liberalization caused by the stagnant progress of trade liberalization initiatives in the 
WTO since 2002.16 This has meant that Taiwan has occupied a marginalized 
position in the process of regional economic integration as shown in the Figure 6.2.1 
below.   
 
    As discussed in chapter 4, when Cross-Strait relations became tense between 																																																								
13 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014. 
14 Tsao-Shan Cho, interviewed by author, April 15, 2014. 
15 Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China,160. 
16 Staples, “Responses to Regionalism”, 100-1. 
	 321 
1999 and 2008, the disputed issue of sovereignty was raised as a constraint on 
Taiwan’s regional space. Consequently, Taiwan’s isolated position in regional 
economic integration has had a considerable impact on its economic performance. 
Notably, Taiwan is an economy guided by an “export-oriented” strategy, and thus 
trade performance is crucial to its economic development17. With respect to impact 
of regionally marginalized position on Taiwan’s economic performance, it can be 
estimated by reviewing both TPP’s and RCEP’s shares of Taiwan’s total trade. 
 
Figure 6.2.1 Regionalism in East Asia and Taiwan’s Isolated Regional Position 
 
Source: Compiled by Mrs. Hsu Chun-fang18 
 
     According to the report compiled by the MOEA (ROC), TPP members had a 
share of 34.4% of Taiwan’s total trade by US$198.22 billion in 2013.19 Furthermore, 
by 2013, RCEP members had a share of 57% of Taiwan’s total trade, and the total 
																																																								
17 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 87.  
18 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014. The author deeply appreciates her 
generosity to allow this this thesis to directly use or edict the figure.  
19 , “ TPP/RCEP”, 2014. The Bureau of Foreign 
Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, ROC, “Joining the TPP/RCEP, We Can Do It!”, 2014, accessed 
April 17, 2015, http://www.trade.gov.tw/Files/Doc/1030305	( TPP
)00312%20%20final.pdf . 
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volume of trading had reached US$325.2 billion.20 “Trade creation effects” are 
important concerns for the Taiwanese government, but the most crucial consideration 
for Taiwanese policy makers actually stems from the “substitution effect” as 
mentioned in chapter 3.21 
   
    For example, South Korea is Taiwan’s major competitor in the region, and 
according to Taiwan’s former Deputy Minister of the MOEA (ROC), Mr. Liang 
Kuo-hsin, “64% of products of manufacturing industries between both economies 
[Taiwan and South Korea] are overlapping and highly competitive”.22 Moreover, as 
Seoul is actively engaging in various FTA negotiations with its major trading 
partners, Taiwan’s industries will lose its competitive advantages vis-à-vis South 
Korea. Table 6.2.1 lists the FTA coverage rate of Taiwan and its major economic 
rivals.23 According to this data, FTAs between South Korea and its major trading 
partners will cover 82.12% of total South Korean trade.24 As for Taiwan, even after 
the full implementation of the ECFA, the FTA coverage rate is merely 33.06%, 
which is fairly low compared to South Korea.25 As a result, impact bred by Taiwan’s 
regionally marginalized position became an imperative issue for the Taiwanese 
government to deal with. Mrs. Chou Tsao-shan points out that:  
 
“South Korea is our major competitor, especially in the ICT sector. The 
quality of our [South Korea and Taiwan] products is about the same…If 
our manufacturers still need to pay tariffs of more than 5%, the price of 
																																																								
20 Ibid. 
21 Urata,“Exclusion Fears and Competitive Regionalism in East Asia”, 28-31. 
22 Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, March 14, 2014. 
23 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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our products will be higher than South Korean ones. Consumers will buy 
their products not ours…Therefore, we should sign FTAs with our trading 
partners as much as we can to ensure that we are on the same starting line 
as they [South Korea] are”.26    
 
Table 6.2.1 FTA Coverage Rate of Taiwan’s Major Regional Competitors in 
2012    
 South Korea Japan Singapore Taiwan 
 Country The share 
of Total 
Trade (%) 
Country The share 
of Total 
Trade (%) 
Country The share 
of Total 
Trade (%) 
Country The 
share of 
Total 
Trade 
(%) 
In Effect 46 34.69% 15 18.79% 26 64.26% 6 4.18% 
In the  
Process of 
Negotiation 
Canada 0.94% South 
Korea 
6.06% Canada 0.31% China 24.34% 
Mexico 1.09% GCC 10.82% Pakistan 0.12% Singapore 4.93% 
New 
Zealand 
0.26% Australia 4.45% Ukraine 0.08% New 
Zealand 
0.21% 
Australia 3.02% Mongolia 0.02% Taiwan 5.04%   
Colombia 0.18% Canada 1.36% Mexico 0.36%   
Turkey 0.49% Colombia 0.12% Egypt 0.08%   
China 20.15% EU 10.9% EU 10.68%   
CJK FTA 29.81% CJK FTA 25.81% GCC 7.06%   
GCC 11.64%   Costa Rica 0.1%   
Total  82.12%  72.27%  88.09%  33.06% 
Source: The Database of Global Trade Atlas Navigator (2012) 
Source: Compiled by Mrs. Hsu Chun-fang, edited by the author27  
     																																																								
26 Tsao-Shan Cho, interviewed by author, April 15, 2014. 
27 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014. The author is grateful to her generosity to 
permit this research to directly use or edit this data. 
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6.2.2 The Connection between the “Substitution Effect” and “Hollowing-out” 
effect 
    In addition to the “substitution effect”, it is noteworthy that some Taiwanese 
policymakers also ascribe the “hollowing-out” effect to Taiwan’s isolated position in 
the process of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.28 Literature on 
contemporary cross-Strait economic relations also support this viewpoint. 
Theoretically, Taiwan’s isolation from the process of regional economic integration 
has also drove enterprises to move their manufacturing facilities or even operational 
headquarters abroad.29 Concern about the “substitution effect” among Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs is the main reason for industrial offshoring. For example, Mrs. Chou 
Tsao-shan points to Taiwan’s textile industries as an example30. Under the TPP’s 
ROOs, Taiwanese textile manufacturers that export to Vietnam will be replaced by 
TPP-member textile producers because they “can enjoy zero tariffs in the US 
market”31. She further says: “In this case, if Vietnam is the major market for 
Taiwan’s textile manufacturing, industry offshoring is predictable”32.” 
 
    Furthermore, this offshoring phenomenon has increased Taiwan’s economic 
dependence on the Chinese market.33 Indeed, Taiwan’s investment towards China is 
export-oriented, and China’s relatively cheap factors of production serve as an 
																																																								
28 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014; Tsao-Shan Cho, interviewed by author, 
April 15, 2014. 
29 Dent, “Taiwan and the New East Asian Regionalism”, 150-52. 
30 Tsao-Shan Cho, interviewed by author, April 15, 2014. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Joshua Meltzer, “Taiwan’s Economic Opportunities and Challenges and The Importance of the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership”, Brookings Center for East Asia Policy Studies, East Asia Policy Paper 2 
(January 2014), 3-5. Accessed April 17, 2015, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/09/30-taiwan-trans- pacific-partnership-meltzer 
Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion Against Taiwan, 19. 
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important attraction for Taiwanese manufacturers. 34  Furthermore, as Taiwanese 
manufacturers in Mainland China also enjoy the treatment that Chinese enterprises 
have in the wave of East Asian regionalization, China’s effort to liberalize trade 
should not be ignored.35 Table 6.2.2 shows Taiwan’s investment in the Chinese 
market and its investments in other areas. Based on statistic gathered by MOEA 
(ROC), Taiwan’s investment in China made up 60% of its total outward investment 
between 2002 and 2013.36 This has further contributed to the “hollowing-out” 
effect.37 Doctor Hong Tsai-lung, Director of the Department of China Affairs in the 
DPP, indicates that:  
 
“Most Taiwanese enterprises are SMEs, and the owners fully control 
international business networks. When they move into the Chinese market, 
their networking connections with Taiwan weaken. It is not beneficial for 
Taiwan’s economic development”.38  
 
    To reduce the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on China, most 
Taiwanese policymakers point to the importance of improving Taiwan’s marginalized 
position in the process of regional economic integration and signing FTAs with other 
countries.39 Nonetheless, this strategy is questionable. For example, as shown in 
Table 6.2.3, the FTA between Singapore and Taiwan did increase Taiwan’s 
investment there, which peaked at US$4.5 billion in 2012.40 However, there has 
been a negative growth in Taiwanese investment in Singapore since 2013. Moreover, 																																																								
34 Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook for Relationship across the Taiwan Strait”, 116-19. 
35 Dent, “Taiwan and the New East Asian Regionalism”, 150-152. 
36 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”. 
37 Wu and Hong, “Economic Integration in East Asia— Taiwan Perspective”, 39-48. 
38 Tsai-Lung Hong, interviewed by author, March 20, 2014. 
39 Chien-Min Chao, interviewed by author, April 4, 2014; Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 18, 
2014.  
40 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”. 
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most of Taiwan’s investors in Singapore were services industries (e.g. financial and 
insurance industries, and wholesale and retail industries). 41  While 64.02% of 
Taiwan’s investments in the Mainland were from manufacturing industries (see Table 
6.4.3) in 2014, it is doubtful that signing FTAs with other trading partners has helped 
Taiwan to reduce the degree of economic dependence on China thus far.42 
 
Table 6.2.2 Taiwan’s Investment in China and Outward Investment 
Year Investment in 
China 
Outward Investment 
(without investment in 
China) 
The Share of Investment in 
China (%)  
2002 6,723,058 3,370,046 66.61 
2003 7,698,784 3,968,588 65.98 
2004 6,940,663 3,382,022 67.23 
2005 6,006,953 2,447,449 71.05 
2006 7,642,335 4,315,426 63.91 
2007 9,970,545 6,469,978 60.64 
2008 10,691,390 4,466,491 70.53 
2009 7,142,593 3,005,554 70.38 
2010 14,617,872 2,823,451 83.81 
2011 14,376,624 3,696,827 79.54 
2012 12,792,077 8,098,641 61.23 
2013 9,190,090 5,232,266 63.72 
2014 10,276,570 7,293,683 58.48 
Unit: US$1,000 
Source: Compiled from Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
R.O.C. (2016) “Monthly Report (December 2015)”.43   
 
 
 																																																								
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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Table 6.2.3 Taiwan’s outward Investment in Asia other than Mainland China (Unit: US$1,000) 
Year Asia Singapore Malaysia Japan 
 Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) 
Overall Asia Overall Asia Overall Asia 
2005 430,673 17.59 97,701 03.99 22.68 28,195 01.15 06.54 42,552 01.73 09.88 
2006 1,390,621 32.22 806,303 18.68 57.98 31,236 00.72 02.24 10,926 00.25 00.78 
2007 2,366,606 36.57 1,194,110 18.45 50.45 65,018 01.00 02.74 18,815 00.29 00.79 
2008 2,046,998 45.83 697,626 15.61 34.08 27,806 00.62 01.35 52,105 01.16 02.54 
2009 765,457 25.46 36,698 01.22 04.79 83,537 02.77 10.91 102,750 03.41 13.42 
2010 1,391,363 49.26 32,697 01.15 02.34 370,369 13.11 26.61 40,648 01.14 02.92 
2011 1,723,918 46.63 448,592 12.13 26.02 130,205 03.52 07.55 252,347 06.82 14.68 
2012 7,151,518 88.30 4,498,662 55.54 62.90 187,905 02.32 02.62 1,089,349 13.45 15.23 
2013 2,894,581 55.32 158,291 03.02 05.46 103,446 01.97 03.57 170,499 03.25 05.89 
2014 2,482,274 34.03 136,771 01.87 05.50 31,786 00.43 01.28 680,020 09.32 27.39 
Total 22,644,009 47.32 8,107,451 16.94 35.80 1,059,503 02.21 04.67 2,460,011 05.14 10.86 
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Table 6.2.3 Taiwan’s outward Investment in Asia other than Mainland China (Unit: US$1,000) (Continue) 
Year South Korea Hong Kong Indonesia Vietnam 
 Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) 
Overall Asia Overall Asia Overall Asia Overall Asia 
2005 3,613 00.14 00.83 107,559 04.39 24.97 9,115 00.37 02.11 93,932 03.84 21.81 
2006 15,910 00.36 01.14 272,021 06.30 19.56 8,798 00.20 00.63 123,736 02.87 08.90 
2007 11,011 00.17 00.46 189,568 02.92 08.01 702 00.01 00.03 109,282 01.69 04.62 
2008 235,264 05.67 11.49 337,361 07.55 16.48 2,932 00.06 00.14 639,325 14.31 31.23 
2009 9,679 00.32 01.26 241,242 08.02 31.51 1,517 00.05 00.19 242,774 08.08 31.72 
2010 3,352 00.11 00.24 244,464 08.65 17.57 389 00.01 00.03 670,118 23.73 48.16 
2011 27,999 00.75 01.62 254,355 06.88 14.75 1,145 00.03 00.06 457,737 12.38 26.55 
2012 21,060 00.26 00.29 291,579 03.60 04.07 17,200 00.21 00.24 943,997 11.65 13.20 
2013 60,986 01.16 02.10 316,405 06.04 10.93 28,470 00.54 00.98 1,736,479 33.19 59.99 
2014 171,150 02.34 06.89 423,421 05.92 17.42 116,667 01.59 04.70 646,502 08.86 26.04 
Total 560,024 01.17 02.47 2,812,755 05.87 12.42 186,934 00.39 00.82 5,663,882 11.84 25.01 
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Table 6.2.3 Taiwan’s outward Investment in Asia other than Mainland China (Unit: US$1,000) (Continue) 
Year The Philippines Thailand India Others  
 Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) Amount Share (%) 
Overall Asia Overall Asia Overall Asia Overall Asia 
2005 14,937 00.61 03.47 20,265 00.83 04.71 1,914 00.08 00.44 10,890 00.44 02.53 
2006 13,483 00.31 00.96 81,672 01.89 05.87 4,296 00.10 00.31 22,240 00.52 01.60 
2007 13,253 00.20 00.56 712,116 11.01 30.90 7,738 00.12 00.33 44,993 00.70 01.90 
2008 2,628 00.06 00.13 9,295 00.21 00.45 16,250 00.36 00.79 26,407 00.59 01.29 
2009 21,833 00.73 02.85 14,962 00.50 01.95 3,160 00.11 00.41 7,305 00.24 00.95 
2010 521 00.02 00.04 8,677 00.31 00.62 3,620 00.13 00.26 16,509 00.58 01.19 
2011 69,174 01.87 04.01 11,665 00.32 00.68 67,051 01.81 03.89 3,647 00.10 00.21 
2012 10,701 00.13 00.15 61,242 00.76 00.86 20,931 00.26 00.29 8,890 00.11 00.12 
2013 58,923 01.13 02.04 78,272 01.50 02.70 65,042 01.24 02.25 117,759 02.25 04.07 
2014 40,926 00.56 01.65 82,824 01.14 03.34 33,486 00.50 01.35 118,723 01.63 04.78 
Total 246,387 00.51 01.09 1,080,990 02.26 04.77 223,488 00.47 00.99 377,363 00.79 01.67 
Source: Compiled from Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. (2016) “Monthly Report (December 2015)”44 
																																																								
44 Ibid. 
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    Furthermore, according to Table 6.2.3, the amount of Taiwanese investment in 
Vietnam increased between 2012 and 2013, but there is no FTA between Taiwan and 
Vietnam. Scholars explain this phenomenon by pointing to the weak growth of 
China’s exports (see Table 6.2.4).45 Moreover, the rise of labor salaries and land 
prices since 2005, as well as China’s increasing focus on the issues of environment 
protection, served to drive Taiwanese manufacturers to find another countries with 
low-cost factors of production from thereon.46 As such, scholars question whether 
signing FTAs with other economies can help Taiwan reverse asymmetric economic 
interdependence across the Taiwan Straits, and they further suggest that the 
government should focus on industry upgrading and unilateral trade liberalization.47 
In response to scholars’ suggestions, Mr. Liang Kuo-hsin says: “the government has 
already budgeted NTD$96.4 billion to assist vulnerable industries to do industrial 
upgrading and transformation. Besides, we also aim to establish the Taiwan Free 
Trade Zone to facilitate market openness”.48 Nevertheless, as these policies still lack 
concrete measures, it seems that the Taiwanese government still focuses on 
multilateral trade liberalization. 
  
    However, there are several obstacles to Taiwan’s participation in multilateral 
mechanisms concerning economic integration. Specifically, in order to participate in 
the process of regional economic integration, Mr. Liang Kuo-hsin points out that 
there are at least three difficulties to overcome, and he says: 																																																								
45 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”; Tung and Yeh, 
“Development of a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 43-44. 
46 95, “+$6&"-0”, *#- ., +/6(!1- ;>
4	, 2013<; Chang Gao, “The Trend and Development of Cross-Strait Economic Relations”, in 
Turn Our Challenges into Opportunities, ed. Chen-Yuan Tung and Xiaoheng Cao (Taipei: 
Independent and Unique, 2013), 19-20; Huang, “TPP Versus ECFA”, 96-97. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, March 14, 2014. 
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“Taking the TPP for example, the first difficulty that we need to overcome 
is to obtain consent from all the members of the TPP…and the second one 
is that we need to abandon protectionist policies despite strong domestic 
oppositions. Most importantly, we need to manage Cross-Strait relations 
well, and this is the precondition to commence negotiations with the TPP 
members”.49 
 
Table 6.2.4 The Annual Growth Rate of Exports between 2012 and 2014 
          Year  
Economies 
2012 2013 2014 
Taiwan -2.3% 1.4% 2.7% 
The US 4.3% 2.2% 2.8% 
Japan -2.7% -10.5% -3.5% 
Germany -4.6% 3.1% 3.6% 
France -3.9% 1.8% 0.2% 
The U.K. -2.4% -0.8% 0.5% 
China 7.9% 7.8% 6.0% 
South Korea -1.3% 2.1% 2.3% 
Singapore -0.2% 0.5% -0.2% 
Hong Kong 3.2% 3.6% 3.2% 
Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China 
(2015), “Economic Indicators EBook”50 
 
    As stated in chapters 1 and 4, economic cooperation featured centrally in 
Taiwan’s current strategy to improve Cross-Strait relations between 2008 and 2014. 
Under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, Taiwan returned to the negotiation table with the 
1992 Consensus, which served as a cornerstone of Cross-Strait negotiations over 
collective governance and functional cooperation. Based on this ambivalent 
“One-China Principle”, Taipei signed 23 agreements with Beijing between 2008 and 
2014, and 18 of them have been put into effects (see Appendix I). It is notable that 11 
agreements between both sides are relevant to the issue of Cross-Strait economic 
integration, and three of them are affiliated to the ECFA signed in 2010 (see 
																																																								
49 Ibid.. 
50 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”. 
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Appendix I). Although several scholars criticize Taiwan’s strategy as the 
“China-leaning policy”,51 Taiwan has seemingly increased its bargaining chip to 
seesawing between regional great powers to enlarge international space in the 
context of the rivalry for regional leadership between China and the US. The next 
part of this section will explore this issue in more details.   
  
6.3 ECFA: The Impacts on Taiwan’s Sovereignty in the International 
Community 
    The previous section of this chapter studied Taiwan’s strategic concern over the 
ECFA with regards to its economic interests. Aside from tackling the problems 
generated by the “substitution effect” and “hollowing-out” effect, as will be 
discussed in this section, Taiwan also aimed to consolidate its functional and de jure 
sovereignty in the international community after the improvement of cross-Strait 
relations. The strategy of seesawing between China and the US constitutes Taiwan’s 
current tactic to expand its international space, especially in terms of participating in 
the TPP and RCEP. However, this chapter finds that the effectiveness of Taiwan’s 
“seesawing strategy” was limited by Beijing, as most countries must take China’s 
attitude into account when engaging with Taiwan. Moreover, despite the fact that the 
ECFA institutionalized the 1992 Consensus across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing’s has 
not yet loosened its definition of the “one-China principle” in the international 
community. In this light, Taiwan is on a passive stance in terms of consolidating its 
“sovereignty” in the post-ECFA era. 
 																																																								
51 Corcuff, “Ma Ying-jeou’s China-leaning Policy and the 1983 Fall of the Zheng in Taiwan”, 93-129. 
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6.3.1 Taiwan: Seesawing between the US and China 
    From 2008 onwards, Taiwan’s strategy to expand its international space has 
gained relative success compared with the achievements of Chen’s administration 
between 2000 and 2008. Notably, this was the significant turning point of Taiwan’s 
strategy for consolidating international legal sovereignty. Between 2008 and 2014, 
the US did not play a central role in assisting Taiwan to obtain a membership in 
IGOs as it did in the cases of Taiwan’s entry in the APEC and the WTO in the 
1990s.52 The reason for this is that Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou has shifted 
Taiwan’s strategic focus from challenging China’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan to 
cooperating with China to construct a platform on which both sides can co-exist. In 
this light, President Ma’s strategy was not to seek Beijing’s recognition of Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty, but instead he aimed to obtain China’s 
acknowledgement of Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty and “functional sovereignty”.53 
As a result, rather than focusing on lobbying Taiwan’s membership in IGOs through 
the US and the EU as what his predecessors did, President Ma Ying-jeou focused on 
getting Beijing to support the expansion of Taiwan’s international space. He also 
endeavored to gain China’s support for Taiwan’s participation in the ongoing 
regional economic integration and the signing of FTAs with Taiwan’s trading 
partners.  
 
    The most profound implication of President Ma’s strategy to consolidate 
Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty is that the tactic of bandwagoning with the 
US is not the only policy instrument available to Taiwan. Actually, China has become 
another bandwagon to jump on as long as Taipei can retain stable relations with 																																																								
52 Cheung, “APEC as a Regime”, 21-39; Winkler, “Can Trade Make a Sovereign?”, 467-85 
53 Lin, “Beijing’s Evolving Policy and Strategic Thinking on Taiwan”, 64-73. 
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Beijing. Hence Taiwan has become equipped to seesaw between the US and China 
following the rapprochement of Cross-Strait relations. Taiwan’s “seesawing strategy” 
went well between 2010 and 2014. After signing the ECFA with China, Taipei was 
able to overcome the “China factor” that confines Taiwan’s international space. 
Thanks to Beijing’s consent in loosening the definition of the “One-China Principle” 
to a degree, between 2010 and 2014, Taiwan has successfully signed FTAs with 
Singapore and New Zealand.54 Most significantly, when the relations between China 
and Japan became intense due to the disputed sovereignty issue over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan signed the fishing agreement with Japan and also 
an agreement to promote Taiwan-Japan electronic commerce.55 As Professor Su Chi 
and Mrs. Hsu Chun-fang point out that Tokyo’s intention of signing economic 
agreements with Taiwan was to prevent Taipei from allying with Beijing to challenge 
Japan’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. 56  This seemingly shows the 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy by wielding commercial diplomacy.  
 
    The effectiveness of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy is also apparent at the regional 
level. Before 2014, China softened its attitude towards Taiwan’s involvement in 
regional integration frameworks in exchange for the smooth process of follow-up 
economic negotiations over sub-agreements of the ECFA.57 Moreover, according to 
Taiwan’s policymakers, in response to Taiwan’s bandwagoning with China in the 
regional arena, the US and Japan have taken a friendly attitude towards Taiwan’s 
																																																								
54 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 97-99. 
55 Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 18, 2014; Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 
2014. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Huang, “TPP Versus ECFA”, 85-88; Shiro Patrick Armstrong, “Taiwan’s Asia Pacific Economic 
Strategies after the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, Journal of the Asia Pacific 
Economy 18, no. 1 (2013): 101-2. 
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participation in the TPP.58 Although Taiwan has not commenced negotiations over 
the accession of either the TPP or the RCEP yet, analysts point out that bilateral 
FTAs between Taiwan and its trading partners has allowed the government to adjust 
protectionist policies to meet the standard of market openness set by regional 
integration frameworks, especially the TPP.59  
 
    In the context of Taiwan’s success in expanding international space at bilateral 
and regional levels, it seems that Taiwan would be able to gradually consolidate its 
international legal sovereignty. However, this strategy contradicts to China’s 
reunification strategy towards Taiwan, and the price Taiwan has paid thus far is to 
facilitate Cross-Strait economic integration by signing the ECFA. Through the lens 
of China’s commercial diplomacy, Cross-Strait economic integration has 
institutionalized not only bilateral economic relations but also the “One-China 
Principle” favorable to China’s strategy of peaceful reunification. Combined with the 
fact that the US role was not as important as it had in Taiwan’s foreign relations until 
2014, it raises the question of whether Taiwan can really seesaw between the US and 
China or Taiwan only able to jump on China’s bandwagon.  
 
    All of Taiwan’s policymakers interviewed for this research are well aware of 
China’s political intentions, and therefore they adopt a cautious stance towards 
Taiwan’s Mainland policy. Taiwan’s strategy for countering China’s commercial 
diplomacy is similar to what most East Asian countries have done—consolidating 
bilateral relations with Washington whilst facilitating economic integration with 
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China60. Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou says: 
 
“The relaxed tensions across the Strait depend very much on the continued 
supply of arms from the United States to Taiwan…Certainly Taiwan will 
not feel comfortable to go to a negotiating table without sufficient defense 
buildup in order to protect the safety of the island”.61 
 
    In addition to strengthening military ties with the US through arms procurement, 
for the Taiwanese government, participating in the US-centric regional integration 
framework is also an important policy for managing China’s political leverage. 
Former General Secretary of National Security Council (ROC), Professor Su Chi, 
confirms that the TPP is an important “instrument to counter the possible political 
impacts on Taiwan bred by the ECFA”.62 In this regard, political interests are greater 
than economic interests in motivating Taiwan to participate in the TPP. However, this 
strategy of balancing China’s influence on Taiwan is problematic even for some 
senior policymakers in the Ma administration. 
 
    First of all, considering the constraints upon Taiwan’s domestic politics, both 
Professor Su Chi and Professor Chao Chien-min put forward pessimistic viewpoints 
on President Ma’s strategy of “participating in the US-led TPP to balance the 
ECFA”.63 According to Su, “while President Ma promises to lead Taiwan into the 																																																								
60 Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China”, 139-142; 8'=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Independent & Unique, 2014), 168-175.    
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through Trade, Defense and Democracy”, The Wall Street Journal, December 15 2009, accessed 
February 4, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703514404574588863008012766  
62 Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 18, 2014. 
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TPP within ten years, his promise sounds like rhetoric. As he promised to lead 
Taiwan to join in TPP in 10 years, this is even beyond his presidency”.64 Professor 
Chao Chien-min also points out that the government has not conducted any explicit 
research to study the economic impact of the TPP on Taiwan yet, and thus it is 
difficult to imagine that “Taiwan can successfully participate in the TPP before 
2017”.65 Taiwan’s policymakers attribute the reasons for this to the government’s 
lack of confidence in convincing people of the benefits of liberalizing imports of 
sensitive agricultural products (e.g. US beef and pork).66 Moreover, according to 
Mrs. Chou Tsao-shan, “since Taiwan’s entry to the WTO in 2002, there has been no 
external factor to stimulate Taiwan to progress with its policy of trade 
liberalization”.67 Although bilateral FTAs are helpful in adjusting the policy of 
market openness, it has a limited efficiency for Taiwan due to the low coverage rate 
of total trade (see Table 6.2.1). Combined with significant opposition against 
importing sensitive agricultural products, the constraints of domestic politics delay 
Taiwan in meeting the standard of trade liberalization set by the TPP.  
 
    Furthermore, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy is questionable. 
In order to seesaw between the US and China, Taiwan must have freedom to ensure 
that it stands on a strategic equilibrium between these powers. However, Taiwan has 
limited freedom to act in the international community owing to its problematic 
statehood. So far, Taiwan can barely sustain its membership in 26 IGOs, the 
implication of which is that, unlike ASEAN members, Taipei cannot use 
multilateralism as a strategic instrument to influence the US and China. In this case, 																																																								
64 Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 18, 2014. 
65 Chien-Min Chao, interviewed by author, April 4, 2014. 
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the only feasible approach for Taiwan is to influence China and the US through a 
bilateral approach, but asymmetric power between Taiwan and its counterpart 
constrains the efficiency of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy.  
 
    Additionally, following the rise of China and the decline of the US regional 
influence since the late 1990s, it is worth considering whether the US is willing to 
challenge Beijing’s interests in Taiwan. According to Mr. Liang Kuo-hsin, while 
China was provoked by Taiwan’s resolution to search for de jure independence 
between 2002 and 2008, the US hesitated in commencing negotiations with Taiwan 
over the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) despite the fact that 
Taiwan had become one of the US’ top 10 trading partners.68 Mr. Liang said that an 
US officer asked to him: “Francis, how would you [like to] handle this 800 pounds 
gorilla in the room? ”.69 He further added: “US officer then told me that if Taiwan 
would like to force them to choose between Taiwan and China, the result would not 
be good for us”.70 This case illustrates that even a superpower like the US needs to 
evaluate China’s attitude carefully when managing issues related to Taiwan. As 
discussed above, on the one hand, Taiwan’s core interest in joining the TPP is to 
decrease the degree of economic dependence. On the other hand, Taipei also aims to 
counter China’s commercial diplomacy. These strategic goals certainly do not 
correspond with China’s interests in Taiwan. Consequently, it increases the difficulty 
for the Taiwanese government to bandwagon with other regional great powers 
because it risks these powers’ relationships with China.  
        
    Finally, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy is contingent upon the 																																																								
68 Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, March 14, 2014. 
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development of both regional integration and Sino-US relations. Based upon 
Taiwan’s political concerns discussed above, the TPP is an ideal integration 
framework that the government expects to be involved in. Nonetheless, whether the 
TPP will successfully be finalized or not remains dubious. The high standard of trade 
liberalization set by the TPP drives scholars to cast doubt on its feasibility71. 
Moreover, the impacts bred by the TPP have also generated controversy in the US, 
and both candidates for the presidential election in 2016, Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton, have openly opposed the US participation in TPP.72 This then raises a 
question of whether the US could successfully build up the TPP in the Asia-Pacific 
region.73 Taiwan has no platform to wield seesawing strategy in this situation; 
neither can Taipei take initiative to promote the TPP. Therefore, despite the fact that 
Taiwan spared no effort in lobbying for its participation in the TPP, Taipei was still 
on a passive situation, which limited the effectiveness of its seesawing strategy.      
     
    The other regional integration framework in Taiwan’s policy list is the RCEP in 
which China plays a central role. The RCEP members had a share of 57% of 
Taiwan’s total trade whist the members of TPP only had a share of 38% in 2013.74 
Economically, Taiwan should benefit more from by joining the RCEP than the TPP. 
However, the RCEP is not an ideal option for Taiwan. Politically, since China plays a 
central role in the RCEP, there is concern over whether Beijing will attempt to block 
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Taiwan’s membership. 75  Furthermore, the question of whether Taiwan can 
participate in the RCEP or not entirely depends on Beijing’s attitude. Again, Taiwan 
was in passive situation, and to be a member in the RCEP, Taipei must maintain close 
relationship with Beijing. In this case, Beijing is anticipated to possess more 
bargaining chips than Taiwan, and it also increases the efficiency of China’s 
commercial diplomacy, which is certainly counter to Taiwan’s strategic goals. 
      
    In sum, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s seesawing strategy is questionable, 
especially when the negotiation process of the US-centric TPP has not achieved 
significant breakthroughs yet. As the RCEP seems to be the only relatively feasible 
regional integration framework for Taiwan, combined with the fact that there has 
been no new FTA negotiation between Taiwan and other countries since 2012, it is 
not surprising that several Taiwanese political elites conclude that the expansion of 
Taiwan’s international space is “under Beijing’s control”76. Nevertheless, Taiwan still 
successfully obtained membership to some IGOs, and it has also signed several 
bilateral agreements with other states. The next part will examine whether Taiwan 
has consolidated its international legal sovereignty in more detail.        
 
6.3.2 Removing the Obstacle: The China Factor and Taiwan’s Sovereignty  
    The “China factor” has been an obstacle to Taiwan’s international space, and 
this has also had a significant impact on Taiwan’s interdependence sovereignty 
following the wave of regionalization in the Asia-Pacific.77 Indeed, in the era of 																																																								
75 Chien-yuan, Tzeng, interviewed by author, October 21, 2013; Jiun-Wei Lu, interviewed by author, 
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globalization, the importance of interdependence sovereignty corresponds with the 
increasing difficulty for a state to manage trans-border activities (e.g. the flow of 
capital, international trade and so on) independently.78 As such, sovereign states 
collaborate with each other to come up with collective responses to the common 
problems (or issues) they face so as to protect their interests, and the proliferation of 
IGOs, RTAs, and even regional institutions are evidence of this.79 As Taiwan has 
been absent from most multilateral institutions and mechanisms owing to the lack of 
prevalent recognition of its international legal sovereignty, the government has taken 
the initiative to tackle the “China factor” by facilitating Cross-Strait economic 
integration. 80  However, the last part of this section demonstrates the limited 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s strategy to expand international space, and thus suggests 
that what Taiwan has gained in terms of international legal sovereignty and 
interdependence sovereignty should not be exaggerated. 
 
    Scholars point out that Taiwan’s strategy for reinforcing its international legal 
sovereignty by signing FTAs only achieved limited effect.81 Firstly, Taiwan does not 
have membership as a fully-fledged sovereign state in any IGO; it is only allowed to 
participate as an economy or political entity. 82  Secondly, Taiwan’s functional 
sovereignty is the main reason that drives other sovereign states to support Taiwan’s 
involvement in IGOs and FTA negotiations.83 Hence, the expansion of Taiwan’s 
international space can only strengthen its functional sovereignty rather than 
international legal sovereignty. Lastly and most importantly, this research also finds 
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that the definition of the “one-China Principle” remains rigid in the international 
community, and thus the ECFA between Taiwan and China has resulted in the 
consolidation of China’s de jure sovereignty over Taiwan. To support these 
arguments, the following paragraphs of this section will examine what Taiwan has 
gained and lost at different levels.         
     
   At the bilateral level, it is doubtful whether signing FTAs with other countries 
can strengthen Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty. In fact, it is entirely up to 
how Taiwan and China prefer to interpret the connection between an FTA and 
international legal sovereignty. For the Taiwanese government, signing an FTA is the 
privilege of a sovereign state, and it is a crucial policy instrument to consolidate 
Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty. But none of the agreements between Taiwan 
and its trading partners are called “FTAs”. Senior policy makers of the Ma 
administration point to the case of Japan as a reference since most agreements 
between Japan and other countries are named “EPA” instead of “FTA”.84 The key 
reason for this is that international economic cooperation is no longer restricted to 
the fields of market openness and tariff reductions; other issues such as 
“electronic-commerce” and “human resources development” are important, too.85 
Following this logic, what Taiwan cares about is the efficiency of an economic 
agreement rather than its title, as Mr. Liang Kuo-hsin says: “If it quacks like a duck 
and walks like a duck, it is a duck. Whatever you name these agreements, they are 
FTAs. And we have notified the WTO”.86  
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    However, given the recognition standard of an FTA set by the WTO, the 
connection between an FTA and international legal sovereignty is not clear. The 
WTO has recognized that all the economic agreements between Taiwan and its 
trading partners are FTAs except for the ECFA with China.87 Contrary to the 
understanding that signing an FTA is the privilege of a sovereign state shared among 
Taiwanese elites, the WTO has recognized all of Hong Kong’s economic agreements 
including the CEPA with China.88 In this light, the question of whether signing an 
FTA is the privilege of a sovereign state depends entirely on how a state interprets 
this. Therefore, defining the signing FTAs with other countries as an action of 
acquiring international legal sovereignty is not a sufficient reason for Taiwan to 
become a fully-fledged sovereign state, especially after signing the ECFA with 
China. 
 
    As discussed in the previous chapter, China has institutionalized the “one-China 
Principle” by signing the ECFA with Taiwan although the definition of this principle 
remains ambiguous between both sides. Scholars point out that the ECFA is an ideal 
example for other countries to refer how to avoid sensitive political issues when 
negotiating an FTA with Taiwan. 89  Thus countries without formal diplomatic 
relations only signed FTAs with Taiwan after Beijing signing the ECFA with Taipei 
in 2010.90 Indeed, China is cautious about the definition of Taiwan’s political status. 
Since Beijing had not defined Taiwan’s political status in terms of economic 
cooperation before signing the ECFA with Taiwan, it was difficult for both Singapore 
and New Zealand to adopt a definition that was in line with both China’s and 																																																								
87 WTO, “List of All RTAs in Force”, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015, 
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Taiwan’s interests91.  
 
    Concluding economic negotiation over Cross-Strait economic integration 
therefore became the precondition for Taiwan to sign FTAs with countries without 
diplomatic relations. In this case, the title of Cross-Strait economic agreement 
matters because it defines Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty directly. As a 
result, at the negotiating table with China, Taiwan rejected any title containing the 
word “arrangement” whilst China was opposed to calling any bilateral agreement 
with Taiwan as an FTA, and thus both sides decided to adopt the term “framework 
agreement”, which is more neutral than “FTA” but better than “arrangement”.92 Yet 
this does not affect the effectiveness of the ECFA in terms of defining Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty within the “One-China Principle”. As mentioned in 
chapter 1, according to the “GATT: Article XXIV 5”, a “framework agreement” is 
similar to the “interim agreement leading to the formation of a custom union or a free 
trade area”. 93 Therefore, by signing the ECFA, China actually defines Taiwan’s 
political status as an economy rather than a sovereign state, which corresponds with 
Taiwan’s membership in the WTO. After signing the ECFA with China, both 
Singapore and New Zealand respected China’s political arrangement with Taiwan, 
and thus they adopted the term “TPKM” to refer to Taiwan’s political status in the 
FTAs. Besides, none of these agreements are entitled “FTAs”; they are “economic 
partnership” instead. Consequently, the “One-China Principle” is still an obstacle to 
Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty. 
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    At the regional level, the impact of the “One-China Principle” on Taiwan’s 
international space is more prominent. Although scholars point out that Beijing plans 
to use the ECFA as reference for Taiwan’s participation in East Asian economic 
integration,94 both sides have to work harder to find a feasible name for Taiwan’s 
membership in regional multilateral mechanisms. Indeed, Taipei has not commenced 
a negotiation over its involvement in any regional economic integration framework 
yet because both sides have not reached consensus about Taiwan’s political status in 
regional institutions. Taipei has sent delegates to China to consult Beijing’s attitude 
every year since 2008; however, the response made from Chinese President Xi 
Jinping is: 
 
 “Strengthen cross-strait communication and coordination, explore 
possible ways in which [Taiwan] could participate [in regional integration] 
and make arrangements in the hope of affording Taiwan economic 
development new vigor and dynamics.”95  
 
President Xi’s response implies that Taiwan’s participation in East Asian economic 
integration is contingent upon the development of Cross-Strait relations and a 
consensus about Taiwan’s regional status on both sides. Following this logic, the 
issue of Taiwan’s regional participation is negotiable, but Taiwan still finds it 
difficult to leave from the One-China framework as most Taiwanese elites observe.96 
Additionally, the failure of Taiwan’s application to be to a “founding member” of the 
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Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015 shows that China cannot allow Taiwan 
to attend any regional institutions until both sides can reach consensus on the 
“appropriate name” of Taiwan’s membership.97     
    
    The “one-China Principle” is flexible at the bilateral level and negotiable at the 
regional level; however, it is impeccable at the global level. Scholars indicate that 
Taiwan’s membership in the WHA cannot improve its international status. Contrary 
to Taiwan’s expectations, the narrow definition of the “one-China Principle” in these 
IGOs has not only led to Taiwan being seen as affiliated with the PRC, but has also 
resulted in the loss of its interdependence sovereignty and even “functional 
sovereignty”.98 For example, Taiwan participates in the WTO as a “separate custom 
territory” by the name of “TPKM”, and is also known as “Chinese Taipei” in official 
WTO documents.99 Even though Taiwan became a member of the WTO in 2002, 
Taiwan was still not allowed to take part in the Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA) until the outset of negotiations over cross-Strait economic integration with 
China in 2009.100 Furthermore, under China’s pressure, the WTO published the 
“GPA/87” which clearly states: “With respect to the nomenclature and other 
terminology used in a decision of accession of the Agreement [GPA] … none of the 
nomenclature and other terminology used have implications for sovereignty”.101  																																																								
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    As to the case of Taiwan’s membership in the WHO, an institution affiliated to 
the UN, the “One-China Principle” has no ambiguity that would allow Taiwan to 
interpret it in different ways. Former Deputy Minister of Mainland Affairs Council 
(ROC), Professor Huang Chieh-cheng, he denies Taiwan’s membership in the WHO 
as an observer by saying: “There is no membership entitled ‘observer’ in the WHO. 
Taiwan can only attend the WHO assembly [WHA] with an invitation letter from the 
PRC on a year by year basis”102. In other words, Taiwan’s attendance to the WHA is 
contingent upon the development of Cross-Strait relations, which further constrains 
Taiwan’s options. Moreover, the “Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 
China and the WHO Secretariat” indicates that the WHO can only contact the 
Taiwan’s authorities with the consent of the PRC.103  In this regard, Taiwan’s 
political status is apparently affiliated to the PRC. Furthermore, Taiwan’s “functional 
sovereignty” and interdependence sovereignty have also been compromised owing to 
China’s sovereign claim over Taiwan in the international community.104 By this 
reasoning, Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty is constrained by the “One-China 
Principle”, and it is therefore doubtful that Taiwan can strengthen de jure sovereignty 
by enlarging its international space at the global level. 
 
    In summary, it is doubtful that Taiwan can strengthen international legal 
sovereignty through the enlargement of its international space after improving 
cross-Strait relations. At the global level, the narrowly-defined “one-China principle” 
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is widely adopted, and the ambiguous “one-China Principle” institutionalized by the 
ECFA is not applicable. Furthermore, the problematic statehood in IGOs has also 
constrained both Taiwan’s interdependence sovereignty and functional sovereignty 
because China fully controls the rights of Taiwan’s membership. At the bilateral and 
regional level, as the ECFA serves as a reference for other countries to commence 
economic negotiations with Taiwan,105 the self-interpreted “one-China Principle” is 
not a sufficient factor to ensure Taiwan’s sovereign status as it wishes in the 
international community. Consequently, in terms of sovereignty, Taiwan has received 
interdependence and functional sovereignty due to its signing of FTAs with 
Singapore and New Zealand. Yet, on the one hand, this is limited since Beijing’s 
acquiescence is necessary for other countries to sign FTAs with Taiwan. On the other 
hand, there is no new FTA between Taiwan and other countries following the stalled 
progress of cross-Strait economic integration. As such, it is also doubtful whether 
Taiwan can decrease the degree of economic dependence on the Chinese market via 
bilateral and regional FTAs. However, the impact of cross-Strait economic 
integration is not only on Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty and 
interdependence sovereignty; scholars argue that it also allows China to intervene in 
Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty.106 Thus the next section will study the economic and 
political aspects of this issue. 
6.4 Evaluating Taiwan’s New Mainland Policy  
    After discussing Taiwan’s strategic concern over the ECFA at the regional and 
global levels, this section evaluates the ECFA’s impacts on Taiwan’s economic 
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performance and its de facto sovereignty at the bilateral level across the Taiwan 
Strait. From an economic perspective, the ECFA did not significantly benefit 
Taiwan’s economic performance between 2010 and 2014, as the government had 
anticipated. Moreover, given the huge outflow of Taiwanese capital towards China, 
some analysts even worried that the ECFA would generate the “hollowing-out” 
effects.107 This section argues the “hollowing-out” effects in Taiwan are not yet 
apparent. However, Taiwan’s economic performance relies on its export performance. 
As most of Taiwan’s major export commodities, especially ICT products, were 
mainly produced in China,108 Taiwan has depended heavily on the low-cost factors 
of production in the Chinese market. Finally, this section contends that as the 1992 
consensus became institutionalized following the signing of the ECFA in 2010, 
China infringed on Taiwan’s functional and de facto sovereignty in the post-ECFA 
era.		
6.4.1 ECFA and Taiwan’s Economic Performance  
    The question of whether Cross-Strait economic integration is beneficial or 
harmful to Taiwan’s economic development has generated fierce debate among 
scholars.109 However, the impact of the ECFA on Taiwan’s economic performance 
are not clear because the progress of Cross-Strait economic integration is stagnant. 
So far, the sub-agreements of the ECFA, such as Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in 
Services and Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Goods, are all pending in effect due 
to the burst of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 2014 (see Appendix I). Thus 																																																								
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most evaluations of the ECFA’s impact on Taiwan’s economy are based upon 
anticipations, which are not convincible but questionable. To make objective 
analyses, this section will examine whether the Taiwanese government have achieved 
their goals by signing the ECFA with China. However, it is essential to mention that 
although the ECFA did not meet the Taiwan’s expectations in boosting its economic 
performance, the question of whether Taiwan’s economic performance would be 
worse without the ECFA is worthy of consideration. In fact, as will be discussed 
below, Taiwan’s economic performance was affected by the financial crisis in 2008. 
Meanwhile, due to the weak growth of China’s exports, Taiwan had also suffered 
impact on its trade performance. 110  
 
    Generally speaking, the Taiwanese government asserts that the ECFA’s benefits 
to Taiwan’s economic performance include lowering Taiwan’s unemployment rate to 
3% by offering 60,000 jobs, increasing the market share of Taiwan’s products in the 
Chinese market vis-à-vis South Korea, raising Taiwan’s real GDP growth rate by 
2.83%, boosting Taiwan’s exports to the Mainland, and attracting FDI to Taiwan by 
US$8.9 billion.111 However, the “Economic Indicators EBook” published by the 
MOEA (ROC) paints a less rosy picture.112 First of all, with respect to lowering 
Taiwan’s unemployment rate, although the rate had decreased from 5.21% in 2010 to 
4.39% in 2011, the contribution made by the ECFA did not correspond with the 
government’s expectations (see Figure 6.4.1). Even four years after the signing of the 
ECFA, the unemployment rate in Taiwan was 4.03%, which was still 1% higher than 																																																								
110 Tung and Yeh, “Development of a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 
43-44. 
111 MOEA, ROC, “Taiwan, Mainland China, and Global Trading Partners”, 2010, accessed April 17, 
2015, http://www.ecfa.org.tw/Download.aspx?No=10&strT=ECFADoc; Tung and Yeh, 
“Development of a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 44-52; Hsieh, “The 
China-Taiwan ECFA”, 133-37.  
112 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”.  
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the government anticipated. 
Figure 6.4.1 Taiwan’s Unemployment Rate between 2008 and 2014 
      
Source: Compiled by the author based on the “Economic Indicators EBook” 
published by the MOEA (ROC) in 2015113 
 
    Furthermore, concerns about a possible substitution effect caused by the FTA 
between China and South Korea was another reason that motivated the government 
to sign the ECFA with China.114 As discussed above, Taiwan’s manufacturing 
industries have faced fierce competition from South Korean enterprises, especially 
the ICT industry. Scholars also argue that the implementation of China-South Korea 
FTA, China-ASEAN FTA, and the upcoming trilateral FTA between China, Japan 
and South Korea, will result in the loss of competitive advantages for Taiwan’s 
manufacturing in BDCCs.115 All Taiwanese policy makers from the MOEA (ROC) 
recognize this point, but they indicate that the ICT industries did not benefit from the 
ECFA as they have been enjoying tariff exemption owing to the ITA in the WTO.116 
Instead, chemical material manufacturing and auto parts and components 
manufacturing were the industries that received significant benefits among all 																																																								
113 Ibid.  
114 Karackattu, “Post-ECFA Outlook for Relationship across the Taiwan Strait”, 119-21. 
115 Dent, “Taiwan and the New East Asian Regionalism”, 119-24; Tung and Yeh, “Development of a 
Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 46-50. 
116 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014; Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, 
March 14, 2014; Tsao-Shan Cho, interviewed by author, April 15, 2014.  
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manufacturing industries owing to the implementation of the Early Harvest List 
(EHL) of the ECFA.117  
     
    Mrs. Hsu Chun-fang further says: ”We expect to stabilize Taiwan’s industrial 
development and investment in the Mainland through the ECFA, which also 
contributes to the market share of Taiwan’s industries in the mainland”. 118 
Nevertheless, contrary to Taiwan’s goal, the market share of Taiwan’s products in 
China decreased after the signing of the ECFA (see Table 6.4.1).119 According to 
Table 6.4.1, the market share of Taiwan’s industry had been dropped from 8.3% in 
2010 to 7.2% after one year of signing the ECFA with China in 2010. In 2014, the 
statistics regarding Taiwan’s market share in the Mainland was 7.8%, which was still 
lower than the 8.5% in 2009, the year before the implementation of the ECFA. In this 
light, the ECFA did not help Taiwan to raise its market share in China, and Taiwan 
even rivaled with the US to secure a seat amongst the top three economies with 
respect to the market share in China since 2014. 
 
Table 6.4.1 The Rank of Market Share in China 
     Year 
Country 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
South 
Korea 
10.2% 9.9% 9.3% 9.2% 9.4% 9.7% 
Japan 13.0% 12.6% 11.2% 9.8% 8.3% 8.3% 
Taiwan 8.5% 8.3% 7.2% 7.3% 8.0% 7.8% 
The US 7.7% 7.3% 6.8% 7.0% 7.5% 7.8% 
Germany 5.6% 5.3% 5.3% 5.1% 4.8% 5.3% 
Source: Compiled by the author according to the “Economic Indicators EBook” 
published by the MOEA (ROC) in 2015120  
 																																																								
117 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”. 
120 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.4.2 Taiwan’s GDP Growth Rate (%) 
       
Source: Compiled by the author according to the “Economic Indicators EBook” 
published by the MOEA (ROC) in 2015121    
 
    Taiwan’s GDP growth rate may be the only evidence that can show the 
efficiency of the ECFA in boosting Taiwan’s economic growth. However, the 
contribution of the ECFA was only significant between 2010 and 2011, when 
Taiwan’s GDP growth rate reached 10.63% and 3.80% respectively (see Figure 
6.4.2) ; it was not clear between 2011 and 2013, since Taiwan’s GDP growth rate was 
about 2%. Moreover, by looking at Taiwan’s GDP per capita at current prices, it 
becomes clear that the ECFA was not unambiguously beneficial to Taiwan’s GDP 
growth. According to the “World Economic Outlook Database” compiled by the IMF 
in 2015, although Taiwan’s GDP grew by double-digits, Taiwan’s current GDP per 
capita was US$19,261 in 2010, which just came back to the standard before the 
world financial crisis in 2008.122 Furthermore, Taiwan’s GDP was US$20,911 in 
2011, US$21,269 in 2012, and US$21,874 in 2013; it is clear that Taiwan’s economic 
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growth slowed down since 2012.123 Some scholars explain this by pointing to the 
decline in Taiwan’s exports to the Chinese market, especially because the annual 
growth rate Taiwan’s total exports to China became negative in 2012 (-4.3%).124 As 
such, it is unclear to what extent the ECFA contributed to Taiwan’s economic 
performance.  
 
    Finally, the assertion that the ECFA can enhance Taiwan’s competitive 
advantages to attract FDI is problematic. Taiwanese policy makers believe that the 
ECFA has motivated several foreign enterprises to direct their capitals to Taiwan, 
especially Japanese enterprises125. For example, Mr. Liang Kuo-hsin says: 
 
“Cannon, a famous manufacturer of digital cameras, invested in Taichung 
City and Chiayi County to build two new factories right after the signing of 
the ECFA in 2010. They found that their products could enjoy duty free by 
exporting from Taiwan. Besides, it has also created 5,000 to 6,000 
employment opportunities”.126 
   
    Notwithstanding several large investments from Japan, based upon the statistics 
of Taiwan’s inward and outward investment (see Table 6.4.2), Taiwan only attracted 
FDI by US$5 billion on average between 2010 and 2014; obviously, it was far less 
than the government’s prediction of US$8.9 billion.127. Most significantly, the 
balance of Taiwan’s inbound and outbound investment was negative between 2007 
and 2014. As shown in Table 6.4.2, the capital deficit doubled following the 																																																								
123 Ibid. 
124 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”; Tung and Yeh, 
“Development of a Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement”, 44-46. 
125 Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, March 14, 2014. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”. 
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implementation of the ECFA, which peaked at US$15 billion in 2012.128 Besides, 
the net outflow of Taiwan’s investment reached US$20.8 billion that year. Therefore, 
the efficiency of the ECFA to attract FDI to Taiwan is dubious, and the government 
seems to exaggerate ECFA’s contribution to Taiwan’s economic performance.  
 
Table 6.4.2 The Balance of Taiwan’s Inbound and Outbound Investment 
between 2008 and 2014 
The balance of Taiwan’s Inward and Outward Investment between 2008 and 2014 (Unit: US$1,000) 
Year Investment 
from 
China 
Inward 
Investment 
(without 
China) 
Subtotal of 
Inward 
investment  
Investment 
in China 
Outward 
Investment 
(without 
China) 
Subtotal of 
Outward 
Investment 
Balance of 
Inward 
Minus 
Outward 
2006 0 13,969,247 13,969,247 7,642,335 4,315,426 11,957,761 2,011,486 
2007 0 15,361,173 15,361,173 9,970,545 6,469,978 16,440,523 -1,079,350 
2008 0 8,237,114 8,237,114 10,691,390 4,466,491 15,157,881 -6,920,767 
2009 37,486 4,797,891 4,835,737 7,142,593 3,005,554 10,148,147 -5,312,410 
2010 94,345 3,811,565 3,905,910 14,617,872 2,823,451 17,441,323 -13,535,413 
2011 51,625 4,955,435 5,007,060 14,376,624 3,696,827 18,073,451 -13,066,391 
2012 331,583 5,558,981 5,890,564 12,792,077 8,098,641 20,890,718 -15,000,154 
2013 349,479 4,933,451 5,282,930 9,190,090 5,232,266 14,422,356 -9,139,426 
2014 334,631 5,770,017 6,104,648 10,276,570 7,293,683 17,570,253 -11,465,605 
Source: Compiled from Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
R.O.C. (2016) “Monthly Report (December 2015)”129 
 
6.4.2 ECFA: The “Hollowing-out” Effect and Asymmetric Economic 
Interdependence 
    The ECFA’s contribution to Taiwan’s economic performance does not 
correspond with the Taiwanese government’s expectations. Moreover, owing to the 
considerable capital deficit in Taiwan, scholars are also worried about the 																																																								
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
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“hollowing-out” effect caused by the ECFA.130 As discussed in the previous section, 
while 97% of Taiwanese enterprises are SMEs, the huge capital outflow towards the 
Chinese market reflects the phenomenon of Taiwan’s industrial offshoring, and it 
also means that Taiwanese SMEs may have moved both their operation headquarters 
and factories to China.131 However, not all Taiwanese political elites agree with the 
“hollowing-out” effects. For example, Doctor Tzeng Chien-yuan points out that 
China’s and Taiwan’s manufacturing industries supplement to each other owing to 
different manufacturing advantages they have; he says:  
 
“China can offer cheap land and labor to Taiwanese businessmen while we 
can offer capital and know-how. Therefore, Taiwan’s investment in China is 
not based upon political strategies but economic logic … China-Taiwan 
economic integration should not be defined by this political terminology 
[the “hollowing-out” effect] without evidence”.132 
         
Thus, this research will examine whether the ECFA has generated the “hollowing-out” 
effect in Taiwan by carefully reviewing several indicators including the structure of 
Taiwan’s investment in China and its exports.   
 
    The argument that Taiwan’s economy has been “hollowed out” by China in the 
post-ECFA era is not convincible when compared with the evidence on Taiwanese 
investment in the Mainland and the structure of Taiwan’s industries. As shown in 
Table 6.4.3, Manufacturing had a share of more than 80% of Taiwan’s total 																																																								
130 Wu and Hong, “Economic Integration in East Asia— Taiwan Perspective”, 39-48. 
131 Tsai-Lung Hong, interviewed by author, March 20, 2014; Jiun-Wei Lu, interviewed by author, 
March 10, 2014. 
132 Chien-yuan Tzeng, interviewed by author, October 21, 2013.  
	 357 
investment in China between 2005 and 2009. Although the ECFA has allowed 
services industries, such as financial services enterprises, to invest in the Chinese 
market, investment from Taiwanese manufacturing industries still made up about 
60% of Taiwan’s total investment in China between 2010 and 2014.133 Scholars 
attribute this phenomenon to the thriving development of Taiwan’s OEM industries, 
and the fierce price competition between OEMs drove Taiwan’s manufacturing 
industries to make use of China’s cheap factors of production to enhance competitive 
advantages.134 Consequently, the “business model” of Taiwan’s OEMs is “receiving 
orders in Taiwan, manufacturing in Mainland China, transiting in Hong Kong, and 
selling overseas”135. In this regard, Taiwan’s manufacturers depend heavily on 
China’s low-cost factors of production. However, according to the “Economic 
Indicators EBook”, manufacturing is not Taiwan’s key industry as it only accounted 
29.8% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2014.136 By contrast, the major industry in Taiwan is 
services, which had a share of 64.05% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2014.137 Most of 
Taiwan’s and China’s service industries are still forbidden from investing across the 
Taiwan Strait owing to the pending Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services. 
Therefore, despite Taiwanese manufacturing industries’ considerable degree of 
economic dependence on the Chinese market, it is inappropriate to argue that 
Cross-Strait economic integration has resulted in the “hollowing-out” effect. 
 
																																																								
133 Ibid. 
13495, “+$6&"-0”, 97-98, Gao, “The Trend and Development of Cross-Strait 
Economic Relations”, 97-98. 
135 Huang, “TPP Versus ECFA”, 97. 
136 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”. 
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Table 6.4.3 Statistics on Approved Mainland Investment by Industry (Unit: US$1,000) 
Year 
Total Manufacturing 
Amount 
Sub-total 1st 2nd 3rd 
Amount Share Amount 
Share 
Amount 
Share 
Amount 
Share 
Total Sub-total Total Sub-total Total Sub-total 
2005 
6,006,953  5,281,921  87.93% 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
1,243,497  20.70% 23.54% 850,106  14.15% 16.09% 560,706  9.33% 10.62% 
2006 
7,642,335  6,649,291  87.01% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
1,618,566  21.18% 24.34% 1,472,132  19.26% 22.14% 664,726  8.70% 10.00% 
2007 
9,970,545  8,765,998  87.92% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
2,426,286  24.33% 27.68% 1,688,385  16.93% 19.26% 1,047,009  10.50% 11.94% 
2008 
10,691,390  8,761,185  81.95% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
2,051,917  19.19% 23.42% 1,783,302  16.68% 20.35% 1,065,871  9.97% 12.17% 
2009 
7,142,593  5,892,078  82.49% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
1,801,294  25.22% 30.57% 1,019,404  14.27% 17.30% 462,680  6.48% 7.85% 
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Table 6.4.3 Statistics on Approved Mainland Investment by Industry (Unit: US$1,000) (Continue) 
Year 
Total Manufacturing 
Amount 
Sub-total 1st 2nd 3rd 
Amount Share Amount 
Share 
Amount 
Share 
Amount 
Share 
Total Sub-total Total Sub-total Total Sub-total 
2010 
14,617,872  10,840,822  74.16% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 
Manufacturing 
4,854,424  33.21% 44.78% 1,235,374  8.45% 11.40% 791,772  5.42% 7.30% 
2011 
14,376,624  10,375,391  72.17% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing Chemical Material Manufacturing 
3,467,195  24.12% 33.42% 1,550,552  10.79% 14.94% 832,680  5.79% 8.03% 
2012 
12,792,077  7,518,803  58.78% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing Chemical Material Manufacturing 
1,948,057  15.23% 25.91% 1,522,422  11.90% 20.25% 1,171,111  9.15% 15.58% 
2013 
9,190,090  5,120,523  55.72% 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 
1,174,675  12.78% 22.94% 1,026,728  11.17% 20.05% 460,145  5.01% 8.99% 
2014 
10,276,570  6,579,158  64.02% 
Electronic Parts and Components 
Manufacturing 
Computers, Electronic and Optical 
Products Manufacturing 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 
Manufacturing 
1,613,022  15.70% 24.52% 1,330,215  12.94% 20.22% 683,346  6.65% 10.39% 
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Table 6.4.3 Statistics on Approved Mainland Investment by Industry (Unit: US$1,000) (Continue) 
Year 
Total Services Industries 
Amount 
1st 2nd 3rd 
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
2006 
7,642,335  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Professional, Scientific and Technical Services Transportation and Storage 
312,778  4.09% 123,672  1.62% 104,781  1.37% 
2007 
9,970,545  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Information and Communication Financial and Insurance 
411,902  4.13% 151,269  1.52% 117,948  1.18% 
2008 
10,691,390  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Information and Communication Other Industries 
499,106  4.67% 324,465  3.03% 261,941  2.45% 
2009 
7,142,593  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Information and Communication Accommodation and Food Services 
743,150  10.40% 106,845  1.50% 80,292  1.12% 
2010 
14,617,872  
Real Estate Wholesale and Retail Trade Financial and Insurance 
1,128,284  7.72% 1,115,494  7.63% 500,376  3.42% 
2011 
14,376,624  
Financial and Insurance Wholesale and Retail Trade Real Estate 
1,255,828  8.74% 1,232,720  8.57% 413,598  2.88% 
2012 
12,792,077  
Financial and Insurance Real Estate Wholesale and Retail Trade 
1,725,721  13.49% 1,337,996  10.46% 1,271,788  9.94% 
2013 
9,190,090  
Financial and Insurance Wholesale and Retail Trade Real Estate 
1,900,966  20.68% 1,035,940  11.27% 289,317  3.15% 
2014 
10,276,570  
Financial and Insurance Wholesale and Retail Trade Real Estate 
1,658,954  16.14% 1,095,575  10.66% 325,297  3.17% 
Source: Compiled from Investment Commission of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, R.O.C. (2016) “Monthly Report (December 2015)”138 
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Table 6.4.4 Top 10 Taiwanese Export Commodities  
 2011 2012 2013 2014 Structure 
of Export 
Electronic Products 839 834 881 1000 33.0% 
Basic Metals and Articles Thereof 302 281 276 289 9.3% 
Plastics and Articles Thereof; Rubber and 
Articles Thereof 
252 242 248 241 7.5% 
Machineries 205 201 198 209 6.9% 
Chemicals 225 208 213 217 6.7% 
Optical, Photographic, Measuring, Medical 
Instruments, etc. 
223 218 210 191 6.2% 
Mineral Products 179 221 237 205 4.4% 
Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated 
Transport 
103 111 110 117 4.1% 
Information and Communication Products 198 155 147 130 4.0% 
Textile Products 127 118 117 116 3.8% 
Unit: US$ 100Million 
Source: Compiled by the author according to the “Economic Indicators EBook” 
published by the MOEA (ROC) in 2015139        
 
    In spite of the fact that the “hollowing-out” effect does not correspond with the 
evidence on the structure of Taiwan’s investment in China, the structure of Taiwan’s 
exports tells a different story. Taiwan is an economy adopting an export-oriented 
development strategy and it is currently the 19th largest exporter in the world.140 As 
shown in Table 6.4.4, the major commodities of Taiwan’s export were electronic and 
ICT products (including “electronic products, machineries, information and 
communication products, and Optical, Photographic, Measuring, Medical 
Instruments, etc.”), which shared 50.1% of Taiwan’s total exports in 2014.141 
Notably most of these commodities were produced in China. By referring to the 
Table 6.4.3, it is clear that manufacturers of Taiwan’s major export products were 
also amongst the top three investors in Taiwan’s manufacturing industries on the 
mainland, which were “Computers, Electronic and Optical Products Manufacturing”, 
“Electronic Parts and Components Manufacturing”, and “Electrical Equipment 																																																								
139 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
	 362 
Manufacturing” respectively.142 By this reasoning, Taiwan’s economic performance 
relies on its export performance, which depends heavily on China’s low-cost factors 
of production. As the ECFA has sped up Taiwan’s manufacturing offshoring between 
2010 and 2011, several scholars therefore argue that China has actually hollowed out 
Taiwan’s economic base.143    
 
Table 6.4.5 Annual Growth Rate of Taiwan’s Export to Major Trading Partners   
                                       Year 
Economies 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
The US 33.6% 15.6% -9.3% -1.2% 7.1% 
China 41.8% 9.1% -3.9% 1.3% 0.4% 
Japan 24.2% 1.2% 4.2% 1.2% 3.5% 
NAFTA 33.8% 15.9% -7.8% -1.4% 6.9% 
EU 30.1% 6.2% -7.8% -3.5% 3.5% 
ASEAN 6 
(Vietnam, The Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and Singapore)  
37.2% 22.7% 9.8% 3.9% 1.2% 
Source: Compiled by the author according to the “Economic Indicators EBook” 
published by the MOEA (ROC) in 2015144 
 
    However, the “hollowing-out” thesis is not supported by the statistics on 
Taiwan’s exports to the Chinese market and its investment in China. First of all, 
according to Table 6.2.2, although Taiwan’s investment in China shared a large 
portion of its total outward investment, both the amount and the share decreased 
between 2012 and 2014. The reason for this is that the cost of Chinese labor has 
increased gradually since 2005, and thus Taiwanese OEMs have redirected their 
																																																								
142 Investment Commission, MOEA, ROC, “Monthly Report (December 2015)”. 
143 Jiun-Wei Lu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014; Tsai-Lung Hong, interviewed by author, 
March 20, 2014 
144 Department of Statistics, MOEA, ROC, “Economic Indicators EBook”. 
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investments from China to Vietnam or Malaysia (see Table 6.2.3).145 This combined 
with the recession in Chinese export growth from 2012 onwards (see Table 6.2.4), 
affected the annual growth rate of Taiwan’s export to China, which was -3.9% in 
2012 (see Table 6.4.5). In this light, it is dubious whether China has hollowed out 
Taiwan’s economic base.    
 
    In the context of the above arguments, the definition of the “hollowing-out” 
effect is ambivalent; and thus it is not possible to argue that the ECFA has caused the 
“hollowing-out” effect before its full implementation. Nevertheless, the asymmetric 
economic interdependence between Taiwan and China has made Taiwanese people 
worry about the emergence of the “hollowing-out” effect, which motivated them to 
oppose further economic integration with China, the best evidence of which is the 
Sunflower Movement in 2014 was most evident. 146  Scholars attribute this 
phenomenon to the government’s propaganda surrounding the ECFA’s efficiency.147 
Based upon the above economic analyses, the ECFA has a limited contribution to 
Taiwan’s economic performance. Additionally, owing to the acceleration of Taiwan’s 
industrial offshoring to China after signing the ECFA, several scholars argue that 
Cross-Strait economic integration has allowed China to hollow out Taiwan’s 
economic base as Taiwan’s export performance and manufacturing output depends 
heavily on China.148 Therefore, the ECFA is not beneficial for Taiwan’s economic 
development. By contrast, it can only increase the degree of asymmetric economic 
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interdependence between China and Taiwan. Mrs. Hsu Chun-fan explains that:  
 
“The government’s prediction of the ECFA’s efficiency was according to 
the simulation of full implementation of this agreement, including the 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services and the Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Trade in Goods. While these sub-agreements are pending, it 
is not surprising to see limited efficiency of the ECFA in term of boosting 
Taiwan’s economic development”.149     
 
   So far, Cross-Strait economic integration has increased the degree of Taiwan’s 
economic dependence on the Chinese market. Taiwanese policy makers of the Ma 
administration aim to reverse this situation by signing FTAs with other major trading 
partners and participating in regional economic integration, but they face difficulties 
in carrying out this strategy. For example, Professor Su Chi says:  
 
“It is very hard for us to participate in the TPP because we are afraid to 
open our market. Taiwanese people were worried about food security when 
we planed to import agricultural products from abroad. When we planed to 
open our market, they began to worry about the decrease in employment 
opportunities and impacts on traditional industries … Finally, we will still 
depend heavily on the Chinese market. This is a very ironic 
consequence”.150  
 
In addition to constraints caused by public opinion in Taiwan, the “China factor” is 																																																								
149 Chun-Fang Hsu, interviewed by author, March 10, 2014. 
150 Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 18, 2014. 
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the other barrier stopping Taiwan from participating in the process of regional 
economic integration. There have been no FTAs between Taiwan and other countries 
since the stagnant progress of Cross-Strait economic integration, and Chinese leaders 
have taken the development of Cross-Strait economic integration as the precondition 
for Taiwan’s participation in regional integration.151 Now that Taiwan’s international 
space is based upon the development of Cross-Strait economic integration, the ECFA 
has actually restricted Taiwan’s policy options.  
   
6.4.3 Strategic Dilemma: ECFA, Taiwan’s Mainland Policy and Domestic 
Sovereignty 
    As discussed above, economically, the ECFA made a limited contribution to 
Taiwan’s economic development. What has made this agreement become much more 
contentious is its political impact on Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty. In general, 
China’s intervention in Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty has three dimensions. Firstly, 
the ECFA has institutionalized the “one-China Principle” between China and Taiwan, 
and it has brought up the question of the legitimacy of Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty. 
Secondly, since the ECFA has been serving as a reference point for not only FTAs 
between Taiwan and other countries but also Taiwan’s participation in regional 
integration mechanisms, Taiwan’s foreign policy is constrained by its Mainland 
policy. Finally, Taiwanese scholars also point out that Taiwan’s national security has 
been threatened by intensive Cross-Strait economic integration.152  
 
    As mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, the “one-China Principle” was 																																																								
151 Editorial, “Cross-Strait Dialogue Should Focus on Taiwan’s TPP, RCEP Bids”. 
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institutionalized by the ECFA based upon the “1992 Consensus”; however, it is an 
interim plan for shelving the disputed sovereignty issues between China and Taiwan. 
The profound implication of the 1992 Consensus is that Taiwan’s de facto 
sovereignty needs to be recognized by Beijing; otherwise, Taiwan cannot even act as 
a political entity with full function in the international community. Scholars have 
illustrated Taiwan’s entry to the WTO and the WHA as cases in point.153 Their 
research indicates that when Cross-Strait relations became nervous, the legitimacy of 
Taiwan’s de facto and functional sovereignty could be compromised by the PRC 
despite the fact that Taipei remained in control of the island.154 Taiwan’s failure to 
join the GPA and WHA as a political entity between 2002 and 2008 is the clearest 
evidence of this.155 As such, since Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s inauguration 
in 2008, achieving the goal of transferring from a situation of “mutual 
non-recognition to mutual non-denial” has been one of his major motivations for 
improving Cross-Strait relations by signing the ECFA.156  
 
    Professor Chao Chien-min explains that: “All the issues about Mainland China 
are political ones ... and the biggest problem is that Mainland China does not 
recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state” 157. He further says that: 
 
“The contingency scenario for us is to convince Beijing of our de facto 
sovereignty. We aim to connect the “One-China Principle” with both sides’ 
Constitutions. For example, we can interpret the “Once-China” principle 
																																																								
153 Winkler, “A Question of Sovereignty?”, 6-12; Tok, Managing China’s Sovereignty, 129-52.    
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by insisting that the Republic of China is the only legitimate China in the 
world, and then we can make Beijing to accept our de facto sovereignty. 
There is no scenario that is more feasible than the current one [the 1992 
Consensus]”.158 
 
    Under the 1992 Consensus, Beijing has recognized the status quo of 
Cross-Strait relations, and thus Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty has been legitimized 
based upon the ambivalent definition of the “one-China principle”.159 Only after the 
legitimization of the status quo could Taiwan act as a political entity in the 
international community. In this light, the legitimacy of Taiwan’s functional 
sovereignty is entirely based upon China’s recognition.160 While the legitimacy of 
Taiwan’s functional sovereignty requires both sides recognized the 1992 Consensus 
based on their Constitutions, this could impinge on Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty. 
 
   The consequence of the institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus is that 
Taiwan’s foreign policy has been constrained by the Mainland policy, which once 
again proves that China has intended to intervene in Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty 
following Cross-Strait economic integration. As mentioned before, the ECFA is a 
reference point for other countries to sign FTAs with Taiwan, and it also serves as a 
reference for Taiwan’s accession to regional economic integration. However, the 
sub-agreements of the ECFA have been pending owing to the emergence of the 
Sunflower Movement in 2014. Ever since the stagnation of negotiations over 
Cross-Strait economic integration, Taiwan has faced difficulties to conclude FTAs 
with other countries, as has been the case for the FTA between Taiwan and 																																																								
158 Ibid. 
159 Hickey, “Wake Up to Reality”, 1-7. 
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Malaysia.161 This proves that it is difficult for Taiwan to bypass China to enlarge its 
international space by discarding the 1992 Consensus. Chinese President Xi Jinping 
further warned it would result in serious repercussions, such as causing “the earth to 
move and mountains to shake”. 162  Neither could Taipei put any issue about 
Cross-Strait economic integration to a referendum to appease controversies over the 
ECFA owing to Beijing’s strong opposition.163 In this light, Beijing has already 
intervened in Taiwan’s policy-making procedure, which is another case of China’s 
intention to infringe Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty.     
 
    Most significantly, the ECFA has also generated fierce debate over the question 
of whether Cross-Strait economic integration has endangered Taiwan’s economic and 
national security164. Indeed, based upon concerns over the “hollowing-out” effect 
which has been argued to put Taiwan’s “national security” in danger, the Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Trade in Services is on hold following the emergence of the Sunflower 
Movement in 2014. 165  It has also affected the negotiations over the other 
sub-agreements of the ECFA, such as the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Goods. 
Economically, Taiwan should benefit from this agreement. According to the 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services, China promises to open “80 market 
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segments” whilst Taiwan only needs to “liberalize 64 industries”.166 Besides, among 
the 64 sectors that Taiwan promised to open, Taiwanese policymakers point out that 
27 of them had already been liberalized since both sides’ accession to the WTO in 
2002, and thus China made more considerable economic concessions in addition to 
the ECFA.167 However, it is notable that service industries shared 64% of Taiwan’s 
GDP in 2014. Therefore, political elites from the DPP expect the government to hold 
more public hearings in order to stringently assess the impact of the Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Trade in Services on Taiwan’s economic performance. For example, 
Doctor Hong Tsai-lung says:  
 
“[The]Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services regulates the issue of 
market openness and personnel exchanges between both sides in great 
detail. However, it will result in the influx of Chinese capitals and workers 
into Taiwan, and this means the ‘China factor’ will penetrate into 
Taiwanese society…It is very dangerous, but there is no effective 
supervisory mechanism over Cross-Strait exchanges. Besides, the 
government has only made casual evaluations of this issue.”168 
 
    Furthermore, although China seemed to make economic concessions in the 
Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services, there is a problem about asymmetric 
market openness between both sides. First of all, Taiwan’s e-business enterprises are 
only allowed to set up a branch in the Fujian Province, and accordingly, China must 
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hold at least 45% of these companies’ shares169. Another case of asymmetric opening 
between both sides is China’s publishers are allowed to invest in Taiwan’s publishing 
industry freely while Taiwan’s publishers need to accept Beijing’s censorship before 
investing or making publications in China170. Moreover, scholars also cast doubt on 
whether Chinese investment in Taiwan’s telecommunications industry will endanger 
Taiwan’s national security171 . Taiwan’s former Chairman of the Committee of 
Research and Planning in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and former Director of 
China Affairs Department of the DPP, Doctor Yen Jien-fa, points out that the factors 
of asymmetric market openness and the difference between both sides’ political 
regimes will result in the limiting of “Taiwan’s influence in the Mainland” whilst 
“Chinese will have much more influence on Taiwan”.172 Thus, according to Doctor 
Yen, “Cross-Strait economic integration will result in the loss of Taiwan’s political 
autonomy and Taiwanese national identity”.173 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
    This chapter examined the impacts of the ECFA on Taiwan’s economic 
development and sovereignty, and analyzed the effectiveness of Taiwan’s strategy to 
counter China’s commercial diplomacy. In summary, economically, the ECFA has 
had a limited contribution to Taiwan’s economic performance, but the question of 																																																								
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whether it is favorable for China to wield commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan 
efficiently is controversial. As discussed above, the efficiency of China’s commercial 
diplomacy towards Taiwan is based on the asymmetric economic interdependence 
between both sides. Although there is still an asymmetry between both sides’ 
investments toward each other, which caused Taiwan to be concerned about the 
“hollowing-out” effect (see Table 6.4.2), the degree of Taiwan’s economic 
development on the Mainland has actually been falling from 2012. Indeed, the share 
of Taiwan’s investment in China has dropped from 83.81% in 2012 to 58.48% in 
2014 (see Table 6.2.2). Correspondingly, the annual growth rate of Taiwan’s exports 
to China has also fallen since 2012, reaching -3.9% in 2012 (see Table 6.4.5).  
 
    It is notable that the decrease in Taiwan’s economic dependence on China was 
not caused by Taiwan’s effort in signing FTAs with other major trading partners. 
Scholars attribute this phenomenon to the recession in Chinese exports growth and 
the rising costs of production in China that drove several Taiwanese enterprises to 
redirect their capitals to Southeast Asian countries (see Table 6.2.2 and Table 
6.2.3). 174  Furthermore, most Taiwanese investment in China comes from 
manufacturing industries, which shared less than 30% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2014.175 
As to Taiwan’s major GDP contributor — services industries — their investment in 
China still shared a small percentage of Taiwan’s total outward investment in China 
owing to the pending of Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services (see Table 
6.4.3). In this regard, to enhance the efficiency of commercial diplomacy towards 
Taiwan, Beijing needs to, on the one hand, boost its exports performance and to 
attract Taiwanese investment. On the other hand, China also needs to convince 																																																								
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Taiwanese people to promote Cross-Strait economic integration, otherwise its 
influence may remain limited.  
 
    However, this is not to deny the efficiency of China’s commercial diplomacy 
towards Taiwan, and in fact, Beijing has made several political achievements. 
Specifically, the ECFA’s institutionalization of the “one-China Principle” under the 
1992 Consensus, which connects the concept of “one-China” with both sides’ 
Constitutions, indicates that the legitimacy of Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty needs to 
be approved by Beijing176. Only with Beijing’s consent could Taiwan’s “functional 
sovereignty” be widely recognized in the international community that allows Taipei 
to enlarge international space by signing FTAs or participating in IGOs as an 
economy or a political entity.177 Furthermore, since the ECFA served as a reference 
for other countries to sign FTAs with Taiwan as well as Taiwan’s membership in 
regional economic mechanisms, it has made Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty 
become self-interpreted, which is not beneficial for Taiwan to achieve the goal of 
becoming a fully-fledged sovereign state. Moreover, following the stagnant progress 
of Cross-Strait economic integration, the “China factor” has become a prominent 
obstacle to Taiwan’s international space again, and it has further affected Taiwan’s 
seesawing strategy of participating in either the TPP or the RCEP. Consequently, 
Taiwan’s interdependence sovereignty has also been constrained by the development 
of Cross-Strait relations. The task of breaking through this stalemate remains a 
crucial preoccupation of Taiwanese policymakers.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
    This thesis has studied the contentious sovereignty issues between China and 
Taiwan in the context of economic integration at the bilateral level across the Taiwan 
Strait and the regional level of the Asia-Pacific region. Elite interviewing and 
document analysis are core research methods of employed in this thesis. Building on 
scholars’ analyses and statistics on East Asian parts and components trade, this thesis 
confirms that Taiwan’s marginalization in the process of regional economic 
integration is beneficial for China to press its economic advantages so as to convince 
Taiwan to facilitate cross-Strait economic integration by signing the ECFA. This in 
turn provides Beijing with further advantages to infringe upon Taiwan's sovereignty 
by wielding commercial diplomacy in the process of cross-Strait economic 
integration. 
     
    As detailed in chapters 1 and 2, commercial diplomacy had been an important 
strategy for Beijing in its attempts to achieve the national goal of peaceful 
reunification since Taipei resumed economic exchanges with China in the late 
1980s.1 However, not until China began to play a determinant role in the intensive 
process of East Asian economic integration in the late 1990s has commercial 
diplomacy been effective for Beijing to further its political agendas towards Taiwan. 
Indeed, as discussed in chapter 3, before signing the ECFA with Taipei in 2010, 
Beijing had already shaped a favorable environment in the context of regional 
economic integration that would allow it to utilize commercial diplomacy towards 																																																								
1 Bush, Untying the Knot, 39-45. 
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Taiwan. Specifically, chapters 3 and 4 confirmed that China’s pivotal role in East 
Asian RPNs had not only allowed Beijing to establish asymmetric economic 
interdependence across the Taiwan Strait, but it had also provided China with more 
advantages in its strategy to marginalize Taiwan in the process of constructing East 
Asian regionalism by wielding commercial diplomacy.2 This has then impinged on 
Taiwan’s economic and sovereignty interests.    
 
    Consequently, improving cross-Strait relations seemed to be the only feasible 
scenario for Taipei to secure its sovereignty and economic interests. Therefore, 
regardless the precondition of the 1992 Consensus, signing the ECFA with Beijing 
became Taipei’s contingency plan for tackling cross-Strait relations and its regionally 
marginalized position under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency. Yet, given the potential 
“hollowing-out” effect, analysts have questioned ECFA’s contribution to Taiwan’s 
economic development.3 Additionally, debates over whether Taiwan’s sovereignty 
has been eroded in the process of cross-Strait economic integration have never gone 
away in Taiwanese society.4 
 
    As shown in the next section, this thesis concludes that Beijing has infringed 
upon Taiwan’s de jure, functional, and perhaps even domestic sovereignty in the 
post-ECFA era based on analyses in chapters 5 and 6. Nevertheless, as Beijing cannot 
solely rely on commercial diplomacy to alter the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, 
Taiwan’s Westphalian sovereignty remains solid. Meanwhile, this thesis also 
contends that the “hollowing-out” effect should not be magnified in Taiwan. The 																																																								
2 Chen et al., “The ECFA and Its Expected Effect on Cross-Strait Trade and Investment”, 109-21; 
Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 117-19; Hamanaka, “TPP Versus RCEP”, 177-81. 
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core reason for this is that although Taiwanese manufacturing industries have relied 
heavily on the comparative advantages in the Chinese economy, they only accounted 
for less than 30% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2014.5 Nonetheless the concern over the 
“hollowing-out effect” has still driven the Taiwanese people to oppose the ECFA, 
which has then impacted on the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in 
influencing the Taiwanese people’s attitude towards Beijing’s reunification agenda.6 
 
    This thesis contributes a new research approach to Taiwan studies by exploring 
how China and Taiwan incorporate economic issues with sovereignty agendas in the 
process of cross-Strait economic integration through the lens of commercial 
diplomacy. By employing Krasner’s and Winkler’s works to categorize definitions of 
sovereignty,7	 this thesis give new insights into the effectiveness of contemporary 
Beijing’s and Taipei’s commercial diplomacy in furthering sovereignty agendas. 
Finally, several factors, such as the DPP’s attitude towards the ECFA, China’s 
economic performance and so on, may influence the effectiveness of China’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. Future research should take these factors 
into consideration, as will be discussed in the last section. 
 
7.2 The Effectiveness of China’s Commercial Diplomacy towards Taiwan 
    As shown in the analyses in chapters 3 and 4, in addition to ameliorating the 
tense cross-Strait relations, signing the ECFA with Beijing was Taipei’s contingency 
plan for securing its economic and sovereignty interests. However, the Ma 																																																								
5 Department of Statistics, MOEA (ROC), “Economic Indicators EBook”. 
6 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 102-5. 
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Ying-jeou’s administration did not successfully convince the Taiwanese people of the 
ECFA’s contributions to Taiwan. Rather, fierce debates over Taiwan’s sovereignty 
and economic security in Taiwanese society have compelled Taipei to suspend the 
implementation of several sub-agreements of the ECFA (see Appendix I), particularly 
following the onset of the Sunflower Movement in 2014. As shown in chapter 5, 
opponents of the ECFA are worried that deepening cross-Strait economic integration 
would risk Taiwan’s sovereignty and economic security, as Beijing can easily exert 
its influence over Taiwanese society in the process of economic integration.8 The 
“hollowing-out” effect bred by the ECFA is another disputed issue in Taiwanese 
society.9 Yet there is no comprehensive evaluation of these issues owing to the 
decline of Taiwan Studies since the 2000s.10 As discussed below, based on the 
evaluations made in this thesis, the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy 
towards Taiwan in the post-ECFA era should not be exaggerated.  
 
7.2.1 The Resources and Conditions of China’s Commercial Diplomacy 
    As stressed in this thesis, the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy 
towards Taiwan has its roots in the asymmetric relations of economic 
interdependence between both sides in the process of cross-Strait economic 
integration. However, it is noteworthy that neither cross-Strait economic integration 
nor asymmetric economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait was generated by 
the ECFA. Rather, economic integration between China and Taiwan had emerged a 
decade earlier than the ECFA, which was mainly triggered by the economic 
dynamics of East Asian integration. While China began to play a pivotal role in the 																																																								
8 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 102-5. 
9 Lin, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, 50-52. 
10 Sullivan, “Is Taiwan Studies in Decline?”, 707-11. 
	 377 
wave of East Asian regionalization following its economic rise in the 1990s, the 
degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence on the Chinese market was also on the 
increase.11 
 
    Specifically, by investigating East Asian parts and components trade (see Table 
3.3.1 and 3.3.3), chapter 3 showed that China’s efforts to press its comparative 
advantage on low-cost production factors in attracting investment of East Asian 
manufacturers had made the Chinese market become the pivot of RPNs in the 
1990s.12 This has then allowed Beijing to create favorable conditions for utilizing 
commercial diplomacy so as to further its political agendas with regards to Taiwan at 
the bilateral and regional levels. 
     
    At the bilateral level, after East Asian RPNs began to converge on the Chinese 
market, Taiwanese manufacturers — the ICT industries in particular — started to 
relocate their production lines to the Mainland.13 By studying the cases of ASUS 
and Yageo in chapter 3, this thesis has illustrated the importance of the Chinese 
market in helping Taiwanese manufacturers to sustain or even enhance their 
competitiveness within the BDCCs. Henceforth, components trade featured heavily 
in total cross-Strait trade, as it occupied 52% of the total trade value between Taiwan 
and China from 1993 to 2008 (see Tables 3.3.4, 4.2.4, 4.2.5, and 4.2.6). This 
statistical data reflects the division of labor between China and Taiwan in the wave 
of East Asian regionalization, which further confirms that East Asian economic 
integration was the main impetus propelling economic integration across the Taiwan 																																																								
11 Dent, “Taiwan and the New East Asian Regionalism”, 117-24; Tanner, Chinese Economic Coercion 
Against Taiwan, 76-82. 
12 Baldwin, “Managing the Noodle Bowl”, 454; Athkorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns 
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Strait.  
 
    The economic dynamics of regional integration then impinged on the 
effectiveness of Taiwan’s policies for managing cross-Strait economic relations. 
Indeed, between 1990 and 2008, Taiwanese leaders adopted a series of policies for 
limiting cross-Strait economic exchanges given Beijing’s political motivations 
behind its economic agendas, but these policies were limited in effect. 14  As 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the low-cost production factors and the large market in 
the Chinese economy helped Taiwanese manufacturers to maintaining their 
competitiveness within the RPNs.15 Combined with Beijing’s unilateral preferential 
trade policies, the outward investment by Taiwanese manufacturing industries mainly 
went to China, despite the government’s restrictions, which caused the “Mainland 
fever” in Taiwan. 16  In this light, Taipei’s Mainland economic policies were 
obviously counter to Taiwanese entrepreneurs’ interests. Consequently, as stated in 
chapter 4, Taipei often confronted great pressure to recalibrate its Mainland 
economic policy, which made Taipei faced the difficulties to counter Beijing’s 
commercial diplomacy by constraining economic exchanges with China.17  
 
    At the regional level, China’s economic rise has eclipsed Taiwan’s economic 
significance in the process of East Asian regionalization, which has in turn impinged 
on the effectiveness of Taiwan’s strategies in obtaining its economic and sovereignty 
interests in East Asia. As specified in chapter 3, before China’s economic rise, 
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Taiwanese manufacturers — OEMs of Taiwan’s ICT industry in particular — had 
played an indispensable role within the US-driven BDCCs in the 1980s, and 
therefore Taiwan was an important trading partners and investors for East Asian 
economies.18 Solid economic ties between Taiwan and East Asian economies served 
as important reasons for why Beijing was unable to block Taiwan’s participation in 
APEC.19 This is an example of how Taiwan utilized commercial diplomacy to 
acquire de jure sovereignty based on its functional and de facto sovereignty.    
 
    However, the effectiveness of Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy has been limited 
by China’s economic rise in the late 1990s. Notably, in the late 1990s, the Chinese 
economy had shared about 30% of East Asian components trade, and this percentage 
has soared to 49.6% in 2005 (see Table 3.3.3). The central role of the Chinese market 
within East Asian RPNs then resulted in asymmetric economic interdependences 
between China and most East Asian economies including Taiwan (see Tables 3.3.4 to 
3.3.9). From thereon, Beijing has possessed many more resources with which to 
further its political agendas at the regional level by utilizing commercial diplomacy 
vis-à-vis Taiwan. The most direct evidence of this was Beijing’s success in expelling 
Taiwan from the process of constructing East Asian regionalism following the 
decline of APEC’s relevance within regional economic integration in the aftermath of 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis.20 As a result of Taiwan’s regionally isolated position, 
the “substitution effect” has endangered Taiwan’s economic interests in the 
BDCCs.21 Meanwhile, Taiwan has also lacked a solid regional platform upon which 
it could consolidate de jure sovereignty by utilizing commercial diplomacy. 																																																								
18 Yun, “International Production Networks and the Role of the State”, 179-81. 
19 Cheung, “APEC as a Regime”, 21-25.  
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    In general, this subsection summarized the research findings on the resources of 
China’s commercial diplomacy. This thesis further confirmed that, since the 1990s, 
China’s predominant role in the process of East Asian economic integration has 
allowed Beijing to create favorable conditions for utilizing commercial diplomacy 
towards Taiwan, which have negatively impacted upon Taiwan’s economic and 
sovereignty interests. In this situation, as explained in chapter 4, since China has 
been a determinant player in the process of contemporary East Asian integration and 
a major trading partner for Taiwan, continuing President Lee Teng-hui’s and 
President Chen Shui-bian’s strategies of defying Beijing’s Taiwan policy would only 
risk Taiwan’s economic and sovereignty interests. Stabilizing cross-Strait relations 
by facilitating cross-Strait economic integration was therefore the main centerpiece 
of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s Mainland policy.22 By offering a positive 
response to Beijing’s integration initiatives, Taiwanese leaders expected to exchange 
Beijing’s acquiescence to allow them to enlarge Taiwan’s regional and even 
international space, based upon which Taipei could not only secure its economic 
interests but also further its sovereignty agendas.23 Yet Taipei’s new Mainland 
policy was not effective in helping Taiwanese leaders to achieve these strategic goals, 
which will be explained below. 
 
7.2.2 Taiwan’s Sovereignty in the Post-ECFA Era 
    Following the institutionalization of cross-Strait economic integration, this 
thesis found that Beijing has many advantages in utilizing commercial diplomacy to 																																																								
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further its political agendas towards Taiwan. chapters 5 and 6 suggested that Beijing 
has successfully impinged upon Taiwan’s de jure, functional, and domestic 
sovereignty in the post-ECFA era. Meanwhile, this thesis also confirmed that 
contemporary cross-Strait economic integration served as a constraint on Taiwan’s 
strategy for pursuing its sovereignty interests. However, it is inappropriate to 
exaggerate the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. 
Based on the analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, this thesis found that China’s commercial 
diplomacy had limited effectiveness in encroaching upon Taiwan’s Westphalian 
sovereignty.   
      
    After signing the ECFA with Beijing in 2010, Taiwan did sign FTAs with 
Singapore and New Zealand without China’s opposition, and its participation in the 
WHA was another significant achievement.24 Yet Taipei has not fully achieved its 
strategic goals of consolidating its sovereignty after signing the ECFA with Beijing. 
By contrast, Taiwan’s sovereignty has been infringed upon by Beijing because the 
institutionalization of cross-Strait economic integration has resulted in the 
institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus did not clearly 
define which side of the Taiwan Strait possesses the legitimacy to represent 
“one-China” as stated in chapter 2.25 Notably, as discussed in chapter 5, Beijing has 
connected this consensus with the internationally recognized “one-China” framework 
in which the PRC is the solely legitimate China. In order to counter Beijing’s 
“one-China principle”, Taiwan intended to connect the “one-China” framework with 
the existence of the ROC under the 1992 Consensus.26 Nonetheless, as summarized 																																																								
24 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 96-99; Winkler, “A Question of 
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below, Taipei’s self-interpreted “one-China principle” was only applicable at the 
bilateral level across the Taiwan Strait, but this might have allowed Beijing to 
infringe upon Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty. At the regional and global levels, 
Beijing’s international legal sovereignty over Taiwan remained strong, and this has in 
turn impinged on Taiwan’s interdependence and functional sovereignty in the 
post-ECFA era. 
 
    At the global level, the “China factor” remains an obstacle to Taiwan’s strategy 
for furthering its sovereignty interests. In terms of Taiwan’s participation in IGOs, 
despite the fact that Beijing has compromised Taipei on this issue in the post-ECFA 
era, Taiwan actually has no strategic space to further its sovereignty agendas in the 
international arena. As stated in chapters 5 and 6, Beijing’s “one-China principle” in 
the IGOs remains solid, and China has made no concession to Taiwan on this issue in 
the post-ECFA era. Since the 1992 Consensus was institutionalized across the Taiwan 
Strait following the implementation of the ECFA, as stated in chapter 5, Beijing’s 
concession to Taiwan’s international space should further consolidate its claim over 
Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty. 
 
    Taking the case of Taiwan’s accession into the WHA as an example, as specified 
in chapter 6, China only allowed Taiwan to attend the assembly of the WHO with an 
annual invitation letter from Beijing based on the 1992 Consensus rather than 
directly supporting Taiwan’s initiative for obtaining a formal membership in the 
WHO.27 The question of whether Taiwan can secure its seat in the WHA is based 
entirely upon Beijing’s attitude. In this regard, Beijing has apparently infringed upon 
																																																								
27 Winkler, “A Question of Sovereignty”, 9-12. 
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Taiwan’s international legal sovereignty. In addition, now that Taiwan’s status has 
been widely granted as part of the PRC in the IGOs, Taiwan’s attendance must go 
through Beijing’s administrative procedure.28 This has further allowed Beijing to 
encroach on Taiwan’s interdependence and functional sovereignty. 
 
    As for Taiwan’s economic relations with other countries, it is problematic for 
Taiwan to further its sovereignty agendas by utilizing commercial diplomacy. As 
discussed in chapter 6, in the post-ECFA era, Beijing’s consent is the determinant of 
Taiwan’s FTA strategy. Without Beijing’s approval, Taipei cannot finalize any FTA 
with other states, as has been the case for the FTA negotiation between Taiwan and 
Malaysia in the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement in 2014.29  This case 
demonstrated that the effectiveness of Taiwan’s FTA strategy is entirely contingent 
on the development of cross-Strait economic integration, which magnified Beijing’s 
infringement on Taiwan’s interdependence and functional sovereignty in the 
post-ECFA era. Moreover, as shown in chapters 5 and 6, the ECFA is a template for 
other economies to define Taiwan’s political status in the process of economic 
cooperation.30 The effectiveness of Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy in furthering its 
sovereignty interests has therefore been constrained by the precondition of the 
ECFA — the 1992 Consensus. This could even result in the erosion of Taiwan’s 
international legal sovereignty, given Beijing’s efforts to connect the 1992 Consensus 
with its narrowly defined “one-China principle” in the international community. 
 
    At the regional level, as studied in Chapter 6, by signing the ECFA with Beijing, 
Taipei hoped to increase its bargaining chips so as to participate in TPP and RCEP by 																																																								
28 Ibid. 
29 Singh, “Can Taiwan Talk ‘Political’ with the Mainland?”, 265. 
30 T. Y. Wang et. al., “Taiwan’s Expansion of International Space”, 255. 
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seesawing between the US and China so as to decrease its degree of economic 
dependence on China and secure its sovereignty interests. However, Taipei has on a 
passive stance in carrying out this strategy in the post-ECFA era. In respect to 
Taiwan’s participation in the US-centered TPP, according to TPP’s stipulation, 
Taiwan must obtain all of the incumbent members’ consent through bilateral 
negotiations.31 Thus far, with Beijing’s acquiescence, Taiwan has commenced and 
even finalized bilateral FTA negotiations with several key players in the TPP, such as 
Singapore and New Zealand. However, as mentioned in chapter 5, owing to the 
stagnant progress of cross-Strait economic integration in the aftermath of the 
Sunflower Movement in 2014, Beijing has intervened in economic negotiations 
between Taiwan and other nations.32 By this reasoning, the effectiveness Taiwan’s 
strategy for participating in TPP has been contingent on the progress of cross-Strait 
economic integration. Combined with factors like domestic opposition to open 
agricultural imports from the US and the uncertainty of TPP’s finalization, it is 
difficult to imagine Taiwan’s participation in the TPP in the short term.33 
 
    With regard to Taiwan’s attempts to join the RCEP or other China-driven 
regional economic integration mechanism, Beijing has not given a positive response 
to Taipei because Chinese leaders were not satisfied with the progress of the ECFA.34 
Again, this highlighted that the steady progress of cross-Strait economic integration 
is a key precondition for the enlargement of Taiwan’s regional space. In addition, as 
shown in chapter 5 and 6, with reference to the case of Beijing’s refusal of Taiwan’s 																																																								
31 Full Text of TPP is available on Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The 
Trans-Pacific Partnership”, 2015, accessed on January 24, 2016, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text  
32 Singh, “Can Taiwan Talk ‘Political’ with the Mainland?”, 265. 
33 Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, March 14, 2014; Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 18, 
2014. 
34 Editorial, “Cross-Strait Dialogue Should Focus on Taiwan’s TPP, RCEP Bids”.  
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application to the AIIB, this research found that the 1992 Consensus may not be 
applicable at the regional level, as Taiwan’s widely used title — “Chinese Taipei” — 
was not acceptable in Taiwan’s membership of the AIIB.35 In this light, rather than 
consolidating Taiwan’s sovereignty at the regional level by adopting the seesawing 
strategy, Taiwan’s international legal, interdependence, and functional sovereignty 
have been infringed upon by China in the post-ECFA era.  
 
    At the bilateral level across the Taiwan Strait, the institutionalization of the 
1992 Consensus might have allowed Beijing to encroach on Taiwan’s domestic 
sovereignty. As specified in chapters 2, 5, and 6, under the loosely defined 
“one-China” framework, Beijing and Taipei can have their own interpretations over 
whether the PRC or the ROC is the legitimate “China” based on their own 
Constitutions.36 This has laid the foundation for the legitimacy of the status quo 
across the Taiwan Strait, based upon which Taiwan could act as a de facto regime to 
participate in the international community in the post-ECFA era. In other words, 
following the institutionalization of the 1992 Consensus in the post-ECFA era, 
Taiwan’s functional sovereignty is based on the legitimacy of its de facto sovereignty 
approved by Beijing. As such, it is reasonable to contend that Beijing has utilized the 
1992 Consensus to infringe upon Taiwan’s domestic sovereignty.  
 
    In the context of the above analyses, the institutionalization of the 1992 
Consensus is a significant achievement of China’s commercial diplomacy towards 
Taiwan, and this has allowed Beijing to encroach on Taiwan’s de jure, functional, 
and domestic sovereignty in the post-ECFA era. However, as most Chinese elites 																																																								
35 Yuan-Ming Chiao, “Taiwan AIIB Member Bid Must Go Through PRC Ministry: China”. 
36 Hickey, “Wake Up to Reality”, 3-16; Su, Taiwan’s Relations with Mainland China, 46. 
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have noted, to accomplish China’s national goal of peaceful reunification, Beijing 
and Taipei still need to go through a political negotiation so as to make an 
arrangement for Taiwan’s political status after returning to the motherland.37 As 
cross-Strait economic integration cannot directly help China to alter the status quo 
across the Taiwan Strait in favor of its interests, it has been ineffective for Beijing to 
manage Taiwan’s Westphalian sovereignty by utilizing commercial diplomacy. 
 
7.2.3 China’s Influence and Cross-Strait Asymmetric Economic 
Interdependence  
   Aside from the intention of embedding Taiwan’s political status in the 
“one-China” framework, Beijing has also aimed to fulfill the strategic goal of 
“placing hope on the Taiwan people for peaceful reunification”.38 As Taiwan’s 
economic performance has relied heavily on the Chinese economy, Beijing should 
have obtained the Taiwanese people’s support for the ECFA, especially after making 
considerable economic concessions to Taiwan through the ECFA. Following the 
progress of cross-Strait economic integration, Beijing also planned to exert its 
influence over Taiwanese society so as to shape Taiwanese public opinion in favor of 
peaceful reunification.  
 
    Yet China’s commercial diplomacy has had limited effectiveness in assisting 
Beijing to achieve these goals in the post-ECFA era. As discussed in chapter 5, the 
Taiwanese people’s sensitive attitude toward the inward investments from Chinese 
																																																								
37 Liping Xia, interviewed by author, December 13, 2013 Wensheng Zhang, interviewed by author, 
December 20, 2013;  
38 Xinhua, “Do Best to Seek Peaceful Reunification, But Never Tolerate ‘Taiwan Independence’: 
President Hu”. 
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and even Taiwanese businessmen in the Mainland reflects Taiwan’s concern over 
Beijing’s influence in the post-ECFA era. Moreover, the fear of witnessing the 
Taiwanese economy being “hollowed-out” by China and the erosion of Taiwan’s 
sovereignty motivated the Taiwanese people to protest against the ECFA in the 
Sunflower Movement in 2014.39 From thereon, cross-Strait economic integration 
has been stagnant, and several important sub-agreements like the CSSTA have been 
suspended (see Appendix I).  
 
    A poll conducted by the NCCU drew a less rosy picture. As shown in Figure 
5.4.1, less than 10% of Taiwanese people on average supported reunification with 
China. However, the support for independence peaked at 23.90% in 2014, which was 
even higher than the final year of the pro-independence government — the DPP 
administration — in 2008 (see Figure 5.4.1). By this reasoning, China’s strategy of 
furthering reunification agenda towards Taiwan by utilizing commercial diplomacy 
has in fact had the opposite result. 
 
    In addition, the ECFA has not yet clearly generated the hollowing out effect in 
Taiwan. As stated in Chapter 6, although China consistently shared more than 60% 
of Taiwan’s total outward investment between 2002 and 2013, the phenomenon of 
asymmetric economic interdependence between Taiwan and China was limited to 
Taiwan’s manufacturing industries. As shown on Table 6.4.3, before 2010, more than 
80% of Taiwanese investment in China was injected by manufacturing industries. 
Following the implementation of the ECFA, in spite of the partial liberalization of 
Taiwanese services industries in the Mainland, Taiwanese manufacturing industries 
																																																								
39 Magcamit and Tan, “Crouching Tiger, Lurking Dragon”, 102-5. 
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still contributed about 60% of Taiwan’s total outward investment in China in the 
post-ECFA era (see Table 6.4.3). However, manufacturing industries are not the main 
contributors to Taiwan’s GDP, as they only shared 29% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2014.40 
It is therefore not reasonable to argue that the ECFA has allowed the Chinese 
economy to “hollow-out” the Taiwanese economy.  
 
    Most importantly, although Taiwanese manufacturers have relied heavily on 
low-cost production factors in the Chinese market, it is notable that the amount of 
Taiwanese manufacturing investment in China decreased between 2010 and 2014 
(see Table 6.4.3). In fact, owing to the rising cost of production in China following 
China’s steady economic growth, there has been a tendency among Taiwanese 
manufacturers to relocate their production lines from China to Southeast Asian 
economies, particularly Vietnam (see Table 6.2.3). This might have further resulted 
in the decreasing percentage of China’s share of Taiwanese outward investment in 
the post-ECFA era, as it had dropped from 83.81% in 2010 to 58.48% in 2014 (see 
Table 6.2.2). This statistical data may reflect the decreasing degree of Taiwan’s 
economic dependence on the Chinese market. The question of whether this 
phenomenon would in turn affect the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy 
towards Taiwan requires further observation.   
 
7.3 Research Contributions to Taiwan Studies 
    This thesis evaluated the effectiveness of China’s and Taiwan’s strategies in 
furthering their political agendas — sovereignty agendas in particular — towards 																																																								
40 Department of Statistics, MOEA (ROC), “Economic Indicators EBook”. 
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each other through the lens of commercial diplomacy in the context of economic 
integration. This thesis’ contributions lay in its pioneering research approach to 
studying how Beijing and Taipei utilized commercial diplomacy to manage 
contentious sovereignty issues while pursuing economic interests in the process of 
cross-Strait and regional economic integration. Specifically, as detailed below, by 
employing Ellen Frost’s theory of commercial diplomacy, 41  this thesis assists 
researchers in Taiwan studies to conceptualize contemporary Beijing’s and Taipei’s 
strategies for managing cross-Strait relations. Moreover, by employing Krasner’s and 
Sigrid’s work on categorizing sovereignty,42 this thesis helps analysts to evaluate the 
effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy in infringing upon Taiwan’s 
sovereignty.  
         
    As mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, owing to the considerable literature deficit, 
only limited amount of literature on Taiwan studies paid special attention to 
contemporary cross-Strait relations in the post-ECFA era.43 Among these analyses, 
economic statecraft remained the main theoretical approach for studying cross-Strait 
relations in the context of bilateral economic integration.44 However, applying this 
theoretical approach to study contemporary cross-Strait economic integration directly 
conflicts with reality, as economic coercion and even sanction have never been 
amongst Beijing’s policy options since the 1980s. As specified in chapter 4, even 
when cross-Strait relations became tense between 1996 and 2008, Beijing still 
continuously directed preferential trade policy towards Taiwan in an attempt to 
																																																								
41 Frost, “China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia”, 95-117. 
42 Krasner, Sovereignty, 3-4; Winkler, “Can Trade Make a Sovereign?”, 467-85. 
43 Sullivan, “Is Taiwan Studies in Decline?”, 707-11. 
44 For more examples, please see: Tung, “Cross-Strait Economic Relations”, 137-75; Tanner, Chinese 
Economic Coercion Against Taiwan. 
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further its peaceful reunification agenda.45    
 
    Currently, promoting cross-Strait economic integration is important for Beijing 
to guide Taiwan towards the pathway of peaceful reunification in the context of 
stable cross-Strait relations.46  Meanwhile, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeous’ 
China policy was also guided by the ECFA. Commercial diplomacy is therefore the 
most appropriate approach for conceptualizing both sides’ policies for managing 
cross-Strait relations because it enables analysts to study how China and Taiwan 
incorporate their sovereignty agendas with economic interests following the 
institutionalization of cross-Strait economic integration. This thesis is the first work 
within the field of Taiwan studies that adopts commercial diplomacy to study the 
disputed sovereignty issues between China and Taiwan in the context of economic 
integration. This thesis expects to serve as a template for future literature on Taiwan 
studies. 
     
    In addition, in order to evaluate the extent to which has China encroached on 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, as shown in Chapter 2, based on Krasner’s work, this thesis 
has further split de jure sovereignty into international legal and interdependence 
sovereignty.47 De facto sovereignty has also been categorized into Westphalian and 
domestic sovereignty.48 Moreover, this thesis also adopts Winkler’s definition of 
functional sovereignty to explain how Taiwan furthers its de jure sovereignty 
interests based on its solid de facto sovereignty.49  
																																																								
45 Sun, “Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Beijing’s Policy Adjustment”, 72-81. 
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Xinhua, “Xi Meets KMT’s Lien, Stresses Cross-Strait Ties”. 
47 Krasner, Sovereignty, 3-4. 
48 Ibid. 
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    Through this classification, this thesis breaks with the myth that sovereignty, 
particularly in terms of de facto sovereignty, is not measurable unless there is a 
change in the status quo of a country.50 By utilizing Krasner’s and Sigrid’s works on 
sovereignty, this thesis is able to evaluate the gains and losses of China’s and 
Taiwan’s sovereignty interests. Combined with the research methods of elite 
interviewing and document analysis, this research makes an objective evaluation of 
the effectiveness of China’s and Taiwan’s commercial diplomacy in furthering 
sovereignty agendas in the post-ECFA era.  
 
7.4 Policy Implication 
    Building upon the theory of commercial diplomacy, this thesis has provided a 
new approach for scholars to conceptualize both Beijing’s and Taipei’s strategies for 
managing bilateral relations in the process of economic integration. In addition to 
this contribution, in this section, this thesis will examine the policy implications of 
Beijing’s commercial diplomacy, which are noteworthy for policymakers in Taiwan 
and other East Asian countries. Specifically, as shown in all China’s White Papers, 
the Taiwan issue has consistently been on Beijing’s list of core sovereignty interests 
since 1949.51 Therefore, Taipei’s decision to solidify economic ties with Beijing by 
signing the ECFA can be a useful case for East Asian leaders to contemplate when 
considering the consequences of engaging with China.  
 																																																								
50 Wang, “Hu Jintao’s ‘New Thinking’ on Cross-Strait Relations” 25-28; Tok, Managing China’s 
Sovereignty, 129-31. 
51 NPC, PRC “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”; TAO, “The Taiwan Question and Reunification of 
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    The foremost implication that policymakers should take note of in this thesis’ 
analysis is the importance of regional multilateral mechanisms in assisting Beijing in 
projecting its influence at the bilateral level. Moreover, as scholars have already 
pointed out, the absence of the US and the target state from these mechanisms can 
further enhance the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy.52 In the case of 
China’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan, Taipei did not decide to use the 
ECFA to participate in the ongoing process of East Asian economic integration until 
Beijing successfully constructed East Asian regionalism in the 2000s.  
 
    As stated in chapters 3 and 4, in spite of China’s rapid economic growth and the 
emergence of Taiwan’s “Mainland fever” in the 1990s, Taiwan’s seat in APEC had 
emboldened Taipei to challenge China’s commercial diplomacy by carrying out the 
“go south” strategy.53 Nevertheless, Taiwan soon lost its advantages since the 
China-driven APT and RCEP became amongst the few feasible mechanisms for 
regional economic integration after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.54 The subsequent 
challenges posed by the “substitution effect” and the “China factor” then motivated 
Taipei to soften its attitude towards the “one-China principle” in exchange for its 
“international space” by signing the ECFA with Beijing. 55  Consequently, the 
question of the extent to which Taiwan can further its economic and sovereignty 
interests becomes contingent on Beijing’s attitude. 
 
    Taiwan may be considered an extreme case, due to its regionally marginalized 
position and its highly contentious de jure sovereignty in the international 																																																								
52 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 117-19; Hamanaka, “TPP versus RCEP”, 165-69. 
53 Peng, “Economic Relations Between Taiwan and Southeast Asia”, 640-47. 
54 Chia, “The Emerging Regional Economic Integration Architecture in East Asia”, 29-33. 
55 The Economist, “Straight from Mr Ma’s Mouth”. 
	 393 
community. However, this case should enable policymakers to see how expulsion 
from China-driven regional economic integration mechanisms can have negative 
economic consequences for a nation. Most importantly, this case should also allow 
observers to better understand how Beijing can take advantage of its predominant 
role in regional economic integration mechanisms to further its interests by offering 
“positive-sum economic incentives” through commercial diplomacy. 56  Similar 
strategic logic may be applied to study China’s “AIIB initiative” and the recent “One 
Belt One Road”, together with Washington’s, Tokyo’s, and even Seoul’s responses.57      
 
    Although Taipei’s reacceptance of the 1992 Consensus under Ma Ying-jeou’s 
presidency magnifies the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy, China did 
not successfully convince Taipei to sign a peace agreement or “CBM”, leading Taipei 
towards the “one country, two systems” scenario. 58  Neither did Beijing’s 
“positive-sum economic incentives” prevent the DPP from obtaining governing 
power in 2016. As such, it is unlikely that commercial diplomacy will be the 
instrument that will utterly resolve the Taiwan dispute. This explains why the 
disputed sovereignty issues between China and East Asian states coexist with the 
China-driven APT, AIIB, RCEP, and the “One Belt One Road”.59 However, given 
Beijing’s intention to extend its influence in East Asia by utilizing commercial 
diplomacy, most East Asian countries, including Taiwan, endeavor to solidify 
bilateral military and economic ties with not only other regional countries but also 
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the US so as to counter China’s commercial diplomacy.60 
 
    In the case of PRC-Taiwan relations, Taiwan is struggling to find an effective 
strategy for countering China’s commercial diplomacy. In the past, President Lee 
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian implemented a series of policies to restrict Taiwan’s 
economic exchanges with the Mainland whilst advocating the “go south” policy in an 
attempt to lessen asymmetric economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait.61  
Nonetheless, as discussed in chapter 4, these strategies had limited effect, and they in 
fact risked Taiwan’s economic interests in the wave of East Asian regionalization. As 
such, President Ma Ying-jeou reversed his predecessors’ Mainland policies by 
signing the ECFA with Beijing.62 Simultaneously, as detailed in chapter 6, Ma’s 
administration also endeavored to access regional integration mechanisms by 
seesawing between China and the US. However, President Ma’s strategy was limited 
in effect due to the lack of domestic support for fully liberalizing Taiwan’s economy, 
and because of China’s intrusion into Taiwan’s FTA affairs after the emergence of the 
Sunflower Movement in 2014.63 Thus far, after the 2016 presidential campaign, 
Taiwanese new President Tsai Ing-wen has not undertaken further measures to 
deepen economic ties with China in accordance with the ECFA, and she has 
re-emphasized the “go south” strategy.64 The question of whether her strategy will 
be effective in defying China’s commercial diplomacy must be answered through 
more research in the future. 																																																								
60 Ciorciari, “The Balance of Great-power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia”, 157-59. 
61 Kastner, Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence Across the Taiwan Strait, 55-67; Tanner, 
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    Beyond the bilateral level of cross-Strait relations, scholars have pointed out 
that numerous multilateral institutions and integration mechanisms in the 
Asia-Pacific region have seemingly helped East Asian leaders to counter China’s 
commercial diplomacy.65 The US and its allies play an important role in this regard. 
Indeed, as China has played an influential role within East Asian economic 
integration mechanisms, ASEAN states have advocated the inclusion of Japan, India, 
and US allies in Oceania, as has been the case in APS and RCEP.66 Despite that fact 
that the ASEAN-constructed regionalism only covers East Asian countries in the 
economic realm, the US and other regional great powers, such as Russia, have been 
invited to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum.67 Most importantly, although the 
majority of East Asian leaders prefer to collaborate with China in pursuing their 
economic interests, they also engage with Washington so as to acquire membership 
to the US-led TPP.68  So far, Washington’s plan to retreat from the TPP magnifies 
China’s regional influence, especially considering Beijing’s AIIB and “One Belt One 
Road” initiatives. 69  However, this cannot be a supplementary explanation for 
“offensive realism”. 
 
    As briefly discussed in chapter 1, literature on “offensive realism” asserts that, 
accompanied with rapid economic growth, China should be able to challenge US 																																																								
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67 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 136-39. 
68 Cheng and Chow, “The TPP and the Pivot”, 124-29. 
69 David Smith, “Trump Withdraws from Trans-Pacific Partnership amid Flurry of Orders”, The 
Guardian, January 23, 2017, accessed February 28, 2017 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/23/donald-trump-first-orders-trans-pacific-partnershi
p-tpp ; John J. Mearsheimer, “Say Goodbye to Taiwan”, The National Interest (March-April 2014) 
http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931 
	 396 
hegemony so as to vie for a “monopoly of domination” in the Asia-Pacific region.70 
In this case, the conflicting interests between Washington and Beijing on regional 
“flashpoints”, such as Taiwan, can be casus belli of a China-US war. 71  By 
considering China’s recent “assertive” attitude (or “new assertiveness”) in managing 
the contentious sovereignty issues to Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and the 
South China Sea, the prophecy of “offensive realism” is much more likely to become 
reality.72 However, arguments about “offensive realism” do not stand well if one 
contemplates China’s regional strategy through the lens of commercial diplomacy.  
 
    Building on commercial diplomacy, regional economic integration is not a 
“zero-sum” game in essence.73 As a result, the expansion of China’s regional 
influence does not necessarily result in the decline of US influence, and vice versa. 
Specifically, it is reasonable to argue that China’s intention behind the APT and 
RCEP is to pursue regional leadership by “balancing” US regional influence.74 It is 
also correct to argue that the effectiveness of China’s commercial diplomacy has 
been enhanced by its active initiatives to construct East Asian regionalism and by the 
decline of US relevance in the process of East Asian economic integration.75 This 
narrative only becomes false when it is asserted that Beijing can use its economic 
power to expel the US from East Asia, leaving China as the only regional hegemon.76  
 
    Ascribing the failure of Washington’s regionalism strategy to Beijing’s growing 																																																								
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71 Ibid., 394-95; see also: Mearsheimer, “Say Goodbye to Taiwan”. 
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regional influence is equivalent to contending that the China-driven RCEP, AIIB, or 
“One Belt One Road” can defeat the US-led TPP, APEC and so on, which conflicts 
with reality.77 In fact, the decline of US regional influence has not been caused by 
the emergence of Chinese hegemony. Conversely, it was Washington’s hegemonic 
approach to furthering its economic interests that negatively impacted on its regional 
influence, as was the case for the decline of APEC’s relevance after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis.78 Washington’s recent unilateral announcement that it would discard 
its TPP initiative is further evidence of this.79  
 
    In addition, China’s achievements in expanding its regional influence cannot be 
explained by “offensive realism”. As many scholars have pointed out, rather than 
aiming to be a regional hegemon, China’s motivation in integrating itself into 
multilateral mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region is to deter collaboration between 
the US and its allies that defies Beijing’s “core interests”.80 For example, as 
discussed in chapter 3, with support from the US and its allies in the late 1980s, 
Taiwan’s success in obtaining membership in APEC challenged China’s sovereignty 
interests with regard to Taiwan.81 Incidents such as this should be uncommon, since 
China has become an important actor in regional multilateral mechanisms. Following 
the decline of Washington’s role in constructing regionalism in the Asia-Pacific 
region, Beijing should become more influential, but this does not mean that China 
will take this opportunity to be an “assertive” regional hegemon.  
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    Specifically, as introduced in chapter 1, analyses based on “Chinese 
assertiveness” and “offensive realism” indicate that China’s current regional strategy 
has no legacy of “peaceful development” or “peaceful rise”, despite the prominence 
of such “peaceful strategies” in China’s foreign policy.82 It is true that Chinese 
President Xi Jinping has proposed a “Chinese dream” that envisages ambitious future 
economic growth; however, this is not a substitution for “peaceful development”.83 
Rather, these two concepts often coexist, as was the case in President Xi’s speech in 
London in October 2015.84  
 
    Finally, contrary to the predictions of “offensive realism” and “Chinese 
assertiveness”, despite the US shifting its focus from East Asia to the Middle East 
following the onset of the “war on terror”, Beijing has still spared no effort to 
ameliorate this tension in the process of East Asian economic integration by utilizing 
commercial diplomacy.85 The most significant evidence of this is the “Declaration 
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”.86 The other important case is the 
PRC-Taiwan relations under Chen Shui-bian’s presidency. Indeed, despite Taipei’s 
firm attitude in pursuing de jure independence, preferential policy targeting 
Taiwanese businessmen remained a major instrument of Beijing’s Taiwan policy.87 
So far, under the guideline of the “Chinese dream” and “peaceful development”, 
China is now forging the “One Belt One Road” and the AIIB initiatives.88 Although 
																																																								
82 Johnston, “China’s New Assertiveness?”, 35-36; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics, 370-94. 
83 Ferdinand, “Westward Ho-The China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’”, 942-48. 
84 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Work Together to Promote 
Openness, Inclusiveness and Peaceful Development”, October 22, 2015, accessed February 28, 2017 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdygjxgsfw/t1308151.shtml  
85 Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, 112-19. 
86 ASEAN, “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”, 2012, accessed February 
28, 2017 http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea-2  
87 Sun, “Economic Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and Beijing’s Policy Adjustment”, 72-81. 
88 Ferdinand, “Westward Ho-The China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’”, 948-55. 
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the question of whether these initiatives will enable Beijing to soothe sovereignty 
disputes with other East Asian countries requires future research, it appears that 
commercial diplomacy is still prominent in China’s contemporary regional strategy. 
“Offensive realism” and “Chinese assertiveness” are therefore not applicable to the 
study of China’s strategies and its role in the Asia-Pacific region. 	
7.5 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
	 	 	 	 This thesis has evaluated the effectiveness of China’s and Taiwan’s commercial 
diplomacy in reconciling their economic and sovereignty interests between 2008 and 
2014 in particular. However, there are several variables that may influence the 
effectiveness of both sides’ commercial diplomacy but which are not included in this 
thesis. These variables are: the DPP’s return to the governing power, Washington’s 
withdraw from the TPP, and the decline of China’s economic growth. 
 
    First of all, the DPP returned to governing power after defeating the KMT in the 
presidential election in 2016. So far, Taiwanese new President Tsai Ing-wen has 
adopted a very ambivalent attitude towards the 1992 Consensus. In her inauguration 
speech on May 20 in 2016, she admitted the existence of the 1992 Consensus in the 
negotiations between the SEF and ARATS under President Lee Teng-hui’s 
presidency.89 However, she makes no response to the question of whether she 
accepts the 1992 Consensus or not. In this case, the progress of cross-Strait economic 
integration may still be stagnant. Moreover, as Chinese President Xi Jinping has 
warned Taiwan that its refusal of the 1992 Consensus will cause “the earth to move 																																																								
89 Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan), “Inaugural Address of ROC 14-th Term 
President Tsai Ing-wen”. 
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and mountains to shake”.	 90 In this regard, Beijing’s response to Taiwan’s new 
government’s ambivalent attitude towards the 1992 Consensus is also difficult to 
predict. Future research should pay close attention to these issues, as these may 
impinge upon not only both sides’ commercial diplomacy but also the stability across 
the Taiwan Strait. 
 
    Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 3 and 6, the TPP was concluded in 2015, 
but the question of whether Taiwan could successfully participate in this regional 
economic integration mechanism remains unclear. Washington’s attitude is a key 
determinant. Under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, because of the fierce debate within 
Taiwanese society over the issue of opening agricultural imports from the US, it was 
difficult for Taipei to obtain US support for participating in TPP.91 Notably, the new 
DPP administration has promised to lead Taiwan to the TPP and Taipei even plans to 
conclude the TIFA with Washington.92 This then raise two questions worthy of 
consideration. Firstly, will Taipei successfully make a breakthrough on domestic 
politics to finalize the TIFA with the US? Secondly, will Taipei obtain Washington’s 
support to access the TPP in the context of relatively cold cross-Strait relations? If all 
of these possibilities come true, this may in turn impinge upon the effectiveness of 
Beijing’s commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan. 
 
    Finally, as discussed in Chapter 6, China’s export growth rate was in recession 
between 2012 and 2014 (see Table 6.2.4). Combined with the recent decline in 
																																																								
90 Tien-lin Huang, “Soft Chinese Lion Hard to Swallow”. 
91 Kuo-Hsin Liang, interviewed by author, March 14, 2014; Chi Su, interviewed by author, March 18, 
2014.  
92 Stephanie Chao, “Tsai Seeks US Support in TPP Bid”, The China Times, May 23, 2016, accessed 
August 31, 2016, 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2016/05/23/467002/Tsai-seeks.htm 
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China’s economic growth rate, 93  this may have caused negatively impact on 
Taiwanese manufacturers in the Mainland. Under these circumstances, whether this 
would further motivate Taiwanese manufacturing industries to relocate their 
production lines to Southeast Asia (in addition to the rising cost of production) needs 
further observation. If this is the case, the degree of Taiwan’s economic dependence 
will be further decreased, which would weaken the effectiveness of Beijing’s 
commercial diplomacy towards Taiwan.            
 
																																																								
93 Mark Magnier, “China Economic Growth Falls Below 7% for First Time Since 2009”. 
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Appendix I The List of Cross-Strait Agreements signed after 2008 
Date Agreement Note 
13.06.2008 Cross-Strait Agreement on Travel by Mainland Residents to 
Taiwan 
 
13.06.2008 Minutes of Talks on Cross-Strait Charter Flights This is the 
agreement of 
Cross-Strait Charter 
Flights 
14.11.2008 Cross-Strait Air Transport Agreement The “Three Direct 
Links” across the 
Taiwan Strait 
14.11.2008 Cross-Strait Sea Transport Agreement 
14.11.2008 Cross-Strait Postal Service Agreement 
14.11.2008 Cross-Strait Food Safety Agreement  
26.04.2009 Agreement on Joint Cross-Strait Crime-Fighting and Mutual 
Judicial Assistance 
 
26.04.2009 Cross-Strait Financial Cooperation Agreement  
26.04.2009 Supplementary Agreement on Cross-Strait Air Transport  
22.12.2009 Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Inspection and 
Quarantine of Agricultural Products 
 
22.12.2009 Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Respect of Standards, 
Metrology, Inspection, and Accreditation 
 
22.12.2009 Cross-Strait Agreement on Cooperation in Fishing Crew Affairs  
29.06.2010 Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement ECFA 
29.06.2010 Cross-Strait Agreement on Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection and Cooperation 
ECFA 
23.12.2010 Cross-Strait Agreement on Medical and Health  
20.10.2011 Cross-Strait Agreement on Nuclear Safety and Cooperation  
09.08.2012 Cross-Strait Bilateral Investment Protection and Promotion 
Agreement 
ECFA 
09.08.2012 Cross-Strait Customs Cooperation Agreement ECFA 
21.06.2013 Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services ECFA, Pending in 
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effects 
27.02.2014 Cross-Strait Collaboration Agreement on Seismological 
Monitoring 
Pending in effects 
27.02.2014 Cross-Strait Collaboration Agreement on Meteorology Pending in effects 
Sources: Straits Exchange Foundation, “Chronology of Meetings”1 
 
 
  
																																																								
1 Straits Exchange Foundation, “Chronology of Meetings”, 2015, accessed April 17, 2015. 
http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&BaseDSD=21&mp=300&nowPage=1&p
agesize=30   
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Appendix II  The List of Interviewees 
Elite Interviewees in Taiwan 
Interviewee Date  Duration Position/Practical Experience 
1. Dr. Yen Jian-Fa 
(DPP) 
16/10/2013 14:40-15:45 Chairman, Committee of Research 
and Planning, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, R.O.C. (2004-2006)  
2. Dr. Tzeng Chien-Yuan 
(DPP) 
21/10/2013 18:30-21:30 1. Associate Professor, Graduate 
Institute of National Development, 
National Taiwan University 
2. Former Chairman, Association of 
Taiwan Development and Cultural 
Exchange  
3. Prof. Chen Ming-Tong 
(DPP) 
28/10/2013 10:00-11:00 1. Minister, Mainland Affairs 
Council, R.O.C. (2007-2008) 
2. Deputy Minister, Mainland Affairs 
Council, R.O.C. (2000-2004) 
4. Prof. Lin Chong-Pin 
(Impartial) 
19/02/2014 15:30-17:00 1. Deputy Minister, Ministry of 
National Defense, R.O.C.  
(2003-2004) 
2. Councilor, National Security 
Council, R.O.C. (2002-2003) 
3.Deputy Minister of Mainland 
Affairs Council, R.O.C. (1996-2002) 
5. Mrs. Hsu Chun-Fang 
(Impartial) 
10/03/2014 15:00-16:30 1.Former Deputy Director, Bureau of 
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, R.O.C. 
2. She has represented Taiwan to 
negotiate the ECFA with China for 11 
times. 
6. Dr. Lu Jiun-Wei 
(Impartial) 
10/03/2014 19:200-21:30 1. Associate Researcher, Taiwan 
Institute of Economic Research 
7. Mr. Liang Kuo-Hsin 
(Impartial) 
14/03/2014 15:00-17:00 1. Advisor, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. 
(2014.2-) 
2. Deputy Minister, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (2009.10-2014.2) 
8. Prof. Su Chi 
(KMT) 
18/03/2014 15:00-16:00 1. General Secretary, National 
Security Council, R.O.C. (2008-2010) 
2. Minister of Mainland Affairs 
Council, R.O.C. (1999-2000) 
3. Convener, National Unification 
Council, R.O.C. (1997-1999) 
4. Deputy Minister of Mainland 
Affairs Council, R.O.C. (1993-1996) 
9. Dr. Hong Tsai-Lung 
(DPP) 
20/03/2014 16:30-17:30 1. Director, Department of China 
Affairs, Democratic Progressive Party  
10. Prof. Liu Chao-Shiuan 
(KMT) 
24/03/2014 14:00-14:45 1. Premier of R.O.C. 
(2008-2009) 
2. Vice Premier of R.O.C. 
(1997-2000) 
11. Prof. Chao Chien-Min 
(KMT) 
04/04/2014 14:30-15:30 1. Deputy Minister of Mainland 
Affairs Council, R.O.C. (2008-2012) 
12. Prof. Lo Chih-Cheng 
(DPP) 
08/04/2014 10:30-11.30 1.Director, Taipei County Branch, 
Democratic Progressive Party (2012-) 
2.Councilor, Mainland Affairs 
Council, R.O.C. (2004-2006) 
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3.Councilor, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, R.O.C. (2002-2004) 
4.Chairman, Committee of Research 
and Planning, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, R.O.C. (2000-2002) 
13. Prof. Huang Chieh-Cheng 
(DPP) 
10/04/2014 16:00-17:00 1. Deputy Minister, Mainland Affairs 
Council, R.O.C. (2003-2005) 
2. Senior Political Consultant, Taipei 
Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office in the U.S. 
(1993-1998) 
14. Mrs. Chou Tsao-Shan 
(Impartial) 
15/04/2014 12:30-14:00 1. General Secretary, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, R.O.C. 
15. Mr. Brian H. Lin 11/12/2014 15:00-20:00 Managing Director, AMMAMSIC 
Technology Group 
16. Mr. Henry H. Ho 11/12/2014 15:00-20:00 Vice President, iOTEO 
17. Mr. Tu Chi-Hsiang 13/12/2014 09:00-11:00 Director-General, Hsinchu Science 
Park Bureau, Ministry of Science and 
Technology 
18. Mr. Jacky B. Chen 16/12/2014 10:00-11:30 Manager, Corporate Development 
Dept., Yageo Corporation 
19. Mrs. Dora W. Chang 16/12/2014 10:00-11:30 CEO, Yageo Corporation 
20. Mr. Kent S. Chien 16/12/2014 11:00-13:00 General Manager, Graphics Card 
Business Unit, ASUS 
Elite Interviewees in China 
Interviewee Date  Duration Position/Practical Experience 
21. Prof. Wang Yong 11/11/2013 14:00-15:00 Director, Center for International 
Political Economy, Peking University 25/11/2013 15:00-16:00 
22. Prof. Zhang Zhirong 11/11/2013 15:00-17:00 Executive Director, School of Taiwan 
Studies, Peking University 
23. Dr. Jie Dalei 11/11/2013 15:00-17:00 Assistant Professor, School of 
International Studies, Peking 
University 
15/11/2013 14:00-16:00 
24. Prof. Pang Zhongying 29/11/2013 Email  Professor, School of International 
Studies, Renmin University 
25. Prof. Li Yihu 02/12/2013 16:00-17:00 1.Dean, School of International 
Studies, Peking University 
2.Dean, School of Taiwan Studies, 
Peking University 
3. Member, Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the National People’s 
Congress, P.R.C. 
26. Prof. Chen Fenglin 05/12/2013 17:00-22:00 Professor, Department of Diplomacy 
and Foreign Affairs Management, 
China Foreign Affairs University 
27. Prof. Pan Rui 10/12/2013 12:00-14:00 Professor, Center for American 
Studies, Fudan University 
28. Prof. Xia Liping 13/12/2013 09:00-10:00 1. Dean, School of Political Science 
and International Studies, Tongji 
University 
2. Researcher, Taiwan Affairs Office 
of the State Council, P.R.C.  
29. Prof. Liu Guoshen 16/12/2013 17:30-19:00 Dean, Taiwan Research Institute, 
Xiamen University 
30. Dr. Zhang Wensheng 20/12/2013 14:30-16:00 Director of Political Sciences, Taiwan 
Research Institute, Xiamen University 
Chinese Scholars Interviewed in Taiwan 
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31. Prof. Tang Yonghong 12/10/2013 18:00-21:30 1.Director, Economy Research Center 
of Taiwan Research Institute of 
Xiamen University 
2.Researcher, Taiwan Affairs Office 
of the State Council, P.R.C. 
32. Prof. Chen Xiancai 29/10/2013 10:00-12:00 Deputy Director of Political Sciences, 
Taiwan Research Institute, Xiamen 
University 
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Appendix III  The Statistics of East Asian Parts and Components Trade 
    In order to explore the process of East Asian regionalization, this thesis provides 
statistics of East Asian ‘parts and components trade’ as most scholars did in their 
research.2 But it is essential to stress that this approach could only analyze regional 
parts and components trade in broad terms. The “Harmonized System of trade 
classification (HS)” and the “Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)” are 
two widely applied standards to discern part and components commodities from all 
other manufactured goods.3 However, as Prema-chandra Athukorala has noted, there 
is no classification standard of commodities that can enable scholars to purely extract 
‘parts and components’ goods from all manufacturing products; neither is there any 
clear standard to catalogue commodities into ‘parts and components trade’.4 For 
example, by reviewing the “HS Classification by Section”, we can observe that 
machinery components are grouped into Catalogue 84, but ‘nuclear reactors’ 
(HS8401) are also labeled as within this grouping.5 Moreover, the classification 
standard of commodities in the HS is also too detailed to draw out all ‘parts and 
components’ products from the list. While the “SITC Revision 3” could go some way 
to resolving this problem, some machinery components are labeled outside the 
machinery catalogue (SITC7).6  
 
    Owing to the flaws of HS and SITC classifications, this chapter adopts both of 
these standards in combination to illustrate East Asian parts and components trade as 
accurately as possible. Specifically, HS is applied to identify specific commodities 
whilst the SITC is adopted to label parts and components commodities. The detail 
classification of commodities is listed in Table 1 below. In addition, the “UN 																																																								
2 Athukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia”, 65-95; Baldwin, “Managing 
the Noodle Bowl”, 449-478. 
3 Athukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia”, 67-70. 
4 Ibid. 
5 United Nations International Trade Statistics Knowledgebase, “HS Classification by Section”, 2010, 
accessed January 24, 2016. 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/HS-Classification-by-Section    
6 Athukorala, “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia”,. 67-70; United Nations 
International Trade Statistics Knowledgebase  “Standard International Trade Classification Revision 
3”, 2010, accessed January 24, 2016,  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/Standard-International-Trade- 
Classification-Revision-3  
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Comtrade Database” is the major source of statistics data in this chapter, as it is the 
only database that collects comprehensive statistics of international trade labeled by 
commodities. Nevertheless, this database does not include every country’s annual 
statistics of every classification standard. For instance, Taiwan is not included in this 
database, and most SITC data of ASEAN economies is also missing before 1995. As 
a result, the SITC statistics shown in this chapter are from 1995 to 2014, but the 
statistics of HS may more or less make up for this shortage, as they cover the 
statistics of major commodities of parts and components trade in East Asia between 
1990 and 2014 (except for China). By employing these data, statistics on 
intra-regional parts and components total trade of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and 
China are tabulated from Table 3.3.6 to Table 3.3.9 in chapter 3. Table 2 to Table 13 
contained in this appendix further tabulated detail data of exports and imports of 
their intra-regional components trade.  
 
Table 1: Definition of Commodities in HS and SITC Codes  
SITC Revision 3 
Commodities SITC Code and Catalogue 
Manufacturing 
Products 
SITC5- Chemicals and Related Products, n.e.s. 
SITC6-Manufactured Goods Classified Chiefly by Material 
SITC7-Machinery and Transport Equipment 
SITC8-Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 
SITC9-Commodies and Transactions not Classified Elsewhere in the SITC 
Commodities of Parts 
and Components 
SITC75-Office machines and automatic data-processing machines 
SITC76-Telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing 
apparatus and equipment 
SITC77-Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and 
electrical parts thereof (including non-electrical counterparts, n.e.s., of 
electrical household-type equipment) 
SITC78-Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 
SITC87-Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, 
n.e.s. 
SITC88-Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical 
goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks 
HS 
Commodities HS Code and Catalogue 
East Asian Major 
Commodities of Parts 
and Components 
HS82-Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal; parts 
thereof of base metal. 
HS83-Miscellaneous articles of base metal 
HS84-Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; 
parts thereof 
HS85-Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound 
recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles, 
HS87-Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and 
accessories thereof. 
HS90-Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, 
precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and 
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accessories thereof 
Electronic/Information 
and Communication 
Technology (ICT) 
products  
HS85-Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound 
recorders and reproducers, television image and sound recorders and 
reproducers, and parts and accessories of such articles 
HS90-Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, 
precision, medical or surgical instruments and apparatus; parts and 
accessories thereof 
Automobiles HS87-Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts and 
accessories thereof. 
Note: The classification of ‘parts and components’ commodities is based on Prema-Chandra 
Athukorala’s work of “Production Networks and Trade Patterns in East Asia: Regionalization or 
Globalization”, Asian Economic Paper 10:1 (2011), p. 69.  
Sources: Compiled from the United Nations International Trade Statistics 
Knowledgebase7  
 
Table 2: East Asian Economies’ Share of Japan’s Intra-regional Exports in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
               Year 
Country 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.03% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 
China 7.48% 9.79% 15.62% 31.68% 42.52% 44.08% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 22.69% 19.43% 19.75% 20.79% 16.80% 15.77% 
Indonesia 2.62% 3.05% 3.15% 2.10% 2.27% 2.39% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Malaysia 9.00% 13.78% 10.60% 5.61% 5.88% 4.35% 
Myanmar 0.08% 0.03% 0.04% 0.01% 0.02% 0.07% 
Philippines 3.00% 4.89% 7.72% 5.02% 3.99% 4.13% 
Rep. of Korea 22.79% 18.20% 19.57% 18.07% 11.87% 12.76% 
Singapore 23.41% 21.79% 15.70% 8.71% 6.84% 5.64% 
Thailand 8.65% 8.76% 7.21% 7.19% 8.09% 7.43% 
Viet Nam 0.23% 0.21% 0.63% 0.80% 1.69% 3.34% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database8 
 
 
 
 																																																								
7 United Nations International Trade Statistics Knowledgebase “HS Classification by Section”, 2010, 
accessed 24 January 2016, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/HS-Classification-by-Section  
United Nations International Trade Statistics Knowledgebase “Standard International Trade 
Classification Revision 3”, 2010, accessed 24 January 2016,  
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledgebase/Standard-International-Trade-Classification-Revisi
on-3   
8 UN, “United Nations Comtrade Database”, 2016, accessed January 24, http://comtrade.un.org  
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Table 3: East Asian Economies’ Share of Japan’s Intra-regional Imports in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
               Year 
Country 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 
China 11.49% 22.43% 32.44% 49.45% 60.86% 67.17% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 5.82% 4.53% 2.12% 0.74% 0.31% 0.21% 
Indonesia 1.12% 1.95% 4.17% 2.74% 2.35% 1.92% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 10.72% 16.13% 16.83% 9.30% 8.13% 6.38% 
Myanmar 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 
Philippines 3.96% 4.95% 9.58% 7.79% 3.94% 4.39% 
Rep. of Korea 44.27% 29.82% 17.88% 16.06% 11.40% 8.67% 
Singapore 14.19% 10.58% 7.74% 3.52% 3.29% 2.42% 
Thailand 8.42% 9.58% 8.39% 8.56% 6.72% 5.40% 
Viet Nam 0.00% 0.03% 0.85% 1.83% 2.98% 3.39% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database9 
 
Table 4: East Asian Economies’ Share of Japan’s Intra-regional Exports in 
Automobile Components (HS87) 
               Year 
Country 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.90% 0.48% 0.52% 0.56% 0.32% 0.22% 
Cambodia 0.03% 0.23% 0.22% 0.17% 0.09% 0.23% 
China 3.82% 7.13% 14.79% 30.02% 50.55% 49.11% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 11.70% 14.04% 12.03% 5.90% 2.95% 3.99% 
Indonesia 13.87% 13.43% 12.82% 10.21% 10.02% 9.15% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.11% 0.07% 0.13% 0.07% 0.11% 0.33% 
Malaysia 14.21% 13.48% 14.06% 11.63% 8.20% 8.16% 
Myanmar 0.54% 0.44% 0.26% 0.18% 0.18% 3.30% 
Philippines 7.68% 8.46% 7.98% 4.24% 3.61% 4.75% 
Rep. of Korea 7.36% 5.83% 8.08% 8.80% 6.40% 3.91% 
Singapore 10.40% 6.19% 11.75% 8.44% 1.63% 2.61% 
Thailand 28.52% 28.62% 15.50% 17.74% 14.77% 11.98% 
Viet Nam 0.85% 1.61% 1.85% 2.04% 1.17% 2.25% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database10 																																																								
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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Table 5: East Asian Economies’ Share of Japan’s Intra-regional Imports in 
Automobile Components (HS87) 
               Year 
Country 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 
China 9.92% 41.45% 50.62% 57.34% 52.68% 56.80% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 5.34% 1.72% 1.25% 0.52% 0.02% 0.05% 
Indonesia 5.51% 7.37% 5.38% 6.26% 7.19% 6.64% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 1.77% 5.79% 2.23% 1.39% 1.27% 1.08% 
Myanmar 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Philippines 10.75% 10.03% 9.48% 5.55% 3.79% 2.85% 
Rep. of Korea 56.14% 21.64% 13.16% 12.55% 9.48% 9.99% 
Singapore 2.09% 4.70% 2.09% 0.32% 0.14% 0.24% 
Thailand 8.50% 7.26% 15.35% 14.44% 20.12% 15.73% 
Viet Nam 0.00% 0.04% 0.43% 1.64% 5.31% 6.59% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database11 
 
Table 6: East Asian Economies’ Share of Taiwan’s Intra-regional Exports in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
                   Year  
Country 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cambodia 0.73% 4.29% 33.82% 41.44% 37.04% 
China 40.06% 38.53% 30.49% 24.40% 26.52% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 1.61% 0.54% 0.42% 0.31% 0.26% 
Indonesia 17.62% 20.41% 11.49% 9.67% 7.08% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Malaysia 5.82% 8.07% 6.17% 7.72% 7.72% 
Myanmar 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Philippines 7.46% 6.29% 3.87% 2.91% 3.54% 
Rep. of Korea 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Singapore 1.74% 5.08% 3.61% 2.58% 2.30% 
Thailand 18.38% 13.60% 7.55% 8.58% 12.73% 
Viet Nam 6.15% 2.77% 2.34% 1.94% 1.65% 
Brunei Darussalam 0.42% 0.41% 0.24% 0.42% 1.15% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the data compiled from the Database of 
Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.)12  																																																								
11 Ibid. 
12 Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China , “Trade Statistics”, 
2016, accessed Janiary 24, 2016,  http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/ENGLISH/FSCE/ . 
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Table 7: East Asian Economies’ Share of Taiwan’s Intra-regional Imports in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
                   
Year  
Country 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cambodia 2.71% 7.07% 18.75% 33.36% 41.94% 
China 4.35% 3.33% 2.05% 0.54% 0.47% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 0.28% 0.50% 0.54% 0.39% 0.33% 
Indonesia 62.46% 46.54% 37.72% 30.36% 22.68% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 10.92% 11.48% 20.06% 14.97% 12.82% 
Myanmar 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Philippines 7.87% 10.50% 6.25% 5.90% 6.12% 
Rep. of Korea 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 
Singapore 1.53% 7.80% 4.88% 2.91% 2.49% 
Thailand 7.47% 9.60% 7.40% 8.97% 9.70% 
Viet Nam 2.40% 3.10% 2.21% 2.42% 2.04% 
Brunei Darussalam 0.01% 0.08% 0.13% 0.18% 1.39% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on the data compiled from the Database of 
Trade Statistics, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (R.O.C.)13 
 
Table 8: East Asian Economies’ Share of South Korea’s Intra-regional Exports 
in Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
               Year 
Country 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.06% 
China 6.69% 5.86% 17.10% 47.96% 60.13% 60.56% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 19.05% 18.00% 18.44% 16.89% 15.88% 14.99% 
Indonesia 1.69% 2.40% 2.21% 1.34% 1.17% 0.77% 
Japan 46.38% 32.67% 23.27% 15.83% 8.56% 5.31% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
Malaysia 5.92% 9.35% 9.78% 3.33% 2.64% 1.81% 
Myanmar 0.04% 0.15% 0.06% 0.01% 0.02% 0.06% 
Philippines 2.02% 2.66% 8.75% 3.41% 2.68% 3.32% 
Singapore 14.25% 24.10% 15.68% 8.23% 5.91% 4.38% 
Thailand 3.96% 3.76% 4.12% 2.20% 1.39% 1.06% 
Viet Nam 0.00% 1.04% 0.55% 0.79% 1.60% 7.69% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database14 																																																								
13 Ibid. 
14 UN, “United Nations Comtrade Database”, 2016, accessed Janiary 24, 2016, 
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Table 9: East Asian Economies’ Share of South Korea’s Intra-regional Imports 
in Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
               Year 
Country 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 
China 5.14% 4.72% 14.07% 28.91% 49.35% 55.26% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 5.27% 3.66% 3.28% 3.29% 1.78% 1.57% 
Indonesia 0.04% 0.26% 0.56% 0.68% 0.84% 0.76% 
Japan 82.81% 78.51% 59.70% 44.90% 27.19% 21.38% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 2.24% 3.85% 7.97% 5.25% 4.65% 3.44% 
Myanmar 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Philippines 0.48% 1.08% 4.45% 4.08% 3.23% 2.44% 
Singapore 3.49% 6.71% 7.30% 10.27% 9.63% 10.09% 
Thailand 0.54% 1.13% 2.48% 2.46% 2.69% 2.28% 
Viet Nam 0.00% 0.06% 0.19% 0.16% 0.64% 2.71% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database15 
 
Table 10: East Asian Economies’ Share of China’s Intra-regional Exports in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
              Year  
Country 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 
Cambodia 0.03% 0.06% 0.02% 0.06% 0.07% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 53.20% 44.44% 54.38% 56.43% 55.65% 
Indonesia 1.40% 2.09% 1.41% 2.04% 2.23% 
Japan 31.18% 30.34% 19.16% 15.51% 12.81% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.26% 
Malaysia 1.85% 3.75% 3.72% 3.80% 3.66% 
Myanmar 0.39% 0.21% 0.09% 0.22% 0.54% 
Philippines 0.78% 1.76% 1.69% 1.32% 1.30% 
Rep. of Korea 4.34% 8.02% 9.58% 11.56% 12.87% 
Singapore 5.19% 7.39% 7.47% 4.66% 3.90% 
Thailand 1.13% 1.75% 2.01% 2.38% 2.36% 
Viet Nam 0.49% 0.16% 0.43% 1.97% 4.32% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database16 																																																																																																																																																													
http://comtrade.un.org . 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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Table 11: East Asian Economies’ Share of China’s Intra-regional Imports in 
Electronic Components (HS85+HS90) 
               Year 
Country 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 18.01% 12.35% 4.34% 1.84% 0.74% 
Indonesia 0.05% 0.78% 0.63% 0.72% 0.56% 
Japan 65.53% 50.47% 33.61% 30.70% 24.87% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 1.69% 7.24% 11.27% 15.24% 14.52% 
Myanmar 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 
Philippines 0.09% 2.95% 8.31% 4.72% 4.25% 
Rep. of Korea 9.69% 17.88% 32.41% 37.16% 43.10% 
Singapore 4.48% 5.33% 5.95% 4.79% 4.52% 
Thailand 0.46% 2.95% 3.40% 4.20% 3.68% 
Viet Nam 0.00% 0.03% 0.09% 0.63% 3.72% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database17 
 
Table 12: East Asian Economies’ Share of China’s Intra-regional Exports in 
Automobile Components (HS87) 
              Year 
Country 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Brunei Darussalam 0.05% 0.01% 0.05% 0.08% 0.17% 
Cambodia 0.52% 0.21% 0.20% 0.36% 0.74% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 20.43% 17.30% 8.51% 6.38% 5.15% 
Indonesia 6.12% 16.42% 10.03% 7.30% 7.63% 
Japan 32.08% 29.98% 50.11% 36.87% 29.95% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1.37% 0.33% 0.53% 0.79% 1.13% 
Malaysia 3.14% 1.75% 5.74% 7.69% 8.53% 
Myanmar 9.05% 0.95% 1.62% 6.29% 6.92% 
Philippines 4.07% 1.27% 4.36% 4.32% 6.41% 
Rep. of Korea 2.59% 3.68% 7.77% 14.23% 10.26% 
Singapore 7.88% 1.64% 2.12% 2.02% 2.26% 
Thailand 8.11% 0.69% 3.44% 5.54% 7.38% 
Viet Nam 4.60% 25.78% 5.53% 8.13% 13.47% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database18 																																																								
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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Table 13: East Asian Economies’ Share of China’s Intra-regional Imports in 
Automobile Components (HS87) 
              Year 
Country 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2014 
Cambodia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
China, Hong Kong SAR 1.47% 0.60% 0.11% 0.01% 0.02% 
Indonesia 0.08% 0.12% 0.57% 0.31% 0.86% 
Japan 75.62% 88.40% 65.60% 78.59% 70.95% 
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Malaysia 0.18% 0.93% 0.33% 0.55% 0.98% 
Philippines 0.03% 0.00% 0.08% 0.05% 0.25% 
Rep. of Korea 19.08% 7.89% 32.25% 19.76% 25.38% 
Singapore 3.03% 1.68% 0.38% 0.32% 0.19% 
Thailand 0.15% 0.37% 0.66% 0.30% 0.86% 
Viet Nam 0.36% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.51% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Source: Calculated by the author based on data compiled from the UN Comtrade 
Database19 
 
																																																								
19 Ibid. 
